True Belief Can be Considered Knowledge - Essay Example

Justified True Belief (JTB Can It Be Considered Knowledge? Immediately, JTB could be perceived as knowledge, because chat else could it be? The mere fact that a belief is true and justified means it is valid. Therefore, it is proven true, and knowledge is truth. What more should there be that JTB is still being doubted as knowledge? Yet this century old philosophical question remains controversial until today. It seems a question with thousand answers, as it is perceived from different perspectives. In fact, understanding contending philosophical viewpoints on JTB is simply amusing and without holding on to basics of truth, one would most likely end-up confused rather than enlightened. Nonetheless, such engagement can also bring one to learn more about knowledge – a term ordinarily thought synonymous with the word ‘know’, when not everything we know constitutes knowledge, not even a JTB? JTB is composed of three concepts – belief, truth and justifiedness. Most basic of which is the understanding of belief, as the question of knowledge here is actually related with belief. To rephrase the main question, if JTB can be considered knowledge, would be: Can belief be qualified as knowledge if it is proven justifiably true? From this question, it can be inferred that not all beliefs can be considered knowledge and that even JTB can be doubted as knowledge. Essentially so, the main question centres on understanding what knowledge is. But since the question of knowledge here is limited only in qualifying JTB as knowledge or not, the discussion would only be limited in understanding philosophical views that either affirm or negate JTB as knowledge. So the discussion shall focus only on understanding when a belief is justifiably true; when JTB cannot be considered knowledge; and when JTB can be considered knowledge. Justified True Belief Belief is something we accept to be real or true. It is the acceptance of what we have witnessed, experienced or personally known (Braden 2008, p. 84). According to Audi (2003, p. 7), belief can be typified based on its source: perceptual – based on tactual perception, memorial – based on stored memory, introspective – based on contemplation or “looking within,” a priori – based on observational experience, and testimonial – based on a statement of a trusted source. Of these, perceptual belief is most common, because we easily believe on the existence of things that are perceivable – these are called sense data. These sense data make us believe on the existence of things. For example, we believe in flowers because we see, smell and touch them. In fact, the first and immediate way for us in knowing about the things around us is making use of our five senses (Huemer 2002, p. 27). We come to know first about flowers not through books but through seeing one; we come to differentiate between sweet and bitter not through others testimony but through our sense of taste; we come to know pain and relief because we felt it; we come to know about odours because we smell them; and we come to know about sounds because we hear them – these perceptual experiences we have everyday made us believe on their existence. But not everything we perceive necessarily constitutes what we believe. There are some things we perceive that we may not believe nor care to believe. For example, we see a horse in a painting. Although we know what a horse look like, we do not believe that the horse in the painting is a real horse knowing that works of art, like painting, are basically imitations of the real world or representations of the painter’s perception, feelings or thought (Sheppard 1987, p. 4). On the other hand, not everything we believe may be true, because we are imperfect not only in our perceptions but also in what we remember, on how we reason out, and in other things that we do; so, it is most probable that we can be deceived by our own senses (Audi 2003, p. 8), which under various circumstances can perform differently. For example, if you are colour-blind, you are unreliable in determining colours. But since what you see is what you believe – you would believe that colour violet is blue, even if in truth it is colour violet. Aside from that, we may fail to correctly recognize even those we perceive that we have no idea of what they are. Our common tendency is either to describe their perceivable properties or to approximate them to something they look a-like. Thus for the sake of finding out the truth, it would help heeding Russell’s (2010, p. 22) warning to doubt even our own beliefs. Since truth is upheld mostly through various theories of justification, the next question then is when a belief is justifiably true? In science, to justify one’s proposition is to present acceptable evidences. In fact, most of our long held beliefs are scientifically proven. Although scientific method is among the commonly used justifiers in philosophy, our knowledge of general principles is most of the time sufficient to justify that a belief is true, because according to Russell (2010, p. 68), they provide ‘even greater evidence and the knowledge of them has the same degree of certainty as the knowledge of the existence of sense-data’. He furthers that knowledge of general