Contemporary Muslim Interpretation of Islam and Democracy - Essay Example

Contemporary Muslim Interpretation of Islam and Democracy Introduction The latter part of the 20th century witnessed the growth of interest in theinterplay between human rights, democracy, and sharia all over the Islamic world, but specifically in Iran, Indonesia, and Egypt. Many contemporary scholars have tried to separate Islam from legalistic and traditionalistic views by introducing their own interpretations of Islam and political ideologies (Hunter, 2005). For these scholars the ‘rigid’ Islam promoted by the conservatives and strengthened by dictatorial political administrations is no longer applicable today. They believe that political Islam is merely a departure from the basic existential Islam spoken by the Prophet and shown in the Quran. To attain the true democratic and humanistic value of Islam, one should take into account new ideas and use modern analytical tools and methods (Sadiki, 2004). These, consequently, have to be learned, appreciated, and used freely and from any existing academic references, whether they are from the West or the East. As argued by Abdolkarim Sorouch, knowledge does not have ‘copyright’ or ‘nationality’ (Ghamari-Tabrizi, 2008, p. 88). This essay discusses and analyses the discourse on Islam and democracy that is currently led by three prominent Muslim scholars: Mohammed Arkoun, Rachid Ghannouchi, and Abdolkarim Soroush. Basically, this essay tries to determine how these contemporary Muslim thinkers reconcile liberal democratic tenets with Islamic ordinances, and the particular conflicts between the ideologies of Sharia Law and democratic government. Reconciling Islam and Democracy Three components of Islamic legal ideology are generally viewed as being incompatible with civil liberties or democracy, namely, corporal punishments, the legal inequality between Muslims and non-Muslims, and the legal gender inequality (Bowering, 2012, p. 129). Those who do not support the argument that governance in modern states has to be carried out within the context of Islamic legal doctrine do view religion as an integral foundation of a political system. They stress that democratic regimes depend on the presence of a particular philosophy for the people to comply with the law and for leaders to focus on the interests of the general public. As stated by Soroush, “Democracy cannot prosper without commitment to moral precepts. It is here that the great debt of democracy to religion is revealed: Religions, as bulwarks of morality, can serve as the best guarantors of democracy” (Bowering, 2012, p. 130). Although democratic regimes have to be unbiased towards religion and other worldviews, they do depend on moral codes, of which religious traditions could be a basis, including republican and constitutional principles. Mohammad Arkoun is one of the leading supporters of moderate Islam and Islamic modernity at present. Arkoun’s major interest is analysing both Islamic and Western traditions, and, at the same time, to develop a new jurisprudential and philosophical model of interpreting and applying Islam. He has promoted controversial, revolutionary views which try to broaden the core meaning and interpretation of Islam and to expand those elements of the tradition which are compatible with the ideologies of liberal democracy. Arkoun supports a historical view of Islam and rejects the legitimacy of any single idea of a ‘true Islam’ (Zayd, 2006). Thus he also rejects any central conflict between the principles and cultural ideals of Islam and Western traditions, interpreting Islam as a flexible and multifaceted cultural entity in continuous growth and with changing possibilities. Arkoun disapproves of the firm standpoint of leaders and scholars in Islamic societies against ‘liberalism’ as a trend evidently unknown or foreign to Islamic tradition. The opposition to liberalism is a way of securing the oppressive social relations and totalitarian political structure in these societies. Arkoun does not believe that there is a major conflict between the Western liberal ideology and a religious sentiment. Indeed, he claims that democracy and liberalism are the ideal political objectives for contemporary Islamic countries (Kamrava, 2006). While keeping a universal idea that transcends cultural and national boundaries, Arkoun is at the same time focused on promoting his ideas all over the cultural domain of Arab-Islamic communities. Introducing a compelling analysis of conservative thoughts in traditional Islamic belief and antidemocratic trends in contemporary Islamist thought, he believes that the only way to surpass the existing crisis in the Muslim world is to strengthen and broaden the core meaning and interpretation of Islam so that its different social domains may be merged with the perspective of liberal democracy. With this in mind, Arkoun uses a hermeneutics (i.e. a method of interpreting texts) to numerous features of the Islamic doctrine and develops a theoretical vocabulary that emphasises those democratic cultural components which support the establishment of a democratic modernity in the