Christian Ethics: Do You See Connections between Conscience and Friendship - Essay Example

Running Head: Christian Ethics Christian Ethics: Do you see connections between conscience and friendship of the of theinstitution] Christian Ethics: Do you see connections between conscience and friendship Moral development has not yet become a major concern for virtue ethics, even though the topic was central to the moral philosophy f Aristotle, the traditional source f much virtue ethics. (Carr 1991) Psychologists concentrate more on the moral development f children than on that f adults. Attention is being increasingly given to the role that moral "practices" play in the formation f virtue and adult character. William Damon quotes Spinoza's aphorism, "The palace f reasoning may be entered only through the courtyard f habit." The importance f practices in the formation f virtuous habits has gained increasing attention since Alasdair MacIntyre's After Virtue. (MacIntyre 1981, 169-89) In his usage, practices are socially established activities that lead those who participate in them to appreciate certain things as goods and to internalize standards f excellence in achieving them. Practices are done for their own sake, such as friendship, not for additional ends, such as practicing free throws in basketball. Martha Nussbaum recommends the engaged reading f literature as a practice that expands moral perception and empathy. This skill is a necessary component f humanistic education, even for lawyers and scientists. (Nussbaum 1997, 85-112) Diana Fritz Cates argues that the practice f committed friendship trains desires and moral vision in the virtue f compassion. The willingness to engage others, even strangers, in their suffering gains added meaning as a practice within a Christian frame f reference. Maria Antonaccio describes recent attention to "practices" as conscious efforts at moral formation. (Antoncaccio 1998, 69-92) She distinguishes between an "existential" model f askesis advocated by Pierre Hadot's study f Stoic sources, a "therapeutic" model in Nussbaum, and an "aesthetic" approach in Michel Foucault. Antonaccio doubts that these attempts to ground moral development in practical exercises can succeed while their authors refuse to consider a normative theory f human nature and moral ideals. Although theories f human nature or development are unpopular in an era that stresses particularity and pluralism, she writes that "some form f theoretical reflection is necessary in order to judge what form f therapy' human beings need, and to assess critically the processes f formation already underway." Some writings on practices use a faith tradition to specify a normative view f human nature that guides moral and spiritual development. Spiritual practices are being recognized as central to Christian moral formation. Dorothy C. Bass edited a collection f essays on 12 central Christian practices, such as hospitality, keeping Sabbath, and forgiveness, that shape the mind and heart in the Christian way f life. With Craig Dykstra she writes that "when we see some f our ordinary activities as Christian practices, we come to perceive how our daily lives are all tangled up with the things God is doing in the world." Catherine M. Wallace analyzes the virtue f fidelity as a constitutive element f the practice f marriage. Fidelity has more than instrumental value in keeping a marriage intact; more importantly, it does something to the spouses by training their desires and reshaping their identities over time. (Kotva 1997, 272-90) From the perspective f evangelical Christianity, Brad J. Kallenberg writes: "Christianity cannot be explained or understood without reference to a distinctive cluster f practices. In order to participate in the tradition called Christianity one must necessarily participate in these practices." (Kallenberg 1997, 7-29) He highlights certain practices f community moral formation: witness, worship, works f mercy, discernment, and discipleship. Reinhard Hutter points out that Luther redefined the marks f the Church to be practices. There is an invariant inner circle f practices that constitute community life and a more adaptable outer circle f practices that give witness and service to the world. (Hutter 1994, 352-57) It may be that the ordinary practices f Christian spirituality provide means f moral formation that will not be found in philosophical virtue ethics. Since philosophers are wary about endorsing any particular way f life, their accounts f virtue and character may inevitably remain somewhat formal. (Kekes 1995) Christian spirituality, by comparison, has developed a whole series f practices that are meant to help individuals and communities develop in a particular way f life. At the same time, looking at the internal standards f excellence embedded in the practice and measuring it against biblical and communal wisdom can keep Christian spirituality from becoming narcissistic pietism. Social dimension f conscience Conscience relies on the moral quality f the groups to which we belong. We gain our moral bearings from the communities we are born into and deliberately choose, beginning with family and extending to peers, other adults, religious and professional communities. We carry their voices in