Peace Can Be Secured through International Law and Institutions - Essay Example

?Were the liberal thinkers of the interwar period wrong to believe that peace can be secured through international law and s? The interwarperiod signified a time of great uncertainty and ambivalence for powerful stakeholders in world peace - not dissimilar to the present day’s political climate. With the atrocities of World War I (WWI) still fresh in the memory of most politicians, and with world anarchy a realistic proposition, the only viable interwar option available in the war vs. non-war dichotomy appeared to be the “Balance of Power” strategy championed by some of the days’ great thinkers (Sylvest, 24). Strained international relations made “balancing” power in an equitable, mutually agreeable manner a lofty, but urgent, goal. Realistically, an international institution with multiple stakeholders, representing all major world powers seemed to be the way forward – considering the immense toll (human and economic) the war had taken (Sylvest, 28, Ranney, 4). From the outset, however, there was significant philosophical disagreement about the ultimate roles and goals of such an institution, both between and within governments. The British Labour Party maintained an internationalist (not dissimilar to the concept of idealism in many ways) perspective, having fought the war along nationalist lines. Specifically, the party maintained that world progress, the ultimate target, could only be achieved by way of global democracy and world law. In this way, the party, and the internationalists as a group, argued that a) the conditions of international politics were malleable and that b) deliberate reform was necessary to enact democratic conditions (Sylvest, 20). As with many burgeoning ideologies, some of the internationalist philosophies were divisive: a liberal faction of the party held that the state could not impinge on the inalienable rights of individuals, and a socialist internationalist faction, in Marxist style, argued that “working men have no state (Goldmann, 56).”Although the internationalist perspective became popular and gained momentum, it did not fully represent either of the dominant views of the day: idealism and realism. The realists maintained, (some would argue as a reaction to interwar idealism), that the conditions of international politics could not be changed, a nation’s main duty was to isolate and protect itself, nation states were primary actors in international politics, that the international system reached a dynamic but peaceful equilibrium via natural struggles for power (as opposed to a central governing body), and that nations must help themselves – as opposed to relying on assistance from others (Schmidt, 435). Conversely, the retroactively labeled ”idealists” of the time, bolstered and transformed by Woodrow Wilson’s commitment to American Exceptionalism and belief in the power of democracy (embodied and communicated through his “Fourteen points” speech), promoted an ideological that aimed to transcend the left-right divide and establish peace through ongoing commitment to moral and ethical concerns – even at the potential cost of negatively impacting the nation state. To many, the idealists’ belief in democratic peace theory - the concept that similarly democratic nations do not fight each other, was especially appealing (Hoogenboom, 190). Though much space and attention has been devoted in textbooks to the dichotomization of the realist and idealist viewpoints of the day, and the idea of a peacekeeping international institution is often synonymous with Woodrow Wilson, in truth, the origins of these ideologies and potential resolution strategies span back much further. Two centuries prior to WWI and Wilson, Kant’s (1972) Perpetual Peace posits that the natural position of governments towards counterparts is war – which creates problems because conflicts between humans are unethical and “inconsistent with the rights of humanity.” Kant argued that war could essentially be institutionalized and regulated in order to systematically resolve conflict as part of a well-established system, and ultimately sustain peace (Kant, 34). Kant envisioned this system as an association between different cultures, leading to the federalism of free states. He also suggested that democracy (the separation of legislative and executive arms and empowerment of the people) was requisite – since it would create confidence and a sense of responsibility (and/or motivation) for everyday people to avoid military conflict. This latter idea is what leads Kant to recommend a republican civic constitution for the State (Northedge, 19). In reaction to WWI, many international anti-war movements were born; some examples are the British League of Nations Society, the Fabian Society, the Round Table Group and the American League to Enforce Peace (Ginneken, 193). As mentioned previously, it was United States President and idealist Woodrow Wilson, who led the charge for international institution: The League of Nations - which was finally approved at the Paris Peace Conference on January 25th, 1919 and established on June 28th, 1919 by the Treaty of Versailles (Ginneken, 12). It could be easily argued that the eventual interwar creation of the League of Nations (LON), often credited to Wilson, had it’s origins and basis in Kantian ideas. Essentially, The League of Nations was an idealistic attempt to create a multi-stakeholder organism that would mediate disagreements in international politics, reduce isolationism, and provide a structured forum to help predict and manage conflict – essentially “world law” to preserve peace (Northedge, 198). Practically and at first, the League was primarily dedicated to solving the territorial disputes created by WWI, and managed to do so successfully for a brief period of time. Congruent with idealist ideas, the LON was also successful in promoting progress in human rights, health, and labor conditions for citizens of member countries (Ginneken, 46). Two major conditions essentially occasioned eventual LON failure: the Great Depression and the fact that many countries, including the U.S. never became members or were denied membership. Ironically, considering Wilson’s role in the LON creation, he faced opposition over membership from the Senate and experienced a decline in health – leading to American non-membership. (Northedge, 45, Ginneken, 111). For other countries, membership was only temporary and/or subject to stringent conditions – for example, Germany, (due to its aggressive involvement in WWI), and Soviet Russia, because it identified as