Muslim world (Kamrava, 2006). He also evaluates the popular assumption that universal ideals like democracy and human rights are quite ‘Western’. Viewing Islam as a continuously changing cultural body subjected to various influences and internal changes, Arkoun presents a new collection of analyses of the tradition which place Islam within its different socio-historical perspectives and reject the idea of a predetermined or stagnant knowledge of Islam. Arkoun argues that in theoretically developing non-ideological and historical assessment of Islam, separated from politics (e.g. government), it becomes evident how historical Islam has been influenced by a broad array of cultural values and traditions. Muslims from different political and social contexts and historical periods have had, and still have, very diverse understanding and views of Islam. Considering this geographically varied and pluralistic reality, Arkoun views the effort to develop only one ‘true Islam’ as unwise and basically risky because it would be based on narrow and petty ideological and political objectives and on the innate concerns of contemporary experience (Zayd, 2006). Arkoun stated that instead of exploring whether there is an equivalent entity for the priest in Islam, one should determine whether there is an equivalent role played. He claims that even though Islam has no pyramidal hierarchy symbolising religious power, there is a group of jurists that keeps a structure of orthodoxy and that supervises the exercise of Islamic law in collaboration with the government (Zayd, 2006). As stated by Arkoun, “ulama have played in historical and contemporary political systems a similar role to that played by the priests in the Christian Church before the separation of Church and state occurred” (Tadros, 2012, p. 54). He further stated that “Personalities such as the Mufti, the Judge and the Imam represent a religious and civil entity at the same time” (Tadros, 2012, p. 54). In other words, Arkoun argues that even though there is no priest in Islam to act as a mediator between God and the people, the clergy remains a crucial figure in Islam. Arkoun, in fact, argues that the contemporary view of Islam and its connection with modernity should be studied within the perspective of a comparison between the other two major monotheistic religions: Judaism and Christianity. Without a historical evaluation of these two religions in their connection to Islam, the likelihood of a democratic and modern analysis of Islam is far less possible. It is crucial, from the viewpoint of Arkoun, to examine the mutual historically contingent domains of the political and social settings of Islam, Christianity, and Judaism (Zayd, 2006). Ultimately, the objective is the democratisation of religious traditions founded on the resolving of conflicts by means of an open dialogue about controversial and problematic issues. Another contemporary Muslim scholar who largely influenced modern Islamic thought is Rachid Ghannouchi. His input to modern Islamic knowledge is his interpretation of modern Western thought and established Islamic concepts and his strong faith in the harmony between Western and Islamic thought in issues regarding civil liberties, democracy, and human rights. Moreover, the importance of Ghannouchi stems from the fact that, dissimilar from other Islamic scholars who support democratic ideologies, he is a scholar and, at the same time, a leader of an Islamic campaign (Glancy, 2007). His ideas are never confined to an intellectual discourse at a period when Islam became a leading political authority in Islamic societies. Ghannouchi strongly believes that civil society is an Islamic construct and that Islam strengthens civil society whilst secularism—an ideology that opposes the involvement of religion in civil affairs— cripples it. He is the first Islamic scholar to talk about the issues confronting the democratic transition in Islamic countries (Glancy, 2007). Ghannouchi views democracy as a political regime that draws legitimacy from the people and that grants the ruled the freedom to choose, scrutinise and, when needed, overthrow the ruler through processes that may differ from one democratic rule to another. Nevertheless, all these democratic systems exercise the process of free election. He believes that democracy creates the rule of power rotation through democratic election, protects several basic human rights, like freedom to form political parties and freedom of expression, and safeguards the autonomy of the judiciary (Tamimi, 2001). In other words, democracy is a system that protects the power of the people over the government and that establishes several integral values that protect the people from oppression and injustice. The major objective of Ghannouchi has been to emphasise the importance of democracy, to confirm its unity with Islam, and to assess the barriers preventing its successful establishment in the Muslim world. Nevertheless, he recognises that democracy is stained by ‘broken promises’. Thus he raises the concerns of Western proponents of democracy (Tamimi, 2001, p. 102). For instance, Italian political