Killing Fetuses Incorrect but Permissible - Essay Example

Abortion is morally permissible Today’s society still debates controversially on the of abortion, and the thoughts’ pertaining to its morality varies significantly. Some people perceive a ‘fetus’ as a human being from the moment of its conception and therefore believe that abortion is nothing but a murder. However, there are several others who disagree with this idea and believe that abortion is morally permissible since a fetus is just an insubstantial material with no actual life of its own as it is dependent completely on its mother’s body for endurance. In this article, two basic assertions will be proved – one that there are no good grounds to believe that abortion is morally incorrect and secondly, that there are good causes to prove that abortion is morally permissible. Providing a brief critique of a known pro-life argument is deemed necessary before we proceed with the construction of an argument for the moral permissibility of abortion. Marquis, a distinguished anti-abortion philosopher, has stated that “the future of a standard fetus includes a set of experiences, projects, activities, and such which are identical with the futures of adult human beings and are identical with the futures of young children...it follows that abortion is prima facie seriously wrong.” According to him, killing a fetus is nothing but killing a human being since the fetus is a future resemblance of human being which makes abortion morally wrong. He added that killing a fetus certainly implies a potential loss of value. All pro-life activists believe that killing children and infants is wrong in the same way as it is killing any human being (as qtd. in Marquis, 1989, 184-185). To counteract the premises of Marquis, Mary A. Warren, a well known pro-abortion feminist philosopher deduces the following anti-abortion argument: 1) It is wrong to kill innocent human beings, 2) fetuses are innocent human beings, and 3) therefore, it is wrong to kill fetuses. She alleges that the reasonability of this anti-abortion argument is based on the misrepresentation of the term ‘human being’. She considers humans from two different aspects – the genetic sense and the moral sense. The human in the genetic sense refers to all beings who are members of the biological species Homo sapiens and incorporates not only functioning children and adults, but also fetuses (even very early fetuses) and alive human bodies without working brains (e.g. those in irretrievable comas). The human in the moral sense refers to all beings who are full-grown members of the moral community and includes all but only persons. Warren further states that if ‘human being’ has the same meaning in both the settings then one of them is questionable. The argument either presumes that it is incorrect to kill a fetus simply because it is a homo sapient or it is a member of the moral community. Further arguments are required to clarify the matter since both the claims are controversial. To clarify this matter, Warren next considers whether genetic humanity is sufficient enough for moral humanity.  She asks “What characteristics entitle an entity to be considered a person [in the moral sense]?” Exemplifying her theory of personhood, Warren states that a being or entity to be considered a ‘human being’ or a ‘person’ in the moral sense must possesses most of the following characteristics: ‘(1) Consciousness, (2) Reasoning, (3) Self-motivate activity, (4) communication capability, and (5) the presence of self-concepts and self-awareness’. She further added that the degree of a being’s similarity to a person decides its degree of right to life. In other words, the more resemblance a being holds to a person, the stronger are its consideration for having a right to life, and the stronger its right to life is. On the basis of this theory, she claims that a fetus doesn’t have any similarity to a ‘person’ at any stage of its development to be considered enough for having the right to life (as qtd. in Warren, 1973, 259-260). Moreover, on the basis of viability too, it can be said that a fetus does not possess human characteristics. For although the fetus is a being and alive, it cannot survive or live on its own if it is detached from the mother’s body implying that the life of the fetus is totally dependent on the life of the mother for its existence. Due to this reason, a fetus has been denied recognition to its humanity. In addition, a fetus does not form a member of the society since it is not human and is unable to communicate with others. Being a non member, the moral rules that exist for the behavior of members of the society towards each other cannot be applied on the fetus. Consequently, the fetus does not possess the right to life which implies that it won’t be unjust killing it thereby proving that abortion is not morally wrong (Noonan, 1970, 52). For the second argument that the fetus has the potential for being a person which is enough to claim its significant right to life, Warren argues that even if a potential person has some right to life, the right of the woman to obtain abortion prevails over the fetus’s right. This is because “the rights of any actual person invariably outweigh those of any potential person, whenever the two conflict” states Warren (1973, 257). She added that the potential right to life of a fetus does not form any basis for accepting its significant right to life. Therefore, a woman can terminate a redundant pregnancy when she desires as her right to guard her health, happiness, freedom as well as her life will always prevail over whatever right to life that has been attributed to