The Ontological : Anselm, Kant, Descartes and a Touch of the Buddha - Thesis Example

March 7, The Ontological Thesis: Anselm, Kant, Descartes and a Touch of the Buddha The ontological argument, used as a theoretical basis for the ideas of many philosophers is St. Anselm’s thesis that: God, being that than which no greater can be conceived, must exist, for if he did not then it would be possible to conceive of an existent God, which would be greater than that which no greater can be conceived, which is absurd (Anselm). Ontology includes the fundamental questions of being, the basic properties of what and how and how much and why of anything classifiable. This ontological argument speaks of God as the most non-reducible example of primary being. The idea is that when being is reduced to its ground source, there is God, and that beyond that point of fully reduced concept of ultimate being can be nothing because to imagine beyond that point means we were never yet at that point, in reduction, in the first place, and to argue otherwise is without rational defense. This paper will explore the ontological perspectives of Kant and Descartes, responding critically. Kant responds to Anselm’s ontological argument with the observation that it is based on a confusing assumption. If God exists, this is a property of the world in which God is manifest, and not a property of God, since existence is not a property. He explains, in Critique of Pure Reason: Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something which is added to the conception of some other thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations in it. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment…Now if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say, God is, or There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates – I posit the object in relation to my conception (Kant). If we see existence as a property, and say that God exists, we affirm God. If we then say that God does not exist, it is still an affirmation of God, just missing a property that was present in the earlier statement. In both cases, there is God, so there is no functional meaning in seeing existence as a predicate. To suggest that God exists is actually to say that the concept of God corresponds to something manifest in the world. To say that God does not exist, does not change God, but only denies the corresponding manifested concept in the world. It is a statement about the world, not a statement about existence as a property present or lacking in God. God does not change with a decision to attribute existence or non-existence. Comparison is futile, and the argument collapses. Contrary to some opinions, the concept of God, manifested in the world, does not change, in itself, based on assertion, but can be distorted or differently acted upon, moment to moment, based on mood, based on fever, based on currently presenting stimuli, based on the way we have interpreted previous experience, or based on what drugs are influencing our perception at a given time. This is just as true for our concept of God as for our concept of chair, or table, or door, or freedom, or anything else. We have a concept of how it manifests in the world, and our concept is also a manifestation of that thing in the world. By that, I mean that in thinking about a chair, we have an existing schema of “chair”, which represents what was, at one time, an internalized encounter with “chair-ness”. We probably did not think, at that moment of perceptual genesis, that it is the only chair, but internalized an interpretation of it to be “chair”, stored as a symbolic image of this quintessential chair. After that moment of the encounter, with the first chair, we draw on that stored image for the next encounter with a chair. Modification to that chair schema, accommodation, as Piaget calls it (Piaget), may occur from time to time, based on new perceptual information, and we may even come to barely remember the original image, exchanging it for a new one. The concept of “chair” might be recalled a bit differently, with varying emphasis on specific qualities supportive of our mood, need-of-the-moment, or whatever, but this does not affect the general concept of chair in the world. Furthermore, if all chairs in the world burned completely up, and there was no chair left on the planet, still chair would exist because of our chair schemata. There would be no meaningful function in comparing the schema of my assertion of chair with the schema of my non-assertion of chair, however. Nor would a comparison among personally modified and evolved concepts of chair be, in any way, an assertion of negation of the existence of chair, or a way to make a judgment as to whether one is the true quintessential chair. What is meaningful is not the particular form of the chair in my personal chair schema, but the generalized concept of chair, the collective schema, which asserts chair existence, Everyone’s chair schemas and my own variously modified chair schemas are all taken to be one manifestation of “chair”. My logic leads me to support Kant’s negation of Anselm’s Ontological argument. I find it to be brilliant, actually, because he thought of this argument without the benefit of scientific theory. He not only advocated the maturity of free thinking and personal thought, but he lived it in becoming one of the world’s greatest philosophers, still amazingly influential today. Kant’s critical philosophy is strongly based on the idea of human autonomy. This can be seen in his Critique of Pure Reason and in The Conflict of the Faculties. In the latter work, Kant claims that human autonomy challenges the interest of the totalitarian State, and says: Now the critique of reason has appeared and determined the human being to a thoroughly active place in the world. The human being itself is the original creator of all its representations and concepts and ought to be the sole author of all its actions (Kant). He argues that scientific knowledge, morality and religious conviction are mutually compatible, without threat to each other, because they all have their origin in human understanding, the basis of which is human autonomy. Something to really respect about Kant, in