Davidsons Coherence Theory.Coherence and Skepticism - Essay Example

?Davidson’s Coherence Theory The Coherence of Truth is part of the series of essays that Donald Davidson wrote, which made him one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century. The essay posited a coherence theory on truth and is typified by two significant variables that characterize all Davidson's work - it is both unitary and all encompassing in its breadth. It is these two variables that make Davidson's theory widely accepted and appear more legitimate than others. Davidson was not shy in acknowledging the influences to his works and theories and this contributes to the viability and attractiveness of his philosophy. The Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge All coherence theories are based on the fundamental position that the truth in propositions is validated by its coherence through a set of propositions. They oppose correspondence theories because of this emphasis on the relationship between propositions and truth conditions. According to LePore and Ludwig (2007, p. 316), coherence theorists focus on the nature of truth as guarantee the link between the belief and truth, arguing that “what makes for truth is simply some property of a set of beliefs, namely, coherence.” The variations among coherence theories, on the other hand, are dependent on the way coherence relations are interpreted and the position with regards to what constitutes the set parameters in order for propositions to be considered true. Davidson distinguished his coherence theory from that of correspondence theory by explaining that coherence is a sufficient test for truth. Unlike, the latter, it no longer waits for the confrontation of a belief and the reality, which is a requisite in any theory that requires the production of meanings to be satisfied by objective truth conditions. (p. 154) The coherence is the criterion by which a proposition typified by a set of beliefs is a sufficient indication that such proposition can already be equivalent to objective facts. The coherence and the implications it provides enable one to know that the proposition also corresponds. Meanwhile, he distinguished his theory from other versions of coherence theory by explaining simply that the truth condition for a proposition should be that someone must understand it and that "when the beliefs are true, then the primary conditions for knowledge would seem to be satisfied" (p. 154). He went on explaining that people live in different environments and, hence, different experiences. They have different intentions, desires, own sense organs and are affected by internal and external events that are unique to their own existence (p. 155). This variable supposedly highlights how the recognitions provided by different individuals should be enough to confirm that what is being proposed is true. He explained, "a coherence theory is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief," and that "its partisan rejects as unintelligible the request for a ground or source of justification of another ilk" (p. 156). The evaluation provided by individuals with diverse experiences, constraints and circumstance is authoritative and considered more effective than other theoretical conditions. Davidson explained this further in his discourse about the relationship between belief and sensations. His argument is that "the existence of belief entails the existence of sensation, and so the existence of the belief entails its own truth" (p. 156). It is clear that sensation, among other faculties and factors, enable individuals to justify beliefs on the grounds of causal relationship. But his view is not as simplistic as those other theories that set great import on sensation. Davidson recognized the role of the senses in theorizing about truth but he did not find it satisfactory enough. His position is that while meaning and knowledge depends on experience and experience ultimately depends on sensation, “this is the ‘depend’ of causality and not evidence of justification” (p. 158). Davidson did not discount the possibility that some beliefs are false and that there is no guarantee that what is believed by many people can be true. He further recognized that there is no useful way to count belief and no clear meaning to the idea that holds how a person's beliefs are true. What he instead posited was principle that "there is a presumption in favor of the truth of a belief that coheres with a significant mass of belief" (p. 155). Davidson's coherence theory can be summarized into the following five points: 1. "Nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief" (p. 156). 2. If the coherence theory is proved false, then it means that nonbelief can be a factor for holding a belief. 3. Notable nonbelief theories that are worth taking seriously "attempt to ground belief in one way or another on the testimony of the senses: sensation, perception, the given, experience, sense data, the passing show" (p. 156). 