Hegels Philosophy of Right - Essay Example

Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Part One Whether Hegel’s Concept of Right and its Actualization is Obscure and Controversial or a Logically Connected Argument that Leads to a Wider Account of Freedom Introduction As Smith points out, the revival of interest in Hegel appears more or less an undeniable feature of the contemporary intellectual landscape (1989); hence, Hegel’s political philosophy could be considered not only “a useful point of departure” for all those who are uneasy about justifying liberalism, but also a major source of continued debate amongst commentators and researchers in the field (Smith, 1989; Brooks, 2007). According to Wood (1991), the book of Hegel, entitled Elements of the Philosophy of Right and first published in 1821, could be read as a political philosophy, being an object of heated controversy from the very beginning. Brooks, on the other hand, identifies two great debates on the Philosophy of Right, as the work is more commonly known, namely one over its political sympathies and another on its relationship to metaphysics (2007). Thus, the first debate is thought to have arisen since the book’s first appearance, where the Philosophy of Right had been charged with “a dangerous conservatism” (Brooks, 2007) and the earliest reviews written by those Hegel had considered friends of him were nearly uniformly negative (Wood, 1991). These early attacks, however, viewed the book in relation to the immediate political situation, which may account for the reason why it was read as a blessing on the political status quo; not surprisingly, commentators and scholars in the liberal tradition followed that interpretation (Wood, 1991). The second debate, according to Brooks (2007), divided the scholarship into two camps – adherents of the “metaphysical approach to the study of Hegel’s work” and such of the “non-metaphysical approach to Hegel’s work”. Whereas the first debate, about the nature of Hegel’s political philosophy, is believed to be over, with the assertion that Hegel’s views lie in between the extremities of conservatism and liberalism, the second one has developed into an argument about “how strongly metaphysical” is Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Brooks, 2007). This paper is intended to review Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, namely its Part one – “Abstract Right”, in order to establish which are the main categories of Hegel’s argument and how they logically connect with each other. The paper argues that it is the philosophical method of Hegel, which holds the key to the understanding of his logic. The Concept of Abstract Right There are two main categories of Hegel’s argument in Part One of the Philosophy of Right, as follows – the concept of ‘Abstract Right’ and the development of this concept, or its actualisation; the latter, however, consists of several subcategories, or consecutive phases – property, contract, and the concept of wrong – and delineates the broader motions of freedom, civil society and state. The concept of abstract right is introduced via the understanding of the free will as conceived in a “condition of self-involved simplicity”, where the latter consists “in a negative attitude towards reality, and a bare abstract reference of itself to itself” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p.51). In other words, the free will is depicted as an abstract conception, which is implicit, with “no real object opposed to it”, whose future characters are potential but not yet developed “into an articulate whole” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p.52). According to Hegel, the will becomes, or is being made definite due to the fact that it contains “within itself the contrast between particular and universal”, hence the absence of definite features is “itself a definite feature” (1821, 2001, p.52). Thus, in the condition of lack of definiteness, as set in opposition to the definite, “abstract identity becomes the distinguishing feature of the will”, hence the will becomes “an individual will or person” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p.52). This would account for the transition from a stage, where the abstract, yet separate and independent unit – the consciously free will – is made more definite; however, as Hegel states, there is “no progress or modification of any kind” (1821, 2001, p.52); and where the connection between the abstract and some particularity is made through the absence of definite features. Since personality, in Hegel’s view, arises from the knowledge of oneself as an object, being “raised... by thought into the realm of pure infinitude”, individuals have got personality only when they have “reached this pure thought and self-consciousness” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, pp.52-3). In a nutshell, the abstract will is a person, while the person, however, is different from subject, and the subject appears only the possibility of personality (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p.53). The aforesaid comes to depict the independent state of personality as “the free being” existing for itself, “in pure self-conscious isolation” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p.53). The obvious contradiction here is pointed out by Hegel himself – “the highest aim of man is to be a person”, whereas “the mere abstraction ‘person’ is not held in high esteem”; which, to a degree or another, is explained via the difference between ‘person’ and ‘subject’, as well as the notion that person “has its subjectivity as an object” (1821, 2001, p.53). However, according to Collins (2001), the key to understanding of the nature of such contradictions is Hegel’s philosophical method, which demonstrates that there is a necessary connection between the opposites; hence the contradictory opposite belongs to the concept itself since it follows from what the concept requires (pp.22-3). Nevertheless, this contradiction inter alia may have accounted for some of the criticism about Hegel’s political philosophy, in particular that is “guilty of the organic fallacy” and consisted of controversial metaphysical claims (Smith, 1989, p.1; Brooks, 2007). The controversy is thus fomented by the view that the phases of person that are “distinct as yet from the personality” have not “yet attained the form of freedom” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p.53). Having defined the notion of abstract will, or person, Hegel connects ‘personality’ with its capacity to possess rights, which is seen as “the conception and abstract basis of abstract right” (1821, 2001, p.53). Such a right, according to Hegel, is both abstract and formal, and its mandate includes respect for others as persons; so, at this phase, “the unity between infinite and finite, of limit and unlimited”, as existing in a person, acquires additional particularity, which is not included in the “mere abstract personality” (1821, 2001, p.53). So, thus far, the concept of abstract right could be seen as a particular sequence of phenomena, which begins with the singularity and isolation of self-feeling, or, as Collins aptly points out, an empty ego conscious of every definite thing, including its own, and reaches the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness (2001). Thus, having given itself reality – fist in its own living body, hence life – the will moves into