Intersubjectivity in The Light of Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber - Essay Example

? of An Essay on Inter ivity in The Light of Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber By of Course / Subject) (Name of Professor) (Date of Submission) Introduction Human beings are often divided into two aspects of being: objective and subjective. The former is hardly controversial, for it depicts a person’s thoughts just the way that person ought to speak or act. However, the latter is of great controversy when dealing with intersubjectivity, “that meeting of minds by which two selves take each other's meaning with reference to the same object beheld in common.”1 This is what intersubjectivity is all about, i.e. an account of the way a human being is molded or formed as a subject through ones own relations to other subjects. In this essay, I will conduct a comparative analysis of two accounts of intersubjectivity. I will show that Heidegger’s account of intersubjectivity is foundational for Buber’s account to take place. To nullify the former, we thus nullify the latter. Hence, the differences in both accounts are but a matter of differing modes of interpretation, due to the complexity of the nature of intersubjectivity. Heidegger’s Being-in-the-world In Being and Time, Heidegger discusses how Dasein recognizes objects of consciousness in-the-world first according to two paradigms, i.e. presence at hand and readiness to hand; tools and things.2 However he adds one more type of Being, i.e. Others, which differs from tools or things because “they are like the very Dasein which frees them, in that they are there too, and there with it;”3 “which would imply a certain objectivity, which is appropriate to use in relating to this Being.”4 But who are these Others that Heidegger is pertaining to? Heidegger explains, “by ‘Others’ we do not mean everyone else but me---those over against whom the “I” stands out. They are rather those from whom, for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself---those among whom one is too.”5 Now an important term here is his use of with, for he is trying to eliminate any distinction with Others to that of ourselves, since they share the world with us. Indeed, “the ‘with’ is something of the character of Dasein.”6 Now, here he makes an important point about the existence of Dasein as a Being-in-the-world, i.e. “the world is always the one that I share with Others. The world of Dasein is a with-world. And Being-in is Being-with Others.”7 So, “this Being-with Others defines the existence of Man. In Heidegger’s terms, now we know that for Dasein there is no Being without Being-in, and there is no Being-in without Being-with.”8 But what does Being-with mean? “Being-with must be of the essence of Dasein because without it any kind of relation to Others, even one of love, would not be possible, let alone essential itself.”9 This brings us to the fundamental question – What is Being? Herein is Heidegger’s foundation for intersubjectivity, i.e. the social self: Because Dasein’s Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others. This understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from knowledge about them, but a primordially existential kind of Being, which, more than anything else, makes such knowledge and acquaintance possible. Knowing oneself is grounded in Being-with.10 Thus, Heideggerian intersubjectivity is rooted upon Dasein’s encounter of the others, that is to say, that it depends on the intersubjective encounters with other temporal beings. The world by which we share with other temporal beings requires a kind of open subjectivity in order for understanding to take place. But how do we experience intersubjectivity with others? How does Dasein encounter another Dasein? This is what Heidegger calls the principle of individuation: “the transcendence of the being of Dasein is a distinctive one since in it lies the possibility and the necessity of the most radical individuation.”11 So Dasein actually experiences another Dasein in the immediacy of an encounter in which this particular Dasein meets the particularity of another Dasein, as it is lived through as beings in the world. We gain a mutual understanding by acknowledging the temporal existence of the other as Dasein. In one-way or another, we create an objective standard by which our subjectivity is shared through time. The emphasis of time herein is significant for Dasein’s subjectivity is characterized as temporal. In Heidegger’s History of The Concept of Time, he claims, “Dasein itself is time.”12 Herein, we come to see Heidegger’s understanding and basis for the possibility of intersubjectivity. As beings-in-the-world, we are subject to time, i.e. we are temporal beings. Thus, we share the world as we share time, i.e. past, present and future. Intersubjectivity can be understood here as an intersubjective world-time, wherein Dasein’s all over the world are all connected, and thus paving the way towards “the possibility of an intersubjective establishment of simultaneous events.”13 In the manifestation of intersubjectivity among Dasein’s, Dasein “essentially builds on its intersubjective co-temporality to create an established context that is more explicit, efficient and inclusive by looking for objects or events by which it can engage in.”14 And this common measure that Heidegger is pertaining to, by which all Dasein’s engage in, is time. “It makes use of a measure that is available to the public.”15 This, for Heidegger, is his particular way of showing the possibility of intersubjectivity. Martin Buber’s I-Thou relationship “In the beginning is relation.”16 Buber’s explication on intersubjectivity can be emphasized through his distinction between two kinds of relation: the I-thou and I-it. This was Buber’s interpretation of human being’s two-fold attitude toward the world and others. And it is through an examination of the distinctions between these two that we unfold the meaning of Buber’s version of intersubjectivity. So what is the difference between the I-thou and I-it? Basically, the use of I-thou refers to treating the other as a subject, while the I-it treats the other as an object, regardless of what the “other” may be. Also, in an I-it relationship, one seeks a form of detachment from the other, thereby conscious of itself as objectivity. However, in an I-thou relationship, experience revolves around a genuine relationship, thereby conscious of oneself as subjectivity. In other words, it is in Buber’s I-thou relationship that we are to find his theory on intersubjectivity. A main difference between Heidegger and Buber’s theory on intersubjectivity is that Buber focuses more on the whole rather than to that of the self. For, in order for a kind of mutual understanding to take place, we are “not able to do this by isolating a part of life, the part where the existence is related to itself and