Martin Bubers Intersubjective Philosophy: I-It and I-Thou - Essay Example

of Martin Buber’s Inter ive Philosophy: I-It and I-Thou Self-realization is one of the recurrent issues in our everyday lives. Indeed, it is natural for us to ponder, introspect and address the existential question, “Who am I?” through various approaches. Throughout the centuries, philosophers claim that the issue of self-realization can be dealt with by detaching one’s self from the world of experience while examining his identity from a external vantage point. Through this process, the self shall gradually discover and amplify his potentiality for being, and thus become fully human. Much of this is highlighted in Martin Buber’s analysis of the phenomenon of social relationships. For Buber, the self cannot be fully human without the co-existence of the other; both co-exist in order to achieve a synthesis of what characterizes a meaningful life; otherwise, life would be impossible. Human beings are often divided into two aspects of being: objective and subjective. The former is hardly controversial, for it depicts a person’s thoughts, feelings, and ideas just the way that person ought to speak or act. However, the latter is of great controversy when dealing with what makes us truly human; “that meeting of minds by which two selves take each others meaning with reference to the same object beheld in common” (Percy 631). Similarly, Martin Buber identifies two aspects of being: I-It and I-Thou. This was Buber’s interpretation of the human being’s two-fold attitude toward the world and others. And it is through an examination of the distinctions between these two that we unfold the meaning of Buber’s dialogical philosophy. Given this, I shall devote this essay to a discourse on the phenomenon of social relationships in the light of Martin Buber’s dialogical philosophy. I will investigate the relationship between the self or the “I,” and the other or the “It,” as espoused by Buber in his work, I and Thou. Moreover, I shall emphasize the importance of intersubjectivity in Buber’s philosophy. Herein, I shall argue that in order for self-realization to take place, that is, in order to be truly human, an intersubjective relationship between I-It and I-Thou should co-exist. Thus, self-realization cannot be achieved in a vacuum or in a state of pure isolation but through intersubjective social interaction. The self needs others in order to satisfy his needs, goals, and ideals. Without others, the self cannot exist at all. Furthermore, the self can only gain an enhanced mode of self-expansion through his relationship with the other. Buber’s Theory of Human Relations Buber surmised that human relationships could be watered down into two types: the relationship of seeming or the “I-It” relationship and the relationship of genuine dialogue or the “I-Thou” relationship. The “I-It” is one where the self treats the other as an object of exploitation and vice-versa. Furthermore, it is one where both self and other relate to each other according to appearances, images, and/or forms deception. A perfect example of this is an instance of a blind date. Herein, both parties project ideals of themselves in order to please each other and to take their relationship to a higher level. However, this appears to be problematic because both parties shall interpret each other according to the images that they project instead of their own genuine selves. Thus, both parties fail to see each other in their totality. Yet what are the defining features of an I-It relation in the first place? Based on my understanding of Buber, one of the defining features of an I-It relation is its act of speechifying. This is where one party tries to dominate the other throughout a certain conversation. This, however, is a one-sided relationship akin to the likes of a monologue. For example, if I try to hog the limelight and take full control of my dialogue with my friend without allowing him to speak his mind, then I am, in effect, speechifying. Another feature that I can infer from Buber’s philosophy is propaganda. This is where the self enslaves the other by making the other conform to his or her notion of truth. This is exemplified in the act of proselytizing. This is quite evident in our current political system where politicians cajole most often, when speaking in public. Another example is the sermons of religious fundamentalists around the world. Herein, the act of preaching is used to convert the people by persuasive forms of speech. Nevertheless, this kind of propaganda also extols the superiority of the self and the other. Furthermore, a defining feature of this kind of relation is its emphasis on “reductive analytical thinking.” This is where the self reduces the individuality of the other according to certain labels or generalizations. This is best illustrated in the form of discrimination; such as calling the Black race as Negroes. This however is problematic because it gives us a distorted and fragmented view of the other person. Based on this, Buber contends that the I-It form of interaction leads to forms of depersonalization and decimation of the other. Thus, the relationship between the self and the other will eventually be based on enslavement, deception, exploitation and conflict. Hence, social progress and order cannot be achieved in this form of relation. So with these repercussions in mind, Buber argued that harmonious forms of communality could be obtained, not through an I-It but rather, through an I-Thou relationship. This is one where both parties treat each other as subjects instead of objects. So contrary to an I-It relation, what then defines an I-Thou relationship? Based on my understanding of Buber, one of most prevalent defining characteristic of an I-Thou relationship is genuine dialogue. This is where both parties reach out to each other through a mutual sharing of ideas, beliefs and aspirations. In this form of dialogue, both parties are allowed to speak their minds, are treated as equals, and get to learn from each