Argument of Scientific Realism - Essay Example

Argument of Scientific Realism Scientific realism tends to explain generally that the world we live in is totally realistic world. Science describes world as it conclude theories approximately. The scientific field itself is independent thus realism takes it independent nature as well. The miracle of science had been debated over the years because it’s successful. The debate regarding scientific realism is based upon the fact that unobservable bodies or entities are being concluded as the basis of scientific theories. Hilary Putnam, an American philosophers coined his argument regarding non-miraculous scientific realism. Hilary Putnam claims that “The positive argument for realism is that it is the only philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle” as quoted in Curd and Cover. A great number of scientific realists have opposed his view by presenting their arguments. Among different scientific realists, Bas van Fraassen and Larry Laudan are scientific realists who have debated against the claim of Hilary Putnam more accurately. The argument presented by Hilary Putnam is known as no-miracle argument that elaborates the scientific realism to be no-miracle because of the theoretical features of scientific theories. The argument of scientific realism had been forwarded because the scientific theories could only be possible and accurate when the approximate truth will be concluded. This is the biggest limitation of scientific theories that dents the scientific realism or scientific success. The no-miracle claim by Hilary Putnam further explains the theory on the basis of abduction. The no-miracle claim could also be understood in terms of a hypothetical situation where an entity “A” is a fact that is known surprisingly and through premise “P” the fact “A” can be elaborated. Furthermore, if this premise is not challenged by any other hypothesis then P and A both will be true. This explains that scientific theories are always approximate showing approximate truth. Thus no-miracle argument is considered to be the strongest argument in the ongoing debate of realism (Howson, 2003). In a simpler expression, no-miracle argument can be elaborated as an argument stressing on the fact that scientific theories proposed by different scientists are just matter of approximate truth. The use of word no-miracle is associated with this argument in a way that it shows that scientific realism is just another philosophy stating the theoretical aspect of scientific success (Moran, 2004). Larry Laudan and Realism: Larry Laudan and Bas Van Fraassen are two empiricists who believe in ultimate significance of evidence. No-miracle argument have been criticized by a number of empiricists but Larry Laudan and Bas Van Fraassen are those empiricists who have managed to propose the strongest account in the ongoing debate. In particular the debatable account proposed by Larry Laudan in the year of 1981 was given through the context of historically coined theories. Larry Laudan claimed that there have been great deals of theories which were proposed in the history and were equally accepted. Such theories were surely regarded as empirically successful theories. Such empirical theories were rejected in the past with the clause that the basis or terms of such theories were not in any way applicable in the modern theories. Larry Laudan further elaborates that new theories can similarly be discarded as the historical ones simultaneously. Such an account helps us believing the fact that the absolute truth is not at all absolute. The account presented by Larry Laudan is considered to be a pessimistically arranged view in the context of metaphysical induction (Laudan, 1981). As a response to the account made by Larry Laudan, many realists proposed that realism was only restricted to some theories only which had specific characteristics. Some of the realists who forwarded the theory of no-miracle argument restricted realism to theories which were novel. Larry Laudan proposed another statement as a result of debate interrelating to novel theories and predictive theories. Larry Laudan proposed that the novel theories were also discarded though they were regarded as approximate ones (Putnam, 1975). The intended and accounted statements strongly lead the debate to much complicated level where the realists started proposing more and more accounts but with more alteration to aspect of realism interrelating success of science. As for further understanding about the types of theories that Larry Laudan referred to were those theories which were those coined on the basis of realist grounds. Theories which had internal structure where the entities worked thoroughly and were not at all based upon intuitive assumptions. As in whole the account justified by Larry Laudan explains that scientific realism cannot in anyway be able to help the realists to explain their accounts. The reason behind such an account of Larry Laudan is that realism does not at all explain the working of the theories as proposed by realists. If we sum up the statements accounted by Larry Laudan then it would be the irrelevance of approximate truth proposed by the theories. Theories were discarded that clearly justifies the point of Larry Laudan pertaining to the discernment of contemporary theories to be zero. Moreover, approximate truth itself is an idea that is blurred in a way that it does not provide credibility to the success of these theories. Larry Laudman states that realists are unable to justify the applicability and success of theories which have their theoretical terms as novel (Laudan, 1984). An important pointer that had been raised by Larry Laudan is the fact that realism itself is unable to conclude whether these