Does Kripke's Pierre Really Believe of London both that It Is Pretty and that It Is not Pretty - Term Paper Example

A PUZZLE ABOUT BELIEF A Puzzle about Belief Saul Kripke clearly brings into focus the narration about Pierre in his article, a puzzle about belief1. This story could be possibly true on earth as we know it. The story lacks twin worlds or people who are identical. For this reason, it distinguishes itself as a more innocent story compared to other recent past experiments of philosophical thought Sorensen, Roy. Without employing the use of dramatic devices, the story appears to point to realistic possibilities. The possibilities seem to have a lot of philosophical blast. Supposedly, the story about Pierre has become a common knowledge to philosophers by now. However, a short reminder will be vital. Pierre was initially a normal French speaker. Later, he moved to London where he learnt and practiced English. He did this without attempting to use the dictionary or any other reference material2. While still in France, he used to hear about London. As a result of what he heard concerning London, he obtained a disposition to subscribe to the sentence “Londres est jolie”. He still has this disposition. After spending some time in England, learnt and became a normal English speaker. Following what he had seen in London, he now asserts to the sentence that London is not pretty. Pierre does not notice that the very city he calls London and wishes when he speaks French is that same city as that which he calls London, when he now speak English. When communicating to his English friends, Pierre asserts that London is not pretty. When conversing with the French in this same city, he sometimes claims that "Londres est jolie", meaning that London is pretty3. According to the principles of our common practice of belief acknowledgment, we appear to be compelled to assert that Pierre believes that London is not pretty. This is based on his assertion that London is not pretty. At the same time, we appear to be compelled to conclude that Pierre believes that in fact London is pretty. This assertion is based on the strength of Pierre’s assertion that “Londres est jolie” these contradictory statements bring about a puzzle in the story about the common idea of belief. In other words, it creates a puzzle on the semantic role of proper nouns like London and Londres. Not only does Kripke believe that London is pretty but also as not pretty. Focusing on London not being beautiful, Pierre’s assumptions reveals out very clear. He first viewed London as beautiful before acquiring English knowledge. During that period he was the same as many fellow citizens. This made him viewed as having the same ideology as other native men of London that London was pretty4. Nevertheless, after obtaining the literacy in English he starts to restructure his ideology about London not being pretty. Marie who was also initially monolingual seconds his ideology. She also believes that London is pretty as well as not and this relates to the career she is undertaking. Their first impression about London was the same initially, but later changes with their enhancement in knowledge These controversies from above relates to another person, Lois, who is also on contradiction that Clark Kent cannot fly but superman can. This is even after being told the two are both the same person. Basing on Lois arguments Pierre also believe that London is not beautiful even though he has a foreign language there. This explains that when people drive away from a more farthest from their own ideology to the factual world, they should expect involvement of different theories. This will enhance understanding of their real world and even help them lose the stark simplicity they have ever had. In relation Lois tends not to believe Ralph contradictions that superman flies while Kent do not. This implies that Ralph is not relating to his personal propositions but rather to the reality Moreover stressing on Kripke’s ideology, Bryan argues that peter trust that Hellman who is pianist do not dwell in Minneapolis but rather the Hellman the philosopher. He also does not believe that the pianist and the philosopher are the same person. No matter the contradictions, he also must be coherent in the end. Moreover, his weird situation is because of conditions above his management. This is to say that his weird situations were not because of his cognitive gear. In spite of that, he was able to obtain some level of living by applying his own efforts to reveal if his beliefs are conflicting. The above tends to analyze that the problem was not within his rationality. Furthermore, Pierre becomes exposed to the fact that London is not pretty. His contractions are strongly supported by others’ controversies. His main languages are English and French that he employs to pearl out the famous city London. He does not recognize that these two languages are the main elements of determining the city. In reaction to his puzzle the question that he believes or not in London being pretty becomes very thorny to answers. A satisfactory answer becomes very difficult. It becomes very open that the normal criterion of his contribution results from paradoxes and attributions5. Thus basing on the puzzle, many problems arise. The main one is the normally accepted ideologies. These ideologies do not directly result in paradoxes. These problems cannot be tackled by descriptions made by Kent. This is because they tend to dodge the question of whether London is beautiful or not. Nevertheless, in support of the above, the relation of Tully and Cicero reveals the fact. For instance, Pierre may have gained knowledge on Plato in England and the same as platon in France. The fact that the names are not the same if he the same person he is not the same to Pierre. Moreover, assumption may arise that because Pierre now lives in England, he might have changed his mind about London. Thus, he may now view London as not pretty. The assumption may result from what he gave up in his previous belief that London was once pretty. Pierre becomes determined in his views about London6. He tends to repeat with vitality every contribution he ever pronounced in French. Furthermore, Pierre points out that he has alienated himself from his beliefs. This is to mean he has not changed anything. He is very sure that London is not pretty and no one can change his mind about it. Thus, one cannot argue Pierre’s ideas are right or wrong. Rather accept his ideologies as unquestionable. The idea emerges from the fact that he stayed in two places, England and France. Thus on the standard view of French remarks, one is able to