scientist Norberto Bobbio refers to the ‘broken promises’ as the discrepancy between democratic values as it was visualised by the founding fathers and the actual practice of democracy at present. According to Bobbio, some of the broken promises are “the survival of invisible power, the persistence of oligarchies, the suppression of mediating bodies, the renewed vigour in the representation of particular interests, the breakdown of participation, and the failure to educate citizens (or to educate them properly)” (Tamimi, 2001, p. 102). Ghannouchi believes that the failure in the approach of Western democratic regime to other nations is part of these broken promises. He finds the fact that the rights and liberties of democracy are restricted problematic; they do not apply to those who are outside the borders of the country concerned (Glancy, 2007). Ghannouchi expects that an Islamic perspective of democracy, once developed, will resolve this issue. Ghannouchi believes that the contribution of Islam would be mainly in terms of a code of ethics, an otherworldly morality that is missing in contemporary democracy. He argues that it is the absence of this kind of morality that strongly makes democracy a “rule of the people by the rich and powerful for the interest of the rich and the powerful” (Tamimi, 2001, p. 102). Islam would not only offer a set of principles for self-control and for the purification of human deeds but also a set of limitations to fight domination and a set of protections to safeguard freedom of opinion and expression. He is hopeful that by integrating the Western democratic ideology, Islam can protect the constructive features of democracy. This, according to him, can be attained by changing the Islamic code of ‘shura’—the Arabic term for ‘consultation’—which means including the ‘Ummah’—Arabic term for ‘nation’—in public affairs or government, from a simple set of common values, to an official governing body (Tamimi, 2001, pp. 102-103). Democratic instruments must be viewed as a universal human achievement that can operate in different cultural settings and can exist in harmony with diverse intellectual contexts. Moreover, Ghannouchi believes that none of the democratic instruments is contradictory with Islamic ideologies. Instead, he claims that democratic principles have proven to be the ideal way for Islamic principles to be changed from a set of grand principles to practical or realistic values relevant to the real world (Glancy, 2007). Likewise, and for best applicability, the democratic regime will find no greater principles and ideologies than those provided by Islamic doctrine. Ghannouchi is hopeful that an Islamic framework of democracy will emerge from the communion between Islamic principles and democratic processes. He strongly believes that this is within reach (Tamimi, 2001, p. 104): “The democratic system has worked within the framework of Christian values giving rise to Christian democracies and within the framework of socialist philosophy giving rise to socialist democracies. Why on earth should it not function within the framework of Islamic values to produce an Islamic democracy?” Meanwhile, Iran’s post-revolutionary religious scholarship reflects distinctive features as it develops in a setting which is politically and socially dissimilar from the pre-revolutionary period. Not like the religious scholars of the earlier era, the leading thinkers of the contemporary religious movement have all had some form of connection with the governing system, which complicates the mission of any reform (Jahanbaksh, 2001). However, this intellectual movement has surfaced from within the same intellectual community that created the revolution, and is led by one of its most prominent thinkers, Abdulkarim Soroush. Soroush rejects Islamic doctrine as the validating element in an Islamic society. However, this does not necessarily mean that Soroush is cancelling out the function of religion in political affairs. In fact, he supports a religious democratic government. He believes that a democratic government is not just in harmony with religion, but integral to a religious state (Jahanbaksh, 2001). His idea of a religious democratic government can be more accurately understood in view of the differences he identifies between two interpretations of religion, each one producing a different form of religious state which consequently mirrors one of two different ideas of a religious society. In the first one, the ‘faith-based’, the state is absolutely a democratic one. In the second one, the ‘fiqh-based’, the state is authoritarian, although it may adopt some aspects of a democratic state (Mirsepassi, 2010). Depending on which feature of religion is concerned, two distinct interpretations of religion will surface. At this point, Soroush focuses on Islam. If ‘amal’—outward practice—is prioritised over ‘iman’—inner faith-- the religious state will be characterised as a state in which the performance of all customs and rituals is prioritised. Hence the primary duty of the religious state in this instance is to implement the ‘shari’ah’, and to focus itself on and oversee the