Free Will and Its Critical Concepts in Philosophy - Assignment Example

The debate on the topic of free will is lengthy but interesting. Free will basically questions do men as rational beings have control over their actions and decisions? For the purpose we need to understand the relationship between freedom and cause and must determine whether the laws of nature play any role in determining the future events. The discussion on Free Will encompasses following points and many different philosophical views exist about these: whether all events are determined or not determinism versus indeterminism whether freedom can coexist with determinism or not compatibilism versus incompatibilism Is determinism true? Does free will exist? We can view the principle of free will in three respects: religious implication is that an omnipotent being dies not control individual will and choices. Ethical view is that we can hold individuals morally responsible for their actions. Thirdly, Free will in scientific terms means the body actions of the body, including mind and brain do not have only physical causes (Fischer, 2005). Here defining the basic terms used in the context of free will would be helpful: It is the view that all current & future events are regulated by past events coupled with the laws of nature. Determinism has variety of meanings with corresponding different problem of free will. Under Causal (or nomological) determinism past, present events and laws of nature governing the universe control the future. Logical determinism complicates the idea of free will. We can’t have free choices if all plans about the past, present or future are already determined as either true or false? Theological determinism rejects free will because God is omniscient, predicts and directs the actions of the humans in advance (Shermer, 2004). Under this notion, determinism and free will can coexist. As obvious by the term itself, incompatibilism is in opposite of compatibilism. It says no free will can be exercised in the presence of a universe that determines all events beforehand. Two forms of incompatibilism are: HARD DETERMINISM: This theory accepts only idea of truth of determinism and rejects possibility of FREE WILL. METAPHYSICAL LIBERTARIANISM: This concept agrees with existence of FREE WILL but discards the idea of a need to find compatibility with determinism. It also agrees that some form of indeterminism is true. HARD INCOMPATIBILISM Another view is that of hard incompatibilism which states that free will is incompatible with both determinism and indeterminism (Lynch, 2002). Classical compatibilists such as Thomas Hobbes support their postulation and state that a person is free to do or not to do a particular action. Man’s decision to act is not subject to some abstract notion of will, rather he is liberal to go ahead with his will to act. David Hume explains further that this hypothetical liberty is universally allowed to everyone. They quote an example of murder or rape case wherein the FREE WILL is lacking and not denied because past is causing any influence but here the aggressor overrides FREE WILL of another person. Thus, they argue that determinism does not matter; what matters is that individuals choices are the results of their own desires and preferences, and are not overridden by some external (or internal) force. A compatibilist, does not endorse any particular conception of free will, but only denies that determinism is at odds with free will (Smilansky, 2000). William James displays mixed views about FREE WILL and DETERMINISM. He believes in indeterminism so far as man is free to exercise his will and makes the world a better place. On the other hand, he did not accept incompatibility; he did not believe that the indeterminism of human actions was a prerequisite of moral responsibility. Harry Frankfurt and Daniel Dennett are among the modern compatibilists. They put forward their arguments that there are cases where a coerced agents choices are still free because such coercion coincides with the agents personal intentions and desires. Frankfurt relates his theory ‘hierarchical mesh.’ The idea is that an individual can have conflicting desires at a first-order level and also have a desire about the various first-order desires (a second-order desire) to the effect that one of the desires prevails over the others. A persons will is to be identified with her effective first-order desire, i.e., the one that she acts on. The theory has been criticised, as it does not explain how the various levels of desire in the hierarchy work together (Wegner, 2003). Dennett has another reasoning for truth of compatibility. By excluding God, who is all-knowing and powerful, we shall put the future in chaos for all the finite beings, due to our inadequate knowledge of the current state of the world. He further says because individuals have the ability to act differently from what anyone expects free will can exist. Incompatibilists oppose the idea by their argument that we may be mere robots responding in predictable ways to stimuli in our environment". Therefore, all of our actions are controlled by forces outside ourselves, or by random chance (Wegner, 2003). INCOMPATIBILISM One of the traditional arguments for incompatibilism is based on an "intuition pump": if a person is determined in his or her choices of actions, then he or she must be like other mechanical things that are determined in their behavior such as a wind-up toy, a billiard ball, a puppet, or a robot. Because these things have no free will, then people must have no free will, if determinism is true. This argument has been rejected by compatibilists such as Daniel Dennett on the grounds that, even if humans have something in common with these things, it does not follow that there are no important differences (Kane, 2001). "Causal chain" is another argument for incompatibilism. It asserts that free will means that man must be the "ultimate" or "originating" cause of his actions. To be responsible for ones choices is to be the first cause of those choices, where first cause means that there is no antecedent cause of that cause. The argument, then, is that if man has free will, then man is the ultimate cause of his actions. As per determinism, on the other hand, all of man’s choices are caused by events and facts outside his control. So, if everything man does is caused by events and facts outside his control, then he cannot be the ultimate cause of his actions. Therefore, he cannot have free will (Kane, 2001). Carl Ginet in the 1960s