our heads, for better and for worse. Recent research indicates that people identify with those values and principles that are supported by communities that matter to them. O'Connell writes in his recent work on moral formation that we live up or down to the standards f the groups to which we belong: "the more my relationships depend on my having a particular role, the more that role will be central to me. And the more a particular role is central to me, the greater the likelihood that in role-related settings I will behave in accord with that role." His investigation f psychological and sociological resources leads him to a clear conclusion: "values are transmitted through groups." In groups we find our identity and the inspiration and accountability to lead a moral life. Ministers who prefer one-to-one interaction with individuals may be less effective in forming Christian conscience. "Much more important are those interventions that join people not to the minister but to one another, and that is the sort f activity that most ministers enjoy less." Developmental psychologist William Damon writes: In the end we must help our communities recapture what sociologist Amitai Etzioni refers to as their "moral voices" . . . . Etzioni shows how our modern-day disinclination to "lay moral claims" has eroded the routine moral reactions f our communities and their members. He offers a compelling example f a psychiatrist who argues that doctors should not ask someone to make a risk-free bone marrow donation in order to save a sibling, because refusing to do so might produce guilt in the person who was asked and refused. Etzioni's reply: "If they refuse, they should feel guilty." (Damon 1995, 230-236) Society is deprived f a crucial moral resource when families and communities fail to provide models f sound values and hide behind value neutrality. The aimlessness and cynicism f some young people may say less about them than it does about their parents and the other adults in their world. (Wallerstein 1996) Families can help their children learn how to reflect morally by engaging them in discussions about real life issues in an encouraging manner. One study found that this style "includes behaviors such as eliciting the child's opinion, asking clarifying questions, paraphrasing, and checking for understanding--reminiscent f the Socratic style f questioning." (Walker 1991, 264-81) David Popenoe traces the decline f social virtue to deficiencies in the family and the institutions and communities that had supported families in the past. "The central significance f the community for moral development is this: moral development in children takes place in part through repetition and reinforcement, and through adapting fundamental moral values to a variety f social circumstances beyond the family." (Popenoe 1995, 71-104) When the child begins to move beyond the family, other institutions need to reinforce the values learned at home. Communities where similar standards are echoed in schools, teams, youth groups, and other associations form the most stable characters in the young. Popenoe, who has studied family systems in several cultures and paid special attention to the effect f absent fathers, offers this bracing advice to those who want to support social virtues: "As individuals, we should seek to stay married, stay accessible to our children, stay active in our local communities, and stay put." (Popenoe 1993, 527-42) A study f ten communities over a decade found that adolescent adjustment depends more upon a local consensus f values than any other predictor, including wealth or ethnicity. (Ianni 1989) This consensus is not often found in diverse modern societies, particularly when contrary values are supported in mass media. Consciences are dulled when the young are not taught an adequate moral vocabulary and when moral debate is "dumbed down" into the vocabularies f self-interest and utilitarian advantage. (Bellah 1985) Mass media creates a pseudo community, particularly in the various forms f "youth culture." We are just beginning to appreciate the moral impact f the eighteen thousand hours f television that the average American youngster has seen by age eighteen. Sissela Bok argues persuasively that television's relentless depiction f violence as entertainment desensitizes habitual viewers to its human consequences. (Bok 1998) Mass media creates certain expectations in the young which are often impervious to moral scrutiny or criticism. For all these reasons, conscience-formation is a more formidable task than it was when surrounding institutions reinforced the values inculcated in a stable home. Issues in moral development Moral development is a perennial concern f moral philosophy and theology, but in recent decades it has gained attention from psychological research and debates over the role f public schools in shaping the values and behaviour f students. William Bennett, Thomas Lickona and other advocates f traditional morality decry the public school's abandonment f explicit moral instruction. They point out that American public education had always aimed at moral formation. The 19th century's McGuffey's Readers focused on biblical narratives and moral lessons to train dutiful citizens for a Protestant nation. Later, John