Ontology or the Study of Being - Essay Example

 Ontology or the Study of Being "Man is not the lord of beings. Man is the shepherd of Being. Man loses nothing in this "less"; rather, he gains in that he attains the truth of Being. He gains the essential poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being's truth." (Letter on Humanism, 1964). Martin Heidegger one of the most original thinkers of twentieth century, had his main focus on Ontology or the study of being. In his famous treatise, Being On Time he gave a phenomenological analysis to being (Sein), human existence (Dasein) and later explained the Nihilism in modern technological society. His emphasis was mainly on the language, which is used as the vehicle and stressed upon the importance of poetry in life, time and human existence. His argument is that while analysing the worldhood of the world, it is not possible to do so without bringing Being-in-the-world into focus as the worldhood depends on mankind and Dasein remains in permanent focus while doing so. Heidegger has taken the philosophy as Phenomenological Ontology and was influenced by Husserl and took some of his ‘phenomenological reduction’. . Before his famous Die Kehre he said we are involved in this world’s affairs by developing ‘the phenomenological attitude’, and our consciousness could be analysed by both detachment and involvement. Despite his veneration of Husserl, Heidegger wrote Being and Time as a strong criticism of phenomenology as detailed by Husserl. He started with questioning what being is and never stopped analysing this theme throughout his illustrious career. He argued that western philosophy is shallow for not considering the being, but only stating the obvious. He said the question of Being is a historical argument and this question of Being dominates his book. “Being has entered into the light. Being has arrived in a state of unconcealedness. But whether and how Being itself involves such unconcealedness, whether and how it manifests itself in, and as, metaphysics, remains obscure. Being in its revelatory essence, i. e. in its truth, is not recalled” he says in his Existence and Being. from Existentialism from Dostoyevsky to Sartre edited by Walter Kaufman http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/heidegg2.htm His argument was to understand the Being, we should first understand ‘the human kind of being’ which he coined as Dasein (Being-there) and this human being is adept in asking questions. According to his Dasein is ‘uncanny’, which also could be termed as ‘not- -at-home’ as Being-in-the world. One cannot help getting the feeling that Dasein world is populated by physical objects mainly because of the similarity in forms and behaviour. He projected the relationship of one humanoid creature with another one similar to that of one with self. This means human beings relate to each other as they relate to themselves. He is of the opinion that humanoid creatures think of themselves as a complete entity and they are outside that entity. Self is seen by him as another humanoid creature. “The entity which is ‘other’ has itself the same kind of Being as Dasein. In Being with and towards Others, there is thus a relationship of Being from Dasein to Dasein. But it might be said that this relationship is already constitutive for one’s own Dasein, which, in its own right, has an understanding of Being, and thus relates itself towards Dasein,” (p.162). This means Being of Dasein has a preconceived necessity of Being-with-others because in simple words, Being of Dasein is another way of saying Being-in-the world. Hence, themes and concepts of Dasein and the world are inter-related and belong to one another. As the world inhabits other similarly formed and behaved humanoid creatures that are also part of Dasein in the same way and intensity as the self, Dasein can only be understood as related to the world and as related to other humanoid creatures. “….when material is put to use, we encounter its producer or supplier as one who ‘serves’ well or badly….The Others who are thus ‘encountered’ in a ready-to-hand, environmental context of equipment are not somehow added on in thought to some Thing which is proximally just present-at-hand; such ‘Things’ are encountered from out of the world in which they are ready-to-hand for Others – a world which is always mine too in advance (p. 154). He does not argue that Dasein can be isolated and live away from human company. Being of Dasein and Being with are equated. The presence of the Other is important because without it Dasein cannot have another similar creature because Dasein is incapable of encountering another company. This shows that Dasein’s Being is at a highly disadvantageous position if it is isolated. “The Other can be missing only in and for a Being-with” (p.157). He did not foresee any conflict between the two. He emphasised that Dasein retains its relation with self through its relation with Others. This could be from both sides and is equally satisfactory and the two are considered to be ‘ontologically inseparable,’ that establishes relationship between subjectivity and inter-subjectivity. He gave importance to literature, especially to poetry, which is connected with existentiality. In his view, a certain dictatorship of Others can result in a certain loss of original individuality and this can in turn, create ‘average everyday distantiality’, an original term used by him. Literature and art are extraordinary pleasant pursuits that should guarantee individual pleasure, but they need not lead to uncommon existential individuality, he says. “One belongs to the Others oneself and enhances their power. The Others whom one thus designates in order to cover up the fact of one’s belonging to them essentially oneself, are those who proximally and for the most part ‘are there’ in everyday Being-with-one another. The ‘who’ is not this one, not that one, not oneself, not some people, and not the sum of them all. The ‘who’ is the neuter, the ‘they’.” (p.164). In a way these principles are universal because human beings relate to one another almost in the same way all over the world in all the human societies. So, all, at one point or other, are part of distantiality. To Heideggar all humanoid creatures including the self are parts of the world and no one is more or less. There is no competition and all are equals. They do not exist without the other. “….everyone is the other and no-one