round up that he may still believe that London is beautiful. In addition, he has never alienated from his facts he had while in France. Thus, Pierre becomes uninterested with the environment of London and in turn makes an English sentence that there is nothing good in London. His beliefs that London is pretty and not pretty at the same time depicts that he lacks information to prove otherwise of his assertions. The argument on ‘whether or not’ are based on people’s beliefs. This reduces their rationality. In the case of Pierre, since he is not able to have a stand on whether London is pretty or not, he emerges as irrational. He is not able to alienate from one ideology to another. Thus, this contradiction also affects Mary who believes that Cicero is bald and not Tully. This is to imply that Cicero is both bald and not bald at the same time, which is not possible. In relation, therefore one should respect Pierre words and the corresponding persons of English. Although this is contradictory, it becomes very difficult to separate them with various alternatives. Pierre has no temper to assent to the fact relating to London. His lack of opinion on the two sides makes his comments on London hanging. He is not able to explain himself why like and at the same time dislike London. It is clear from Pierre’s contradictions that he cannot depict a normal logical impact from an integrated lay down of what, at the time, he is considered separately as a speaker of French and English. In addition, he is not able to conclude the contradiction from the beliefs that London is as well as not pretty7. This is to explain that focusing on Pierre, as a French speaker will mainly dwell on his idea that London is pretty. On the other hand, when focusing on him as an English speaker, then the assumption would be that London is not pretty. The main reasons to these may be based on the experiences he shared in those two places. Moreover, theorists in classical point out that, rendition of language in strict speaking takes place among idiolects. This entails the translation of one’s name can take place only when there is same corporation between the speakers of those idiolects. This relates to the fact that any restriction agreed on is bound to noticeably fail in fitting the ordinary translation practices and even other communication reportages, which are indirect in nature. In addition, it does not even emerge to prevent the paradox. The above relates to the problem of substitutions by Millian’s views8. The result is that one may argue his ideologies out until he starts to contradict himself. Another contradiction arises from peter. His contradictions also tend to support that not only Pierre experiences the contradicting beliefs but also others. Peter’s contradictions are based on the fact that Paderewski had musical talents. On the other hand, he also believes that Paderewski had no musical talent. These beliefs are opposing yet he believes that they are all correct. This is not far from that of Pierre but only the context. The beliefs of peter are based on assumptions derived from his past life. The problem with him is that he never got the privilege of acquiring knowledge on Paderewski in a different way. Therefore, on judging him one should base it on the ordinary view of Paderewski. This relates to the common references thus the principle of misquotation. In relation to above, when Pierre obtains the bilingualism, a question may arise that is able to run a conclusion that the English and French names of London are the same. For instance, is London and londres the same? The reason is that his definitions reflected uniquely different properties. This is the reason why he also believes that London is pretty and London is not pretty at the same time. The answer to above question will automatically be a strong no. in explanation, if Pierre had agree that London is pretty in French, may have been as a result of weird feelings within himself9. In addition, it may also have involved the exposure to photos that depicted the worst parts of London. Thus, he may have concluded that London is not beautiful. Therefore, he is able to regard his different views as unique and keep them both. The Pierre’s puzzle depicts that the simple the termination the better. Furthermore, the situation that john is going through is more or less the same as that of Pierre’s. The suggestion that Tully and Cicero can be interchanged results to a homophonic paraphrasing of English language. By this Tully is viewed as Cicero and vice versa10. Moreover, john believes that Cicero is bald while Tully is not. The concept of them being the same person makes this belief vague and contradictory. Therefore, it is not right to put censure conclusions that are not palatable on john’s beliefs. The main explanation here does not rest on a given misleading notion in his argument but mainly in the temperament of the sphere going into entry. Both john’s and Pierre’s cases are in the arena where the ordinary practices are facing question basing on the attributed beliefs. In as much as in the article "A Puzzle about Belief" Kripke appears to oppose two possibilities, his case can be renovated11. This can be done based on the idea that two names attributed to the same item may have different semantic properties. This principle is hence supposed to clarify that co-referring names perform in a different way in propositions with reference to beliefs. However, the same experience takes place even with co-referring names which evidently have the same semantic properties: Kripke makes us to imagine a French, monolingual individual, Pierre, who believes that London is beautiful. Pierre later moves to London without recognizing that London is the same as Londres12. He then studies English in a similar way a child would learn a language. This means learning a language without translating words and phrases from French to English. He learns the name London from the unappealing part of the town in which he lives. As a result, so he comes to conclude that the town, London, is not beautiful. Assuming that Kripke’s account is right, Pierre now has a conviction that both that Londres is "joli" as well as that "London" is not beautiful. This puzzle cannot be made clear by coreferring names that have dissimilar semantic properties. According to Kripke, this reveals that giving extra semantic features to names does not explain the intention. It is logical to argue that Pierre believes that London is pretty. The unattractive part of the city where he moved to seems to have fairly educated inhabitants. Just like the majority of his neighbors, he hardly ever leaves this section of the city