The Various Forms of Functionalism - Essay Example

Philosophy of psychology Philosophy of mind affiliation Philosophy of psychology Philosophy of mind 0. IntroductionFunctionalism has long been termed as the solution to the question of the mind and body relationship. However, for a clear understanding of functionalism, it is vital to understand the different forms of functionalism and how they contribute to offering solutions to the mind and body issue. Despite the debates that surround functionalism, it is reasonable to assess the different forms so as to analyze if functionalism actually contributes to attaining phenomenal consciousness. Through this, it will be easier to relate what faction of functionalism plays a major role in explaining the complete account of the functional human mind. It is also important to realize that the body-mind problem has the physical and mental components in it. This relates to the concept of dualism. One cannot be detached from the other. For instance, pain touches both on the mind and the body of the injured. In this case, functionalism is the most reliable option for explaining the nature and aspects of the human mind. An overview of the accounts of functionalism is therefore necessary. The mind has a massive task to play in the determination of the belief an individual holds. This argument concurs with that of Fodor that argues that an individual may hold on to a theory that justifies common sense, their desires, beliefs or explanations. This is to mean that the mind plays a functional role in a human being. These functions may be categorized into philosophical functionalism and psychological functionalism (Bermúdez, 2005, p. 40). This essay shall attempt to assess the various forms of functionalism and how they account for phenomenal consciousness. The essay shall then assess if the phenomenal consciousness should be rejected or amended based on the role played be phenomenal consciousness and its impact. 2.0. Brands of functionalism 2.1. Fodor’s views on functionalism In the work of Fodor (1987, p. 69) functionalism falls under various types. The author postulates that the most significant factor to note is that the individuals simply require having the right to psychological connections so as have to claim in having a belief (Fodor, 1987, p. 69). In this case, the psychological connections relate to inputs, mental states and outputs that lead to these connections. The endorsement of the psychological connections by Fodor relates to the fact that the physical characteristics of an individual have a huge role to play in determining the kind of belief they hold. However, Fodor (1987, p.69) says that the philosophical aspect of the mind does not hold much importance. The author refers to the philosophical motivations as psycho-functionalism as not having stronger connections than the psychological ones. The connection of the content with the belief is much more important. The major aim and functionality of functionalism, therefore, does not recount in any approach to the role of semantics in functionalism. Content, in the argument of Fodor, does not have any importance to functionalism (Fodor, 1987, p.72). For meaning to be yielded, other factors such as the psychology of the human come in handy as opposed to philosophy. In that case, therefore, Fodor endorses denotation as most important in functionalism. In his work, concepts can only be individuated as long as they have an orientation to the meanings that they portray, and the aspects that they correlate to (Fodor, 1987, p.91). Devoid of any functional role that a thought or mental symbol may play in the context of interrelations, the mental symbols may simply express a property in relation to its causal relationship but not the actual relationship with that particular property (Fodor, 1987, p.91). It is therefore worth to question when a mental symbol will be used to validate or define a property in non-semantic, non- teleological and non-functional terms. Fodor (1987, p.126) says that if one aspect causes another in all its aspects, and that that particular aspect causes psychophysical and psychophysical traces to which the individuals has an optimal relationship, then that mental symbol is validated. If the symbol does not cause an effect, then that symbol is not validated. Summarily, Fodor believes in the fact that commonsense psychology cannot be escaped. This form of psychology, according to Fodor, has chances of having scientific vindication. This means that through vindicating commonsense psychology, one is able to acknowledge the states that display the kinds of properties that common sense attributes to the attitudes in question. If commonsense psychology can be justified scientifically, then it makes sense (Fodor, 1987, p.12). Human beings naturally ascribe their desires, beliefs, sensations and feelings to themselves and the ones around them. This is for the reason that they have knowledge of the existence of such mental states that actually coordinate their bodily activities. Additionally, through the mental states, individuals are able to respond to situations in the world and around them. Through the mental states, individuals can justify how they act based on how they understand them. Commonsense psychology is a theoretical presupposition that explains the internal causes of an individual’s behaviour, beliefs and desires that have a link with content and causal power (Fodor, 1987, p.12-6). Their interactions with some situations must also have some relationship with general laws that connect with their desires and beliefs (Fodor, 1987, p.12-6). In this case, commonsense psychology is a mental phenomenon that allows individuals explain why they believe they believe and justify what they do. The individual body cannot be alienated from external circumstances, internal states and explicit behaviour. Through this form of psychology, therefore, simple and decisive solutions to the predicaments of other people’s minds (Fodor, 1987, p.12). 