The United States versus Morris - Essay Example

?Antonio Fuertes Dr. Amy Baehr Philosophy of Law 04/12 Introduction: United s vs. Morris is one of the famous cases that led to nullification of the Fugitive Slave Law in 1864. Shadrach escaped from slavery in 1850 in Norfolk, Virginia and made his way to Boston. He worked as a waiter in a restaurant until an agent of his former master discovered where he was in 1851 (Abramson 81). The agent began summary proceedings before a magistrate court to take Shadrach back to the master, in accordance with the Fugitive Slave Law. During the proceedings, a large crowd burst into the court room and invited Shadrach to accompany them out. Eventually, Shadrach managed to escape to Canada. However, eight of his alleged rescuers, four whites and four blacks, were arrested and were charged with the violation of the Fugitive Slave Law by aiding the escape of the slave. Despite taking oath and promising to abide the law, the jurors handling this case acquitted the defendants and declared the Fugitive Slave Law null and void. This essay examines this issue in the light of the perspectives of earlier theories of law (the natural law, positivism and realism) and the perspectives of more recent theorists (Dworkin, critical legal theorists and Feinberg). Though they keep to different perspectives, these theorists, in various ways, support the fact that the critical jurors did the right thing by acquitting the defendants on the base that they were not guilty. Discussion Natural law theorists such as Aquinas argue that laws should be perceived to be derived from a divine providence. One of the natural law theorists, Blackstone, believed that natural law is build up on moral principles which originate from and are dictated by God himself (George 175). As such, it is superior to all other laws and it is binding over all societies globally, at all times. According to him, any human laws that contradict moral standards are of no validity. Feinberg (3) further asserts that judges in such hard cases have to appeal to natural justice especially where the law is indeterminate. Therefore, the common laws are mostly based on the moral law from which they try to maintain moral standards in the society. Aquinas, another natural law theorist, supported this view, arguing that all human laws must reflect morality; morality is considered universal given that it stems from the divine. According to Aquinas, human beings are rational creatures with conscience that has an imprint from the divine and enables them to determine what is right or wrong (George 176). Thus, human laws should be developed naturally from conscience and morality. From the view of the natural theorists, laws that are meant to discriminate a group or groups of people, on the basis of color, gender or race are not laws, but mere violence; any kind of unreasonableness that threatens fairness is in contradiction with natural law (Feinberg, 4). Such a law is inconsistent with the divine law or the natural law as it defies the law of morality. The Fugitive Slave Law discriminated against black people by treating them as property of their owners, which is morally wrong. Therefore, the natural law theorists’ perspective supports the act of the jurors in this case. The legal positivism perspective avoids the view held by natural law theorists regarding the connection that exists between law and morality. Hart, one of the major proponents of this perspective, thinks that there is no necessary connection between law and morality or ethics. In Hart’s view, a rule becomes a law when it is established by the society and is recognized in an official, legal manner by the state. As such, the validity of a law is dependent on specific social facts that act as its pillars and not moral standards. However, the positivists suggest that judges are not bound to rely primarily on the established rules; they should apply them only where relevant. The law though valid has to be interpreted in the context of moral concepts. They should always take into account legal facts, but may not apply them case-by-case. This implies that judges may reject a rule if they find it unfit in the determination of a case. The aim of this, as Hart explains, is to come up with the most justifiable outcome. In the United States vs. Morris case, the jurors found slave labour to be grossly unjust according to natural law; they did the right thing in acquitting the defendants. Additionally, legal positivism theorists suggest that when judges face cases to which no established rules or clear rules can be applied, they should ensure the judgment is in accordance with the procedures enforced in the society. Although this notion may not fully apply to this case given that there was an established law, the judges were obliged to pass a judgment that promoted good to the society, to the detriment of manmade corrupt laws and against any law that does not work for the common good. This requires a judge to make a sound judgment that invokes correct principles of natural justice (Feinberg, 8). Generally, the positivism theory supports the acts of the jurors in rejecting the Fugitive Slave Law and giving their own discretion. Legal realism theory also supports the move taken by the judges in the United States vs. Morris case. As Green (1916) explains, this perspective arose in response to a model called ‘legal formalism’ which stipulates that a legal outcome should be based on a legal rule supported by a statement of relevant facts. Realists such as Karl Llewellyn, Felix Cohen and Jerome Frank believe that formalism understates the abilities of judges in lawmaking as it represents legal outcomes to be simply based on the applicable legal rules and material facts. This means that judges should only be constrained and makes judgments according to legal text without interpreting what law should say or mean. As such, judges are bound by formal rules and they lack authority to come up with different outcomes. The legal realists argue that the available legal materials are insufficient to assist jurors in reaching unique outcomes in unique cases that are worth litigating in appellate courts. In other words, legal realists explain that legal rules are based on judicial decisions that are made in the interests of the society and public policy, and not based on any supernatural authority. In such cases, judges should be given discretion to determine and come up with the most suitable outcome through making of new laws (Green 1917). Remarkably, the realists’ conception is universally binding and experimental. Currently, judges do make new and enact the existing laws in order to come up with the most suitable outcomes for cases. The realists argue that evaluation by a judge or judges should stick to the details of the case at hand (Green 1917). They should adapt an inductive, stimulus-based approach in deciding the outcome of a case, rather than the deductive approach suggested by formalists. This implies that judges are free to make new laws in cases that they believe that the existing legal framework does not lead to suitable outcomes that represent good will, or where there lacks precedence in rulings of similar nature, and the law seems indeterminate (Feinberg, 