4. All non-coherence theories have problems explaining, "at least these two things: what, exactly, is the relation between sensation and belief that allows the first to justify the second? and, why should we believe our sensations are reliable, that is, why should we trust our senses" (p. 156). 5. The previous two questions cannot be answered by noncoherence theories, including William Quine's theory on sentences being grounded on sensory hits. These five points, for philosopher, are the reasons why coherence theory has more validity than others and with emphasis on the position that that there is no stronger condition for validating a proposition or a belief except another belief. Breadth of Principle Davidson's theory attempts to be an all-encompassing model, and provided a more practical and realistic approach in determining truth. Unarguably, this comes from the number of influences on his views, most of which he used to build an integrated and unified model, taking the best from other philosophies, while discarding their weaknesses. His thoughts on truth, knowledge, action, language and the mind were informed by the best of other theoretical frameworks. For example, the philosopher turned to the principles set by Alfred Tarski when he attempts to demonstrate how his theory can be empirically accountable. Specifically, he identified Tarski's theory of truth for formal languages as a tool in identifying the formal and structural features of language. He explains: truth is clear and basic concept as we have. Tarski has given us an idea of how to apply the general concept… to particular languages on the assumption that we already understand it… any further attempt to explain, define, analyze, or explicate the concept will be empty or wrong… all theories either add nothing to our understanding of truth or have obvious counterexamples. Why on earth should we expect to be able to reduce truth to something clearer or more fundamental (p. 155-156)? According to Wallgreen (2006, p. 169), Davidson believes that there is a need to bridge the gap between the semantics of formal languages and natural languages. Davidson proceeded on modifying Tarski's theory by taking some useful aspects in his program and explaining what the so-called deflationist Tarski-style truth could not. In summing up Davidson's theory on truth as influenced by Tarski, one must take the philosopher's general pronouncements involving truth as substantive theory, and not as 'analytic' and that he became empowered to voice more general connections between truth and, say, belief or knowledge (Kemp, 2012, p. 106). This is important because Davidson had identified serious attacks on some aspects of Tarski’s theories. For instance, he stated that: The central difficulty [with the thought that a semantic theory is a theory of truth] is due simply to the fact that Tarski does not tell us how to apply the concept to a new case, whether the new case is a new language or a word newly added to a language… This feature of Tarski's definitions can in turn easily be traced to the fact that they depend on giving the extension or reference of the basic predicates or names by enumerating cases: a definition given in this way can provide no clue for the next or general case (Register, 2007, p. 91) Register (p. 91) pointed out that the problem with Tarskian theories that Davidson was effectively able to identify and address is the fact that they can only be recognized by those who understands what truth in a language is and that can only be grasped by someone with the concept of truth. With regards to Davidson’s affinity with Tarski, Evnine (1991, p. 135) observed that while, originally, he shared Tarski’s conviction, that his semantic theory is some form of vindication of correspondence theory, Davidson ‘s position has become more complicated over the years, “effecting a kind of union between elements from both the correspondence and coherence theories.” In addition to the correspondence theoretical elements, Davidson also explained that coherence theory could be a form of realism theory. He explained this by saying that "if a coherence theory of truth is acceptable, it must be consistent with correspondence theory" (p. 155) The philosopher recognized that truth is correspondence with the way things are, that is, there is no straightforward and non-misleading way to state this except a detour through the concept of satisfaction in terms of which truth is characterized (p. 155). Meanwhile, the coherence theory of knowledge, in the words of Davidson, can be considered as a form of realism if it is going to be based on the principle that the theory of knowledge allows a nonrelativized and non-internal approach to knowing the truth. He is quick to distance his realism, however, from that of Hilary Putnam's, stressing his disagreement to the thinker's internal realism and metaphysical realism. According to Putnam's (1985, p. 84) theory of internal realism, "truth cannot simply be justification" and that, it is "supposed to be a property of a statement that cannot be lost, whereas