Husserl and Heidegger Philosophy - Assignment Example

Final Topic Questions Question What does Husserl take to be the essential differences between what he calls “European Man” and “Prescientific man”? What does he take to be the relationship between the two? What do you think about his distinction? Husserl awakens new interest in the subject of European crisis by effectively developing the teleological or philosophico-historical idea of European man. Husserl asserts that living as a person would mean living in a social framework. People live together in a community – with the community as a horizon (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 153). These communities are structured in simple or complex forms. For instance, a community can be structured in forms such as family, state, nation, or an international community. Furthermore, he asserts that the greatness or vastness of the natural sciences lies in rejection to be content with observational empiricism. In essence, all descriptions of nature in natural sciences are essentially methodological processes or procedures for attaining the exact explanations. Nevertheless, mathematically exact natural sciences embrace the infinite contained in the actualities and realities with its method. On the other hand, the methodological situation in humanistic sciences is quite different mainly for internal reasons (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 153). The human physis is primarily the basis of human spirituality. Natural science is also a title for spiritual activities because it mainly involves the activities of natural scientists in teamwork with one another. Husserl asserts that Europe, in a spiritual sense, denotes the English dominions, United States, and copious other nations worldwide. However, the Indians, the Eskimos, and the Gypsies who routinely wander around Europe do not constitute the European category. Apparently, the title Europe represents the unity of spiritual life as well as a creative activity (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 155). These include aims, plans, cares, troubles, interests, establishments, and institutions of Europe. Meanwhile, a typical European Man works on different levels, in a variety of societies, in nations, races, and families. The activities or aspects of European man’s society are intimately joined together in the spirit – in the unity of one spiritual image. Persons, groups, as well as their cultural achievements/accomplishments, are collectively unified by the aforementioned aspects. On the other hand, prescientific man is characterized with agriculture, domestic arts, and artifacts. These aspects signify classes of cultural products with their methods for assuring successful production. That is, they have a passing existence in the surrounding world. Scientific acquisitions, unlike prescientific being, have quite a manner of characteristics that are utterly unrelated from those of prescientific life forms (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 161). Meanwhile, each spiritual image has its place in the universal historical space, or in a particular unity of historical time in terms of succession or coexistence. European nations have a special inner affinity of spirit that essentially permeates all of them. Furthermore, the spirit transcends the national differences of the European nations. In essence, the relationship between these nations is conceivably fraternal, thus giving all European citizens the consciousness or reality of being at home in this circle. Europeans may sympathetically penetrate into the historical process of India, with the country’s copious cultural forms and huge population. In such circle, Europeans would feel the unity of family-like relationship. However, they may find such kind of relationship fairly strange to them. Similarly, Indians also consider Europeans strangers and only find each other their fellows. It is easier for them to interact and even open up to fellow Indians but not to Europeans who live amongst them. In general, historical humanity does not necessarily divide itself, in the same way, as per the category of fellowship or strangeness (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 161). They understand themselves well just as Europeans also understand themselves better. In other words, there is always spiritual unity between people with common characteristics or traits, most of which are derived naturally. Meanwhile, to have a norm continuously in view is an aspect that is intimately part of an individual’s life, and that of nations and particular societies. It will also ultimately bring together nations that constitute Europe. I believe Husserl’s distinction has successfully demonstrated his deep understanding of the prescientific man and the European Man. Question 2: What does Heidegger mean by “autochthony” and what significance does it have in the context of the public address he delivered in his ‘home town’? “Autochthony” as used by Heidegger means the meditative quality or thought of human nature and is normally related to a man’s sense of origin. Each person’s connection or relation to his homeland is the basis of meditative quality (Heidegger pp. 43). As a result, the loss of autochthony is directly linked to the loss of meditative thought. A person does not necessarily have to leave his homeland to lose his meditative thought. Overall, Heidegger uses autochthony as a phenomenological