theories were successful or not though realists have always been trying to make it evident that realism can actually help highlighting the approximate truth. Bas Van Fraassen and Realism: In similar ways Bas Van Fraassen is another philosopher who criticized the argument that was put forward by Hilary Putman. The basis of the criticism as further elaborated by Bas Ban Fraassen was the absolute success of absolute truth which was no where evident in the debate that was put forward by the realists claiming that scientific realism was a notion that had objectivity. The criticism that was accompanied by the statements of other empiricists with Bas Van Fraassen pointed out that scientists have greatly proposed theories with their absolute assumptions that it may be easy for them to explain them but their absolute value would differ with changing references. The view that was presented by Bas Van Fraassen is considered as constructive empiricism. The basic point that had been raised by Bas Van Fraassen is the requirement of explanation for the language of science in which these theories are stated. Bas Van Fraassen elaborates that it had often been seen that scientific theories have been discussed as statements with absolute values but the question that had been rising and being asked by many empiricists is the absoluteness of values. The success of scientific theories seems a dream for some of the empiricists because realist themselves are not able to prove whether the value of their scientific theory is absolute (Schlagel, 1988). Bas Van Fraassen has been successful in putting forward his argument claiming the blurred view of realism in explaining its success of science. His criticism had been long withstanding due to his ability of providing distinction between observable and non-observable entities which have been widely addressed by scientific theories in the past. Bas Van Fraassen had also underestimated realism in a broader sense of constructivist empiricism. He explains that the realists themselves are liable to prove their scientific theories as empirically adequate. Thus there is no point of asserting the no-miracle theory as a coinage for the debate between empiricism and realism (Monton, 2007). The adequate value of a theory is only available when the factual information. The entities which are observable may be the only values of a theory that would be empirically adequate. But it is the sad reality that even such types of theories have also been discarded in the past. In a broader sense of the scientific implication of theoretical adjunct it is arguable that scientific theories are the basis of the debate which has been exhorted by both realists and empiricists. The criticism which had been put forward by Bas Van Fraassen and Larry Laudan are agreeable and very strong which have challenged realists in the ongoing debate of scientific realism (Bueno, 1999). The scientific realism has also faced the mutual argument by empiricists such as Ban Van Fraassen, Larry Laudan and others that observable entities could easily be explained by the matter of fact interrelating with theories. But the mix of theories can not in any way be interrelated. This proves the dimensions of realism to be inaccurate and inexplainiable. The best example that clearly defines the inability of realism in providing the values of scientific theories is the estimation of approximate truth through observable entities. The example could be taken from the predicate of dinosaurs, for instance, the living age of dinosaurs have been predicted through the fossils assuming the absolute age and era of dinosaurs. Thus this clearly explains that scientific realism as defined by Hilary Putman is critically addressed by empiricism (Fraassen, 1980). Through the analysis of the scientific realism and most importantly the no-miracle argument of Hilary Putman stating positive argument for realism as a philosophy that does not make success of science a miracle, it can be concluded that scientific realism could not derive the theoretical truth to be positivistic and successful. The theories which have been regarded as authentic and applicable in the past have been discarded leading into the belief of people to expect the modern theories to be discarded as well. The criticism which has been put forwards by Larry Laudan and Bas Van Fraassen could be well adjusted and agreed because they provide complete assumptions for the best understanding of empiricism and realism. Every scientist has added more turmoil in the debatable consequences of realism theory assuming the empiricist providing strongest account against scientific realism and success of science. Realists have tried to explain success and theories of science but they have failed to explain science in its best sense of epistemology. Bibliography Bueno, O. (1999). What is Structural Empiricism? Scientific Change in an Empiricist Setting. Erkenntnis , 50, 59–85. Fraassen, B. (1980). The Scientific Image. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Howson, C. (2003). Hume's Problem:Induction and the Justification of Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Laudan, L. (1981). A Confutation of Convergent Realism. Philosophy of Science , 48(1), 19-49. Laudan, L. (1984). Discussion: Realism Without the Real. Philosophy of Science , 51, 156–162. Monton, B. (2007). Van Fraassen's Philosophy of Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Moran, D. (2004). Hilary Putnam And Immanuel Kant: Two `Internal Realists'? Synthese , 123(1), 65-104. Putnam, H. (1975). Mathematics, Matter and Method. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Schlagel, R. (1988). A Critique of Bas Van Fraassen's "Constructive Empiricism". The Review of Metaphysics , 41(4), 789-814. Read More