From Chance to Choice - Assignment Example

? From Chance to Choice The most prominent issues connected to germ line negative intervention centres on preventing the birth of individuals with disabilities. The use of such technology seemingly appears to present no challenge since the technology need not require abortion of the foetus or selective elimination of embryo, but simply “curing” disability. Buchanan at al. (2000) has supported negative genetic intervention by stipulating that the “inclusion of disabled people” and “avoidance of the birth of people with disabilities by utilizing the technologies” can be compatible. Nevertheless, the logic in supporting such genetic intervention presents numerous problems. In the event that social inclusion refers to the obligation of all members of the society to include individuals secluded by society based on bias or unjustified reasons, then preventing the birth of people with individuals via genetic intervention cannot be justified. The paper holds that preventing the birth of individuals with disabilities within the present social system is immoral and exclusive of people with disabilities. From Chance to Choice Introduction One of the dominant ways in which the human condition could be altered is through the enhancement of fundamental human capacities. If one of the partners carries a version of a gene that could prejudice the offspring to inherit conditions that they want to avert, then gene manipulation may appear a viable way to safeguard the undesired outcome. Disability represents a physical or mental condition that individuals have a powerful preference not to be, which in some sense can be considered as a “harmed condition.” This elevates the significance of probing the normative questions raised by such prospects (Robertson,1996. Background In the article titled “from Chance to Choice,” Buchanan et al. discuss the issue on whether utilizing germ line choice to eliminate disabilities is immoral since it will yield to harm to disabled people. The first objection centres on sweeping empirical generalization detailing that as the number of persons with a particular disability reduces, support for the individuals will decrease (Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, & Wilker, 2000). Second, the decision on whether the support will reduce within a certain case will hinges on a number of factors. The prediction on whether support will reduce as science reduces the occurrence of genetic diseases is much less reasonable today, than it would have been two decades ago. This disregards the possibility that those who may not be disabled can possess legitimate interests in minimizing the rate of disabilities (Buchanan, Brock, Daniels, & Wilker, 2000). The interest that individuals have in not having disabilities can be regarded as morally legitimate; however, in some instances, the interest may be irrelevant since the disability can be averted only by safeguarding the existence of the individual who might be born with the disability. The incidence of genetically based diseases may be minimized devoid of preventing the birth of individuals who might have disabilities. Hence, argument on the loss of support must be rejected as it fails to award any weight to the legitimate interests that individuals possess in averting disabilities. Buchanan et al. (2000) makes a distinction between being harmed and being wrongly harmed. Furthermore, the loss of support argument is exclusionary, which render it flawed since it considers only a section of legitimate interest at stake and award no weight to the legitimate interests that individuals have in not having disabilities (Sherlock & Morrey, 2002). Discussion I agree with the presented notion that utilizing germ line choice to eliminate disabilities is immoral and harmful. Overall, there exists an inherent ethical objection to the pursuit of altering genes of future generations given that such an action cannot be labelled as a “therapy” of a set future offspring, but rather relies on a “eugenic” judgement on the worthiness of the future offspring with inherited disabilities. Indeed, genetic engineering does not represent an attempt to make “people people” but rather make better people (Delaney, 2009). Opponents to germ line technology object to the use of germ line gene modification within humans based on ethical, scientific, and social concerns. Proponents of germ line manipulation presume that the moment a gene is implicated in identified conditions; it might be suitable and relatively easy to replace, supplement, alter, or otherwise adjust that gene (Wolpert, 1994). Nevertheless, the biological characteristics or traits mainly depend on interactions among numerous genes, and more significantly, the activity of genes can be influenced by diverse processes that manifest inside the organism and its environment. This implies that scientists cannot fully predict the effect that any gene modification will possess on the traits of individuals or other organisms (Hotta, 2008). Moreover, the connection between traits and genes is not adequately understood ensuring that, by eradicating genes linked to traits that one might desire to avert, one may not simultaneously change or get rid of traits that one would like to safeguard. Studies have shown that even genes linked to diseases may cause problems within one context while being beneficial in other contexts (MacKinnon, 2011. There is no universally accepted ideal regarding biological perfection. As such, making deliberate changes in the genes that individuals will pass to their offspring will necessitate that society has a consensus on how to categorize “good” and “bad” genes, which is likely to draw from social biases (Stowe, Turnbull, Schrandt, & Rack, 2007). Is gene therapy