a fetus, even though it is a completely matured one. Therefore, laws which forbid abortion or limit the time of pregnancy till when abortion can be performed are completely infringing upon a woman’s fundamental moral and constitutional rights (Warren, 1979, 257-258). Another premise which the anti-abortionists claim is that brain death is not identical to the death of a human being. However, this claim too has been proved ambiguous by the facts. According to Michael Tooley, a distinguished philosopher at the University of Colorado, a significant right to life is not possessed by any human with a complete upper brain death since they are already dead for any relevant lawful and ethical purpose. In other words, we cannot consider the carnage of a fetus, which is brain-dead, prima facie incorrect since a brain-dead human does not possess any right to life. Another claim that has been made by Tooley to thwart the anti-abortion premise is that a being can possess the right to life only if it has the intellectual capability to aspire for a persistent existence. This approach makes fetus ineligible for the right to life since it lacks the intellectual aptitude to desire for a sustained life. As a result, killing of a fetus on grounds of right to life is totally justified. Thus, we can conclude that there are no good grounds to consider abortion as wrong or immoral (Marquis, 1989, 198-199). Moreover, some people argue that even though fetus is not person like, killing of all fetuses should not be permissible. Agreeing with the statement, Thompson added that only those abortion cases should be permitted which are necessary to save the life of the mother, or, cases where pregnancy has resulted from a rape, or has happened despite of taking enough precautionary measures (Thompson, 1971, 49-51). This view is based on the claim that an unborn child who conception has happened due to rape has no privilege to utilize the body of its mother against her desire. So, aborting them does not imply irrationally murdering them or disallowing them of any birthright (Thompson, 1971, 58). However, a set of parents, who have implicitly taken the total responsibility of their child from conception to birth and have not put it for foster care, cannot abandon it at the cost of its life simply because they are unable to afford it now. However, this theory does not apply to parents who had taken reasonable precautions against parenthood and will have to make huge sacrifices for the child if its born; such parents should legally have the privilege to choose between giving birth to the child or aborting the fetus. The rationale behind abortion should always be decent for instance, it will be inappropriate of a woman who is in her seventh month of pregnancy to ask for abortion merely to evade the nuisance of deferring her excursion (Thompson, 1971, 65). Supporting this premise, Warren added that “whether a fetus is a person or not, abortion is justifiable early in pregnancy to avoid modest harms and seldom justifiable late in pregnancy except to avoid significant injury or death” (as qtd. in Warren, 1973, 258). Despite of all the good grounds which consider killing fetuses permissible because they are not full-grown members of the moral community, it would be wrong to consider that killing newborns is morally permissible. Agreeing with this issue, Warren reinstates that the intentional killing of viable newborns is not defensible at all since neonates bear so close resemblance to being persons that to kill them commands a very strong moral explanation and so does the killing of dolphins, whales, chimpanzees, and other nearly person like creatures. Carnage of such beings merely for convenience, or financial profit, or for sport is immorally unjustified (Warren, 1973, 258). Conclusion In conclusion, it can be stated that aborting a fetus is morally permissible and therefore, it should be legalized. To defend this view, we can say that although the fetus is a biological member of the Homo sapiens, it does not possess the intellectual traits that would qualify it as a person. The psychological criterion provided by Warren, Noonan and Thompson for personhood is completely acceptable since they are non-arbitrary and have an expounding scope. Moreover, their theory that the purpose of rights is to safeguard interests is absolutely authentic. On the basis of the psychological criterion presented by them, it has been established that fetus do not have the considerable right to life therefore killing a fetus won’t breach any strong interest or right. To sum up, we can agree that a woman has the fundamental right to safeguard her life from the risk posed to it by the unborn child, even if it is at the cost of its death. Moreover, if a redundant child is born in a society which cannot meet its expense or take its adequate care, it is acceptable to destruct the fetus. These premises make us conclude that abortion is morally permissible. References Marquis, D. (1989 Apr.). Why Abortion is Immoral? The Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183- 202. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2026961 Noonan, J. T. Jr. (1970). An Almost Absolute Value in History. In Noonan Jr. Ed. The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives, 51-59. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. Print. Thomson, J. J. (1971 Autumn). A Defense of Abortion. Philosophy &Public Affairs, 1(1): 47-66. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265091 Warren, M. A. (1973, Jan.). On the Legal Status of Abortion. The Monist: An International Quarterly Journal of General Philosophical Inquiry, 57(1): 253-58. Print Read More