principles tells us that there are principles that can be equally true in their particular and general application. For example, basic mathematical principles state that adding of values increases value, subtracting values decreases value, and so on; thus one plus one equals two; applying this principle to whatever object will give similar result (e.g. one dollar plus one dollar equals two dollars). One may say that this does not hold true with signed numbers, as in -2 when added to +2 does not increase but results to zero. Does this negate the general principle? No, because obviously the condition is different, and a different set of principle is used. Another general principle commonly used in philosophy is logical principles – if premises are factually true, then the conclusion must be true. Although Russell (2010, p. 77), clarifies that there are some instances wherein the meaning of the general proposition has to be defined. Therefore, it is assumed in JTB that a true belief must have justifications that will make the belief justifiably true. Thus justifications must be irrefutable; if not, the belief can be refuted and a refutable belief is most likely false. For example, I believe that Liza is a woman, because she looks like a woman; acts, talks, feels and dresses like a woman; and in an intimate relationship with a man. My belief is justified but could be falsified if Liza’s reproductive organ is proven that of a man. There are of course various contending theories of justification: epistemic or nonepistemic justification, noninferential justification, infallible justification, evidentialism, contextualism, coherentism, foundationalism, and mixed theories (Fumerton 2002), but the point in JTB is that one’s belief to be true should be justified. Justification in JTB is important because it is provides truth to the belief, which to traditional view is vital to knowledge. Thus a belief that is unjustified is false, and a false belief cannot be knowledge. In other words, JTB is knowledge. JTB: Knowledge or Not The traditional view since Plato holds that three conditions make up knowledge: First, there must be the belief; second, the belief must be true; third, there must be a justification to the belief (Appiah 2003, p. 43). Schematically, the JTB analysis of knowledge is: A subject S knows that p just in case (a) 〈p〉 is true; (b) S believes p; and (c) S is justified in believing p. (Schmitt 1995, p. 204) This implies that belief and knowledge are two distinct concepts, but knowledge cannot be possible without belief. In other words, we cannot have knowledge on something which we do not believe. For example, I know fairytales because I believe in them. But believing is not enough for knowledge. The condition of truth is required. Thus the belief must be true. In fact truth comes first before the belief. In other words, fairytales are true; I believe in fairytales. But a true belief is still insufficient for knowledge. The belief should be justifiably true. In short, the trueness of the belief should be proven through justifications. So I know fairytales; I believe in them, because I have read and watched variations of fairytales. What kind of knowledge is this then? This may fall under literary knowledge wherein fairytales are considered fiction genre. On the other hand, I do not believe in UFO even if I have seen pictures of it; not believing is enough to stop me from knowing about it; thus I cannot have knowledge about it. From the above example, it is implied that knowledge are those that truly exist, believable, and justifiable. To say it the other way, we come only to know things that exist, because it is their existence that makes us believe them, however for us to be sure that what we come to believe are true, there should be a way that we could justify that what our belief is true. By doing so, we create knowledge. For example I come to know about fairytales because I have heard, read and seen them. However, even if I did but did not believe in them, would I bother to find out more about them? I think this is one of the principles that JTB asserts about knowledge – Knowledge should cause us to further our knowing. And this only becomes possible if there is the condition of belief. Belief therefore is the motivating factor. Furthermore, it is in believing that we tend to prove what we believe, and through proving our belief we come to know whether or not it is true. Either way, we gain knowledge. Thus knowledge comes with the process and not simply with the result. In this sense, JTB can be considered knowledge. Another way to look at JTB analysis of knowledge would be: There are things in this world which existence is hard to define yet we believe in them because we can justify that they are true. In short, knowledge refers only to those we can justifiably believe to be true. For example, is my believing in God knowledge or hallucination? Does God truly exist that I should believe? What source would I have to believe in God? This of course is a question of faith, because in faith the existence of God is felt and experienced. So following JTB analysis of knowledge, I would say: I believe in God; I know my belief is true; because of creation, because of my own experience, and because of the Holy Bible. Although my