Dualism as a Viable Philosophical Position - Report Example

Dualism Although the concept of dualism began with Plato and his world of forms, it has been revived by several other philosophers especially the French rationalist philosopher Rene Descartes. Descartes provided three arguments for dualism in his Meditations and through the years, several other philosophers gave their own explanations of how viable dualism is as a philosophical position. So far, three arguments prove the validity of dualism and remain valid despite objections: the Knowledge Argument, the Argument on the Validity of Predicate Dualism, and Descartes’ Argument from Feigning. Metaphysical dualism is the doctrine that there exist two substances: a physical reality and an equivalent spiritual or mental reality. Dualism is the concept that declares that the brain is not everything and that there is a mind that exists apart from it. In fact, the idea of dualism has extended from metaphysics to religion, psychology and phenomenology. Dualism is not only about the physical and the nonphysical; it is also about good and evil, mental states and outward behavior, as well as neural connections and physical action. One of the arguments for dualism is the Knowledge Argument, or the idea that the physical and mental substances seem to have properties which are irreconcilable, or that the mental substances have properties that can never be reduced to physical forms. Thus, as the goal of the Knowledge Argument is to argue for the existence of the “irreducible [and] immaterial nature of the mind” (Robinson), then it is an argument for dualism. In a thought experiment that demonstrates the validity of the Knowledge Argument, a scientist who is deaf from birth has learned all the perfect scientific understanding of the mechanism of hearing, but when this scientist undergoes an operation to restore his hearing, “it is suggested that he will then learn ‘something’ he did not known before” (Robinson). This “something” is “what it is like to hear” (Robinson). Considering that he has already known all the physical facts before, it simply means that this “something” that he has just learned is “non-physical” (Robinson). Simply speaking, the Knowledge Argument means that the qualitative knowledge or experience one has of a particular thing is non-physical for it cannot be reduced to the physical aspect or physical knowledge. It is true that the knowledge one has of hearing, such as its anatomical and physiological aspects – or “how to hear,” can be reduced to the physical and can be proven by physical experiments. Nevertheless, “what it is like to hear” can only remain mental and the existence of such somehow prove the validity of the Knowledge Argument and of Dualism as well. However, one objection to this argument is the idea that “physical concepts [such as “how to hear”] and phenomenal concepts [such as “what it is like to hear”] are cognitively independent” (Nida-Rumelin). Based on the previously discussed thought experiment, it is possible for the scientist to know phenomenal hearing or “what it is like to hear” simply from knowing the physical concept of “how to hear.” This therefore means that “what it is like to hear” is actually an entirely different piece of information from “how to hear” and thus the former cannot be regarded as the irreducible mental property of the latter. My reply to this objection is that although the physical may be considered different from or unrelated to the phenomenal, the mere fact that the phenomenal is distinct from the physical is a proof that there are indeed two aspects of something: the physical and the nonphysical. The objection presented against dualism is weak as it simply evades the issue by criticizing the connection between the physical and the phenomenal. Aside from the Knowledge Argument, dualism is also argued for by the validity of predicate dualism. Predicate dualism is the concept which states that “psychological predicates are not reducible to physical descriptions” (Robinson). This claim is further explained by the idea that “special sciences are not fully objective, but are interest relative” (Robinson). Simply speaking, it means that certain concepts in the social sciences and even in the natural sciences cannot be reduced to their definite physical equivalents, and therefore means that mental substances exist independently of the physical. The exception remains in the physical sciences and those sciences reducible to physics such as chemistry, where the concept of “CO2” remains reducible to physical “carbon dioxide in any way that CO2 is conceptualized. Nevertheless, terms in meteorology like “hurricane” or technical jargon in biology such as “tissue” remain like Gestalt phenomena (Robinson). The reason for this is that the term “hurricane” cannot be exactly reduced to its physical counterpart – the physical hurricane – for this physical hurricane is relative among individuals trying to conceive a physical idea of it. Another reason is that the term “hurricane” does not seem to make any sense to creatures that do not have the same concern about the weather as humans have. In a similar way, the term “tissue” in biology is not specific and may create in a number of individuals the same number of interpretations of physical equivalents. Thus, this particular argument for dualism proves that certain concepts of the special sciences are irreducible to exact physical equivalents. Psychology, for one, is a science whose majority of concepts do not have any possible physical equivalents such as Functionalism. Moreover, the fact that one has a perceptual or intellectual perspective of the world is an evidence of the existence