7). As Green explains, judicial outcomes in such cases are largely influenced by a judge’s moral and political convictions and to a lesser extent by legal considerations (1925). Therefore, morality is one of the factors that judges can base their decisions in hard cases or in cases with conflicting outcomes. This clearly shows that realists’ view supports the actions of the judges in the United States vs. Morris case. One of the recent theorists, Ronald Dworkin, focuses on the power of principles in determining the outcomes of cases. He disagrees with the views of Hart on judges’ discretion. According to Dworkin, the fact that judges sometimes rely on non-legal sources to arrive at outcomes does not mean that they use discretion (37). He argues that apart from legal rules, judges rely on other principles that turn the function of the rules on or off. Thus, he argues that these principles should always be considered part of specific cases. Dworkin also disagrees with the positivists’ view that laws originate only from social facts, arguing that there are some legal standards that derive their authorities from other sources other than from social forces. For instance, judges often invoke moral standards in solving hard cases, or incases that lack precedence in rulings (Feinberg, 6). Since they are bound to consider such standards when relevant, there is no good reason why they should not be characterized as law (Dworkin 38). Dworkin further argues that in looking for solutions for hard cases, judges should find the best justifications by thoroughly consulting the standards of political morality. According to him, “the correct legal principle is the one that makes the law moral the best it can be” (Dworkin 1101). As such, Dworkin supports the view held by natural law theorists. He believes that the constitution of the United States protects the moral rights of all citizens as it restricts discrimination or violation of inherent rights of individuals by the democratic majority (Dworkin 1105). This indicates that Dworkin’s view supports the acts of the judges in the mentioned case, since treating a human being as a property is violation of his or her moral rights. The judges also based their decision on deep moral justification and this further explains the reason why they were right in Dworkin’s eyes. Critical legal theorists, on the other hand seek to challenge and to overturn standards and norms in the legal practice and theory (Abramson 85). They believe that the logic and structure of law is designed by the dominant and powerful social classes in the society to protect their interests. Law consists of prejudices and beliefs that legitimize the injustices carried out by the social group that form it. The powerful groups use it as an instrument for oppression of the less powerful and the minorities in order to maintain their positions in the hierarchy. Thus, critical legal theorists argue that the law is a part of politics and is not neutral in its effects (Abramson 86). Like positivists, critical legal theorists use morality to critique social dynamics in the society and social justice in the society. Butler, a critical race theorist, argues that the constitution of the United States cultivates and supports a white supremacist society (Butler, 23). For example butler examines two laws that are perceived to be discriminatory to the African Americans involving crack and powder cocaine that are harsher to the African Americans than to the whites (Butler, 2003). However, Butler rejects Malcolm X recommendation that Blacks should use “any means necessary” to stop discrimination, but recommends that such minorities have to have the full range of powers in combating the evil of racism but they be constrained and guided by morality (Butler, 2003). Butler suggests that minorities should consult international law doctrines of “just war,” which supports the use of moral law in the society. Finally, the perspective of another law theorist, Feinberg, tends to uphold the supremacy of moral obligations over legal duties. In an article called “The Dilemmas of Judges Who Must Interpret 'Immoral Laws’,” Feinberg argues that the practical difference between legal positivism and natural law is minimal as applied in the law (Feinberg, 3). He argues that when judges encounter a conflict between a legal duty and an overriding moral obligation, the outcome should be determined in two ways: "The law, though valid, is outweighed by moral considerations" (legal positivism) or "The enactment is immoral and is therefore not a valid law," (natural law) (Feinberg 5). Thus, in both perspectives, a judge is morally justified to violate a law that is against morality. However, Feinberg argues that a legal positivism judge has to admit that he has based his decision on sources that are outside the law and invite other judges and the public to censure him for overriding the limits of his office. For a natural law judge, he may argue that the moral principles relied upon are a part of the international law and seek to prove this point. Either way, Feinberg asserts that judges should always uphold morality and should always find justifications in moral principles to assist in arriving at the best outcome that reflect good will towards the society (Feinberg 7). Clearly, the judges in the case under discussion based their decision on moral principles overriding the Fugitive Slave Law. This clearly shows that Feinberg’s perspective view supports the outcome of the case. Conclusion The views of all the different types of theorists examined in the paper (natural law theorists, positivists, realists, Dworkin, critical legal theorists, and Feinberg) support the decision of the jurors in the United States vs. Morris case; some for moral reasons, and others for practical reasons. Natural law theorists, Feinberg and Dworkin, believe that moral obligations override legal duties and jurors should always consult moral principles to come up with the most justifiable outcomes. On the other hand, realists and positivists advocate for a right of the judges to accept, reject or come up with new rules in order to arrive at the best outcomes. Critical legal theorists also support the decisions of the judges since they are against any forms of discrimination that are based on race. Works Cited Abramson, Jeffrey B., We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy : With a New Preface, Harvard University Press, 1994 Butler, Paul D., By Any Means Necessary: Using Violence and Subversion to Change Unjust Laws. UCLA Law Review, February 2003. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=325320 (Accessed 17th April, 2013). Dworkin Ronald, Hard Cases, Harvard Law Review, 88.6 (1975), 1057 - 1109 Dworkin, Ronald M., The Model of Rules Faculty Scholarship Series,1967 Feinberg, Joel., Natural law: The Dilemmas of Judges who Must Interpret immoral Laws in Problems at the Roots of Law : Essays in Legal and Political Theory: Essays in Legal and Political Theory, NY: Oxford University Press, 2003 George, Robert P. Natural Law, Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, 31.1 (2005): 171-196 Green, Michael Stephen, Legal Realism as Theory of Law, William and Mary Law Review, 46.6 (2005): 1915 – 2000 Read More