a form of eugenics? The contemporary eugenic programs are thought to be driven by individual need and “choice.” It is essential to note that the ideal of eradicating “harmful” gene variants from the whole human population could be attained over extended periods of years, and can only be attained through massive coercive programs of germ line manipulation. Nevertheless, such programs would be unviable and immoral. This arises from the fact that the presumed benefits of such programs trickle to individual families only, and are not probable to yield to public health benefits unless accompanied by unacceptable compulsion (Reindal, 2000). Even people who may not have access to germ line modification could avert having a child who manifests a trait that they do not desire to pass on such as adoption, abortion and prenatal diagnosis. Hence, majority of disabilities are acquired rather than inherited, and the individual would not have exhausted the available social measures that could be implemented to allow all people to live ordinary lives. As such, such a technique can be regarded as unsafe unnecessary, and a disastrous step towards solving the challenge of disability within the society (Walters & Palmer, 1996). The wrongs associated with practicing eugenics may encompass the assumption that individuals who are genetically weak should be "cut off" from reproducing, or may be less morally significant than others and that mandatory measures to safeguard individuals from reproducing might be defensible (Andorno, 2002). The issues should not be that genetically weak individuals should not be discouraged from reproducing, but rather all people should be discouraged from reproducing children who might be significantly harmed by their genetic constitution (Rasko, O’Sullivan, & Ankeny, 2006). Genetic engineering may pass the mistakes of genetic engineers, which may trigger and expand a web of suffering. Harmful changes may not manifest until much later in life. Moreover, germ line genetic engineering might trigger the worst excesses linked to libertarianism given that parents will be at liberty of imposing on their children their own perception; hence, parents my act out as egoism to generate private eugenics to the extent of objectifying or commodifying offspring (Wright, 1990). In other instances, parental expectations might be increased too high and are likely to be disappointed in the event that their offspring manifest new defects not provided for by the genetic modification (Bulger, Bobby, Fineberg, & Institute of Medicine, 1995). This contravenes the principle of intrinsic value of human beings, which is likely to be breached in the event that children will not be valued in themselves, but rather based on what the genetic modification can deliver, which weakens unconditional parental love (Gordon, 2003). Moreover, the technique lacks concise line between therapies for legitimately medical genetic condition. Conclusion Gene engineering raises a critical question on whether parents have the right to make a decision regarding children’s genotypes. One would be hesitant that parents should be allowed to rule over their children’s destiny. This arises from the fact that parents would be directly controlling the qualities of their offspring. The capability to modify the genome could transform the children into a commodity in which children are transformed into commercial products with set parameters of normalcy and function. Genetic engineering presumes that individuals are aware of the traits that are favourable and those which are bad. Nevertheless, the traits that are suitable in a set environment might be deleterious within another environment. References Andorno, R. (2002). Biomedicine and international human rights law: in search of a global consensus. Bulletin of the World Health Organization, 80 (12): 959-963. Buchanan, A. Brock, D. W., Daniels, N., & Wilker, D. (2000). From chance to choice: Genetics and justice. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Bulger, R. E., Bobby, E. M., Fineberg, H. V., & Institute of Medicine (U.S.). (1995).Society's choices: Social and ethical decision making in biomedicine. Washington, D.C: National Academy Press. Delaney, J.J. (2009). The Catholic Position on Germ Line Genetic Engineering. The American Journal of Bioethics 9 (11): 33-34. Gordon, J. W. (2003). The Science and Ethics of Engineering the Human Germ Line. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. Hotta, Y. (2008). A critique of liberal eugenics: Disability and the problem of inclusion. Journal of Philosophy in Health and Medicine, 3 (1): 86-107. MacKinnon, B. (2011). Ethics: Theory and contemporary issues. Boston, MA: Wadsworth/Cengage Learning. Rasko, J. E., O’Sullivan, G., & Ankeny, R. A. (2006). The ethics of inheritable genetic modification: A diving line? New York, NY: Cambridge Unvesity Press. Reindal, S. M. (2000). Disability, gene therapy and eugenics-a challenge to John Harris. J Med Ethics, 26 (1): 89-94. Robertson, J. A. (1996). Children of choice: Freedom and the new reproductive technologies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. Sherlock, R., & Morrey, J. D. (2002). Ethical Issues in Biotechnology. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Stowe, M. J., Turnbull, H. R., Schrandt, S., & Rack, J. (2007). Looking to the future: Intelectual and developmental disabilities in the era of genetics era. Journal of Developmental Disabilities, 13 (1): 1-64. Walters, L. R., & Palmer, J. G. (1996). The ethics of human gene therapy. New York: Oxford University Press. Wolpert, L. (1994). The unnatural nature of science. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Wright, T. R. F. (1990). Genetic regulatory hierarchies in development. San Diego: Academic Press. Read More