of a psychological state or mind (Robinson). This means that the mere fact that one can perceive an alien even if the existence of such is unconfirmed in reality or even if the physical equivalent is nowhere in the sight of the perceiver serves a proof that the perceiver’s mind exists. The mere existence of this mind and its irreducible concepts, and the given existence of physical reality both prove dualism as a valid philosophical stance. One objection to this argument, however, is the idea of Donald Davidson that “there can be no strict psycho-physical laws which connect mental and physical events under their descriptions as mental and physical events” (Schmidt et al.). This means that it is not valid to argue from the point of view of predicate dualism that certain concepts of the special sciences that are irreducible to their physical equivalents actually necessitate these physical equivalents. The fact that there is no clear law that proves and governs the interaction between mental and physical events somehow presupposes that these concepts in the special sciences, like “hurricane” and “tissue,” are in fact not connected with the physical hurricane and tissue. Thus, dualism does not exist because of this lack of interaction. My objection to this argument, however, is that it does not actually discount dualism but rather it just focuses on the lack of causal connection between the mental and the physical. Just because the physical is not connected with the mental does not necessarily mean that the mental does not exist. Since everything here is hypothetical, it is possible that both the physical and the mental still exist but independently of each other. A third argument for the validity of dualism comes from Rene Descartes himself. The argument from feigning concludes that “I am not my body” simply because “I can feign that my body does not exist” but “I cannot feign that I do not exist” (“Descartes’ Argument”). The minor premise for this argument of Descartes may have been derived from the existence of the cogito, which means that “I” must exist. Descartes’ argument from feigning is pretty simple in implying that one may imagine one’s body as non-existent or that one may imagine not having a physical body but the mere fact that he can imagine this nonexistence attests to the fact that he has a mind. It therefore means that his mind is separate from his body – and so dualism is valid. One possible argument against this is that just because Descartes can think or imagine that his body may not exist does not necessarily mean that it is his mind that is thinking. Therefore, it also does not necessarily follow that his mind exists. This argument may simply imply that it may be God or something else that is doing the thinking and not Descartes’ mind. The idea therefore is that just because there is an act of thinking does not necessarily mean that the mind exists, or that thinking does not assume the existence of a mind, or that thinking may not be an action of the mind. Nevertheless, this objection may be refuted by saying that although it may not be Descartes’ mind that is doing the thinking and that although this could mean that the mind does not necessarily exist, it still cannot be denied that the thinking is happening. The mere idea that the thinking is happening is a proof that something is doing the thinking, although it may not be the mind that is doing it. Therefore, whether it is God or something else, the agent behind the thinking is still something nonphysical that exists. Therefore, given the fact that the physical already exists, then dualism is valid. The viability of dualism as a philosophical position may be proven by the knowledge argument, the validity of predicate dualism and Descartes’ argument from feigning. Each of these arguments may be objected to but the objections can all be logically refuted. First of all, the knowledge argument supposes that certain mental events are irreducible into the physical. One objection to this is that the mental and the physical are independent of each other. However, the mere existence of both the mental and the physical is enough proof that reality is made up of both. Secondly, according to the argument on the validity of predicate dualism, certain concepts of the special sciences are irreducible to their physical counterparts. One objection to this is that there is no causal connection or interaction between the concepts and their physical counterparts. Nevertheless, the lack of causal connection does not necessarily suppose the nonexistence of the mental, and that both mental and physical may still exist although independent of each other. Lastly, Descartes’ argument from feigning supposes that the body and the mind are separate simply because he can pretend that his body does not exist but he cannot have the same idea about his mind. An objection to this is that just because he is thinking does not necessarily mean that his mind exists. However, although the mind may not exist, the agent behind the act of thinking supposes the existence of the mental. Dualism, therefore, remains a viable position despite such objections to three of its arguments. Top of Form Bottom of Form Works Cited “Descartes’ Argument from Feigning.” Substance Dualism. Philosophy of Mind.info, 2006. Web. 31 Mar 2011. Nida-Rumelin, Martine. “Qualia: The Knowledge Argument.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 2009. Web. 24 Mar 2011. Robinson, Howard. “Dualism.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford University, 2007. Web. 31 Mar 2011. Schmidt, J.W., Davidson D., and Fodor J. “Predicate Dualism.” Consciousness Studies. Scribd, 2007. Web. 31 Mar 2011. Read More