term. Autochthony is largely significantly, particularly in the context of the public address Heidegger delivered in his ‘hometown. Heidegger believes that a person might end up losing his meditative quality without leaving his homeland or hometown. He alleges a recent trend whereby several Germans lose their native soil (homeland). Even those whose homeland or native soil was saved have since wandered off (Heidegger pp. 43). It is important to reiterate that autochthony and rootedness both gave rise to the concept of meditative thinking. According to Heidegger, the rapid advancement or development of contemporary technology has vastly endangered the sense of man about the autochthony. Heidegger argues: "From this arises a completely new relation of man to the world and his place in it. The world now appears as an object open to the attacks of calculative thoughts--attacks that nothing is believed able any longer to resist. Nature becomes a gigantic gasoline station, an energy source for modern technology and industry...The power concealed in modern technology determines the relation of man to that which exists." (Heidegger pp. 43) Meanwhile, Heidegger asserts that the magnitude or vastness of the natural sciences lies in their refusal to be content with observational empiricism. In essence, all descriptions of nature in natural sciences are essentially methodological processes or procedures for attaining the exact explanations. Nevertheless, mathematically exact natural sciences embrace the infinite contained in the actualities and realities with its method (Heidegger pp. 43). In contrast, the methodological situation in humanistic sciences is quite different mainly for internal reasons. The human physis is principally the basis of human spirituality. Natural science is also a title for spiritual activities because it mainly involves the activities of natural scientists in teamwork with one another. As an assistant to Husserl, Heidegger took phenomenology to utterly new direction. Besides, Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962) was an influential text on the development and expansion of European philosophy in the 20th century (Heidegger pp. 43). However, the arguably divisive subject of National Socialism and considerable philosophical differences between Heidegger and Husserl strained their relationship. Hence, even Heidegger’s subsequent philosophy bears little connection to the classical Husserlian phenomenology. Heidegger presented a fairly interpretive approach. Meanwhile, Heidegger holds positive viewpoint and account of the fundamental methods of phenomenology in relation to its ontological agenda. Question 3: Explain and discuss what Husserl means when he says that “With the first conception of ideas man gradually becomes a new man.” According to Husserl, the conception of ideas influenced man into becoming a new man. Apparently, these ideas established personhood as a new type of being-in-the-world. A new attitude to reality is inborn from the new type of being-in-the-world, which is significantly different in comparison with a simple interest in the finite Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 168). Ideas, meaning-structures typically produced in individual persons and have miraculous new way of containing intentional infinites within themselves, are essentially not like real things in space. The breakthrough of philosophy into history meant the establishment of a new European humanity in a deep spiritual sense. A new man would share ideas in the deep spiritual sense. Husserl maintains: “It will mean that by virtue of a continuity that bridges intentionally the discreteness involved, men will hold on to the new type of interests as worth being realized and will embody them in corresponding cultural forms” (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 167). In addition, the spiritual being of man enters into the movement of an advancing reconstruction. The evolution of man into a new man following the conception of ideas involves communication and interactions from the beginning. Ideas further influenced relationships between individuals, groups, and communities. These ideas even changed how people interact with each other. With the conception of new ideas, man notably transformed to become an absolutely different individual. In addition, culture and norms changed across societies. It is imperative to note that ideas also positively and negatively influenced the spiritual well-being of man. The essence of initiating ideas is to make people think beyond their spiritual or social structures. Moreover, a new sort of humanity grows; a form of humanity that lives in finitude, towards the poles of infinity. Husserl links the presence of ideas about infinity in the human mind to something that is specific for human beings as hypostatic, personal beings. For someone to be a person, he must relate to all and be in constant communion with all generations through the future horizon of infinity. To have ideas pointing towards infinity would imply to be spiritual, and to be a person (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 169). A new form of enduring community whose spiritual life, communalized through the love of ideas, the production of ideas, and through ideal life-norms, bears within itself the future horizon of infinity. It is infinity of generations being renewed in the spirit of ideas. Meanwhile, prescientific mankind is characterized with agriculture, domestic