Gettier's Problem of Knowledge - Article Example

Knowledge is a special kind of relation between a mind and some externally existing content, perhaps a fact. To objectively describe and define the concept of knowledge, a philosopher must first conclude what exactly are the necessary and sufficient conditions for declarative knowledge: that class of knowledge focused on facts that can be put into sentences either true or false. These sentences are also called “propositions”, and the knowledge of propositions excludes other kinds of knowledge like procedural knowledge (that is, knowing-how). When epistemologists trying to strictly define knowledge speak of the concept of knowledge, they often use “S knows that p”. “S”, in this case, refers to the mind, “that” serving as the relationship between the mind and the content, and “p” referring to the proposition or fact. In the opening words of his famous “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Edmund Gettier considers traditional and tried sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing “that p”. These traditional accounts, according to Gettier, are incorrect, and he proceeds to demonstrate why this is the case. The problem is that Gettier’s arguments have not been properly dismissed and the difficulties they give rise to still remain. Therein lays the effect the so-called “Gettier problem” has on the account of knowledge. Ultimately, alternative approaches to justifying knowledge, such as reliabilism, fail to address the underlying problems posed by Gettier’s arguments. If the “justified true belief” model of declarative knowledge is to be salvaged, it must be done so with an additional condition encompassed in neither justification, truth, nor belief. The traditional account of knowledge defines the concept as “justified true belief” (JTB). Under such an analysis “S knows that p” if (a) p is true, (b) S believes that p, and (c) S is justified in believing that p. Condition (a) is uncontroversial and thus will not deserve attention here. Condition (b) is relatively uncontroversial, but still deserves some recognition. The simplest definition of belief is “mental content held to be true”; that is, in order for S to believe that Earth is flat, S must believe the proposition “Earth is flat” is true. Since belief is a necessary condition for knowledge, anything that is known must also be believed on the JTB model. Moore’s paradox proves this point by showing “I know the Earth is round but I don’t believe it” is a contradiction. Thus, it seems conditions (a) and (b) are valid; however, problems arise as philosophers try to substantiate the validity of condition (c) dealing with the justification condition (Steup). The justification condition of knowledge is included because it accounts for something called “epistemic luck”: beliefs that lack justification are, from induction, more likely to be false. Nevertheless, this does not exclude them from being true either. For instance, if a racist accuses the first person of darker skin color he sees of robbing him, the racist perhaps will believe this person was the person who stole from him. By coincidence, however, the accused did commit the crime. The racist cannot be said to have known this, since he was casting blind suspicion on someone who just happened to be the man he was looking for. For a belief to be justified, one might say that one should have evidence, which then forms knowledge in the knower’s mind. Gathering epistemic evidence for a proposition requires some effort beyond the mere luck that cannot reflect true knowledge. No one would gain anything from believing something that happened to be true, despite there being no evidence supporting a rational belief in the proposition. The Gettier problem arises in the context of trying to understand what it means exactly for a belief, or for propositional knowledge in general, to be justified. Gettier presents two counter-examples to the JTB model. Focused on the justification problem, the second of these counter-examples stems from Smith’s belief in the false, but evidenced, proposition “Jones owns a Ford”. Beyond this point, Gettier asks us to imagine Jones’ friend, Brown, whose whereabouts Jones is completely unaware, is somewhere in the world. Smith picks locations randomly to form the propositions (1) “Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston”, (2) “Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona”, and (3) “Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk”. What is interesting is that each (1) – (3) are entailed by the original “Jones owns a Ford” proposition. Smith accepts all of the propositions as true because he correctly inferred each from an original proposition, which, although false, he has strong evidence for. Moreover, if Brown actually is in Barcelona, three facts are entailed: Smith does not know (2) is true, even if (2) is true, he does not believe (2) is true, and he is justified in believing (2) is true. As a result, the standard JTB model for understanding knowledge is inadequate (Bernecker and Dretske). Gettier accomplished creating doubt about the popular view of knowledge by arguing that, in some situations, one’s believes may at once meet conditions (a) and (c), and yet fail to be knowledge. In other words, justified belief form necessary conditions for knowledge, but not sufficient conditions. There exist particular situations wherein one might not have knowledge, even if conditions (a) – (c) are met. However, the falsity of the justified true belief, or JTB, model leaves one after Gettier wondering about the alternative one might be able to use, and whether Gettier’s challenge warrants a new paradigm or a new condition to be tacked onto the old model. That is, while Gettier proves justification, truth, and belief are not sufficient, it does not prove they are not necessary. In all likelihood, these conditions are still necessary to knowing. The question becomes then what is the extra element preventing the JTB model from correctly representing the actual state of affairs. From the perspective of the necessary conditions already given, it seems likely there is some unnamed epistemic condition that will unite the ones already given and form mutually sufficient conditions for the existence of knowledge, and move