Aristotle & Boethius - Term Paper Example

?Why does Aristotle think that actions done out of fear might be excused but not actions done from some other kind of response? For Aristotle, the actions that are committed as a result of some emotional excitement, especially fear, are considered as not unlike a physical handicap that eventually excuse the actor from any culpability. This is part of his wider discourse on what is morally virtuous, wherein he famously explained how a person’s moral quality is characterized by how he responds to pleasure and pain. This is crucial for Aristotelian readers because this effectively enables them to discriminate characters better simply by examining his or her choices instead of the actions. In this particular area, fear is one of the variables that are considered to result during the time or circumstance when an agent acts or fails to act because of strong feelings. Broadie put this more clearly when she explained the Aristotelian principle about how “fear might prevent the craftsman from functioning properly as a craftsman,” and that “it might hinder his dexterity or warp his judgment in some way; but if we know the situation we shall not assess his skill on the basis of that response” (81). Aristotle’s position is clear – an action driven by fear is excusable - but he put forward a fundamental condition: the perpetrator must not know the consequence of his action or that the outcome of his actions or inactions is unforeseen. This balance is what makes me agree with the philosopher’s point of view. There are instances when fear makes us irrational, clouding our judgments. Mistakes that are made in the process, hence, cannot be considered as guilt-ridden acts as long as it is not deliberate, voluntary and made by choice. Fear In Aristotle’s theory of moral responsibility, there are two specific exceptions that supposedly dilute or diminish a person’s guilt resulting from his actions: ignorance and compulsion. It is this last variable that covered fear. For example, when a person kills another, his action cannot immediately be considered wrongful when a strong emotion has driven him to commit such an act. Since we are talking about the morality of such action, it is, hence, imperative to examine the reasons behind the action. Otherwise, we brand all killings as murders. Aristotle, through his arguments regarding fear, allowed us not only to explain wrongful acts but determine their blameworthiness according to degrees. Morality is not a black and white affair; it is shaped by norms of the time and specific belief systems. During the philosopher’s time, for instance, war was permitted, whereas Christianity made us think it as morally unacceptable. The point is that there are many variables that must be included in the moral evaluation of an act. Factors like fear figure prominently in this discourse because they are valid and legitimate contributors to the way humans act. It compels us to act, making the process involuntary. If fear drove one to jump off a roof, for instance, killing another in the process, would we condemn him for taking another’s life? Emotional compulsions form part of the inherent characteristic of man as a rational and emotional being, and having them rejected defeats the very purpose of moral evaluation. According to Spain, “a person acting under compulsion is unable to exercise physical control over his or her bodily movement, in other words, is not free to act,” and that it “provides the basis for claims of exculpation contesting authorship-responsibility and, hence, indirectly, moral responsibility” (30). This explains how I can say that if I am overcome by an overwhelming fear; I will be incapacitated because it reduces my agential power to choose. Here, it is clear that my freedom is diminished and, hence, my moral responsibility as well. Indirect responsibility or partial excuse for actions is a very important factor why I agree with Aristotle. I think it agrees with the utilitarian approach to punishment as against those obsess on the action and not the motivations behind it. There should the consideration of the principle of proportionality wherein punishment or blameworthiness is quantified. To deny fear and other compulsions would mean that we are pursuing a kind of morality that is based merely on intuition. It is not just; it is simplistic, rigid and never morally virtuous. Modern Evidences We can find evidences to the Aristotelian claim that fear excuses us from culpability in the examples of our time. When one kills another, many legal systems the world over evaluate his motives and decide whether he could be charged with murder or homicide or set free. For example, the criminal law of Spain has a concept called “insurmountable fear” that can free an individual from any legal responsibility. Bachmaier and Garcia explained: The basis for this exemption from criminal responsibility lies in the absence of criminal intention or negligence, due to the complete nullification of volition and the capacity for motivation. In other cases, it is the principle of non-demandable conduct that determines the