Dewey strove to inculcate the virtues f democracy through collaborative "progressive education." (Westbrook 1991) A number f dissenting voices, however, argue that there is little evidence to indicate that schools can teach moral principles or stimulate moral development in the young. Mary Ann Glendon writes that democratic culture relies on civic virtues that have to be inculcated in every generation: "The American version f the democratic experiment leaves it primarily up to families, local governments, schools, religious and workplace associations, and a host f other voluntary groups to teach and transmit republican virtues and skills from one generation to the next." Whether schools, especially public schools, can shoulder this responsibility today is an open question. Robert D. Heslep has made a comprehensive proposal for moral education based on civic values that are central to the American polity. Although early education may have the most formative impact on students' moral character, some evidence exists that undergraduates are still shaping their value systems, while this openness may diminish for students in graduate and professional schools. Psychological studies f moral development take two different directions, from the past and from the future. The first views human development as primarily remedial. Growth into healthy, mature adulthood comes through gradually rectifying the traumatic events f infancy and childhood. This therapeutic model typically leaves the profile f moral maturity sketchy, perhaps in deference to the multiple life plans available in a pluralistic culture. Particularly for neo-Freudians, most moral formation occurs in the first decade f life, and much f it is negative. The problems f adult life can be traced back to the struggle f the child to differentiate from his or her parents sexually, morally, and psychologically. Here authentic conscience needs to be discovered beneath the tyranny f the superego that employs guilt and shame to repress the unruly id and reinforce conventional morality. Problems f adult gender identity originate in the different forms f attachment that boys and girls have with the primary care giver, usually their mother. Recently a more romantic form f this remedial approach is taken by the popular literature that urges adults to rediscover their "inner child" in order to unleash their native powers f growth. Analyses f contemporary moral behaviour based upon evolutionary psychology and primatology also take their cues from the more remote past. Generally, however, moral development looks more to the future for guidance. In Aristotelian terms, all natural growth is directed by the final cause, the perfected state f the entity. Human nature has innate potentials and inclinations to develop towards moral maturity, granted education and proper choice. The state f human flourishing that is found in the virtuous measures the intermediate stages. Although various thinkers and cultures depict human flourishing differently, naturalist ethics almost always posits some general features f individual and social maturity that normatively guide appropriate human growth. American psychological research on moral development has until recently been dominated by Harvard's Lawrence Kohlberg and his disciples, in particular his former colleague who emerged as his foremost critic, Carol Gilligan. Considerable writing in women's studies and feminist ethics have been based on her work. It is sobering to realize how much f American research and writing on moral development over the past 30 years has been constructed on the work f Kohlberg and Gilligan with little or no awareness f the significant limitations f their theories about morality. Resisting Freudian dogma on childhood formation and the ethical emotivism and behaviourism that were prevalent in the 1960s, Kohlberg posited a highly rational model f moral reflection. (Reimer 1993, 91-102) He derived a sequence f six stages f moral development from the stages f cognitive development outlined by Jean Piaget, whose work had recently been discovered by American psychologists. If children progressively learned to incorporate the structures f causality, space, time, and the like into their thinking, Kohlberg reasoned, they should also progressively move to understand and employ the analogous universal moral structures. They would move from pre-conventional morality based on fear or shame to more conventional motives based on self-interest and peer respect. The higher stages f morality would be post-conventional since the mature person comes to acknowledge moral obligations as autonomous claims. The final stage set the goal for moral development: acting according to universal moral principles for the good f humanity. Philosophically, Kohlberg adopted a form f Kantian ethics in which obligation is central and moral claims are properly autonomous, that is, based on universalizable duties rather than on any emotive incentive or practical consequence. He grounded morality simply and exclusively on justice, that is, the fair and rational treatment accorded to others as equals and asserted that virtue is one and "the name f this ideal form is justice." He concluded that there is an invariant, cross-cultural sequence in