epistemologists beyond Gettier cases (Williams). One approach epistemologists take to avoid the Gettier problem is known vaguely as reliabilism, a term that refers to a series of epistemological theories attempting to ground justified belief in so-called reliable processes. That is, S knows that p (for instance, “Earth is flat”) if p is true, one believes that p is true, and one concludes belief in p is rational through some rational process. In other words, condition (c) for knowledge has been replaced with a more defined notion of what exactly epistemic justification is. Reliabilism can either work in the way described (J-reliabilism, where the “J” refers to justification), or in terms of K-reliabilism, where the “K” refers to knowledge. This second model of reliabilism rests on the notion of truth plus reliable belief formation as the two necessary and sufficient conditions for knowledge. These theories are different in subtle ways. For instance, consider the false belief A, which was reached through a reliable process. J-reliabilism will suggest that A is either not an instance of knowledge and A is justified belief, whereas K-reliabilism will not suggest the latter point. J-reliabilism’s unique focus on justification gives the J-reliabilism model contain one more condition than the K-reliabilism model (Steup). On the most general level, reliabilism fails to answer the Gettier problem. The reliable processes required under the system are not any more reliable than one’s sense perception at giving one accurate information on which to base beliefs. Under certain circumstances, it seems vision is less reliable, such as when there is a lack of lighting. Thus, if reliabilism is to be safe from providing the incorrect outcome in terms of justification, the reliable sense perception would have to be delimited with another clause, which was part of the original solution to the Gettier problem. As a result, the Gettier problem poses the same issues for reliabilism as it does the traditional model of belief. Trying to use reliabilism to answer Gettier moves one in a circle of reasoning. The ideal approach to answering Gettier is not to redefine justification or any of the terms necessary for the construction of the JTB model. What is best is to add as minimally as possible to the existing model, with its necessary conditions, in order to create a fourth condition, which makes all of the conditions mutually sufficient. In what can be referred to as a JTB+G model, the philosophy of pragmatism provides an explanatory framework in which the effect of the Gettier problem can be mitigated. Truth, according to pragmatism, is the correspondence of something in language to an object, and the opinion to which further investigation would eventually lead us. This conception of truth deals with proposition that work in the way of belief. A belief, according to the pragmatists, would be true if in the it worked for all of our intellectual investigations, and gave us reason to act and think in particular ways. Thus, deciding whether a belief is justified and true becomes an issue of whether ideas are useful or not (Peirce). Thus, pragmatism ascribes a fourth necessary condition to the existence of knowledge. Gettier, who claims that justified true belief is not sufficient, can be responded to with the thesis of pragmatism by justifying justified true belief with having the proposition p in “S knows that p” solve a problem. In other words, a condition (d) under the pragmatist framework holds “S can use p in creating other true propositions”. Pragmatism, as a fallibilist epistemological position, also does not share the kind of view of knowledge that those who treat Gettier’s problems as impregnable do. Instead of requiring knowledge to be certain and a part of an irrefutable base, fallibilists lower the standard of knowledge to something that may be constructed and revised later. Imperfections in human knowledge become acceptable and whether or not our concepts of knowledge are wrong or not based on the Gettier counterexamples is not much of an issue anymore. The levels of necessary justification are lowered, and, under the pragmatist umbrella, the fourth condition of a proposition’s usefulness becomes the final sufficient condition. Approaches to rectifying the traditional JTB model of knowledge by simply changing the justification criterion definitionally, such as J-reliabilism, or rest on the premise of reliable belief formation, fail in addressing the true problems generated by Gettier’s 1963 paper. If a JTB model of declarative knowledge is to be salvaged, it must be done so with an additional condition encompassed in neither justification, truth, nor belief. That is, a JTB+G conception, which handles special classes of counterexamples, can effectively deal with Gettier while maintaining the traditional analysis. The debate between Gettier and the traditional model of knowledge is one over the necessary and sufficient conditions of what forms knowledge. Philosophers have traditionally identified the JTB model as being relatively correct with what it thinks are the three necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for knowledge. Nevertheless, Edmund Gettier seems to disprove traditional sets of necessary and sufficient conditions for knowing p. The problem is that Gettier’s arguments have not been dismissed. Because of their staying power, the effect of the so-called “Gettier problem” on the account of knowledge has remained large. However, Gettier can be answered by conditioning the traditional JTB model to reflect the fallibility of human knowledge, and the pragmatist conception of truth. Introducing both of these factors, the criterion of usefulness enters the equation, and our entire universe of what actually is known changes. Bibliography Bernecker, Sven and Fred I. Dretske. Knowledge. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Gettier, Edmund L. "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge." Analysis, Vol. 23, No. 6 (1963): 121-123. Peirce, C. S. "Issues of Pragmaticism." The Monist, Vol. 15 (1905): 481-499. Steup, Matthias. The Analysis of Knowledge. 6 February 2001. 16 October 2009 . Williams, Michael. Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Epistemology . New York: Oxford University Press, 2001. Read More