justification can be lost." Putnam also emphasized that a statement is true if it would be justified under epistemically ideal conditions for many sorts of statements (p. 84). In Davidson's view, this is faulty. He explained: "it [coherence theory] is not internal realism because internal realism makes truth relative to a scheme, and this is an idea I do not think is intelligible" (p. 155). Davidson also rejected Putnam's metaphysical realism, pointing out that it is "radically non-epistemic, which implies that all our best researched and established thoughts and theories maybe false" (p. 155). Davidson was also heavily influenced by Quine. This is reflected in the way Davidson's theory on truth and meaning came to integrate a theory regarding translation from an early stage. Davidson and Quine Davidson affirmed many of Quine's assumptions. For example, he upheld the thinkers position that truth of our sentences must be tested together rather than one by one and that a satisfactory theory of meaning can allow a sort of indeterminacy (p. 157). This is not surprising because Davidson is a philosopher of language and gives importance to the philosophy of language, treating the sentence as the primary channel by which meaning is constructed and expressed. Davidson sided with Quine in his critique of propositions and identified the sentence category's importance in this area. According to Wallgreen (p. 169), in Davidson's attempt to innovate in the area of meaning theory, he was able to suggest the idea to reconstruct the theory of meaning as a theory of truth, explaining: Truth now becomes a more primitive notion than meaning in the hierarchy of the theory.. Due to the influence of Quine's meaning holism, Davidson's theory of truth and meaning also involve a theory of translation from an early stage. Due to internal theory evolution basic aspects of theories of agency, the intensional states (belief and desire), and reason gradually becomes integral to the theory of meaning and truth (vice versa). Davidson also wrote: I do find congenial Quine's resolutely third person approach to epistemology, and to the extent that the naturalization of epistemology encourages or embraces such an approach. I am happy to count myself a naturalized epistemologist" (cited in Mason, 2007, p. 144). But in his discourse about the justification of beliefs, Davidson criticized Quine when the latter declared "our only source of information about the external world is through the impact of light rays and molecules upon our sensory surfaces" (p. 157). His argument is that there is simply no sense in setting the condition-, much less, expecting, for the confrontation of beliefs with the deliverances of the sense one by one, or in confronting the totality of beliefs with an individual's experiences. He strongly disagreed with the philosopher's fidelity to the argument that "whatever there is to meaning must be traced back somehow to experience, the given, or patterns of sensory stimulation, something intermediate between beliefs and the usual objects our beliefs are about." Davidson's position is that this principle of natural empiricism is tantamount to skepticism because it rendered all sentences and beliefs suspect and, worse, false. Therefore, for Davidson, Quine's attempt to base beliefs epistemically on sensory hits cannot work. Sensation for theorists led by Davidson, "can only play the pedestrian role of casually grounding some beliefs, or sentences, viz., occasion sentences" that is why "observation sentences cannot possibly influence the discourse on belief” (Leonardi & Santambrogio 1995, p. 96). Davidson theorized that coherence theory avoids the confusing outcome of Quine's principle because it does not dwell with the absurdity of having to look for a justifying ground for the totality of beliefs. Instead, it focuses on finding a reason besides a form of evidence for supposing that a belief is true (p. 158). As Quine required experience and sensory stimulation as foundation for theorizing meaning and knowledge, Davidson objects. The philosopher does recognize Quine's notion that theory of meaning and epistemology are associated with each other, he rejected Quine's foundationalist take on semantics and epistemology. Again, he believes that this is the same as skepticism, stressing that "a person's sensory stimulations could be just as they are and yet the world outside very different" (p. 158). The interaction between Davidson and Quine's philosophical positions on truth creates two important arguments. The first is this: Following Davidson's principles, Quine's theory is no longer applicable in the explaining the nature of the relationship between sensation and observation sentences, rejecting the capability of the former to justify the latter. Leonardi and Santambrogio (p. 97) identified the second, stating that Quine's view, as per Davidson's position, cannot be used in order to explain how one can trust his senses. Coherence and Skepticism Descartes established the Skeptical school as he sought