What Is Epistemology - Essay Example

Descartes What is epistemology? If we define it narrowly, it is the study of justified belief and knowledge. If epistemology is considered as a study of knowledge, it deals with the following questions: What are the sufficient and necessary conditions for knowledge? What are the sources of epistemology? What are the limits and structure of epistemology? If it is considered as a study of justified belief (JB), epistemology deals to reply to such questions as: How are we able to comprehend the idea of justification? What are the factors which make these justified beliefs justify? Is this justification external or internal to one’s own mind? Broadly comprehend epistemology deals with issues of dissemination and creation of knowledge in specific areas of question. This paper talks about what epistemology is, how it relates to justified belief, what is justified belief and explains the project of Descartes. (Audi, 1993) There are several types of knowledge: recognizing how something can be done (for instance, how can you ride a bicycle), knowing anyone in person, and knowing about a city or a place. Even though such type of knowledge consists of epistemological interest too, we shall emphasize on the knowledge of propositions and also relate to such type of knowledge by means of the schema ‘S knows p’, in which ‘S’ is the subject who has all the knowledge and ‘p’ stands for the proposition that is known to us. Now our query will be: What are the compulsory and adequate criterions for S to know that p? We may broadly differentiate, between a non-traditional and traditional approach used in responding to this question. We shall relate to them as ‘NTK’ and ‘TK’. (Audi, 1993) Pertaining to TK, the knowledge that p is, at least roughly, justified true belief (JTB). Fake and bogus propositions cannot be identified. Thus, knowledge needs truth. The scheme S does not even consider cannot be a scheme that S knows. Thus, knowledge needs belief. Finally, S’s being right in thinking that p might just be a matter of good luck. Consequently, knowledge needs a third element as well, conventionally recognized as justification. Now we come at a tripartite psychoanalysis of knowledge such as JTB: S also knows that p if and only if p is genuine and S is also justified in supposing p. This analysis talks about three conditions- belief, truth, and justification- are independently essential and collectively enough for knowledge. (Armstrong, 1973) At first, we were saying that the function of justification is just to make sure that S’s belief is not correct just because of luck. On this instance, NTK and TK are in mutual agreement with each other. TK and NTK do move away from each other from each other as soon as we go on to be more precise about faithfully how justification is to accomplish this role. Pertaining to TK, S’s idea that p is genuine not just because of luck when it is true or reasonable, from S’s own viewpoint, to keep p to be genuine. Now according to the theory of evidentialism, what comprises a belief is justified in this logic is the control of complete proof. The primary idea is that a belief is justified to the extent that it fits the evidence provided by S. On the other hand, NTK imagines the responsibility of justification in a different sense. Its work is to make sure that S’s belief has a very high purpose of truth and thus, if genuine, is not true just because of luck. One famous plan is that this is done if, and only if, a belief is created in consistent cognitive faculties or processes. This view is called reliabilism. (Axtell, 1997) The Descartes project is a tripartite psychiatry of knowledge as JTB is sometimes known to be unfinished. These are the instances of JTB that contradict with cases of knowledge. Therefore, JTB is not enough for knowledge. Such cases are known as Gettier cases and they happen because n either the inauguration in reliable powers is enough for making sure that a belief is not genuine just due to luck nor the ownership of evidence say anything about it. Take the instance of the famous case of barn-facades: John is driving across a rural area in which there are barns, with the exemption of just one, merely barn facades. From the road in which John is driving on, these frontages looks just like genuine barns. John is looking at the one and only genuine barn in the area and supposes that there is barn off that road. John belief is justified, according to TK, because his visual knowledge is true to his belief. Pertaining to NTK, his belief is justified because John’s belief begins in a consistent cognitive process: idea. Yet John belief is reasonably viewed as being genuine just because of luck. Had John have observed one of the facades of barn instead, he would also have thought that there’s barn over there. Therefore, there is great agreement among epistemologists that John’s belief does not meet the criteria of knowledge. (Descartes, 2008) To emphasize on conditions that are equally adequate for knowledge, what further key elements must be added into JTB? This is called the Gettier impediment. According to TK, resolving the dilemma needs a fourth condition. NTK theorists call for redefining the idea of reliability. For instance, if consistency could appropriately be indexed to the environment of subject, reliabilists would then say that John’s belief is not warranted because in John’s environment, visualization is not dependable when it comes to astute