Morally permissible for abortion - Essay Example

In this article, two basic assertions will be fortified – one that there are no good grounds to believe that abortion is morally incorrect and secondly, that there are good causes to prove that abortion is morally permissible. Providing a brief critique of a known pro-life argument is deemed necessary before we proceed with the construction of an argument for the moral permissibility of abortion. The eminent anti-abortion philosopher Marquis has stated that “the future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human beings and are identical with the futures of young children.

it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong.” According to him, killing a fetus is nothing but killing a human being since the fetus is a future resemblance of human being which makes abortion morally wrong. He added that killing a fetus certainly implies a potential loss of value. All pro-life activists believe that killing children and infants is wrong in the same way as it is killing any human being (cited in Marquis 184-185). To counteract the premises of Marquis, Mary A. Warren, a well known pro-abortion feminist philosopher deduces the following anti-abortion argument: 1) It is wrong to kill innocent human beings, 2) fetuses are innocent human beings, and 3) therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses. . e biological species Homo sapiens and incorporates not only functioning children and adults, but also fetuses (even very early fetuses) and alive human bodies without working brains (e.g. those in irretrievable comas).

The human in the moral sense refers to all beings who are full-grown members of the moral community and includes all but only persons. Warren further states that if ‘human being’ has the same meaning in both the settings then one of them is questionable. The argument either presumes that it is incorrect to kill a fetus simply because it is a homo sapient or it is a member of the moral community. Further arguments are required to clarify the matter since both the claims are controversial. To clarify this matter, Warren next considers whether genetic humanity is sufficient enough for moral humanity.

  She asks “What characteristics entitle an entity to be considered a person [in the moral sense]?” Exemplifying her theory of personhood, Warren states that a being or entity to be considered a ‘human being’ or a ‘person’ in the moral sense must possesses most of the following characteristics: ‘(1) Consciousness, (2) Reasoning, (3) Self-motivate activity, (4) communication capability, and (5) the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness’. She further added that the degree of a being’s similarity to a person decides its degree of right to life.

In other words, the more resemblance a being holds to a person, the stronger are its consideration for having a right to life, and the stronger its right to life is. On the basis of this theory, she claims that a fetus doesn’t have any similarity to a ‘person’ at any stage of its development to be considered enough for having the right to life (cited in Warren 259-260). Moreover, on the