reasons to doubt the truth of his beliefs, explaining in the First Meditation that these beliefs are acquired "either from the senses or through the senses", which are unreliable having deceived him in numerous circumstances (2:12: AT 7:18). If one would agree with Davidson and believe that his coherence theory provides the right naturalistic description and explanation of the foundations of linguistic communication, including the implications on philosophical issues such as truth, belief and knowledge, then it is easy to understand how the philosopher was able to declare that "one can tell the sceptic to get lost." In his coherence theory, Davidson addressed the Cartesian skepticism through the application of points learned from radical interpretation to epistemology. The philosopher believes that this field - epistemology - is primarily concerned with truth and therefore within the confines of radical interpretation. His answers to the skeptics are contained in his various essays. In The Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge, Davidson stated two of these: First I urge that the correct understanding of speech, desires, intentions and other propositional attitudes of a person leads to the conclusion that most of a person's beliefs must be true, and so there is a legitimate presumption that any of them, if it coheres with most of the rest, is true. Then I go on to claim that anyone with thoughts, and so in particular anyone who wonders whether he has any reason to suppose he is generally right about the nature of his environment, must know what a belief is, and how in general beliefs are to be detected and interpreted. These beings perfectly general facts we cannot fail to use when we communicate with others. The point being made, writes Malpas (1992, p. 215), is that the lessons learned from radical interpretation can be turned on ourselves: "If we are to interpret our own utterances, then, by the principle of charity, we must take most of our beliefs to be true." This argument has been echoed in Davidson's other works, notably in The Method of Truth in Metaphysics and Thought and Talk, among others. A recurring theme in all of his discourse of coherence theory is his emphasis on the need to pair truth and meaning and that this is shown in his defense of his theory and his criticisms of other frameworks. In this respect, Davidson is not short of critics. One of the most important positions against his view on skepticism was put forward by McGinn (2002, p. 183) who argued that it is absurd to dismiss skepticism in such an absolutist rejection. He stressed: If it is a condition of having beliefs about (say) the external world or other minds that these beliefs be mainly true; and if it is a condition of having an interpretable language that most of what the speaker says is true: then we know, just by knowing that we believe and speak, that most of what we think and say is true - and so the skeptical claim that we might be globally mistaken about the external world or other minds can be dismissed as inconceivable. There is then no need to provide any demonstration that our belief is true. McGinn disputed Davidson's position on skepticism further by providing an analogy. To quote: "suppose someone (you or an envatted brain) has an experience as of a round, red object, as a result of some event in his brain; this person may, on the basis of this experience, then form beliefs involving the concepts round and red - even though he may never have had causal contact with (specifically perceived) round or red objects." McGinn, distinguished this from the manner by which individuals cannot have beliefs involving concepts of water or tiger without appropriate causal contact with water and tiger, demonstrating the importance of experience in the process. The argument is that skepticism -in some respects - is legitimate and valid because: 1) experiential content can be a component of belief-content; and, 2) beliefs about individuals as well as the natural kinds are not in the mind since they are determined by causal relations with the environment. McGinn is baffled because (using his argument), say, when the view about snow falling from the sky. This is one of his analogies that summarized his attacks on coherence theory. His interpretation is that the falling snow, as per Davidson's theory, will not be considered as truth if it does not cohere with other beliefs. The philosopher is right to be baffled because the snow will fall regardless of whether other believe there is snow in the first place. However, Davidson's principle can work around his criticism easily and also avoid getting branded as susceptible to idealism in the process. McGinn's criticism assumes that the condition that makes the sentence true treats the world objectively. Davidson and his adherents could easily invoke the idea that "snow falls from the sky" is true because it is a sentence and that like any other, it is anchored on or coheres with a set of beliefs. It is important to note that Davidson repudiates