Essence of Decision - Assignment Example

Realist philosopher Hobbes argued that humans were innately anti-social and that the activity of war was intrinsically linked to the survival instinct. Hobbes further posited that “I put for a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power that ceaseth only in death” (Hobbes, Leviathan, quoted in Morgan, 2001, p.523). Therefore according to Hobbes’ version of classic realism, concepts of “human morality” are inherently limited to the societal obligation to comply with man made rules. However, in respect of foreign policy and international relations, Hobbes argues that the lack of common legal framework negates any moral obligations, which in turn informs a selfish approach to foreign policy strategy. In stark contrast, Kant’s theory of international relations emphatically rejects Hobbes’ classic realism paradigm. Indeed, Kant states that “a true system of politics cannot… take a single step without first paying tribute to morality. For as soon as those two come into conflict, morality can cut through the knot which politics cannot unite”(Kant, translated by Nisbet, 1991; Quoted in Fiala, 2002, p27). If we consider this polarised theorem in context of the framework within which US foreign policy operates, a central issue of contention has been the power of Congress to shape foreign policy and limit the autonomy of the President in international affairs, the increasing powers of whom have been coined as the “imperial presidency” (Schlesinger, 1973, quoted in Cronin, 1980, p.211). Indeed, Einer extrapolated that “the American system of government disintegrates the leadership of Congress, and then largely stakes the fate of itself and the world of nations with which it is merged by physical oneness, upon the character and ability of one solitary man in the White House, that is upon an accident….ruin as well as bliss is risked upon a single throw” (Einer, 1951, p.688). As such, it is submitted at the outset that whilst Kant’s theory is a theoretical and moral ideal for modelling foreign policy, Kant’s belief the morality of man is the significant weakness and does not mirror contemporary political approaches to foreign policy. As such, it is arguable the reality of foreign policy is more in line with Hobbes’ theory, whilst justified as being on Kantish “morality” as evidenced by the power struggle between the President and Congress in foreign policy issues. The focus of this paper is to critically consider the political framework within which US foreign policy operates and in particular consider the tension between the roles of Congress and the President in shaping international affairs. From a constitutional perspective, whilst the American Constitution vests significant power and prestige in the President, the chief constitutional powers appear to limit this to conducting foreign relations and federal laws (Cronin, 1980, p.213). A further constitutional restriction on presidential powers is Congress (Fisher, 2000, p.xiii). According to the Constitution, in international affairs Congress is effectively entitled to more powers than those attributed to the President (Lindsay, 1994, pp. 607& 618). It authorises Congress to deal with international commerce, vests control over declarations of war and the power to appropriate funds from the treasury and to tax and spend on the common defence and general welfare (Fisher, 2000, p.35). Indeed, the Congressional “powers of the purse” continually imprint the conduct of foreign affairs (Lindsay, 1994, p.618). Moreover, the curbs on Presidential power by Congress are highlighted by Article II of the Constitution, which provides that the president “shall be commander in chief to the army and the navy of the United States and of the militia of the several states …… by and with the advice and consent of the senate” (Article II, Section 2). Therefore, the structure of the Constitution inherently prevents abuse of power and Schlesinger comments that the “specific grants of authority to the executive in foreign policy were trivial compared with the authority specifically granted to Congress” (Schlesinger, 1973, quoted in Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p. 341). Notwithstanding these constitutional restrictions, the reality remains that the President is pre-eminent in foreign policy making (Fisher 2000, p.43). This is further evidenced by the incremental increase of Presidential power by virtue of Congress enacted legislation (Rubner, 1986, p.629). For example, in the Cold War era heralded the first nuclear age and the cold war and this phase highlights how nuclear weapons’ programmes were rooted in the need of both superpowers to assert power in the arms race. Moreover, the shared consensus in the public polls regarding strong presidential leadership, fuelled a wave of legislative measures such as the Vandenberg Resolution (1949), in which Congress supported a permanent American alliance with European Nations (NATO) and the Formosa Straits (1955), The Middle East (1957), Cuban (1962) and the Gulf of Tonkin resolutions (1964), in which the Congress gave the President broad powers to deal with external conflict situations. This in itself undermines the theoretical separation of powers doctrine as regards legislative measures, which will often be shaped by power. Moreover, notwithstanding constitutional convention, American foreign policy has been shaped by presidential prevalence in formulation and execution of American foreign policy (Fisher, 2000, p.43). Moreover, Lindsay highlights the point that Members of Congress are up for re-election every two years, which intrinsically renders domestic policy issues more important at Congressional level, thereby leaving foreign policy matters open to Presidential precedence (Lindsay, 1994, p.609). Moreover, the President is elected on a national basis, whereas members of Congress are limited to smaller constituencies and as such their policies