other through a civil and harmonious exchange of ideas. Thus, both parties are able to enhance their respective identities and outlooks towards life. In addition, genuine dialogue entails that both the self and the other relate to each other through openness and sincerity without employing any such forms of deception. Thus, both parties are able to gain access to their true selves. Indeed, through an I-Thou relationship, both parties are able to realize themselves and become truly human. Another defining characteristic of an I-Thou relationship is the prevalence of what can be called, a dynamic center of free initiative. This aspect presupposes that the self encounters the otherness of the other. That is to say, the self does not judge the other according to his or her own calculations or precepts but experiences the other as a concrete particular or in other words, and more importantly, as a unique individual subject. This is shown when the self phenomenologically “brackets” or sets aside his personal prejudices thereby investigating the nature of the other through “new eyes,” that is to say, in a new bias-free perspective. In addition, an I-Thou interaction involves the element of what I call, the personal making present. This is where both parties do not see each other as competitors or obstructions to each other’s existence but as co-workers in the game of life. In this manner, the other is a necessary prerequisite for the self-realization of the individual self. Hence, the relationship between the self and the other is not to be deemed as a polarized relationship but rather, as a symbiotic one. As a theistic existentialist, Buber also indicates that the perpetuation of an I-thou relationship shall inevitably lead to the experience of the Eternal Thou, which is God. With this, Buber proposes that all individuals must treat each other according to the mechanics of an I-Thou relationship. To his view, this is the only possible way to implement and sustain a just and orderly society. Through an examination of the distinction between these two kinds of relationships, we, in turn, unfold the meaning of Buber’s intersubjective philosophy. As previously discussed, the use of I-Thou refers to treating the other as a subject, while the I-It treats the other as an object, regardless of what the “other” may be. Also, in an I-It relationship, one seeks a form of detachment from the other, thereby conscious of itself as objectivity. However, in an I-Thou relationship, experience revolves around a genuine relationship, thereby conscious of oneself as subjectivity. In other words, it is in Buber’s I-Thou relationship that we are to find a genuine symbiotic relationship, that is to say, his inclination towards intersubjectivity. In the next section, I shall turn to my analysis of Buber’s dialogical philosophy as an explication of intersubjectivity. Buber’s Theory on Intersubjectivity A defining characteristic of Buber’s theory on intersubjectivity is that he focuses more on the whole rather than the individual self. For, in order for a kind of mutual understanding to take place, that is, in order to be fully human, we are “not able to do this by isolating a part of life, the part where the existence is related to itself and to its own being, but by becoming aware of the whole life without reduction” (Buber “Between Man,” 166). Hence, our relationships with other beings characterize our existence, without them, our experiences would be meaningless. Given this as our foundation for Buber’s intersubjective philosophy, Buber goes on to explain the I’s experience with others. A key term here is his use of mutuality. As Buber states, “he makes his assistance, not his self, accessible to the other; nor does he expect any real mutuality... he ‘is concerned with the other’, but he is not anxious for the other to be concerned with him” (Buber “Between Man,” 170). Herein, the self creates a form of mutual understanding with another self, by whom the I relates to, because this other is also its own self. This is the mutuality that makes intersubjectivity possible. Yet how does the process work exactly? For Buber, intersubjectivity takes place when “one experiences the mystery of the other being in the mystery of one’s own. The two participate in one another’s lives” (Buber “Between Man,” 170). In this sense, we tend to understand, for instance, how lovers understand each other in an unspoken level. This kind of understanding is akin to a transcendental relationship, wherein our experiences are shared along with our subjectivity, from being to being, that is, from the self to the other. This is what Buber refers to as otherness. It is through this otherness that makes relationships manifest self-realization in a transcendental level. “Otherness is necessary in order for any essential relation to be possible” (Olesh 9). Thus, life is characterized through our relationships, and our relationships are, in turn, characterized by otherness. The medium by which we participate in otherness is through dialogue. Take for instance a person’s relationship with his or her God. Their dialogue is what keeps the relation essential since no other mode of contact and communication takes place. Indeed, “for Buber, dialogue was both an intersubjective relation between an individual and others, and between an individual and God” (Banathy and Jenlink 9). He stresses the importance of speech, of counter-speech, that is to say, of dialogue. “Here alone does the word that is formed in language meet its response … I and Thou take their stand not merely in relation, but also in the solid give-and-take of talk” (Buber, “I and Thou,” 79). Herein, Buber likens man’s relation with man to that of his relation with God – The Eternal Thou. And in The Eternal Thou, man’s subjectivity intertwines into a coherent union. As Buber claims, “The world of It is set in the context of space and time. The world of Thou is not set in the context of either of these. Its context is in the Centre, where the extended lines of relations meet – in The Eternal Thou” (Buber, “I and Thou,” 77). This perhaps is one distinct feature of Buber’s intersubjectivity. For, unlike Heidegger who centers on the individual, Buber refocuses every Thou to that of The Eternal Thou – God. For, I quote: Every particular Thou is a glimpse through to the eternal Thou; by means of every particular Thou the primary word addresses the eternal Thou. Through this mediation of the Thou of all beings fulfillment, and non-fulfillment, of relations comes to them: the inborn Thou is realized in each relation and consummated in none. It is consummated only in the direct relation with the Thou that by its nature cannot become It (Buber, “I and Thou,” 61). The importance herein is that despite the differences of human beings, each person participates in a genuine dialogue, so as to form a mutual understanding of others, of oneself, and of life. It is through a genuine dialogue between man and man, that is, between man and God, The Eternal Thou, that intersubjectivity, for Buber, thus takes course. This emphasis on intersubjectivity brings to fore man’s obstacle in attaining self-realization. For Buber, the obstacle lies in “the development of the ability to experience and use comes about mostly through experience and use comes about mostly through the decrease of man’s power to enter into relation” (36). The moment we experience life, we gain the ability to enter into genuine relation. But the moment we use life, our ability to enter genuine relation is decreased in its potential. Thus, in one way, our present age is indeed, an It world, wherein most of the time, the concerns of many lie in using the world for the benefit of oneself. Herein, no form or genuine dialogue takes place; rather, the principle of utility takes place in the achievement of the desires and interests of many. In this light, men start to realize that something is lacking in their pursuits in a world of It. Herein, when realization takes place, man gradually starts to yearn and engage into genuine relation, that is the I-Thou relation. “For mans limited mind, of course, most of existent Being is neither Thou nor It - he does not meet it at all. But if a content enters his world even as It, there is the chance of its becoming Thou also” (Wodehouse 27). It is in this regard that “without It man cannot live. But he who lives with It alone is not a man” (Buber, “I and Thou,” 32). Analysis and Conclusion Given the aforementioned analysis of Buber’s dialogical philosophy, it is clear that Buber’s view on what makes us fully human is our relation with both It and Thou. In order for the self to experience and live life meaningfully, that self must undergo living in the It world and thus move on to the Thou when self-realization takes course. Upon realizing one’s self, one attains genuine dialogue with the other, for in essence, the other is also one’s self. This is what Buber’s theory on social relationship tells us. We cannot maintain a Thou relationship forever. It is necessary that we stumble upon an obstacle that pulls us down, back to an It relationship. Herein, it is our task to re-discover and learn from our experiences, in order to enter genuine dialogue, which takes place only in a Thou relationship. Given this, is it sufficient to accept Buber’s analysis of what truly makes us human? From my understanding of his text, Buber’s theory on social relationship is not really convincing as it turned out to be. To my view, I find it a little too ideal and impractical to our everyday life due to pragmatic reasons. First, Buber said that we are obliged to treat all people as subjects or as Thou. However, in everyday life, we cannot simply do that to everyone, especially if those people who cause us suffering are beyond our control. Now, to treat them as subjects is to relegate our selves to martyrdom. So sometimes in life, it is more appropriate for us to treat other people as objects or It, instead of subjects or Thou. Secondly, Buber proposes that we must set aside our expectations and prejudices to understand the essence of the other from a new perspective. However, what he failed to consider is that our minds from the very beginning of our childhood has already been inculcated with precepts, norms, ideals, which we inherit through culture and tradition. Hence, we cannot help but bring our expectations or biases in our understanding of the other. It is not as easy as putting on a pair of shades, wherein our vision of the world of objects changes instantly. We are ontologically committed to these subjective beliefs and opinions, that it will not be possible to put them aside; to do so would imply that we are not human. In line with this, it is natural for us to have expectations. It is a fact of the human condition and we cannot help but objectify the other according to our ideals and expectations. Now, to set aside such is nothing but a utopia. Therefore, all human relationships in general shall involve the objectification of both self and other. This, in effect, is my analysis of Buber’s philosophy. Nevertheless, Buber’s dialogical philosophy does serve as an ideal from which all human relations ought to strive for. Works Cited Banathy, Bela and Patrick Jenlink. Dialogue as A Means of Collective Communication. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2005. Print. Buber, Martin. Between Man and Man. Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. London: Lund-Humphries, 1954. Print. Buber, Martin. I and Thou. Trans. Ronald Gregor Smith. London: Continuum, 2004. Print. Olesh, Andrew. “Martin Buber’s Critique of Heidegger’s Being-with: An exploration of a disagreement between two of the most significant thinkers of the 20th century.” The 13th annual SUNY Oneonta Undergraduate Philosophy Conference, Oneonta, New York. April 2008. Conference Presentation. Percy, Walker. “Symbol, Consciousness, and Intersubjectivity.” The Journal of Philosophy 55.15 (1958): 631-641. Print. Wodehouse, Helen. “Martin Buber’s I and Thou.” Philosophy 20.75 (1945): 17-30. Print. Read More