communist (Northedge, 23). So, reading between the lines, and although the LON appeared to have a great deal of global support in theory, and due to its goals, many major world players were not willing or able (however much they appreciated the philosophy), to abandon their commitment to anarchic realism. Further to this, the forced withdrawals of Japan and Germany at more advanced stages, caused by noncompliance with LON’s resolutions, made the international organization look too weak. When coupled with financial devastation caused by the Great Depression, the LON was unable to enforce its rulings in a meaningful way, and permitted countries to dissolve membership at will, which unsettled and likely weakened the resolve of the remaining adherents (Ginneken, 87). More specifically when analyzing the LON failure, there appeared to be unwanted and unintended consequences of membership – for example, the possibility of having to sanction ally countries, which might create tensions or relationship fragilities that did not previously exist. From the U.S. Senate’s standpoint, it was clear that having other countries meddling in internal affairs was unacceptable. Taking the concept of idealism one step further, it is clear that the LON did not constitute “world law,” which is conceptualized as being global, enforceable, and inclusive. Rather, it constituted “international law,” which was none of the above, and promoted a sense of “collective insecurity” (Ranney, 4). In deciding which countries “could” be members, based on past problems and current economic systems, the LON, which was idealistic in foundations, merely became an embodiment of realism – whereby instead of transcending the nation state, and emphasizing human rights and inclusivity, it merely constituted a collection of exclusive nation states who were devoted to protecting themselves and each other – in essence a conglomeration of similar-thinking nation states, who when push came to shove, were unable to function as a whole unit and emphasized self-preservation (realism), as opposed to the preservation of world peace (idealism) (Ranney, 3; Sylvest, 208). In essence, a level of trusting on the organization and some conception of the effectiveness of the LON policies by adherents would be the only way that a world law could function and world peace could be maintained. At this time, and although the role of the Great Depression must be considered, the evidence points to the climate being unready and unwilling to fully accept and embody idealism as a route to world peace (Ginneken, 34). Although the LON is far from fresh in the minds of current politicians and idealism was replaced by Liberalism following the LON failure, the realism vs. idealism debate still poses several important questions: Is idealism viable? Is human nature flawed in the direction of fighting wars? Can war be outlawed? Will war always be a possibility in an anarchical international system? And, can international institutions contribute to world peace, despite the LON failure? Regarding the viability of idealistic ideas, much evidence points to the retrospective construction of the realism vs. idealism “First Great” debate during the interwar period, which is sometimes put forth as a historical fact (Wilson, 2). Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that “idealism” never really existed, and that this Utopian/idealistic view of humanity was Carr’s construction – an attempt to discredit and argue against individuals who stood in the way of realism (Wilson, 4). Carr’s Twenty Year Crisis used Utopianism to form two distinct arguments against idealism: that it was idealistic and therefore incapable of being enacted and that Utopianism was a set of “false ideas” that ran contrary to the reality (Wilson, 2). Carr equated Utopian idealism with morality, goodness, conscience, and essentially “not reality,” and realism with power, reality and coercion – essentially positing that human nature (and therefore political nature) is more congruent with conflict seeking, expansionism, and war (Wilson, 5). The logical remedy to preserve peace (if the reality is congruent with Carr’s ideas) is to protect one’s own, to neither trust nor align with others, and to bolster one’s own defenses. Simply put, the goal is to ensure that enemies/power-seekers understand that the country has the capability to enact substantive harm on an aggressor if necessary. This view can be construed as defensive realism (anarchism in some cases), and has been posited to be a method of preserving a dynamic kind of peace – not based on mutual goals or understanding, but on fear, or threat of harm. The Cold War could be construed as exemplifying Carr’s ideas – that is peace assured by the threat of mutual destruction if “non-peace” occurs; in essence, an ongoing standoff (Ranney, 22, Wilson, 1). One of the biggest critiques of Carr’s discrediting of idealism is his use of the dialectics: morality and reality. Morality, in Carr’s work was not explicitly defined and thus, rather ethnocentric in nature (Wilson, 11). For example, and although it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the different conceptions of human morality (or whether humans are essentially good or bad), Carr, in his failure to define morality, also failed to discuss the social, cultural, and religious conceptions of morality – the individuality of morality. For example, two English people may view personal morality very differently, with one emphasizing religious morality over personal morality, and the other dismissing religion as an important component. Carr viewed morality as a universal concept (each country has the same mindset, the same morality, and the same strivings), while simultaneously failing to explore dominant elements of morality within each country. This ethnocentric critique applies to many of the key players in the interwar period – the assumption that because we know ourselves, what we need, what we desire, we also know what others want, need, and desire. The failure to see beyond the end of our noses, to explore individual intra-country, intra-political differences, and the use of faulty assumptions, likely contributed to the unequivocal failure of the LON – there was an assumption that each country was striving for the same goals (Wilson, 3; Ginneken, 232). Regardless, Carr’s seminal work and the abject failure of the LON marked the demise of “idealism” as a cohesive account of international relations. Again, some historians maintain that this account never truly existed to the extent portrayed in the textbooks. Many historians and political scientists