people’s performance of their religious obligations and practices. At this point ‘fiqh’—Islamic jurisprudence—is viewed as the heart of Islam; the authorities in shari’ah, or the ‘fuqaha’, thus function as guardians and will be given a high and honoured place in politics as well (Jahanbaksh, 2001). In such situations the state will be compelled, as one of its religious obligations, to defend and execute the shari’ah even if it has to use coercive means. This fiqh-based society is based on the religious rights and religious obligations of the leader and the subordinate. The governance system is also based on religion. Soroush believes that what makes a state religious is not the implementation of the shari’ah which has been imposed on Islamic countries. He argues that a religious state is one whose people accept religious beliefs freely. Soroush claims that a fiqh-based state is never democratic or religious, even if it exercises the shari’ah or demands the performance of its rituals (Burgat, 2003). It is never religious because shari’ah and fiqh are not the heart of Islam. It is never democratic because it enforces the exercise of shari’ah and hence demands sameness in spirit and in the religious practices of the people. Therefore, as stated by Soroush, the analysis of Islam and democracy must occur not from within but from outside established religion. So long as the issue is not resolved on a thorough theoretical manner, any explanation of the incompatibility or compatibility of democratic principles and Islamic doctrine based on Islamic legal principles or by means of revising some of its earlier traditions are seriously faulty (Sadiki, 2004). Not like other Muslim thinkers, the ideas of Soroush do not depend on episodes from early Islamic history, legal rulings, or Qur’anic verse. Soroush believes that even though democracy is incompatible with the normative legal interpretation of Islam, specifically the ‘fiqh’, it can be compatible with a different interpretation of it wherein human values like human rights, reason, justice, and freedom are given great importance (Mirsepassi, 2010). Justice and freedom are not based on religion. In other words, justice is not religious because it is religion itself that should promote justice. The legitimacy of a religion is analysed in view of these additional religious values. A religion which is unable to recognise human beings’ natural rights threatens its own legitimacy (Mirsepassi, 2010). Soroush believes that the task of reuniting democracy and Islam falls within the domain of reuniting revelation and rationality, the same as the discourse on fate and free will. Therefore, any success in reuniting democracy and Islam rests on a theoretical achievement in reuniting rationality and religion. Issues like democracy, human rights, and freedom are among the more current ones being confronted by Islam. These are not separate matters. Instead they are interrelated to one another, similarly vital issues like how Islam treats natural rights and man. However, Soroush does not argue that these concepts are based on or have to be based on Islam (Jahanbaksh, 2001). He argues that, democracy, when envisioned as an effective system of governance which reduces errors in socio-political government, can be successfully established in religious societies as well, but as long as the important theoretical bases of religion and democracy are reconciled (Jahanbaksh, 2001). Soroush argues that the foundation rests in evaluating and advancing people’s knowledge of man. He believes that the source of the problem is in the contemporary understanding of man; otherwise the connections and harmony between democracy, freedom, and true religion is quite obvious as to necessitate no rationality whatsoever (Otto, 2010). Soroush believes that a religious state can be democratic. A requirement for building a democratic religious government is to have an open knowledge of religion wherein rationality serves a central function. All other efforts to reconstruct some Islamic concepts or to enforce Islamic doctrine on institutions that only have a democratic facade are merely temporary solutions (Jahanbaksh, 2001). A genuine solution can only be attained if followers of Islam start to create a new worldview and thus develop a new view of humanity. This enormous undertaking is unachievable unless they visualise a view of Islam which, as its basic ideology, gives great importance to human rights, freedom, justice, and reason. References Bowering, G. et al. (2012) The Princeton Encyclopedia of Islamic Political Thought. New Jersey: Princeton University Press. Burgat, F. (2003) Face to Face with Political Islam. London: I.B. Tauris. Ghamari-Tabrizi, B. (2008) Islam and Dissent in Post-Revolutionary Iran: Abdolkarim Soroush, Religious Politics and Democratic Reform. London: I.B. Tauris. Glancy, B. (2007) Liberalism without Secularism? Rachid Ghannouchi and the Theory and Politics of Islamic Democracy. 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(2006) Reformation of Islamic Thought: A Critical Historical Analysis. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. Read More