arts, and artifacts. These elements stand for classes of cultural products with their methods for assuring successful production. They have a passing existence in the surrounding world. Scientific acquisitions, unlike prescientific being, have quite a manner of characteristics that are utterly unrelated from those of prescientific man. New humanity inaugurated through inherent philosophy was essentially inclined to deal with absolute and certain knowledge in contradistinction to the world of opinion. In general, man lives primarily for generative reasons, in family, tribe, nation, and in communities, which are all divided into varying degrees of complexity. Question 6: Relate or compare what Husserl says about science in the Cartesian Meditations and in Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man, quoting a relevant passage from each of these two texts Edmund Husserl holds diverse views about science in the Cartesian Meditations and in Philosophy and the Crisis of European man. In the Cartesian Meditations, Husserl maintains that the only reality the world can have for a person who would approach it scientifically is a phenomenal reality. Human understanding and analysis of the world must be purely phenomenological if they were to understand it scientifically. He emphasizes the need to analyze the phenomenal ‘world’. In particular, he directs much attention to the reality that, “phenomenological epoche often lays open an infinite realm of being of a new kind, as the sphere of a new kind of experience: transcendental experience” (Husserl, “Cartesian Mediations: An Introduction to Phenomenology”, p. 66). Husserl asserts that nature is one that repeats continually despite evolution. Thus, members of natural species usually follow each other in the same identifiable form. However, spirit is an ongoing process or totality, never reproducing itself in the same form or even reaching maturity. In his view, Husserl states that the beginning of a philosophical focusing of attention on the environing world represents the most important revolution in the history of human thought. In The Crisis of European Man, Husserl states: “…natural science (like all sciences as such) is a title for spiritual activities, those of natural scientists in cooperation with each other” (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 154). Husserl maintains in the Cartesian Meditations that a successful phenomenological philosophy must start as solipsism, moving on to intersubjectivity only after it has been initiated on a solipsistic basis (Husserl, “Cartesian Mediations: An Introduction to Phenomenology”, pp. 121-135). In this regard, Husserl has fundamentally derived his inspiration on the 17th and 18th-century rationalism. His arguments contradict poetic, naïve, or mythical attitude. Furthermore, Husserl considers this revolution as continuous with previous attitudes because it is a transformation, not elimination. In the Cartesian Meditations and in Philosophy, Husserl asserts: “The spiritual telos of European Man, in which is included the particular telos of separate nations and of individual human beings, lies in infinity; it is an infinite idea, toward which in secret the collective becoming strives” (The Cartesian Meditations p. 121-135). In Philosophy and the Crisis of European Man, Husserl awakens new interest in the subject of European crisis by effectively developing the teleological or philosophico-historical idea of European man. Husserl asserts that living as a person would mean living in a social framework. People live together in a community – with the community as a horizon. These communities are structured in simple or complex forms. For instance, a community can be structured in forms such as family, state, nation, or an international community. Furthermore, he asserts that the greatness or vastness of the natural sciences lies in their refusal to be content with observational empiricism. In essence, all descriptions of nature in natural sciences are essentially methodological processes or procedures for attaining the exact explanations (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 152). Nevertheless, mathematically exact natural sciences embrace the infinite contained in the actualities and possibilities with its method. The methodological situation is fairly different in the humanistic sciences. Besides, the human physis is primarily the basis of human spirituality. Husserl maintains that natural science is also a title for spiritual activities because it mainly involves the activities of natural scientists in teamwork with one another. Question 8: Compare and/or contrast Husserl and Heidegger, selecting and quoting a passage from each of these authors Edmund Husserl, a German philosopher, established a school of philosophy. He differed with positive orientation of philosophy and science of his day. His thought is arguably revolutionary. Husserl’s revolutionary thought is evident in the way he creates a distinction between phenomenological and natural modes of understanding (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 140). He believes in ‘phenomenological reduction’ – a rigorously ‘presupposition less’ of phenomenological understanding. He widely criticized the philosophical positions of Brentano (his teacher), Christoph Sigwart and J.S. Mill about psychologism in logic and mathematics. Nevertheless, he argued that anti-psychologists’ failure to defeat psychologism resulted