Functionalism and the Theory of the Mind - Essay Example

Running head: Functionalists account for mental causation 30th April If every physical event has a sufficient physical cause, how can a functionalist account for mental causation? According to Aristotle, every event has a cause. Being a principle that is universally adopted, this statement by Aristotle generates controversy as to the actual cause of a certain event. Additionally, Aristotle indicates that there are many kinds of causes which he classified as efficient, final, formal and material. One of the major challenges that the philosophers depict is to refine the idea of determinism and tracing the particular path that results to a certain cause. Functionalism also referred to as philosophy of the mind refers to the theory of the mind which is largely developed as the substitute to the identity theory of the mind as well as behaviorism. The most important point to note about the functionalism is that it indicates that mental states which constitute beliefs, being in pain and desires are composed entirely by their functional roles. Being a theoretical; level existing between implementation and physical output, functionalism is different from Cartesian dualism which supports the physical substance and mental independency. The aim of this paper is to discuss how functionalist account for mental causation given that every physical event has a sufficient physical cause. Mental causation One of the major worries that are experienced in functionalism is the problem of mental causation. This refers to facing a problem of accounting for the idea that intentional mental state and intentional thoughts are triggers of intentional actions1. Mental causation covers the mind’s interaction with the rest of the world and how it influences the behavior of individuals. One of the major sub-division of the problem of mental causation is problem of mental causal exclusion. Others are anomalism and externalism problems. A good example of the causal exclusion problem is indicated when pain is experienced and it is generally linked to a certain state, and the higher properties of that state occurs, then argument that it is pain can casually irrelevant. In dealing with the problem of mental causation, various responses have emerged. According to Antony and Levine 1997, the problem occurred due to highly restrictive causation whereby a cause has to produce its effect. Other philosophers indicate that causation covers the relationships that exist between various events that must be invoked in order to produce a certain behavior. Recently, causal exclusion problem has been noted to relate with theories of mental states. Theorists such as Anthony and Levine indicated that even though mental states can be defined based on their implication on human behaviours, they generate other effects that are not in line with the definitions, an aspect that figures out causal generalizations that are true and contingent. Another issue that relates to the mental causation problem is entirely disagreeing with humean account of causation Based on the fact that mental conditions are identified by their functional role, it shows that they are realized on various or multiple levels. This implies that they are manifested in various systems as long as the system, even if it is a computer functions in an appropriate manner. While computers have electronic substrate that is provided with inputs to produce an output, brains on their part are physical devices that contain neural substrate that produce behaviours once an input in inserted. Multiple realizability One of the major aspects that accounts for functionalism on mental causation is the one that touches on multiple realizability. Standard functionalist theory indicates that mental state includes the corresponding functional duties that can be explained without considering the physical medium that includes neurons and brain. In this regard, an individual need to take into consideration the higher-level functions within the cognitive system. Another point to note is that due to the fact that mental states are not limited to particular medium, they can be achieved in multiple avenues, which includes non-biological systems for instance in the computer networks. This can also be explained by the example that silicon-based system could have similar mental life like the one with human beings as long as the cognitive system has effective functional roles. It is worth to note that mental states are personalized just like a valve. For instance, a valve can be made of metal, plastic or any other material as long as it appropriately performs it function of blocking and unblocking the flow of the liquid in an industry or in the environment. As more changes occur in the functionalism is viewed by different individuals, there has emerged different functionalist theories that corroborate with the theory of the mind which refute the issue of multiple realizability. As indicated by Block (1978), there exist Functional Specification Theories that indicates that mental states are not functional role themselves but they represent certain realizers of the functional roles2. Additionally, this theory indicates that mental states of believe for instance is the neurological process or brain that undertakes the correct belief function. This implies that Functional Specification Theories do not support the issue that mental states have multiple realizability, an aspect that is allowed by the standard functionalism which is commonly referred to as Functional State Identity Theories. The major reason as to why Functional Specification Theories do not support