Hegels Ideologies in Intersubjectivity - Article Example

Intersubjectivity denotes a situation that is relative and shared among all pertinent subjects: neither objective nor merely subjective, however, inter-subjective.

In the passage, understanding intersubjectivity is a challenge. This is evident in the passage as it is confirmed by this statement “thus, intersubjectivity emerges as part of a larger problem (141).” It is a reality that the subject reacts with other subjects without the mediation of material elements such as body or sense media.  This concept is implicit in the notion of ‘intersubjectivity’. Recognition that the person uses the materials of culture and is impacted by other people does nothing to impose on the reality that such a notion is essentially individualist (Williams, 1992). Hegel does not believe that every person has to involve in a life and death fight for recognition. This is evident as gave suggested a different concept in substitute of a ‘formation of consciousness’, he proposed an individual level and a communal social-cultural world-chronological level.’  This can be analyzed as an attempt to prevent people from seeking recognition too much.

The concept of consciousness is brought in the passage, however, not as self-consciousness but as people living in self-sufficient communities. Undeniably, consciousness remains a prerequisite for cognitive self-consciousness. Hegel regards material culture as products of contemplation, and never spent bothered to understand the interrelationship between materials.  While he discarded the labor procedure as a pattern of the dialectic he did not discard apprehension with the creation and use of material civilization but changed it into a logical stature. Thus, when the promoters of ‘intersubjectivity’ expunge the usage of artefacts from unrestrained action, they ignore Spirit itself. Williams asserts that Hegel changed subjectivity to intersubjectivity. However, ‘intersubjectivity’ is incomprehensible and incoherent with core fundamentals of Hegel’s perception of subjectivity (Williams, 1992).