moral development that was attained step by step, with no regression to previous stages or straddling f the levels f moral reasoning. Why concentrate on moral reasoning In part, because verbally expressed rational skills are more accessible to measurement than the more interior dynamics f emotion, intuition, and imagination. Kohlberg's model permitted researchers to ignore the elusive arenas f moral sensitivity to interpersonal and social complexities, intuitive judgments, moral dispositions, and character as the basis f action. Unfortunately this whole movement appears to be based on flawed empirical and philosophical assumptions. Empirical evidence showed that infants are not as egocentric as Piaget and Kohlberg posited. Martin L. Hoffmann argued that children experience claims upon them that cannot be accounted for by rewards and punishments. Even though they are unable to articulate those claims verbally, one-year old infants typically display rudimentary forms f empathy and two year olds become aware f rules. Interview results challenged Kohlberg's insistence on "hard stages" since "most children mix responses from the second and third stages, and most adults mix responses from states 3 and 4," writes psychologist Owen Flanagan. Even by Kohlberg's measure, almost no one attains the highest stage f moral development, and "on the new scoring system the highest stage has no empirically confirmed instances." Philosophically, Kohlberg's instrument appears narrow and rigid. Are all moral encounters and concerns reducible to fairness and impartiality Consider relations between friends or family members: while fairness is a consideration, it cannot possibly be the sole guide. Does it make any sense to counsel a mother to treat her children solely according to what duty requires f her Flanagan concludes that there is no "universal and irreversible sequence f stages according to which moral personality unfolds and against which moral maturity can be unequivocally plotted." Even staunch advocates f Kohlberg's approach now concede that moral sensitivity, motivation, and character must be studied as well as moral judgment. (Rest 1997, 5-28) Finally, neither Kohlberg nor his followers have successfully demonstrated that clear thinking produces morally right conduct. In fact, research done on the cognitive processes f real-life moral virtuosos finds them scoring mostly at the level f conventional morality, a finding that calls into question the whole industry f testing and moral education inspired by Kohlberg. More generally, this debate raises the question f whether any descriptive account f moral experience can ever rise to the level f a normative account. Even the descriptions f moral development will be selected according to some conception f an end state that itself exercises normative influence, whether acknowledged or not. Referring to the desirable condition as "maturity" or "health" begs the question, unless some definition f these terms is presented. Kohlberg's putatively descriptive sequence was deeply influenced by his stage 6 which was the very model f Kantian moral autonomy; he later expanded his ideal as a liberally democratic citizen along Rawlsian lines. Carol Gilligan's work on moral development suffers from similar reductionist tendencies. Her book In a Different Voice remains an academic bestseller nearly two decades after it appeared. She challenged the rationalist and androcentric model f Kohlberg and proposed two seminal ideas: first, that there are two basic perspectives in moral reflection, one based on justice, the other on care; secondly, that men predominantly but not exclusively favour justice while women mostly prefer the care perspective. These ideas led to a vigorous academic debate about the adequacy f the care/justice hypothesis and a widespread assumption by many that Gilligan had demonstrated clear gender differences in moral reflection. Despite her caveats, her book was read not as a hypothesis about a different voice but as prof that she had discovered the different voice f women. Gilligan's subsequent writings have not clarified the matter. A collection she edited "maps the moral domain" exclusively along the justice/care dichotomy, while conceding that men and women are not anchored in a single perspective. In the debate that followed, empirical evidence was advanced to assert that men and women do not in fact score differently on moral reasoning tests, even Kohlberg's. Whether someone employs a care or justice perspective may have more to do with the nature f the problem presented than with the person's gender. In addition, men and women seem to switch readily from one perspective to another, with only minuscule groups f either gender using one perspective exclusively. There are more fundamental problems with the hypothesis f two moral voices that make the debates about measuring gender preferences moot. Why should all moral considerations have to be jammed under the rubrics f care or justice (Flanagan 1987, 622-37) Lawrence A. Blum suggests that community, honesty, courage, prudence are equally important and not reducible to care and impartiality. Gilligan's original position and subsequent hypotheses rest on theories f childhood development, specifically Nancy Chodorow's