2.2. Commonsense psychological explanation Bermúdez (2005, p. 52) holds the idea that the nature of the functional mind has a huge role to play to commonsense psychological explanation in the study and analysis of the mind. As argued by philosophers and psychologists, patterns of behaviour can only be understood after a deep analysis. This recounts to the reality that the mind can only be understood by the functionalism has a sharp distinction between the generalizations of commonsense psychology and the causal generalizations (Bermúdez, 2005, p. 52). In this light, it is vital to understand the kinds of functionalism put in play by the individual. An analysis of psychological explanation relates to the fact that psychological explanations explain which agents perform which roles as opposed to the reasons behind those agents performing those roles. The psychological states are likened to physical structures that only continue to exist due to the causal relations to the action that was taken, which is the construction process, or the architectural deigns. In this regard, Bermúdez (2005, p. 53) says that so as to attain functionalism, the following conditions must be attained; One must think that causal explanations must exist only with the existence of causal laws One must believe that causal explanations must require the existence of causal laws One must consider that the causal laws governing commonsense psychological explanations must be at the individual level. 2.3. Commonsense philosophical explanation Ravenscroft (2005, p.26) says it is vital to comprehend the variations between philosophical behaviourism and others. The author argues that philosophical foundations of behaviour have no relationship with the mental states being the causative agents of our dispositions to having one way or another or in different circumstances (Ravenscroft, 2005, p.26). Philosophical functionalism, as argued by Bermúdez (2005, p. 70) are laws that can be read from the inanity that all humans need to embrace the fact that mental states feed to our behaviours. In this case, the philosophical functionalists believe that all explanations at the sub-personal level will unearth the realizers for the mental states that reside in the network nodes of the causal generalizations that construct reasonable psychology (Bermúdez, 2005, p. 70). Philosophical foundations, therefore, overlook the fact that psychology will discover the causal laws that will explain behaviour. It is the responsibility of the being to understand the concept of realization, if they have to understand behaviour. 3.0. Variants of functionalism account and phenomenal consciousness The variants of functionalism in one way or in another can account for phenomenal consciousness. In simple terms, phenomenal consciousness can be described as experience. This may relate to incidences of the experiential characteristics. This involves characteristics such as the feeling to have something or the feeling to own something (Ravenscroft, 2005, p.160-164). The experiences, as seen in the work of Ravenscroft (2005, p.164), may also refer to perceptual experiences, such as those of events, where an individual recalls of certain events. These memories are ones that may be referred to as the individual being phenomenally conscious. An individual may imagine being in a cinema hall even without being physically present. When they experience the same experience, chances are that they will find a relationship with what they imagined. Such persons may, as a result, be said to have attained phenomenal consciousness. This form of consciousness is, therefore, premeditated. It also limits its experiences to the perceptual experiences of an individual. The individual, hence, works on representational content (Ravenscroft, 2005, p.160-164). Variants of functionalism may account for phenomenal consciousness, as individuals may only experience events if they are phenomenally conscious. Fodor (1987, p.16) argues that if an individual has intentionality, they have both the representational features of the mental states. These mental states, therefore, have the phenomenal and intentional facets of the perceptual experiences. This can be related to the psychological variant of functionalism. For instance, an individual may have a visual experience of a football pitch. The pitch, according to them, may represent paradise as they have an experiential sense of the pitch. Having this belief is related to the senses of the individual, which touches on the psychological unit of functionalism. Additionally, the individual may also have a belief that they hold on to. This has a great relationship with the philosophical functionalism. This is because as the philosopher accounted, the phenomenal consciousness greatly relates to the intentional content. In line to these presuppositions, one would argue that variants of functionalism may account for phenomenal consciousness in an individual. Fodor (1987, p.16) says that functional system should be conscious. This is because a functional system is one comparable to the human mind that requires phenomenal conscious mental states. Through the types of functionalism, consciousness can be explained. It is evident that consciousness is simply a culmination of the mental states. This means that as opposed to the inner experiences of an individual, consciousness explains the experiences. This is a validation of the fact that units of functionalism embrace phenomenal consciousness. Phenomenal consciousness will also be attained through an understanding of dualism (Bermúdez, 2005, p. 14-15). Phenomenal consciousness links to non-physical and non-functional characteristics of the mental structures. Phenomenal consciousness can then be accounted for through the mental states being the realizers of the mind and the physical being. The functional states, as argued be Bermúdez (2005, p. 36-7), have attributes, and these attributes play the role of accounting for phenomenal conscious characteristics of some mental states. 4.0. Conclusion Conclusively, functionalism is a theory of the mind and body that explains behaviorism and identities. As seen in the essay, the mental states can be accounted for without considering the physical structure of the being. Functionalism focuses more on beliefs, emotions and desires of the individual. These mental states have been the source of consciousness that greatly correlates to the multifaceted interactions between diverse functional processes. Conversely, it is imperative to note that in spite of functionalism seeming too justifiable, a lot of con arguments have resulted touching on its ability to lead to phenomenal consciousness. Nonetheless, functionalism indicates that for consciousness to be attained, systems must function identically and in conjunction with each other. What is evident is that mental states are simply representational functional shapes within the system of the human body. These mental states may either have a qualitative touch or even quantitative. The various factions of functionalism have a huge role to play in attaining phenomenal consciousness. This has some absolute certainty in it. References Bermúdez, J. L., 2005. Philosophy of Psychology: A Contemporary Introduction. London: Routledge. Fodor, J., 1987. Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Ravenscroft, I.M., 2005. Philosophy of mind: A Beginners Guide. New York: Oxford University Press.  Read More