addition to the brilliance of his thinking and his emphasis on human autonomy, is the balance I see in his approach to freedom of thought. Many, perhaps most, scholarly people have a certain thought or stance and then stick to it without further thought, as though no longer free to think again, unless consistent with the identifying thought or stance they already expressed. They support other scholars who are on the same intellectual side of the fence, and refute those who are not. Kant, on the other hand, took freedom from thought restraints, and his devotion to human autonomy, as a responsibility. He was not afraid to publish “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God” (1763) and also provide an elegant rebuttal to Anselm’s ontological argument about proof of the existence of God. I like that. In “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God,” Kant elegantly argues that the existence of God pre-dates God’s possibility and the world’s possibility (Kant). “Pure Existence” is prior to predicated conditions. There can be none without the prior existence to which predication refers. When we look at “Pure Existence”, it can only, by definition, be God. Therefore, God exists. This is an example of Kant’s honoring of the rational over the empirical. He rationally poses the existence of God as being prior to the possibility of the empirical. Kant prefers rational thinking over empirical knowledge because the latter is always subjective. Kant proposes that: Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but ... let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition (Preface to Critique of Pure Reason B/XVI) It occurs to me that this idea sounds very Buddhist, in the suggestion that thought is the basis for the material world. For example, tulpas are material forms that can be created from focused thought. Alexandra David-Neel reportedly created a monk tulpa, through intense focus and willpower, having learned the technique to do at a Tibetan Buddhist monastery (David-Neel). Tulpas are evidence of the Buddhist understanding, that material existence arises from mind, and Kant’s suggestion that objects must conform to our thoughts and awareness. This idea also seems suggestive of quantum physics, in that thought influences the material world. Praying yields healthier and more rapid plant growth, lowers blood pressure, and speed recovery from illness, while directing negative intention toward a colony of microbes has been demonstrated to significantly retard growth (Williams). So Kant has made a viable point. Now, turning our attention to Descartes and the ontological argument, it should be noted that Anselm’s argument was devastated (Aquinas) thoroughly and long ago. Anselm’s argument rests solely on God. Descartes' argument, is grounded in theories of innate ideas and clear and distinct perception. In Meditations, Descartes argues that: …from the very fact that I can derive from my thoughts the idea of something, it follows that all that I clearly and distinctly recognize as characteristic of this thing does in reality characterize it … It is certain that I find in my mind the idea of God, of a supremely perfect being, … and I recognize that an actual and eternal existence belongs to his nature (Descartes, 62). After reflecting on the objection that it is possible to attribute existence to a God that in fact does not exist, Descartes says, in Meditations: From the fact alone that I cannot conceive of God except as existing it follows that existence is inseparable from him, and consequently that he does, in truth, exist. Not that my thought can bring about this result or that it imposes any necessity upon things: on the contrary, the necessity which is in the thing itself --- that is, the necessity of the existence of God --- determines me to have this thought. For it is not in my power to conceive of a God without existence ---- that is to say, of a supremely perfect Being without a supreme perfection (Descartes, 63-64). Traditional interpretations of Descartes’ ontological argument usually see his view of existence as predicate, which is a perspective, as discussed, that Kant argues against. To see existence as predicate to the object, in this case God, is an interpretation consistent with Anselm’s ontological argument. Existence either belongs to God or it does not Actually, Descartes distinguishes between the existence of God, for whom existence is a product of perfection, and therefore the logic of the argument for or against the existence of God, and the existence of other objects, and therefore the logic of the arguments for or against the existence of other objects. In Philosophical Works, he states: Existence is contained in the idea or concept of everything, because we can conceive of nothing except as existent, with this difference, that possible or contingent existence is contained in the concept of a limited thing, but necessary and perfect existence in the concept of a supremely perfect being (Descartes, 57). What he means is that God is an ontological necessity. Banach points out three themes that Descarte’s critics rely upon: the controversy over existence and predication; the problem of bridging the gap between problems and things; and the difficulties in maintaining that one has a coherent conception of God. Banach replies, on Descartes’ behalf, that the controversy over existence and predication, although the most often levied criticism, has little to no relevance to Descartes because Descartes is referring to ontologically necessary existence, and not to literal existence. I agree that this argument has been established, based on Descartes philosophy. However, I find myself wondering of what use it is to establish ontologically necessary existence? Establishing this is not a reassurance that God exists in a literal way, and it is, after all, a literal God that people rely upon. People want a God who will be on their side, protect them, help them win wars by crushing their enemies, heal their illness, save their loved ones from death, provide funding for a new car, rescue their house from foreclosure, guide their leaders, choose their people over other people, give them inner peace, and hang out with them in heaven