lack of culpability – in some specific cases through a subjective state of necessity, but above all, through the exemption of insurmountable fear (107). Many western legal codes have a version of this principle in their jurisprudence and they demonstrate how the law, a completely rational mechanism, agrees that fear has its impact on people’s actions, that is why it is considered an important factor in determining responsibility. Even those legal codes that do not exempt people from criminal responsibility because of fear consider it as a mitigating circumstance, diluting punishment and culpability. To further support this point, I would like to cite what the psychological field has to say about the subject. The main agreement in this field regarding the issue rests on the law of causality, which is only one of the many forms of restrictions and legitimation of free will (Rank, Richter and Lieberman 120). Even Otto Rank, who argued that free will is an autonomous force, conceded that it organizes and integrates itself based on biological impulses and social drives, making the individual will subject to its own dynamic causality (Boa 107). What these tell us is that free will can be undermined, reducing our capacity for reason, hence, excusing some of our actions owing to the fact that we are not exercising full volition. Here, one can say that we cannot be held fully accountable, especially in instances of wrongful acts. Specific examples wherein fear could elicit irrationality in the context of psychology are the cases of phobia and the anxiety disorders. As known to everyone, phobia is an irrational fear of a thing, image, situation or even people. The need to avoid or the manifestations of fear in people with phobia can incapacitate their mental processes and prevent them from leading a normal life. There is also the case of the post-traumatic stress disorder, which can develop after a trauma, overwhelms normal biological and psychological defense mechanisms and is characterized by intense and alternating feelings of vulnerability and rage (Carlson, Eisenstat and Ziporyn 55). These examples are extreme cases of fear that are already related to some disorder. But they highlight the fact how fear can cripple both the mental and physical aspects of an individual’s person, depriving him of his wits to determine what is right or wrong. To condemn him for a wrongful act is, hence, an injustice. Conclusion In conclusion, Aristotle has put forward a very sound argument that calls for the expulsion of culpability for acts that are driven by fear. This has been supported by the more advanced, rational and scientific minds in modern psychology and criminal law. Fear, indeed, can incapacitate an individual to the point that he is no longer master of his reason. Besides the extreme examples cited by this paper, we have experienced this for ourselves. At some points in our lives, we were confronted with situations that made us act rashly, committing actions which in retrospect never characterized our personality or actions that we regretted or thought that we could have never done. The bottom line is that discounting this variable in the moral evaluation of acts, especially wrongful ones, is simply preposterous. People act for a reason. To focus on the act and not the motivational factors behind it, would be immoral. Finally, a crucial element in the Aristotelian principle on fear was his idea with regards to how fear should be considered blameless. This avoided the principle from being absolute and, as mentioned previously, made it balanced. It also addressed the criticisms that the philosopher has paved the way for people to assume the ‘something made me do it” argument, a bad imitation of the more incapacitating excuse. People cannot invoke or hide from the fear argument so that they can be excused for what they have done. This also provided the basis for which the concept of proportionality emerged. An action should have a proportionate culpability. Depending on the degree of compulsion, say fear, moral responsibility can be quantified. Does the degree merit non-responsibility, indirect responsibility, direct responsibility? This is the beauty of Aristotle’s argument; it is not only legitimate but also just. References Bachmaier, Lorena and Garcia, Antonio. Criminal Law in Spain. The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 2010. Print. Boa, Kenneth. Augustine to Freud: what theologians & psychologists tell us about human nature (and why it matters). Nashville: B&H Publishing Group, 2004. Print. Broadie, Sarah. Ethics with Aristotle. Oxford: Oxford University, 1993. Carlson, Karen, Eisenstat, Stephanie and Ziporyn, Terra. The new Harvard guide to women's health. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004. Print. Rank, Otto, Richter, Gregory and Lieberman, James. Psychology and the Soul: A Study of the Origin, Conceptual Evolution, and Nature of the Soul. Baltimore: JHU Press, 2002. Print. Spain, Eimer. The Role of Emotions in Criminal Law Defences: Duress, Necessity and Lesser Evils. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. Print. Read More