justifications may continue to be refuted, unless these are not defeated, my belief in God would remain to be true, as JTB asserts that knowledge must be justifiably true. Meaning, the true belief must be reliably justified and not simply a result of luck or intelligent guess. The irrefutability of truth therefore is crucial to knowledge. With this, JTB can be considered knowledge. However, some philosophers find JTB otherwise. Most well-known opponent of JTB as knowledge is Edmund Gettier (1963, p. 121), who in his paper “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge” counter-argued JTB for two points: First, in the sense of “justified” in which S’s being justified in believing P is a necessary condition of S’s knowing that O, it is possible for a person to be justified in believing a proposition that is in fact false. Secondly, for any proposition P, if S is justified in believing P, and P entails Q, and deduces Q from P and accepts Q as a result of this deduction, then S is justified in believing Q. To demonstrate his points for refuting JTB, he presented two cases. In these two cases, he demonstrated that gaining JTB does not result to knowledge. Here he shows that a proposition that is actually true is believed to be true but on grounds that unknown to the subject is actually false (bad luck); but because the proposition is justifiably believed to be true (good luck), then the conclusion turns up to be justifiably believed. The formula of Gettier’s problem involves the intervention of bad and good luck. The good luck made the belief which is falsified by bad luck to be true. Following the principle that knowledge must not be a result of luck or intelligent guess; then it follows that JTB cannot be knowledge. In Gettier’s (1963, p. 122)Case 1 – Smith and Jones applied for a certain job where Smith has strong evidences that assures Jones of the position, thus leaving Smith to believe that Jones will be the one to be hired, but in the end it was Smith who is hired not because his evidences are incorrect but because unknown to him, he also has what he believed would make Jones be hired. In short, Smith is justified in believing that Jones will be hired, which in the end is proven false, even if he relied his belief in true propositions. In short, justifying a belief to be true does not necessarily make it to be true. In this case, JTB cannot be knowledge, because the correctness of the proposition although justifiably true is based on luck. In Gettier’s second case, it is sheer coincidence that made Smith’s belief to be justifiably true, which again cannot be considered knowledge. In his study, Turri (n.d., pp. 21-22) asserts that Gettier’s problems illustrate the weakness of JTB to be ignoring the ‘central role of intellectual powers in the production of knowledge’, which would have helped the subject better identify possible aberrations that may come with the subject’s true belief. He furthers that there may be different ways by which to overcome Gettier’s problem but he maintains that nothing can refute that fact that what weakens JTB is its non-inclusion of something fundamental to the nature of knowledge and that is ‘the particular way that intellectual powers must relate to true beliefs and how that fits into a more general pattern relating dispositions to outcomes’ (p. 22). Thus to improve JTB would be ‘knowledge is true belief manifesting intellectual power’ (p. 23). Conclusion It would be unfair not to recognize that JTB can be considered knowledge. I agree with Sellars (1975) that despite the pitfalls of JTB as knowledge – as Gettier’s problems illustrate – it remains essentially sound (cited in Turri, p. 1). As knowledge is the source of wisdom, the mere process of achieving JTB already provides rich opportunities for us to become wise in many ways. Needless to say that to engage in such process also compels us to test out limitations and to discover our potentials. Though Turri’s recommendation to include intellectual power makes JTB stronger, I don’t think that this will free JTB from pitfalls, because nothing is perfect. What matters of course is our genuine search for truth. Reference List Appiah, KA 2003, Thinking it through: an introduction to contemporary philosophy, Oxford University Press, New York. Audi, R 2003, Epistemology: a contemporary introduction to the theory of knowledge, Routledge, New York. Braden, G 2008, The spontaneous healing of belief: shattering the paradigm of false limits, Accessible Publishing Systems Pty Ltd, Sydney, Australia. Fumerton, R 2002, ‘Theories of justification’, in P Moser, The Oxford handbook of epistemology, Oxford University Press, New York. Gettier, EL 1963, ‘Is justified true belief knowledge?’, Analysis, vol. 23, no. 6, pp. 121-123. Huemer, M (ed.) 2002, Epistemology: contemporary readings, Routledge, Oxon, OX. Russell, B 2010, The problems of philosophy, revised version 1945, Indo-European Publishing, Los Angeles, CA. ISBN: 978-1-60444-150-1 Sheppard, A 1987, Aesthetics: an introduction to the philosophy of art, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Schmitt,FF 1995, Truth: A Primer, Westview Press, Boulder, CO. Turri, J n.d., Is knowledge justified true belief?, viewed 31 January 2012 from http://john.turri.org/research/KJTB.pdf Read More