skepticism to the core because such rejection is a cornerstone of what his coherence theory. A quote by Mason captured this sentiment in which Davidson declared: "I have vacillated over the years on how to describe my attitude toward skepticism. Do I think that if I am right about the nature of thought scepticism is false, or that skepticism simply can't get off the ground" (p. 142)? His answer to this question is straightforward. He said: "I set out not to 'refute' the sceptic, but to give a sketch of what I think to be correct account of the foundations of linguistic communication and its implications for truth, belief, and knowledge" (Mason, p. 142). It is during this point when he affirmed the correctness of his theory that he told the skeptics to get lost. Unlike Quine, however, who already despaired on the hopelesness of the Cartesian principle as a reason to shift the focus of epistemology to the study of how knowledge is acquired through natural processes, Davidson has shown an inclination to accommodate the reconciliation of the subjective and objective domains (Dunn, 2008, p. 154). Although this accommodation is part of his recognition of the role of sensation and epistemology, perhaps this is also still in keeping with the general and encompassing tenets of his philosophy. Conclusion The premise of coherence theory is simple, in evaluating whether a belief or a proposition is true, it will only take others to understand and recognize it, hence, the concept of coherence. This theory is recognized as comprehensive and general approach to theorizing truth and knowledge owing to the several influences such as Quine and Tarski. These two philosophers figured prominently in Davidson’s attempts at theorizing meaning and belief. So what he was able to develop is a theory that argues for coherence of truth on the basis of epistemological and semantic considerations. A distinctive characteristic of Davidson’s coherence theory is its repudiation of the skepticism. He scoffed at the hair-splitting Cartesian arguments, espousing a position that is not complicated. Indeed, why fret over the truth when you have others to confirm them for you? According to Egginton and Sanbothe (2004, p. 235), this is one of the positive aspects of Davidson’s theory: It is not self-defeatist and is actually a commendable attempt at perpetuating American philosophy and a valiant struggle against the bewitchment of post-Kantian denouement. Within the parameters set by the coherence theory, one could say that Davidson's belief on truth may as well be considered as a truth in itself as others will find no difficulty in recognizing and affirming its propositions. As this paper has pointed out, Davidson was able to incorporate elements of other theories such as correspondence theory in such a way that philosophers following this school will find themselves affirming what he has to say. His coherence theory figures systematically with his other theories about action, knowledge, language and the mind contained in his many essays. To say that his theory on truth has a strong philosophical viability is already an understatement. It is a legitimate point of view that is recognized even by its critics. Today, his coherence theory is one of the most dominant philosophical schools, attracting interest, interpretation and is widely seen as having a continuing influence and importance in the field. This should already depict that validity of his claims. References Davidson, D 1987, "A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge." In E. LePore (ed.), Truth and Interpretation: Perspetcives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson. Blackwell, New York. Descartes, R 2007, Meditations on First Philosophy. NuVision Publications, LLC, Sioux Falls, SD. Dunn, P 2008, Beyond skepticism & certainty. ProQuest, Ann Arbor, MI. Egginton, W and Sanbothe, M 2004, The pragmatic turn in philosophy: contemporary engagements between analytic and continental thought.SUNY Press, New York. Evnine, S 1991, Donald Davidson. Stanford University Press. Kemp, G 2012, Quine Versus Davidson: Truth, Reference, and Meaning. Oxford University Press, Oxford . Leonardi, P and Santambrogio, M 1995, On Quine: New Essays. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. LePore, E and Ludwig, K 2007, Donald Davidson's truth-theoretic semantics. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Malpas, JE 1992, Donald Davidson and the mirror of meaning: holism, truth, interpretation. CUP Archive, Cambridge. Mason, R 2007, Spinoza: logic, knowledge and religion. Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., Hampshire. McGinn, C 2002, Knowledge and Reality: Selected Essays. Oxford University Press, Oxford. Putnam, H 1985, Realism and Reason. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Register, Bryan. (2007). Donald Davidson and moral realism. ProQuest, Ann Arbor. Wallgreen, T 2006, Transformative philosophy: Socrates, Wittgenstein, and the democratic spirit of philosophy. Lexington Books, London. Read More