What do you think comprises reality - Term Paper Example

Philosophy Philosophers have shown in various ways that substances exist in different forms, depending on individualperception. They range from material to immaterial and finite to infinite. This paper will discuss several arguments pertaining to the nature of substances as proposed by different philosophers. Locke argues that ideas of substances are derived by sensation and reflection. The substances are purely assumed to exist through the sensation of the pattern and qualities of the ideas. Substance, mode and relation, are complex ideas of sensations (Tully 39). We do not have a direct perception of substances in minds, but only a representation of them. What we know is not what is inherent to the substances, but only the secondary and primary qualities. Thus, according to Locke, the substances are bodies, which are material, and souls, which are immaterial. Then there is God. He explains the existence of God, not from inherent ideas, but from sense-experience. Their basic substance is assumed from the perception of physical qualities, since qualities must have a solid basis. Likewise, a spiritual soul is formed from the observation of mental operations. We perceive bodies through sensation and have a lucid and instant idea of our soul by reflection. The outside world is independent of the mind. The presence of real objects is what causes real sensations in us (Tully 53). Locke further says there are interactions between the body and mind, both of which are real beings, resulting in the actions of our bodies and minds. The changes experienced by the soul are as a result of its being acted on by outside bodies. On Locke’s third substance, God, he provides that we shape an idea of God by expanding or taking to infinity the rules and objects of our sensations and reflections. What we experience are existence, extension, knowledge and power. Taking them to infinity is our idea of God (Tully 67). Descartes described a substance as a particular thing. He argues that there are material or physical substances and thinking substances, the mind. The substances have characteristics called modes. Modes of physical substances include their location in time, space, shape and volume. The mode of thinking substances includes ideas, judgments and desires of the subject. Every substance has an essential property. The essential property of a material substance is occupying space and time. The essential property of a thinking substance is thinking. Therefore, having ideas, believing or desiring are ways of thinking, and having a shape and volume are ways of occupying space and time. Descartes further divides material substances into finite and infinite. Examples of finite materials are human bodies, plants and earth. Likewise, human minds are finite thinking substances. Adding a third substance, he says God is an infinite substance. Therefore, according to Descartes, there are three types of substances; modes, finite substances, and infinite substance. Descartes views reality as relative and divides them into formal and objective reality. Formal is the kind of reality something possesses by merit of the type of thing it is. Infinite substances, finite substances, and modes possess formal reality in varying degrees. Modes have the least formal reality, followed by finite substances then infinite substance in ascending order. The amount of formal reality contained in something is determined by its dependence on another for its existence. The higher the dependence something has on another for existence, the less the formal reality it contains. Modes depend on finite substances, and in turn finite substances depend on infinite substances for existence (Tully 41). For example, the shape of a ball would not exist without a ball, but a ball could exist without that shape. On objective reality, Descartes contributes that first it is only possessed by representation. This means that it is possessed by things that stand for other things. Basically, these are ideas. Examples of representations are the spoken or written words. Secondly, an idea’s amount of objective reality is the same as the amount of formal reality the idea’s object would have if it existed. Consequently, all ideas of modes will have a low degree of objective reality, and all ideas of infinite substances will have a high degree of objective reality. In addition to representing things, ideas are indeed things. They are modes of thinking substances. Because every idea is a mode, it will have the lowest amount of formal reality. It follows, therefore, that the idea of God has the lowest degree of formal reality because it is a mere mode, yet it contains the largest degree of objective reality since it represents a substance that is infinite. Spinoza argues that there is only a single substance in the universe. The substance is God, and everything else that is in the universe is in God. He sees a substance as what is in itself and was conceived through itself (Nadler 1). He explains an attribute to be what the mind perceives of a substance, constituting its essence. Finally, he describes the being of God as perfectly infinite. He terms it as a substance made up of infinite attributes, where in turn each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence. Spinoza gave several proposals to present his basic perception of God. He terms God as the infinite, necessarily existing, unique substance of the universe that was not caused. Since he says there is only one substance, God, then everything else is in God (Nadler 1). He proposes that a substance is prior in nature to its affections. Two substances with different attributes do not have anything in common; hence one cannot be the cause of the other. Various, distinct things are distinguished from one another, by either a difference in the attributes of their substances or by a difference in their affections. Naturally, there cannot be more than one substance with the same or attribute. Every substance is necessarily infinite, and each of its attributes must be conceived through itself. A perfectly infinite substance is indivisible, and, except God, no substance can be, or be conceived. Spinoza concludes that God only exists in a philosophical sense (Nadler 1). He is against portraying God as consisting of a body and mind, subjected to passions. On Leibniz’s part, he argued that in natural perception and sensation, whatever was material and divisible and isolated into many units could be expressed or represented in a single, indivisible entity, or in a substance endowed with real unity (Wilson 499). He provides that materialism can give rise to a perception. He explains that a perception is a condition whereby a mixture of content is represented in a true unanimity. Hence, whatever is not a true unity will not give rise to a perception. Whatever can be divided is not a true unity. Matter is infinitely divisible. Thus, matter can neither form a true unity nor give rise to a perception. It follows that if the matter can give rise to perception, then materialism is false (Wilson 509). In conclusion, I find Spinoza’s position to be the strongest. He explains the existence of only one substance in the universe, and everything else being in that one substance. The substance is seen to be in itself, and was conceived through itself. It is made up of infinite attributes, where in turn each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence. Consequently, the cycle of infinite substances will not end, owing to the fact that each is also made up of infinite attributes. Possible objections to this position would arise on the stand that he explains an attribute to be what the mind perceives of a substance, constituting its essence. It would then be difficult to explain what this substance’s mind perceives of its own attributes. The only explanation to this would be Spinoza’s own explanation that God only exists in a philosophical sense. Works Cited Nadler, Steven. "Baruch Spinoza", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), . Web. Tully, James. An Approach to Political Philosophy: Locke in Contexts. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Print. Wilson, M. “Leibniz and Materialism,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 3 (1974): 495-513. Print. Read More