the reality of its physical life, or beyond its own singular existence to a thing that exists outside itself, and within a context of other natural things (Collins, 2001). As mentioned above, the contradictions, including the self-contradiction of abstract right, in fact represent Hegel’s philosophical method, or procedure, which implies “a necessary connection to what contradicts or negates it”; in such a manner Hegel derives his concept whereby the necessary connection between the opposites is acknowledged (Collins, 2001, pp.22-3). The Actualisation of Abstract Right Having admitted that “the possession of right gives a certain authority”, whereas the necessity for it is just one aspect of the matter; hence being a “mere possibility”, abstract right, just as in all other possibilities, may or may not occur (1821, 2001). Such a possibility, according to Hegel, appears the “first and direct existence” of freedom, which, in the Hegelian sense, is seen at this stage as “that of abstract will in general, or of a separate person who relates himself only to himself” (1821, 2001, p.54). Subsequently, a person relates to another person in their capacity of owners, as opposed to their fixed existence for each other, whereby the possession of property is depicted as another phase of the existence of right (Hegel, 1821, 2001). Insofar as a person’s freedom should be given an external sphere – so that the person “may reach the completeness implied in the idea” – the possession of property is seen as such an external sphere of freedom, which supersedes and replaces the subjective phase of personality (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p.55). At that point, as Hegel states, the person becomes rational, although the first realisation of one’s freedom is rather imperfect (1821, 2001). The concept of property and its possession appears the obvious connection to the next phases of the actualisation of right; whereby, assuming that “in personality all persons are equal”, Hegel sets forth another contradiction – the reference to the source of possession and the possession of property itself are declared “the only kind of equality”, which could be taken in consideration (1821, 2001, pp.60-61). Here, in regard to the possession of property, are introduced the concepts of justice and wrong, which are also contradicted to each other – “justice demands merely that everyone should have property”, whereas “men often desire the goods of others, but this desire is wrong” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p.61). However, the act of possession is defined as the next step in fixing property as the outward symbol of personality, insofar as the inner act of the will should be recognised by others (Hegel, 1821, 2001). The modes of taking possession – whether “the simple bodily grasp”, forming, marking or designating of the object – are set forth to exhibit “the progress from the category of particularity to that of universality” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, pp.63-4). The use of the object, however, reveals such a dynamics, where the will returns from its existence as property to its existence “within the singularity of its own life”, so the property, being governed by the will, necessarily becomes private property (Collins, 2001, p.25). Thus the two phases – the act of possession and the use of the object – are connected via the fundamental principle of the will of the owner, whereas the use of the object is seen as an external, subordinate manifestation (Hegel, 1821, 2001). The relinquishment of property, on the other hand, is understood as a process, which, in all its phases may denote “a true taking of possession”; thus, once again, Hegel demonstrates his method of making necessary connection between the opposites – “possession through relinquishment” (1821, 2001, p.71). Since things can manifest one self’s power over them, but this could be only acknowledged by another person, the obvious – according to Hegel – development is two “absolutely distinct and separate owners” to form one will; thus, each of them “ceases to be an owner through his own distinct will”, while the “one will remains” (1821, 2001, p.77). This phase of development of the concept of right, where property departs its external reality, “as a mere thing”, and embodies the elements of the two separate persons’ will is the contract (Hegel, 1821, 2001). The contract is regarded as an external manifestation of right, where “right and its essential embodiment in the particular will” are in accord, whether directly or accidentally; in other words, such a reality “consists in the opposition of abstract right to the particular will”, which, however, “may act in opposition to the general abstract right” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p. 83). The contrast between the common will and the particular will of the participants is defined as exposed to wrong (Hegel, 1821, 2001). Subsequently, crime and justice are described as “the visible outer form” of the development of the will, which is further underpinned by the distinction between the universal and individual will, where the latter exists in opposition to former (Hegel, 1821, 2001, p.95). The transition from right to morality, in turn, denotes the whole process of actualisation of will, whose first and simple form – the abstract right – undergoes development, where that will is involved in “the opposition of the abstract universal will and the independent particular will” (Hegel, 1821, 2001). So, according to Hegel, the removal of this opposition, “i.e. by the negation of a negation”, the will becomes actualised one, which has acquired “its personality as its object” (1821, 2001, p.95). Accordingly, the conception of freedom progresses from the first abstract phase to the phase of the “self-determining subject” (Hegel, 1821, 2001, pp.95-96). Conclusion In his preface to the book, Hegel states that the logical rules, like “definition, classification and inference”, etc., are “generally recognized to be inadequate for speculative science”, whereas his method of procedure, namely the general speculative method, should be considered the “only kind of scientific proof available in philosophy” (pp.10-11). Thus, having appeared a part of his system of philosophy, the Philosophy of Right should be understood within the context of that larger system, and particularly its foundation in Hegel’s conception of logic (Brooks, 2007). All in all, Hegel’s philosophical method, which undertakes to prove the legitimacy of its concepts instead of taking them for granted, presents the key to the logic of his conceptions (Collins, 2001). References Brooks, Thom, 2007, Hegel’s Political Philosophy: A Systematic Reading of the Philosophy of Right. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd. Collins, Ardis B., 2001, “Hegel’s Critical Appropriation of Kantian Morality” in Beyond Liberalism and Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, edited by Robert R. Williams. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 21-41. Hegel, G.W.F., 1821, Philosophy of Right, translated by S.W. Dyde, 2001 Edition. Kitchener, Ontario: Batoche Books Limited. Smith, Steven B., 1989, Hegel’s Critique of Liberalism: Rights in Context. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Wood, Allen W., (ed.), 1991, Hegel: Elements of the Philosophy of Right. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Read More