A Discussion of Four Dissenters from the Social Contract Theory - Coursework Example

A Discussion of Four Dissenters from the Social Contract Theory Milena Annette Political Philosophy Fachhochschule Wolfenbuettel Abstract This paper seeks to examine the theory of the social contract and how four seminal philosophers sought to disagree with it. Hume, Bentham, Hegel and Hart will all be examined to discern their key lines of thought and how they diverged from what had been accepted doctrine in political philosophy. In their critical evaluation of Hume, Noxon (1973) and Coventry (2007) note that Hume developed a “science of man” but that men act collectively by feeling, not merely reason. Bentham was very reform-minded, and felt that human action, governments and laws must promote happiness above all else. Farekh (1974) includes H.L.A. Hart in his own anthology of Bentham’s ideas. Hart himself, an outstanding legal scholar as well as political philosopher, was actually a close student of Bentham too. His thoughts are assessed by Finnis (2011) a former student of Hart’s at Oxford. Finally, Hegel is mentioned as perhaps the most abstract and purely theoretical of the dissenters from the contract theory. Weiss (1974) notes that Hegel’s ideas about free will and ethical associations impacted civil society and political history. Keywords: social contract, dissent, political philosophy A Discussion of Four Dissenters from the Social Contract Theory The social contract theory has long been held up as an almost ideal type of model to explain how human beings are supposed to behave in organized societies, both ancient and modern. Whether under a monarchy or a democracy, the assumption is that they will conform to some kind of overall group principle that will ensure general stability. Rousseau, writing in the Eighteenth Century, helped to popularize the phrase and the theory. He was much concerned with rights, and held that citizens were inherently equal but that a sovereign alone had the power and the right to compel actions by the people. This paper seeks to explain how four dissenting philosophers substantially differed from the standard understanding of the contract. Hume , Bentham, Hegel and Hart all deviated from and challenged the traditional interpretation of this social dogma. They should be individually evaluated to demonstrate their differences. Hume, a leading figure in the Scottish “mini-Enlightenment”, was a onetime friend and contemporary of Rousseau. Hume came from the British Empiricist tradition, itself grounded in close thinking and inherent skepticism of an almost laboratory nature. Like sleuths combing for facts and clues, the Empiricists tackled all aspects of philosophy with an attention to detail not previously seen in the history of the discipline. Such notions as causality, truth and even theories of the passions came under their scrutiny. Hume himself even experimented with a kind of primitive psychology, although it was crude when compared with later analysts such as Freud. As regards politics and society, Hume could not be more sharply contrasted with the adherents of the social contract theory. His anti-contractarian views were both provocative and startling. According to Noxon (1973), Hume had some interesting notions about complex political and social relations. Hume apparently rejected the social contract on the grounds that governments were usually founded on the principles of conflict and usurpation, not on the just consent of the governed. By extension, this of course would also seem to preclude any hope of true democracy as understood from the time of the ancient Greek city-state to the present day. If the state is indeed seen as a moral person, then it would be hard pressed to justify its own ongoing existence on any rational grounds as an agent in the service of the people. Hume’s insights into the workings of the polity are indeed intriguing, but his metaphysics at times seem to get in the way. His work with causation, for example, suggests that his bias was toward the notion of an irrational society primarily governed by emotions, not reason. This, of course, virtually guarantees political instability and periodic upheaval. Thus, Hume enters the ranks of major dissenters from the central tenets of the social contract and establishes his anti-contractarian position. Bentham, writing about a generation later than Hume, also staked out an anti-contractarian standpoint from the prevailing views about the social contract. He was one of the founders of the school of philosophy that came to be known as Utilitarianism, which in its broadest interpretation tried to live by the principle of “the greatest good for the greatest number.” One of Bentham’s contributions was to penal reform, then a pressing social issue in England. In keeping with his progressive views, he rejected retributive punishment, long held to be an effective deterrent to criminal behavior. This ancient principle, known as Lex Talionis (“an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth”) had been around since the Old Testament. Bentham also analyzed penal reform of physical prisons, being dissatisfied with the general state of affairs in the England of his day. Toward the end of reform, he even designed a model prison for the future, known as the Panopticon. His enlightened views on these matters have earned him legions of followers to the present day. Bentham did not have a great use for contracts of any kind. He felt that utility was the only real source of good in the relations of humans and the state. Ideas about natural law and inherent rights did not appeal to him. Contracts, he held, were grounded in superstition. Here again he certainly delineates his anti-contractarian theories. Because Bentham was so reform minded, it was almost natural for