gave a third argument for incompatibilism. It simply says that if determinism is true, then we have no control over the events of the past that determined our present state and no control over the laws of nature. Since we can have no control over these matters, we also can have no control over the consequences of them. Since our present choices and acts, under determinism, are the necessary consequences of the past and the laws of nature, then we have no control over them and, hence, no free will. This is called the consequence argument (Smilansky, 2000). Compatibilists contradict with this argument as it entails that one could not have chosen other than one has. David Lewis suggests that compatibilists are only committed to the ability to do something otherwise if different circumstances had actually obtained in the past. METAPHYSICAL LIBERTARIANISM Another type of incompatibilism is metaphysical libertarianism. Libertarianism holds that free-will exists, which entails that the individual is able to take more than one possible course of actions under a given set of circumstances. Since determinism implies that there is only one possible future, it is not compatible with this conception of free-will, and must be false (Shermer, 2004). Metaphysical libertarianism subdivides into supernatural and scientific or naturalistic theories. The supernatural theory holds that the acts of man are not entirely caused by physical reasons, a non-physical mind or soul exists to direct actions of man. Scientific approach to libertarianism involve invoking panpsychism, the theory that a quality of mind is associated with all particles, and pervades the entire universe, in both living beings and non-living entities. Free volition is regarded as a particular kind of complex, high-level process with an element of indeterminism (Fischer, 2005). Some philosophers do not agree on any term under discussion here. John Locke denies the phrase ‘Free Will’ and also rejects the truth of determinism. He opines instead that the will of a man is nothing more than a power or ability to prefer or choose. Similarly, David Hume describes free will as a ‘false sensation or seeming experience" (a velleity) which is associated with many of our actions when we perform them. On reflection, we realize that they were necessary and determined all along (Fischer, 2005). FREE WILL AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Moral responsibility is the main issue of contention between hard determinists and compatibilists. Hard determinists are forced to accept that individuals often have "free will" in the compatibilist sense, but they deny that this sense of free will can ground moral responsibility. The fact that a man’s choices are unforced, hard determinists claim, does not change the fact that determinism relieves the man of responsibility (Wegner, 2003). Compatibilists argue, on the contrary, that determinism is a prerequisite for moral responsibility. Society cannot hold someone responsible unless his actions were determined by something. If indeterminism is true, then those events that are not determined are random. It is doubtful that one can praise or blame someone for performing an action generated spontaneously by his nervous system. Instead, one needs to show how the action stemmed from the persons desires and preferences—the persons character—before one can hold the person morally responsible (Wegner, 2003). On similar grounds, a view is that individual character also is directly related with moral values practiced by a person. That is, a person with the character of a murderer has no choice other than to murder, but can still be punished because it is right to punish those of bad character. How ones character was determined is irrelevant from this perspective. Hence, Robert Cummins and others argue that people should not be judged for their individual actions, but rather for how those actions "reflect on their character". If character (however defined) is the dominant causal factor in determining ones choices, and ones choices are morally wrong, then one should be held accountable for those choices, regardless of genes and other such factors (Smilansky, 2000). There is one exception to the assumption that moral responsibility is determined by individual character or freely willed acts is in cases where his actions were a consequence of abnormal brain function. The person with this condition can be said to have less responsibility for his actions. Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen, researchers in the emerging field of neuroethics, argue, on the basis of such cases, that our current notion of moral responsibility is founded on libertarian (and dualist) intuitions. They argue that cognitive neuroscience research is undermining these intuitions by showing that the brain is responsible for our actions, not only in cases of serious mental disorders, but even in less obvious situations. For example, damage to the frontal lobe reduces the ability to weigh uncertain risks and make prudent decisions, and therefore leads to an increased likelihood that someone will commit a violent crime. In each case, the guilty party can be said to have less responsibility for his actions. Greene and Cohen predict that, as such examples become more common and well known, jurors’ interpretations of free will and moral responsibility will move away from the intuitive libertarian notion which currently underpins them (Wegner, 2003). Greene and Cohen also argue that the legal system does not require this libertarian interpretation. Only retributive notions of justice, in which the goal of the legal system is to punish people for misdeeds, require the libertarian intuition. Consequentialist approaches to justice, which are aimed at promoting future welfare rather than meting out just deserts, can survive even a hard determinist interpretation of free will. The legal system and notions of justice can thus be maintained even in the face of emerging neuroscientific evidence undermining libertarian intuitions of free will (Wegner, 2003). Works Cited: Lynch, Chris. Freewill. Harpercollins Childrens Books, 2002. Smilansky, Saul. Free Will and Illusion. Oxford University Press, 2000. Fischer, Martin. Free Will: Critical Concepts in Philosophy. Routledge, 2005. Kane, Robert. Free Will. Wiley-Blackwell, 2001. Shermer, Michael. The Science of Good and Evil: Why People Cheat, Gossip, Care, Share, and Follow the Golden Rule. Holt Paperbacks, 2004. Wegner, Daniel. The Illusion of Conscious Will. The MIT Press, 2003. Read More