to explore better parts of London. All his neighbors do not know any French. He therefore has to learn English using the direct method. He achieves this through mixing with the neighboring people. Eventually, he manages to pick up English. In essence, every individual talked of the city London where they dwelt. Pierre therefore learnt all that they knew about London13. However, there is little overlap in whatever he learns now with that which he heard before. He of course learns to refer to the city he stays, as London. His surroundings are pathetic and not attractive at all. He is hence not impressed with majority of the new things he happens to see. He is also inclined to go along with the English sentence, London is not pretty. In real sense, he does not withdraw for a moment, his subscription from Londres est jolie, which means London is beautiful. Rather, he simply takes it for granted that the pathetic and unattractive city that he lives in now is different from charming city he used to hear about while in France. After his stay in London for some period of time, he becomes similar to his neighbors both in the knowledge of English and in the command and mastery of significant facts about the local geography. At this moment, his neighbors would in essence be said to use London as a name for London, and also to speak English. As an English speaker, Pierre does not differ in any way from his neighbors. However, on the basis of his sincere claim that London is not pretty, we ought to conclude that Pierre believes that London is pretty. It is however important to take into consideration, both the French utterances of Pierre as well as the English utterances. In that case, we need to say that his beliefs are contradictory, if any. Supposing that Pierre is a leading logician and philosopher, he would not entertain the contradictory beliefs. At least he would not let them pass. It is however clear that provided he is not aware that the city he calls London and Londres are not two different cities but rather one and the same, logic alone tells us that at least he has one false belief. On the other hand, he cannot be convicted of being inconsistent. It will be incorrect to do that. His contradictory beliefs are merely as a result of lack of information. All in all, we can only effectively attribute a belief to Pierre if we used London to exactly refer to the very same thing as londres. It is of great significance to remember that Londres for Pierre is the idealized place he came to know second hand. If Londres and London referred to the same referent, which means, the idealized place that Pierre learned about second hand, then we can comfortably attribute the belief that to Pierre, London is pretty. However, once we get to know that London refers to something else other than londres to Pierre, it is important to qualify the language we make use of. It is not correct to assert that Pierre is convicted that London is pretty since London for him, has occupied a whole new meaning as compared to what we know 14. Before Pierre made a visit to the slums, we were using londres synonymously with London. After the visit to the slums however, we are expected to qualify the language we are using in our narrative due to the revelation that Pierre does not view London in the same way that we do. As long as londres and London are kept to refer to London, like majority of us believe, then the case for Pierre remains puzzling. This puzzle can only be solved by giving up the fact that languages are for all intents and purposes shared. The personal history of Pierre hence affects his language. Communication with Pierre would have been a bit efficient if he were to use words and phrases the same way we use. Pierre unfortunately, is not aware of what his words mean. The main question for this puzzle therefore is that Do we assert, when we say “Pierre believes that London is pretty, and Pierre believes that London is not pretty” that his beliefs are contradictory? Given that the language we employ in ascribing belief is context responsive, there should be no clear answer to this question. It would not be astonishing, to find out that the answer is that it depends: a normal use of this would suggest that he had contradictory beliefs. Unusual uses of these ones, on the other hand, in a unique context whereby our interests are merely to express the truth conditions of various pieces of Pierre’s ill-fated mental landscape may not have such an entailment Theories regarding what an individual says and what he believes are therefore interdependent. A theory that discloses what a person says ought to be linked in a systematic manner with whatever the person believes or desires. In order to perfectly re-describe a person’s belief or say regarding what the person says or believes, there is need to source empirically adequate conditions of truth. In order to make sense to Pierre there is need to make necessary adjustments15. These adjustments should however be imposed basically for normative reasons. In conclusion, therefore clear notification should be considered that the principles of conversions could influence a person’s view of a place or another person. The results may be in form of a proof or disproof. Therefore understanding these people’s ideas becomes very difficult. For instance, Jan believes that Cicero is bald and not bald at the same time. Moreover, Mary also has her own belief that Cicero is bald and Tully is not. Pierre also believes that London is pretty and not pretty at the same time. These contradictions are not easily understandable. Some arguments may arise that the controversies may be due to personal ideologies and experiences. Thus different philosophers have many times, argued that these contradictions are very important to the study of psychology among other fields. In contrast, the current system views this as uncalled-for. It becomes even lesser due to no appreciation of existing paradoxes relating to Pierre ideologies. Bibliography Saul Kripke, A Puzzle About Belief, in A. Margalit, (ed), Meaning and Use (Dordrecht: D. Reidel 1979) David Sosa, The Import of the Puzzle About Belief, The Philosophical Review, 105/1996: 373- 402 Graeme Forbes, The Indispensability of Sinn, Philosophical Review 99/1990: 535-563 Bryan Frances, Defending Millian Theories, Mind 107/1998: 703-727 Schwitzgebel, Eric. "Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the Gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief." Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91, no. 4 (2010): 531-553. Sorensen, Roy. "What lies behind misspeaking." American Philosophical Quarterly 48, no. 4 (2011): 399. Read More