him to care so much about the promotion of societal happiness. Any government that did not measure up to this standard did not deserve to exist. No amount of coercion could justify the forcing of people into a social contract. Calls to patriotism meant nothing to him. Happiness alone was to be the criterion for the government’s existence. This applied equally to republics and to monarchies. But Bentham did not stop with governments alone. The happiness principle also was applied to human social action in general. According to Farekh (1974) Bentham stressed his own “calculus” when it came to the analysis of humans in social interaction. This meant that actions were governed by a variety of responses to the world’s external stimuli, whether in the form of pleasure, the senses, the possession of property or simply the expectations of people for their governments and lives. This of course implied a fertile field for intricate social and political relations with each other and with the state. Bentham put the individual above nearly everything else in his universe. Individual wants and actions were paramount. Any hypothetical collective will or consciousness was dismissed by Bentham. He even went so far as to express skepticism about the existence of other persons’ minds and feelings. This denied even the theoretical possibility of a social contract guiding people on the road to political balance and social harmony, and cemented his anti-contractarian political philosophy. Despite the apparent negation of an overriding social principle in his view of society and politics, Bentham’s citizens must not be thought of as a mob of unbridled anarchists. On the contrary, his calculating individualists form their own unique mold and pattern. One would think that this would lead to many a social collision and much civil strife and anarchy throughout Bentham’s polity, but this is not necessarily so. His model actually holds up as a coherent alternative, as seen, for example, in the contemporary United States. Even with the emphasis on “rugged individualism” and privacy in almost all matters, there is an order and a regularity on a subliminal level which prevents the society from collapsing into utter chaos on a daily basis. This would seem to imply that Bentham was on to something important in his challenge to the conventional apostles of the social contract. His anti-contractarian perspective succeeds, but only at a more subtle and elegant level. Society seems to hang together, but only if all actors concerned are on a basically rational course of action. There is risk if any unusual variable (such as a war or major natural disaster) were to intervene. It remains to be seen if such a model could long endure under conditions of the most extreme duress. Bentham’s ideas clearly distinguish his views as an advocate of the anti-contractarian principle. With Hegel, almost a new dimension is reached in the definition of society, the state and political behavior. This arguably most abstract of theoreticians had ideas of such originality that he is almost in a league by himself. Unlike Hume, he did not grow out of any traditional school of thought, such as British Empiricism. Resembling Kant in his uniqueness and individuality, he eclipses almost all other philosophers of his time. He also neatly cleaves himself from the ordinary interpretations of the social contract, and ekes out his own place as an anti-contractarian philosopher. Hegel was preoccupied with the science of logic. He thought that he discerned a pattern to history, indeed a rational pattern that would lend itself neatly to analysis. This of course opens a whole new subject for interpretation. Is history orderly or chaotic? Hegel believed that a somewhat fantastic entity, the Absolute or Idea, revealed itself as a guiding force in the world, including such phenomena as states and governments. With such a rational presence in the world, it should be possible to apply logic to explain the unfolding of this force. One salient feature that Hegel saw emerging from this unfolding process was the dialectic. This method is one of the most striking tools to apply to social and political philosophy. Briefly stated, a thesis or proposition is put forth into the world. This is then met by a countering antithesis which is in turn rebuffed. The only acceptable solution is to effect a synthesis, which provides a compromise and an answer. As applied to political philosophy, the dialectic was borrowed from Hegel and most effectively used by the Marxists. Capitalism, the prevailing socioeconomic system, was then confronted by Marxism as an antithesis. The synthesis would come after a brief dictatorship of the proletariat (the workers), when the forces and means of production would then be reintegrated into the economy, but under socialist ownership. Of course, Marxism came well after Hegel’s time, and attempts to link him to future dictators such as Hitler or Stalin is an exaggeration of philosophical interpretation. Also, the Marxists were always grounded in the class struggle, which did not really concern Hegel. Hegel’s influence on Marx was incalculable, but the important thing to remember about the dialectic as a mirror of the Absolute unfolding itself in history is the process of change implied by this fluid quality. Weiss (1974) notes that Hegel should not be misinterpreted as a totalitarian. He in fact is more democratic than he would appear at first inspection, as in his implied notion of freedom unfolding. This quality, always desirable in any society, can be objective or subjective. Another problem with the social contract theory stems from this fluid, mutable property. With so much change in the world at all times, it is difficult for any one social organism to be around long enough to establish a contract with