will be shaped by localised interest groups (Fisher, 2000, pp.27, 29 & 160). This is further compounded by the fact that there are 535 members and each has to case a vote on particular strategy, which clearly risks stalemate in passing bills as evidenced between Reagan and Congress (Fisher, 2000, p.130). This invariably leaves the Executive President with control over the flow of information necessary to shape strategy in international relations and crisis. Indeed Kegley & Wittkopf refer to the statements of an anonymous Congress member in 1976 that “the actions of the United States are not secret to other nations, only to Congress and the American People” (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p. 439). Furthermore, the vast number of agencies and personnel at the President’s disposition, such as the National Security Council and the National Security Adviser, the Central Intelligence agency the FBI and others ensure that executive branch has the required expertise to formulate foreign policy (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p.341). To this end it is argued that in essence, US foreign policy “is what the president says it is” (Kegley & Wittkopf, p341). This argument is further supported by the Supreme Court ruling in the case of United States v Curtiss Wright Export Corporation (1936) which determined that “the President acts as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations”, indeed leading to Schlesinger’s assertions of the “Imperial Presidency”(Schlesinger, 1989, quoted in Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p.341). Schlesinger further suggested that Presidents were abusing and misusing the authority conferred upon them and that in some cases it even “threatened our constitutional system” (Scheslinger, 1989, quoted in Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p.342). However, the first significant indication of discontent with this growing Presidential autonomy in foreign policy affairs was with President Lyndon Johnson, whose credibility was undermined by persistent failures to end the War in Vietnam. Such was his lack of popularity that he was effectively prevented from running for a second term, which highlights the interrelationship between Executive power over Congress and the nature of public opinion (Lindsay, 1994:623). This is further supported by the fact that Nixon’s victory went unencumbered for a time until the Watergate scandal hit, signalling the end of the “imperial presidency”. Moreover, Zeidenstein argues that Congress awoke to the monster they had created with the repeal of the War Powers Resolution (1973) (Zeidenstein, p.394), the Hughes Ryan Amendment (1974) (Zeidenstein, p.398), the Congressional Budget and the Impoundment Act (1974) (Zeidenstein p.405) and the National Emergencies Act (1976) (Zeidenstein, p.407). However, whilst these measures were significant in a Congressional reassertion of power to a certain degree, Kegley and Wittkopf highlight the practical limitations of this insurgence by conceding that “none removed the president from his pivotal position in the foreign affairs government however” (1996, p.342). Moreover the first Article to the Constitution is clear in asserting that “Congress shall have the power to….declare war”. Yet during the period after the Second World War, Presidents sent American troops into action in Korea, Lebanon in the Congo, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam without a Congressional declaration of war and in each case the President was utilising the constitutional power of commander in chief to enable the deployment of armed forces. This further highlights how the inherent paradox in the Constitution clearly enables Executive autonomy towards an “imperial presidency” particularly evidenced by US foreign policy matters. Nonetheless, developed the presidential autonomy issue is often negated by public opinion as stated above (Lindsay, 1996). Provided the consensus of public opinion supported the decision, then concerns regarding constitutionality of presidential actions were confined to constitutional lawyers and minority opposition groups (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p.343). The war in Vietnam however turned into a ticking time bomb, arguably marking a turning point in congressional attitudes towards the pre-eminence of the presidency (Lindsay, 1996, p.608). The failures of Johnson in the war were absorbed into the Nixon presidency with the policy of “Vietnamisation”, to provide the South Vietnamese with overwhelming military support to fight and win their own war (Fisher, 2000, p. 15). Unfortunately, this measure failed and when troops were pulled out due to pressure, the situation in Vietnam grew worse and in 1970 Nixon bombed North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia secretly. When this failed, Nixon then sent troops into Cambodia in a sharp offensive to save the situation (Fisher, 2000, p. 15). However this plan backfired and sparked nation wide outrage against the President’s action, which led to student demonstrations, protest marches and renewed demands to end the war (Fisher, 2000, p. 25). This wave of public dissent appeared to wake Congress to the unconstitutional nature of the “presidential wars”, which in turn led to the repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Whilst the President used his veto to stave off constitutional restraint and send allies into Laos, this measure failed (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p.341). Conversely, Nixon’s diplomatic activities led by Kissinger reopened the lines of communication between America and China, which had been frozen since the Communist take over in 1958. The negotiation of the arms control treaty with Soviet Union fuelled positive public opinion, however the Watergate scandal “was a subversion and corruption of the political process”(Cronin, 1980, p.209) marked with presidential deceptions and