from their inability to clearly distinguish between theoretical side of logic, the foundational, the applied, and practical side. According to Husserl, the beginning of a scientific or philosophical focusing of attention on the environing world denotes the vital revolution in the history of human thought. Similarly, Husserl considers this revolution as consistent with previous attitudes because it is essentially a transformation of them. Husserl says: “In contrast to the higher-level practical attitude there exists, however, still another essential possibility of a change in the universal natural attitude (with which we shall soon become acquainted in its type, the mythical religious attitude... The theoretical attitude, even though it too is professional attitude, is thoroughly unpractical” (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” pp. 168) Moreover, Husserl believes that neither science nor philosophy can become the exclusive interest in the life of any man. Instead, humankind focuses on designing or adopting different philosophical concepts. Predominant interest makes a person become a designated philosopher. In most cases, the predominant interest has an intentional continuity through entire occupations of his day-to-day life. In addition, Husserl’s philosophical life was almost exclusively devoted to the programmatic aspects or elements of phenomenology (Husserl, “Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man,” 140). The works of his students such as Heidegger influenced his philosophical views on a wide variety of areas. His constant plea has always been for a return to the ‘rationalism’ of Plato and Socrates, and not to the rationalism of the 17th or 18th century Europe. Husserl’s inspiration is traceable far more to Hume, Kant and Descartes than to Plato and Socrates. Nevertheless, Husserl fails to recognize Plato’s purpose, even in the most theoretical investigations. There is a profound insight in Husserl’s “historical erudition.” On the other hand, Martin Heidegger (also a German philosopher) was arguably a seminal thinker and theorist in the Continental tradition. He held a widely debated and controversial relationship with Nazism in Germany. Heidegger was among the few German philosophers who adopted phenomenology, broadened and even extended it. As an assistant to Husserl, Heidegger took phenomenology to a rather new direction. Heidegger’s Being and Time (1962) was an influential text on the development and expansion of European philosophy in the 20th century. However, the arguably divisive subject of National Socialism and considerable philosophical differences between Heidegger and Husserl strained their relationship. Hence, even Heidegger’s subsequent philosophy bears little connection to the classical Husserlian phenomenology. Whereas Husserl presented descriptive approach to phenomenological research, Heidegger presented a fairly interpretive approach. Meanwhile, Heidegger holds positive viewpoint and account of the fundamental methods of phenomenology in relation to its ontological agenda. However, a single question continues to dominate Heidegger’s philosophy: What is the meaning of being? According to him, the differences between Being and beings (entities) constitute “the ontological difference.” He states “ontology is the science of Being (Heidegger pp. 17). He asserts that beings (unlike Being) include people, theories, chairs, tables, universals, and numbers. On the subject of Intentionality, Husserl argues that the intentionality is directedness or aboutness as demonstrated by conscious mental acts. On the other hand, Heidegger expanded the notion or idea of intentionality, stating that it (intentionality) fall short of describing what he considers as the most important form of intentionality. Heidegger asserts: The usual conception of intentionality… Misconstrues the structure of the self- directedness- toward… An ego or subject is supposed, to whose so-called sphere intentional experiences are then supposed to belong… The idea of a subject which has intentional experiences merely inside its sphere and is not yet outside it but encapsulated within it is an absurdity. (Heidegger pp. 63-64) In conclusion, both Husserl and Heidegger played an integral role in the formation of the historical movement of phenomenology. They particularly helped in launching the philosophical tradition during the first half of the twentieth century. Other great philosophers who played a significant role in the formation and advancement of phenomenology include Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Phenomenology studies the structure of different experiences, including thought, memory, perception, imagination, desire, emotion, and volition. The discipline was vital to the tradition of continental European philosophy in the entire 20th century. Works Cited Heidegger, Martin. (1955/1966). "Memorial Address". In Discourse on thinking. Trans. John Anderson and Hans Freund. New York: Harper Torchbacks: 43-57. Husserl, Edmund. (1931/1977). Cartesian Mediations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Trans. Dorion Cairns. Kluwer Academic Publishers. Husserl, Edmund. (1935/1965). "Philosophy and the Crisis of the European Man" ("The Vienna Lecture"). In Philosophy and the Crisis of Philosophy. Trans. Quentin Lauer. New York: Harper Torchbacks: 140-192. Merleau-Ponty Maurice. (1948/2004). The World of Perception. Trans. Oliver Davis. New York, Rouledge. Read More