itself. Hegel again joins the ranks of the anti-contractarians here. Growing out of this change is the original idea that the state is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Again, the dialectic presents itself forcefully at this point. There seems to be an almost subliminal drive toward the synthesis phase at the end of the struggle. This too seems to nullify any admission of a social contract into the sociopolitical whole. The social contract, which presupposes a condition of some permanence, is almost bypassed in the process of unrelenting change. Any state which tries to present itself as a candidate for permanence is faced with the bald fact that it may be overthrown sooner or later, whatever its ideology. The dialectic is simply too potent a force as an instrument of change to ignore. This is one of Hegel’s iron laws of history. Hegel actually began his analysis of history with the study of the family as an institution. As Weiss (1974) again notes, Hegel stressed the self as an outgrowth of the family. The self is primarily concerned with relationships with others. Free will-- so important to Hegel—can lead to ethically based associations, but this is still a far cry from any kind of social contract. To Hegel, the state is more important than the family as a subject for study as it pertains to society. The state would seem to be the ultimate goal toward which society is running, if only as a means to an end. The state is the agent of Hegel’s transcendent mission, usurping the role of the family as any kind of social reference point. This has again caused Hegel to come in for some perhaps unjustified criticism as inhuman, but it serves his purposes well as an analyst of these phenomena. Hart, the last anti-contractarian to be evaluated from the conventional acceptance of the social contract, was a political philosopher at Oxford for many years. He also was an expert on jurisprudence and the philosophy of law, so he brings to the table of wisdom the added advantage of a professional legal perspective. More tightly focused than the other three, he is also the most recent contributor to the discussion. Hart was unquestionably a liberal as the term is now generally understood. He was not, however, a communist, as was sometimes alleged during his lifetime. A member of some controversial organizations and causes, he was at times a flashpoint of concern during the Cold War. Like so many others during that recent but now fading period, his teaching and research were all too often open to misquotation and faulty understanding. Hart was supremely interested in rights. He saw as the most fundamental of these the background right to liberty. This implies the free movement of individuals in society--but not necessarily as part of any social contract. What, really, is liberty? To Hart, liberty is to be stretched almost to the vanishing point. Finnis (2011) delves into some of Hart’s motivations, and finds some surprising results. Himself a former student of Hart’s, Finnis notes that his mentor rested some of his assumptions on shaky ethical grounds. According to Hart, it is ethically permissible to interfere with the rights of others and their freedom of thought and movement. It all depends on how far one is willing to take the boundaries of liberty. Hart indeed seems to push the limits of tolerance when he talks of interference with essential rights. However, it all falls into place if one keeps in mind that liberty would perish without the right to deviate from accepted norms and the usual ethical conformity of society. Hart employs this justification argument as the basis for his ethical choices in these matters. Although it is refreshing—if chilling—it certainly wreaks havoc on any standard notion of a social contract. In any other hands than Hart’s, this line of reasoning would be unbearably casuistic, but he brings it off with his precisely formulated arguments, and again firmly establishes himself as a leading anti-contractarian thinker. In conclusion, the previous four dissenters have effectively overthrown conventional notions of a social contract as understood by Rousseau and others. Hume demonstrated that governments tended to be built on the basis of usurpation, not consent of the governed. Bentham was inclined to reform—so much so that he insisted that the attainment of happiness was almost a government’s sole function. He also harbored doubt that the human individual’s wants and actions could ever be subordinated to any higher group calling. Hegel proved that the unfolding of the world historical Spirit was itself unsettling to the establishment of a social contract with history in a state of perpetual flux. And Hart practically rewrote the book on social ethics with his near revolutionary assertion that it is permissible to interfere with others’ rights as an essential precondition of liberty. Obviously, far more research is needed to settle this debate. It remains at the core of all political philosophical inquiry. One should properly hesitate before offering any final judgments. Indeed, the question of the validity of the social contract has been so vigorously negated by these four thinkers that one may be compelled to the conclusion that the question cannot be resolved, but it will at least remain open to future interpretation. References Coventry ,A. (2007). Hume: a Guide for the Perplexed .London: Continuum. 49-51. Farekh, B. (1974). Jeremy Bentham: Ten Critical Essays. Farekh, B.(Ed.). London: Frank Cass. 78-79. Finnis, J. (2011). The Philosophy of Law. Retrieved from http:// www.Oxford Scholarship Online.com./ Sept. 2011, 6-8. Noxon, J. (1973). Hume’s Philosophical Development. London: Oxford University Press. 191. Weiss, F. (1974). Hegel: the Essential Writings. Weiss, F.(Ed.) New York, NY: Harper & Row. 253-255. Read More