barns from barn-facades. (Descartes,2008) Several NTK theorists eschew the justification situation altogether. They would say that, if we envisage knowledge as consistently produced genuine belief, there is no requirement to provide a justification. Subsequently, reliabilism then is considered in two forms: either as a theory of justification or theory of knowledge. The older concept, however, viewed this justification as an integral part of knowledge but, not like TK, believes in reliability and takes justification in it. As a hypothesis of knowledge, reliabilism states that justification is not primarily for knowledge, but it is reliably shaped as true belief (given the idea of reliability is rightly redefined to outclass Gettier cases) is adequate for it. (Steup, 2005) Descartes project deals with defining justification. When discussing about justification nature, we must differentiate between two distinguished issues: First of all, what is meant by us when we are using the word ‘justification’? Secondly, what is the fact that makes beliefs justified? It is integral to keep these two issues apart fro each other as the disagreement between these two may pose a problem as how to respond to these questions in a verbal fight, it the conflicting parties have vastly apparent and diverse ideas of justification in their minds. So now, let’s first think about what we might mean by the term ‘justification’. (Devitt, 2005) Let’s use this term in simple day to day language. Here is an instance: Jimmy asked Andrea a question, and Andrea answered it untruthfully. Was it justifies to lie in this situation? Amy thinks it was because she believes that Jimmy’s question was irrelevant and inappropriate. Andrea shouldn’t have answered that question and Jimmy had nothing to do in that matter. What is May thinking when she believes that Andrea was justified in answering with a lie? An instant reply to this will be: Andrea was under no duty or restriction to keep away from lying. Due to the irrelevancy of Jimmy’s question, Andrea wasn’t obliged to answer it honestly. This comprehension of justification is commonly known as deontological and it may be described as: S is justified in performing x if only S is not restricted to refrain from performing x. (BonJour, 1985) Consider, when we imply the word justification to pour beliefs rather than our actions, we refer to something analogous. In that instance, the terminology ‘justification’ as utilized in epistemology would have to be described in a similar way as such: Deontological Justification (DJ) S is justified in supposing that if only S proposes that p, whilst it isn’t the scenario that S is restricted to keep away from thinking that p. (DeRose, 1999) What type of duties are pertinent when we wish to figure out whether a belief, despite of an action, is unjustified or justified? However, when we discuss an action, we are highly interested in figuring out the action from either a prudential or moral viewpoint, when it deals with beliefs, what is important to us is truth. The pertinent types of restrictions, subsequently, are those that come up when we focus on having genuine beliefs. Though, what exactly, we must do to pursue our focus? According to Descartes, we must believe in according to our evidence. For this reply to be of some help, we must follow the footsteps of the right norms of epistemology and keep a record of what our evidence comprises of. If this reply will assist us in assessing what restrictions the aim of truth imply on us, we shall be given an idea of the genuine norms of epistemology. (Descartes, 2008) Non-Deontological Justification (NDJ) S is justified in supposing that p if only S proposes that p on a ground that rightly justifies S’s idea that p. (Dretske, 1970) If we claim to list down what exactly this justification will result in, we will have to counter several tricky issues at hand. For time being, we will just aim on the focal point. People, those who are inclined towards NDJ rather than DJ would claim that justification and deontological probabilification are two different terminologies; it is probable for an idea to be deontologically verified without even being rightly justified. These are the instances of cognitively scarced subjects or benighted cultures. (Alston, 1989) References Descartes, Rene?. Meditations. Raleigh, N.C: Alex Catalogue, 2008. Internet resource.Audi, Robert. The Structure of Justification. . 1993 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Devitt, Michael. "There is No A Priori." In: Steup and Sosa 2005, pp. 105–115. Alston, William. Epistemic Justification. Essays in the Theory of Knowledge. Ithaca. 1989. Cornell University Press. BonJour, Laurence. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. 1985. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Armstrong, D.M. Belief, Truth, and Knowledge. 1973.Cambrdidge: Cambridge University Press. Boghossian, Paul and Peacocke, Christopher (eds.). New Essays on the A Priori. 2000 Oxford: Oxford University Press. Dretske, Fred. "Epistemic Operators." The Journal of Philosophy, 1970. 67: 1007–23. Axtell, Guy (ed.). Knowledge, Belief, and Character. Readings in Virtue Epistemology. 1997. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Steup, Matthias and Sosa, Ernest (eds). Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. 2005. Malden (MA): Blackwell. DeRose, Keith, and Warfield, Ted. Skepticism. A Contemporary Reader. 1999. Oxford: Oxford University Press Read More