multiple realizability is the fact that mental states are only realized by brain an issue that is seen to be important. According to Hilary Putnam on his view on functionalism, he depended on the perception that creatures such as silicon-based systems would contain the same mental states as human being, and that Functional State Identity Theories and their support for multiple realizability makes them good theories of the mind. While covering on the mental causation, various functionalisms provide diversified views as discussed below. Machine state functionalism Having been established by Hilary Putnam, machine state functionalism was the first formulation of functionalism. The theory was also supported by other psychologists who indicated that there exist analogies between the theoretical machines for instance computer systems that are in a position to compute algorithm and the human mind3. Another notable point as indicated by machine state functionalism is that the nature of the mental state is similar to the nature of the automated systems and their functions are just like the way the mind interacts with the surrounding environment. Psychofunctionalism Psychofunctionalism as the second type of functionalism indicates that it does not support behaviourist theories as covered in the area of psychology and they should be substituted by models of the mind that are empirically cognitive in nature4. According to functionalists who adopt this functionalism, psychology is a complex area and that the terms applied in the subject to describe the properties of the mind in the theories cannot be redefined to achieve simpler behavioural nature. They also argue that psychology applies the same principles that are used in biological science which for instance indicate that the role of a kidney is to filter blood while the heart is responsible for pumping it. Thus, psychofunctionalists indicates that the duties of mental states for example desire and belief depends on causal role that is given to them according to best scientific psychological theory that we possess. Analytic functionalism Analytic functionalism on its part touches on the implications of the theoretical terms applied in the field of psychology. Having been developed by David Lewis, this functionalism indicates that theoretical terms are not defined by the intrinsic properties on the issues they comprise but by the theories in the formulation they exist5. For example the meaning of terms like desire, hunger or belief is not sufficient to hold the rigor indicated by the materialistic theories of casualty as well as reality. Homuncular functionalism Homuncular functionalism, which was established by Daniel Dennett and later enjoyed support from William Lycan emerged as the result of the challenges that were experienced by the Chinese nation in addition to the Searle Chinese Room, where thought experiments adopted earlier types of functionalism. While they were wired together, some individuals argued that qualitative as well as intentional properties of the mind were key aspects that were noted in the Chinese nation6. According to this theory, a change in the underlying physical substratum will definitely result into a change in mental realm. A good example can be indicated by labeling mental facts residing in higher-level A1 while the one at the lower-level A2. In this case, if A1 supervenes on A2, while A2 supervenes on the physical base referred to as P, then it implies that A1 and A2 will ultimately supervene on P even though the two sets of the mental facts are separate7. Based on the fact that mind-mind supervenience has been allowed within the functionalist circles, it has become a major method of resolving the puzzle that is experienced in the hierarchical series of minds. Conclusion Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the way functionalists account for mental causation varies depending on their views on the relationship of the mental states. Functionalism, which stands for the theory of the mind, has played a major role for theorists in learning on the issues touching on mental causation. Another important aspect that the paper has covered is multiple realizability. Having emerged from philosophers such as Fodor and Putnam, multiple realizability has recently been noted to attack key theories. As a result, functionalism has taken its position in explaining the philosophy of mind. Notable types of functionalism that are discussed in the paper include machine state functionalism, psychofunctionalism, analytic functionalism and homuncular functionalism. Based on the importance of importance of philosophy that include identifying how brain works, mental properties, mental functions and consciousness, there is need for philosophers in various institutions of higher learning to undertake more research and come up with clear and simpler way of understanding philosophy of mind. Additionally, by undertaking research among the students in various levels on their learning experiences and habits, learning institutions will be exposing the learners to better understanding of how their brain works. Once the researches are undertaken, it is essential that the information in properly stored in libraries in addition to be put in the internet for interested parties to read it. References Armstrong, D. 1981. The Causal Theory of the Mind, in Chalmers. Putnam, H.1967. The Nature of Mental States, in Chalmers. Lewis, D, 1969. Psycho-physical and Theoretical Identifications, in Chalmers. Block, N, 1978. Troubles with Functionalism, in his Readings in Philosophy of Psychology. Vol. 1. London, 1995. Methuen. Excerpt reprinted in Chalmers. Read More