Analysis of Humes Writings - Reasoning and Experience - Term Paper Example

? Philosophy Introduction According to Hume’s writings, the reasoning of humans and animals are similar, the difference comes in their reasoning abilities. One of the differences is that animals, unlike humans, possess specific cognitive instincts tat are designed to assist them propagate and survive, and another difference is that humans, unlike animals, have the ability to improve their reasoning. Let’s first get a clear understanding of what it means by “reasoning.” Hume convincingly argues it as the ability of an imagination to link and relate ideas in various situations that would either produce belief or reason (Owen, 1999). Hume says in his treatise that “reason is nothing but a wonderful and unintelligible instinct in our souls, which carries us along a certain train of ideas, and endows them with particular qualities, according to their particular situations and relations” (T 1.3.16.9; SBN 179). In this sense, Hume regards reason as an instinct both in humans and animals. My work narrows down to animal reasoning with a few studies and comparisons to human reasoning. Animal actions depend on two sorts of reasoning: based on experience and instincts. Reasoning and experience The claim about reasoning ability being essentially different in animals and humans was rejected by Descartes by arguing that animals have reason, and concluded it with certain observed behaviors in animals. He began with claims about human understanding, indicating some behavior in which animals resemble human, therefore concluding that animals must also take after humans in their reasoning (More, 1996). Hume on the other hand disagrees to this order of argument in the opposite direction where clearly states that animals learn from experiences. He cites some examples horses learn what heights they can safely leap, and dogs learn to fear the sight of a whip (EHU 9.2-3; SBN 105). More over, animals do not clearly utilize “any process of argument or reasoning” to make such inferences. Indeed, Hume says that it is “impossible” for them to do so, due to their “imperfect understandings” (EHU 9.5; SBN 106). Reasoning and instincts We have seen in first sort of animal reasoning that it almost resembles the human reasoning. However, this is quite different in the second kind of action. Hume claims that reason is itself an instinct and this is made peculiar after considering the two types of instincts: the generalized cognitive instinct of reason which is the ability to relate ideas in various ways, and the specialized cognitive instincts that comprise knowledge of particular matters of fact required for the animal’s survival (Boyle, 2003). Hume cites an example to support the latter sort of reasoning when he says “a bird which chooses the location and materials of her nest and then sits on her eggs for the appropriate amount of time” (EHU 9.6; SBN 108). Hume argues that such knowledge comes “from the original hand of nature,” and that we call such knowledge “instincts” (EHU 9.6; SBN 108). He also argues that although humans may marvel at such knowledge, “their wonder will, perhaps, cease or diminish, when they consider, that the experimental reasoning itself, which they possess in common with beasts, and on which the whole conduct of life depends, is nothing but a species of instinct or mechanical power” (EHU 9.6; SBN 108). This way, Hume sticks to his argument that the specific instincts of animals are do not differ from the ability, both in humans and animals, to reason according to experience. It would be lame to think that humans lack instincts altogether, they do also possess instincts which are mostly portrayed in their passions such as thirst, hunger, love, resentment and attachment to other humans. They however rarely utilize such instincts for survival which seems to be the matter of fact with animals that have more of these instincts. According to Massey’s (1976), it is clearly an empirical matter whether human beings or any other organisms possess a priori knowledge of matters of fact. This means that it is satisfactory to depict that animals seem to possess innate knowledge of matters of fact, which is not the same case with humans. Reasoning and demonstration The argument above has crowned animals to possess instincts that enable them reason, however, they lack one type of reasoning attributed to demonstration. This type of reasoning requires higher intellectual functioning, which animals lack. This is due to inability to relate ideas, perceive relations in quantities or numbers, and therefore cannot sustain a chain of such intuitions in heir minds (Boyle, 2013). Hume emphasizes that the minds of animals, like that of humans’, operate by the principles of association of contiguity, resemblance, and causation (T 2.1.12.7; SBN 327), he however perceived that animals were not capable of the philosophical relations, which involve actively choosing to compare two ideas (T 1.1.5.1; SBN 13). He therefore asserts that “their thoughts are not so active as to trace relations, except in very obvious instances” (T 2.2.12.4; SBN 397). This does not ultimately mean that minds of animals are completely inactive; therefore there is a possibility that animals have the ability to make some limited comparisons between quantities (Boyle, 2013). The argument that animals cannot engage in reasoning through demonstration is also conceived due to their lack of sufficient powers of observation and attention (Boyle, 2013). Hume says that “the reasoning difference between humans and animals will be easily understood by considering how wide their reasoning abilities can vary” (EHU 9.5, n20; SBN 107). In other words, powers of observation and attention in animals fall so far short of humans’ therefore it is difficult for them to engage in reasoning through demonstration. Conclusion In conclusion I defend Hume’s arguments that create a bridge between the faculty that generates reasoning in animals as a basis of experience and instincts, and minimally through demonstration. Both the empirical and methodological grounds demonstrate that animal reasoning is acquired knowledge of matters of fact, which really exists from sense perception and causal reasoning. Again, unlike many commentators who perceive animals to lack morality in reasoning, I advocate that animal reasoning can be virtuous just like in humans since “reason is a virtue” (Boyle, 2003). REFERENCE LIST Boyle, D. Hume on animal reason: Hume Studies Volume XXVIX, Number 1(2003),3-28. Owen, D.(1999). Hume’s Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 197. More, H. The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vols. 1 and 2.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. Hume, D. An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: A Critical Edition, Tom L. Beauchamp Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000. Massey, D. Inference, Explanation, and Other Frustrations: Essays in the Philosophy of Science. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. References to Hume’s works have following abbreviations: “EHU” = David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding: A Critical Edition, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Read More