argue that although war is always a possibility and an option whether the prevailing system is anarchical or idealistic in nature, “world law” can be utilized and constructed to preserve peace (Ranney, 2). However, with the LON failure as an example to the contrary, debate remains as to how “world law” can be enacted successfully. Ranney (2012) argues that “world law” is an evolutionary process, which begins in small, trust-promoting ways, and is expanded and consolidated over time – as opposed to a single enactment like the LON, which ignores tensions based along cultural, social, and historical lines. In it’s most stringent sense, world federalists suggest that the only viable “world law” is agreed upon, inclusive, enforceable, and enacted by global courts, police, and policies – which is interesting because it runs in stark contrast to the LON (Ranney, 3). However, and with the current climate of global political unrest and mistrust in mind, this conception may be Utopian in nature and thoroughly unrealistic. Ranney (2012) predicts that the current trajectory of law-as-peace may include: Global economic regulations, human rights enforcement (peace and justice; gender equality), global rule of law at the international level (international court of justice), arms reduction, and an expanded conception of a United Nations Peace Force. The latter would require the United States to relinquish its role as “world police,” which, considering it’s current economic circumstance may be timely and viable. The United Nations was founded in 1945, following the war, and has been successful in describing military politics and peacekeeping aims: consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate. The United Nations optimally assures members individuality regarding techniques and procedures and the liberty to choose how to enforce actions when required. However, the UN retains the authority to coordinate the efforts and upholds the responsibility to back members up (United Nations). This “middle position” between an anarchical system and idealism, provides latitude for countries to uphold cultural values and is acceptable to many in theory – in practice, particularly in terms of disarmament, the UN has not been especially fruitful. It seems that in the future, the UN must seek a more effective way of ensuring adherence to policies, or persuade countries not to enact military action (Ranney, 2). Though these goals are lofty, the UN would need to have much more empowerment and support from the rest of the world in order to maintain longstanding peace. Rousseau’s Social Contract, extrapolated to nations instead of individuals would suggest people, “in surrendering their individual freedom, would acquire political liberty and civil rights within a system of laws based on the general will of the governed” (Campbell, 21, Wraight, 122). Nations in turn would need to voluntarily relinquish some of their autonomy and exchange it for security, peace, and general welfare for their citizens. Nations today, in embracing the realist position, are more reluctant to lose power than to lose autonomy - being certain less autonomy would render them vulnerable to threat. Also, the memory of being dominated by the large empires of the past centuries is still relatively fresh for some nations, who are still not established in the democratic process as a result. Therefore, a gradual loosening of interventional fears together with steady, small steps taken towards overcoming these barriers should lead the way to finally fulfilling the long lasting ideal institution that is capable of securing international peace. In conclusion, Kant’s conception of eternal peace may be attainable, but international leaders, need to work collaboratively and openly to achieve this goal by way of mutual understanding and exploration. In a given society, individuals choose, (or are forced), to be subjected to laws and institutions because of the safety that States provide. Using this parallel, for nations to agree to fully abide by international regulations, they should believe that the international institutions that implement them guarantee protection (and have the means to enforce that protection). Specifically in the interwar period, the turmoil, the exclusivity of membership for the League of Nations, the lack of trust, and the desire to impose democratic will on other countries, represents ethnocentrism, an oversimplification and intellectualization of the reality, and an idealistic notion. However, the League’s failure is just a step in the evolution of global organizations and world peace, as Ranney (2010) suggests, and many strides have been made since this time to find areas (however small) in which to strengthen international relations, and work toward mutually agreed upon goals. Hopefully, the current phase of international relations will be marked by a desire for greater cultural, social, and historical understanding, which will derive enforceable, mutually agreed goals, inclusion, and peaceful resolution to international conflict. Works Cited Campbell, Heather M. The Britannica Guide to Political and Social Movements That Changed the Modern World.” New York: Britannica Educational Pub, 2010. Ginneken, Anique H. M. Historical Dictionary of the League of Nations. Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2006. Print. Goldmann, Kjell. The logic of Internationalism. New York: Taylor & Francis, 1994. Print. Hoogenboom, Ari. "American Exceptionalism Republicanism as Ideology". In Glaser, Elisabeth; 2002. Kant, Immanuel..Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay. New York: Garland Publishers, 1972. Northedge, F. S. The League of Nations: Its Life and Times, 1920-1946. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1986. Ranney, James. “World Peace Through Law: Rethinking an Old Theory.” Cadmus 1.5, 2010. Schmidt, Brian C. "Lessons from the past: reassessing the interwar disciplinary history of International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly 42.3: 433-459. Sylvest, C. “Interwar Internationalism, the British Labour Party, and the Historiography of International Relations.” International Studies Quarterly, 48: (2004) 409–432. doi: 10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00307.x United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Principles and Guidelines. New York: United Nations Secretariat, 2008. PDF File. Wilson, Peter. “The Myth of the First Great Debate.” Review of International Studies, 24.1 (1998): 1-15. Wraight, Christopher D. Rousseau's The Social Contract: A Reader's Guide. London: Continuum Books, 2010. Read More