to its own being, but by becoming aware of the whole life without reduction.”17 Hence, our relations with other beings characterize our existence, that without them, our experiences would be meaningless. Given this as our foundation for Buber’s intersubjective philosophy, Buber goes on to explain the I’s experience with others. A key term here is his use of mutuality. As Buber states, “he makes his assistance, not his self, accessible to the other; nor does he expect any real mutuality... he ‘is concerned with the other’, but he is not anxious for the other to be concerned with him.”18 Herein, the ‘self’ creates a mutual understanding with another self, by whom the ‘I’ relates to, because this other ‘self’ is too its own self. This is the mutuality that makes intersubjectivity possible. How does the process work? For Buber, intersubjectivity takes place when “one experiences the mystery of the other being in the mystery of one’s own. The two participate in one another’s lives.”19 In this sense, we tend to understand how lovers understand each other in an unspoken level. This kind of understanding is akin to a transcendental relationship, wherein our experiences are shared along with our subjectivity, from being to being. This is what Buber terms as otherness. It is through this otherness that makes relationships manifest in a transcendental level. “Otherness is necessary in order for any essential relation to be possible.”20 Thus, life is characterized through our relation, and our relation is in turn, characterized by otherness. The medium by which we participate in otherness is through dialogue. Take for instance a person’s relationship with a God. Their dialogue is what keeps the relation essential since no other mode of contact takes place. Indeed, “for Buber, dialogue was both an intersubjective relation between an individual and others, and between an individual and God.”21 He stresses the importance of speech, of counter-speech, i.e. of dialogue. “Here alone does the word that is formed in language meet its response … I and Thou take their stand not merely in relation, but also in the solid give-and-take of talk.”22 Herein, Buber likens man’s relation with man to that of his relation with God – The Eternal Thou. And in The Eternal Thou, man’s subjectivity intertwines into a coherent union. As Buber claims, “The world of It is set in the context of space and time. The world of Thou is not set in the context of either of these. Its context is in the Centre, where the extended lines of relations meet – in The Eternal Thou.”23 This perhaps is one distinct feature of Buber’s intersubjectivity. For, unlike Heidegger who centers on the individual, Buber refocuses every Thou to that of The Eternal Thou – God. For, “every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou … Through this mediation of the Thou of all beings fulfillment, and non-fulfillment, of relations comes to them: the inborn Thou is realized in each relation and consummated in none.”24 The importance herein is that despite the differences of man, each person participates in a genuine dialogue, so as to form a mutual understanding of life. It is through genuine dialogue between man and man; between man and God, The Eternal Thou, that intersubjectivity, for Buber, thus takes course. Conclusion It is easy to dismiss something which one makes no effort to understand. The literature of both Heidegger and Buber were obscure and abstract, yet full of meaning; most of which is left unspoken. Yet isn’t it the case that intersubjectivity is obscure and abstract? Doesn’t dialogue take place when its left unspoken? Herein is where the philosophies of both meet. For, it is in my contention that both philosophers need not differ drastically from each other’s account of intersubjectivity. It is in Heidegger’s account where Buber carries out his. The difference perhaps, if any, lies in its mode of interpretation, which is due to the complexity of the nature of intersubjectivity. Nevertheless, both accounts capture the essence of intersubjectivity, which proves to show how intersubjective relations takes place. Intersubjectivity involves our awareness of others, the role they play in our lives, and the their significance in our quest for meaning and authenticity. We exist as social beings, as Heidegger would contend, and part of that is the role that other people play in our lives. “My relation to others already belongs to the way that I am, and I cannot understand my own Being apart from them. I am with them from the very beginning.”25 It is in this regard that intersubjectivity is possible given Heidegger and Buber’s account, for both hinge upon the view of the self as a self for others and a being with others. Therefore, our very existence in this mundane world is characterized by our intersubjective relationships with the nature, with others and with ourselves. And so it is. Here alone beholding and being beheld, recognizing and being recognized, loving and being loved exist as an actuality that cannot be lost. 'When a man is intimate with his wife, the longing of the eternal hills wafts about them.' The relation to a human being is the proper metaphor for the relation to God - as genuine address is here accorded a genuine answer. But in God's answer all, the All, reveals itself as language.26 Bibliography Banathy, Bela, and Patrick Jenlink. Dialogue as A Means of Collective Communication. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005. Buber, Martin. I and Thou. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. London: Continuum, 2004. Buber, Martin. I and Thou. Translated by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Charles Scribners's Sons, 1970. Buber, Martin. Between Man and Man. Translated by Ronald Gregor Smith. Lund-Humphries: London, 1954. Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquiarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., 1962. Heidegger, Martin. History of The Concept of Time: Prolegomena. Translated by Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985. Heidegger, Martin. Basic Problems of Phenomenology. Translated by Albert Hofstandter. Bloomington: Indiana State University Press, 1982. Large, William. Heidegger’s Being and Time. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008. McMullin, Sheila Irene. “The Social Self: A Heideggerian Account of Intersubjectivity.” PhD diss., Rice University, 2007. Olesh, Andrew. “Martin Buber’s Critique of Heidegger’s Being-with: An exploration of a disagreement between two of the most significant thinkers of the 20th century.” Paper presented at the 13th annual SUNY Oneonta Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, Oneonta, New York, April, 2008. Percy, Walker. “Symbol, Consciousness, and Intersubjectivity.” The Journal of Philosophy 55, no. 15 (July 17, 1958), http://0-www.jstor.org.lib1000.dlsu.edu.ph/stable/2022067 (accessed March 19, 2011). Read More