The Richness of Michel Foucaults Philosophy - Essay Example

Foucault’s Elitist Project The richness of Michel Foucault’s philosophy is characterized by his problematization over the individual subject vis-à-vis its relationship with a given institution: how the subject is constituted; how it is formed, transformed, and influenced; how it is governed; and how it becomes possible for this subject to constitute itself. In his investigations into the workings of disciplinary institutions, Foucault’s philosophy is highlighted by his analytics of power. His work on the subject inevitably leads to a consideration of the relations of power that operate in institutions of conformity, where the interplay of the latter result in the production of what he calls a ‘docile body’: a specific type of individual as opposed to another, one who has been touched and molded in the context of a power relation. It is in this context where Foucault’s project becomes attractive to the reactionary elite: the institution plays a central positive role in the formation of the relevant discourse itself. In other words, Foucault’s base project, the problematization of the self, does not call for the removal of the dominant institution. Instead, his project can be interpreted as an indirect support for the latter. In this paper, the author examines Michel Foucault’s philosophy and takes a look at how it can be interpreted in a manner that appeals to the reactionary elite perspective. While Foucault does talk about such concepts as relations of power, subjugation, and resistance, his discussions present these concepts as interweaving modes of discourses. As such, his philosophy is in fact highly positive in tone. Positive Power Foucault asserts that power relations are productive; where some interpretations of power tend to lean towards its repressive and oftentimes, oppressive nature, Foucault offers an opposite view, one that shows power to be a positive network of relations. This reversal of perspectives pertaining to power is one of the trademarks of Foucauldian thought. His genealogical projects are characterized by a generous sprinkling of such reversals, wherein he takes the dominant intellectual, social, or political trend and subjects them to a critical evaluation. Foucault poses opposite the ‘repressive’ view of power an ‘empowering’ one, which for present purposes will be referred to as ‘negative’ power and ‘positive’ power, respectively. Contrasted with the former as the power that says ‘no’, positive power ‘enables’. In an interview, Foucault says, If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold good, what makes it accepted, is simply the fact that it doesn’t only weigh on us as a force that says no, but that it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, forms knowledge, produces discourse. It needs to be considered as a productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than as a negative instance whose function is repression (Foucault in Gordon, 1980, p.119). If power were understood only in terms of its repressive effects, the whole social structure within which every member of society is enmeshed, including the operations responsible for its advancement, would not be accounted for. Societal ‘progress’ that results from the efficient distribution of interweaving points of resistance is not seen for what it is. Thus, there is a failure to recognize the import of power as a force that is capable of ‘producing’ a myriad of things we consider valuable and ‘good’, as Foucault himself mentioned in the above interview. In other words, power relations should be seen not merely as something that prohibits, but as a relation that has the capacity to produce. It is understandable that Foucault’s philosophy appeals to the marginalized, primarily because of his insistence that “where there is power, there is resistance” (Foucault, 1978, p.95). However, the idea of resistance for Foucault is not simply emancipatory in nature. Rather, like small drops of water that erode a slab of concrete over time, resistance has an effect, either directly or indirectly. In this sense, resistance is basically the human capacity to create a particular lifestyle, or more specifically, the capacity to practice freedom. Thus, it is possible to understand ‘freedom’ as the condition that is constituted by the ability to resist. Nevertheless, it should be clarified that resistance in Foucauldian terms is not limited to acts that are contrary to institutional demands; ‘to resist’ does not simply mean ‘to go against.’ Rather, it is with emphasis that resistance be understood as the ability to change the hold of power in such a way as to not be restricted, but empowered by the relation to live a specific lifestyle. Disciplinary Power as Positive Power Disciplinary institutions are, by and large, places where power is exercised and coursed through various mechanisms, but not merely for its own sake. This point is important. The latter observation is made by subjecting the study of such institutions to a reversal: is it really the simple case that power is found only on one side, exerting its influence through restrictions and rules? The answer as per Foucault is ‘no.’ Not only can power be understood in the negative, it can also be seen in the positive, as a productive relationship. This is an aspect of power relations that is either overlooked or altogether dismissed. There is a purpose to an institution’s exercise of power, depending upon the nature of that institution; at most, what can be said insofar as purpose is concerned is that institutions all aim at producing ‘docile bodies’ in whatever form the latter may take. Again, this depends on what type of individual an institution intends to fashion. ‘Docile body’ simply refers to the type of individual that is trained and disciplined in the context of a power relation in an institution. It is in Discipline and Punish (1977) that Foucault’s concern with discipline and surveillance becomes even more pronounced than his other genealogical works. Here he examines the progressive sophistication of disciplinary mechanisms employed in prisons that are in fact, upon closer scrutiny, representative of the same progression of disciplinary mechanisms in society. Foucault poses the question of how and why discipline is utilized as an important institutional technique. With the individualization of ‘man the machine’, discipline functions to analyze and transform the body into a manipulable being, capable of being put to productive use by the institution. ‘Productivity’ in this sense refers to the condition of being able to carry out and further the cause of the institution. Thus, the meaning of ‘productivity’ depends on the institutional demands imposed upon its subjects. Further, the notion of productivity in this sense carries with it the aspect of ‘training the individual’. He writes: Discipline is an art of rank, a technique for the transformation of arrangements. It individualizes bodies by a location that does not give them a fixed position, but distributes them and circulates them in a network of relations (Foucault, 1977, p. 144). In understanding discipline as training, it becomes even clearer how Foucault’s philosophy aligns itself with elitist ideals and practices. “Discipline is no longer simply an art of distributing bodies, of extracting time from them and accumulating it, but of composing forces in order to obtain an efficient machine.” (Foucault, 1977, p.164). Discipline, therefore, is combinatory: it functions to combine elements, in this case, individuals, into a uniform mass not through the individual variables found in each element, but through the characteristics imposed upon it because of the space it occupies. Hence, the space defines the capabilities of each individual, which in turn contribute to the collective function of the mass. As it were, the individual is trained through its designation or position, the series that is relevant to his codified space, and through the issuance of a systematic order or command from the authority (Foucault, 1977, p.166). In sum, it can be seen that for Foucault, power relations can be understood as productive relations, and not just negative and prohibitive. As a network of productive relations, it utilizes disciplinary techniques that do operate on subjugation, but subjugation of a type that produces efficient masses of individuals. It is in this latter sense that Foucault’s philosophy becomes elitist in flavor, for while he talks of resistance, he situates acts of resistance within relations of power and not outside of it, hence the perpetuation of the relation as a dynamic and self-sustaining discourse. Nevertheless, as a final positive note, Foucault mentions in an interview that: I am not positing a substance of resistance in the face of power. I am simply saying: as soon as there is a power relation, there is the possibility of resistance. We are never trapped by power: we can always modify its grip in determinate conditions and according to precise strategy (Foucault in Lotringer, 1989). Works cited Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish. Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Vintage Books, 1977 (translation copyright). ---. “The End of the Monarchy of Sex”. Foucault Live: Interviews, 1966-84. Ed. Sylvere Lotringer. New York: Columbia University, 1989. 137- 155. ---. The History of Sexuality. Trans. Robert Hurley. New York: Random House, 1978 (translation copyright). ---. “Truth and Power.” Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972-1977. Ed. Colin Gordon. New York: Pantheon, 1980. 109-133. Read More