is himself. The “they”, which supplies the answer to the question of the “who” of everyday Dasein, is the “nobody”to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one another” (p.166). Being and Time says that ordinary everyday mode of self could be termed as ‘they-self’ because everyday mode could be misleading and it cannot project the genuine individuality. In simple words Dasein usually gets immersed in They and ‘they’ becomes the great leveller of all the individualities. So in a way, Dasein is happy to live in a world by the terms provided by ‘they’ because it is easy to be so. This way Dasein is happy to avoid contradictions and conflicts that might arise from the show of acute individuality. Hence, Heideggar says even the philosophers lose their authenticity because they too become part of ‘they’ and thus, philosophical individuality dies down eventually because it is full of unauthentic ontology that comes out due to lack of individuality. So, Self becomes They-self and the lack of individuality in Dasein makes it unauthentic. This leads to another argument that has been pointed out by many. If a Being is capable of finding itself, it also should be capable of losing itself. This is followed by another argument that acute individuality and isolation need not be the forerunner of authenticity. This is followed by another argument that being aggressively ‘self’ need not mean absolute isolation; instead it might mean another form of relationship that could be called unconventional. But Heideggar is clear in his argument: “This Being-with-one-another dissolves one’s own Dasein completely into the kind of Being of ‘the others’, in such a way, indeed that the Others, as distinguishable and explicit, vanish more and more,” (p.164). He curiously makes another statement: “The boat anchored at the shore is assigned in its being-in-itself to an acquaintance that undertakes voyages with it, but even if it is a ‘boat which is strange to us’, it is still indicative of Others,” (p.154). The ‘they’ he refers to might come in various forms as service providers, suppliers, producers, farmers etc. they might come as occupiers of various social positions. Mostly they are the other side of Self, because They are part of Self. Their identity depends on Self’s identity. It depends on the way of living Self has chosen, place of living, kind of education and employment and the kind of life chosen by Self. They are connected with the decisions and choices Self has made. They are complimentary to those decisions and ‘they’ alter according to the change in decisions. This means that the decision-making Self’s individuality still will exist. He says Dasein steadily gets deprived of its answerability, because ‘they’ make more and more decisions. Under such circumstances Dasein might feel anxious about its individuality. Such anxiety might provide Dasein its prior individuality or even more. Anxiety that is created by the aggressive nature of ‘they’ can become Dasein’s decision making vehicle. According to his opinion, since Dasein’s Being is Being-in-the-World, understanding self as related with the possible dimensions that might be offered by They become important and worth-pondering as ‘they’ here are ‘part of worldhood of the world’. This represents socially accepted concepts and values, interrelationships, encounters, conflicts, foreseeable and unforeseeable functions and attitudes. He argues that the most real of all the worlds is the work-world in which most of the time is being spent. It could be culturally inherited, or individually chosen, or educationally compatible. Sometimes it could be socially compelled which the individual cannot disobey. Whatever it could be work-world is the nearest place to the person, because of its relevance with the livelihood and the time an individual spends in the work-world. Here, culture plays an important role by compelling the individual to go by familiar lines, or inherit a work-world of the person’s ancestors. The individual might rebel which is rather rare. Mostly the individual gets cowed down by the social compulsions and in that state, he is totally unauthentic. But he encounters ‘they’ who have either taken the same path, or the suppliers, or the distributors or the buyers. Along with the work-world, also comes in a complete set of ‘they’ and the individual functions within the framework of this newly provided ‘they’. He says this is the position from which the occupants of various roles start blurring the individuality and authenticity of Self. These role players might look entirely impersonal and distant. But the influence generated by them is clear and distinct and slowly they become and decision makers, even though they entered the world of Self through the initial decision of Self. He does not deny that Self still retains a certain portion of future decision making that can result in total change of ‘they’. But the fact remains that as long as such a decision making process is not exercised, ‘they’ remain powerful and their power goes on increasing. Thus Dasein has to re-invent itself frequently, by first finding itself, and in such a process, authenticity becomes an achievement. “The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the authentic self. ….If Dasein discovers the world in its own way and brings it close, if it discloses to itself its own authentic Being, then this discovery of the ‘world’ and this disclosure of Dasein are always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking up of the disguises with which Dasein bars its own way” (p. 167). Heideggar thought that Dasein is absorbed in the world, but is an entity of its own and somehow remains as the ‘I’ of each case, despite depending on ‘they’. But such entities can be taken as presence-at-hand. “The very state of Being, in its everyday kind of Being, is what proximally misses itself and covers itself up,” (p. 168). But he also says that presence-at-hand taken in a pure way is different from Being-with-one-another on every day basis because exceptional conditions have to be reckoned with. He maintains that ‘I’ that goes through various experiences and retains its identity is separate from the selfishness of the ‘authentically existing Self’. BIBLIOGRAPHY: 1. Heidegger, Martin (1962), Being And Time, Blackwell, Oxford. (All Page References relate to this Book). ONLINE SOURCES: 1. http://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/ge/heidegg2.htm Read More