neo-Freudian account f infant development that imprints a preference for separation on boys and attachment on girls. Gilligan later speculated that universal childhood experiences f powerlessness and attachment form the basis f the two voices and explains why people f both genders have access to each perspective. In terms f moral philosophy, there may be less to "care" than meets the eye. People can be caring toward some groups but indifferent toward others. Distinct moral understandings, habits, and emotions are involved in caring for intimates as compared to caring for strangers, likewise in caring for groups as compared to caring for individuals. Ordinary moral development gradually extends concern for one's closest connections to concern for strangers, including those affected by social arrangements. Justice and fairness might be considered components f this expanded caring rather than its alternatives. Marilyn Friedman charges that Gilligan treats relationships too individualistically by removing them from their institutional settings. Kathryn Tanner reconstructs an ethics f care so that it is not confined to immediate relations or fall prey to a gender essentialism which she sees as flaws in Gilligan's approach. The popularity f Gilligan's binary model has not been diminished by its many critics. Nor has it been dimmed by her inability to chart a distinct developmental pattern for girls and women, a project she insisted was necessary before any further comparisons between the moral experience f men and women could be made. This has not stopped them from being taken as canonical in some quarters. A recent textbook for graduate students in student development lists the many applications f her theory in teaching, social work, developmental psychology, moral and political philosophy, and student affairs. (Evans 1998, 195-200) While there is an intuitive plausibility to Gilligan's account, unfortunately her observations fall short f being empirically established or philosophically adequate. References Antoncaccio, Maria, "Contemporary Forms f Askesis and the Return f Spiritual Exercises," The Annual f the Society f Christian Ethics 18 (1998) 69-92. Bellah, Robert N. et al., Habits f the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University f California, 1985) Bok, Sissela, Mayhem: Violence as Public Entertainment (Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1998). Carr, David, Educating the Virtues: An Essay on the Philosophical Psychology f Moral Development and Education (New York: Routledge, 1991). Damon, William, Greater Expectations: Overcoming the Culture f Indulgence in America 's Homes and Schools (New York: Free, 1995) 236 Evans, Nancy J., Deanna S. Forney, Florence Guido-DiBrito, Student Development in College: Theory, Research, and Practice (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1998) 195-200. Flanagan, Owen and Kathryn Jackson, "Justice, Care and Gender: the Kohlberg-Gilligan Debate Revisited," Ethics 97 (1987) 622-37. Hutter, Reinhard, "The Church as Public: Dogma, Practice, and the Holy Spirit," Pro Ecclesia 3 (1994) 352-57 Ianni, Francis A. J., The Search for Structure: A Report on American Youth Today (New York: Free, 1989). Kallenberg, Brad J., "The Master Argument f MacIntyre's After Virtue," in Virtues and Practices in the Christian Tradition: Christian Ethics After MacIntyre, ed. Nancey Murphy, Brad J. Kallenberg and Mark Thiessen Nation (Harrisburg, Penn.: Trinity International, 1997) 7-29, at 22. Kekes, John, Moral Wisdom and Good Lives (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1995). Kotva, Joseph J., Jr., "The Formation f Pastors, Parishoners, and Problems: A Virtue Reframing f Clergy Ethics," Annual f the Society f Christian Ethics 17 (1997) 272-90. MacIntyre, Alasdair, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University f Notre Dame, 1981) 169-89 Nussbaum, Martha C., Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense f Reform in Liberal Education (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1997), esp. 85-112 Popenoe, D., "American Family Decline, 1960-1990: A Review and Appraisal," Journal f Marriage and the Family 55 (1993) 527-42. Popenoe, David, "The Roots f Declining Social Virtue" in Seedbeds f Virtue: Sources f Competence, Character, and Citizenship in American Society, ed. Mary Ann Glendon and David Blankenhorn (New York: Madison Books, 1995) 71-104 Reimer, Joseph, "The Case f the Missing Family: Kohlberg and the Study f Adolescent Moral Development," in Approaches to Moral Development: New Research and Emerging Themes, ed. Andrew Garrod (New York: Teachers College, 1993) 91-102. Rest, James, Lynne Edwards, Stephen Thoma, "Designing and Validating a Measure f Moral Judgment: Stage Preference and Stage Consistency Approaches" Journal f Educational Psychology 89 (1997) 5-28, at 5. Walker, Lawrence A. and John H. Taylor, "Family Interactions and the Development f Moral Reasoning," Child Development 62 (1991) 264-81 Wallerstein, Judith and Sandra Blakeslee, Second Chances: Men, Women and Children a Decade After Divorce (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996). Westbrook, Robert B., John Dewey and American Democracy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University, 1991). Read More