transgressions against the notion of separation of powers (Cronin, 1980, p.209). Moreover, the Senate investigation highlighted a series of executive agreements that had been covertly undertaken in the sixties (Cronin, 1980, p.213). Article II of the Constitution asserts that the President has the power to make treaties, which are only valid once ratified by the Senate. Executive agreements however permit a president to enter into secret arrangements with a foreign nation without congressional approval (Lindsay, 1996). After Watergate, many members of Congress argued that this undermined the separation of powers and that the subversion of the treaty ratification process of the constitution was a serious violation (Lindsay, 1996). Therefore the 1972 Case Act was implemented requiring the executive to submit to the Senate the text of any executive agreement. However, whilst a symbolically significant inroad, it still remains the President’s own discretion to submit only to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the house international relations committee on a classified basis. Moreover, those executive agreements the President judges to contain “sensitive national security implications” are exempted (Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p.218). Nevertheless a year later, in 1973 the congress enacted the War Powers Resolution. Nixon attempted to veto it claiming it encroached on presidential constitutional authority and a hindrance to effective decision making in crisis, however Congress overrode the veto and held that president could only commit armed forces of the US in the current scenarios: 1) Declaration of war; 2) Statutory authorisation; 3) National emergency created by attack on US or armed forces. However Zeidenstein questions the practical reality of the War Resolution and asserted that it “is not a severe encroachment on the president’s authority”( Zeidentstein, 1978: 398) and no president has ever acknowledged the constitutionality of the legislation (Fisher, 2000, p.63). For example in 1983 US Marines and Army rangers were deployed to Grenada “to protect nearly 1,000 American citizens…… whose lives had been allegedly jeopardized by actions of a military junta that had gained control of the island after a bloody coup a few days earlier; to forestall further chaos; and help in the restoration of democratic institutions in Grenada” (Rubner, 1986, p.627). The War Resolution expressly stipulates that “the president in every way possible instance shall consult with Congress before introducing United States Armed Forces into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement in hostilities is, clearly indicated by circumstances” (Section 3). However, there is no evidence of any such consultation in the Grenada situation and Speaker Thomas O’Neill later admitted “we weren’t asked for advice….we were informed what was taking place” (Rubner, 1986: 631). Moreover, the CIA is not included in jurisdiction of War powers resolution and does not require the President to inform Congress of covert CIA operations. However Congress placed restrictions on CIA in the Hughes Ryan Amendment act placing some restrictions on covert operations by the CIA. The amendment requires the executive to advise eight congressional committees of its plans for clandestine operations with the exception of necessary intelligence gathering. However, written reports are not required and a report is not a prerequisite for covert operation therefore (Fisher, 2000, p. 101). The above analysis demonstrates that whilst Congress retains constitutional significance as a curb on executive power, ultimately foreign policy is shaped by the President. This is further enabled by exploitation of the inherently paradoxical constitutional provisions. Moreover, the importance of public opinion is paramount and often acts as a tipping point. Indeed, the times where Congress has taken most measures to curb executive autonomy has been in cases where public opinion has operated against unpopular foreign policy moves of the executive. Similarly, Presidential autonomy is further facilitated by the weight of public opinion. As such, it would appear that Congress has proved more successful in domestic policy and foreign policy clearly rests in the hands of the executive and the US approach to foreign policy will have to readapt if “Congress will play a key role in redefining America’s interests and strategies”(Kegley & Wittkopf, 1996, p.628). BIBLIOGRAPHY Allison, G. & Zeikrow, P (1999). Essence of Decision. Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers Cronin, T. E. (1980). A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency. Political Science Quarterly. Volume 95, Issue 2 pp.209-237 Fiala, A. G (2002). The Philosopher’s Voice. Suny Press. Finer, H. S. (1951). The Theory and Practise of Modern Government. Methuen Fisher, L. (2000). Congressional Abdication on War & Spending. Texas A & M University Press. Hunt, M. H. (1996). Crises in US Foreign Policy Yale University Press. Kegley, C. W., & Wittkopf, E. R. (1996). American Foreign Policy. St Martin’s Press Fifth Edition Lindsay, J. M (1994). Congress and the Politics of Foreign Policy: Why the Hill Matters. Political Science Quarterly, Volume 107, No. 4: pp.607-628. Morgan, W. (2001). Questionable Charity: Gender, Humanitarianism, and Complicity in American Literary Realism. University Press of New England Nisbet, H. S. & Reiss, H. S. (1991). Kant: Political Writings. Cambridge University Press. Rubner, M (1985). The Reagan Administration, the 1973 War Powers Resolution and the invasion of Grenada. Political Science Quarterly Volume 100, Issue 4 Winter 1992 pp.627-647 Schlesinger, A. M. (1973). The Imperial Presidency. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Zeidenstein, H. G (1978). The Reassertion of Congressional Power. New Curbs on the President. Political Science Quarterly. Volume 93 Issue 3, Autumn 1978 pp.393-409 Read More