for eternity. This is the God whose existence people argue about. Descartes has not given people reassurance of this God, by arguing ontological necessity. Banach replies to the next problem area, of bridging the gap between problems and things, by pointing out how all the critics’ arguments come down to the same point, that the abstract cannot translate into the concrete. He argues that this rests, ultimately, on a singular assumption, that we cannot discover facts by considering ideas. He comments that, on the contrary, scientific discovery is based on ideas that are based on facts. Descartes would say that in our innate ideas is the ontologically necessary (Banach). I have a problem with Descartes’ understanding of innate ideas and clear and distinct understanding. From how I understand him, it seems that Descartes believes that some ideas are natural. I guess he might be referring to archetypes, but archetypes are merely shapes to channel the material of the psyche and are not clear and specific ideas. They also are conditioned, I suspect, because they are part of the collective unconscious. They may pre-date our own personal conditioning, but they reflect ancestral conditioning, no doubt. As for clear and distinct understanding, Descartes alleges that this can only come from setting aside one’s philosophical bias and reflecting outside one’s programming and conditioning. This would appear to be in agreement with the Buddhist teaching that rational mind obstructs Pure Mind and that we can access Pure Mind only when rational mind is momentarily stopped (Hoover). However, Buddhism offers technology to do so, for example, through mindfulness meditation and through the practice of Dzog-chen (Khyentse). In the end, rational mind is only momentarily stopped, so that enlightening glimpses of Pure Mind are experienced. It cannot be sustained because one cannot reflect on these enlightening glimpses without using rational mind, and rational mind distorts, fragments and obstructs the enlightening glimpse. I appreciate that Descartes managed to hold himself above the drowning-inducing religious programming of his youth, and that he investigated a lot of people’s ideas and reflected on them, so that he felt he was now thinking for himself, and not from his religious and cultural programming. I also accept, based on Descartes’ writings, that he has a good and flexible mind. I accept that it is quite possible to set aside one’s conditioned beliefs, with a lot of directed attention and intention. However, to do so requires re-conditioning belief. I do not accept that it is possible to think outside all conditioned belief. To do so is what Buddhism refers to as full enlightenment, and this is not a casual matter. To glimpse (momentary enlightenment) is not to think. To think is to respond, distort, expand, condense, corrupt, personalize, rearrange and organize. It is sustained activity. It activates voices other than one’s own. In the end, it fills one’s mind with merely a rearranged set of conditioned learning. So I am wondering how Descartes can so innocently assume that his thinking is so clear from bias that he can sustain the insights of pure knowing? Indeed there is evidence that he cannot. An example is that he sees God as eternal, absolute, the epitome of perfection and as male. Eternal, absolute, and perfect are perhaps necessary properties to a concept shared with so many people in the world, over time. Still, and even because of that, I must argue that this is a conditioned concept and his ideas are based on this conditioning. The assigning of gender is the best example of this concept conditioning. All scriptures speak of God as spirit, and Christianity, which Descartes was originally conditioned by, uses both male and female words to describe God in the original Biblical scriptures, and emphasizes the lack of gender in Heaven. But male gender was assigned in the Biblical translations. This was not due to pure ideas, but to conditioned thinking. Descartes’ allegedly clear and distinct ideas of God still reflect this conditioning, to lay masculine claim to the concept. Furthermore, such properties as wrathful, vengeful, and jealous are also part of the conception of God, but they are anthropomorphic and egocentric references that should not apply to a non-human God of eternal and absolute perfection. Because Descartes is human and, by definition, biased and conditioned, he used re-conditioned thinking to reach into the abstract and “prove” the concrete. In my estimation, nothing has been proven at all, since his assumption of predictably accessing an absolute source of knowledge is without merit. A third area of criticism levied by critics, against Descartes’ ontology, is that we cannot know whether God really exists or whether we made Him up in our imagination. Descartes replies to Caterus’ challenge of this sort by arguing that if God were a fiction, we would be able to analytically break down its synthesized parts (Banach). On this point, I do not agree. Humans are caught up in all kinds of fictions, and do not see it, and cannot disassemble it and sustain a new understanding. By way of example, modern physics has revealed a very different universe and reality than the one we all think we live in. Yet our conditioning and our fear keep us living as though modern physics has discovered nothing. Banach claims that knowing whether God really exists presents a bigger problem, than the other charges made by Descartes critics. It is not possible to prove that a conception of God is ontologically possible, and if it is not possible, and God is disaffirmed, then that would make the God concept meaningless (Banach). I think that is a good argument. However, I think that the effects of conditioned mind make Descartes’ entire ontological argument meaningless. The ontological statement made by St. Anselm is not a statement about God, but a statement about the world which manifests or does not manifest the concept. It adds nothing to the proof of God’s existence more than a launching point for argument. However, as a launching point, it is very useful. Kant did a brilliant job in arguing the assumptions held within the argument. But what is most brilliant about Kant is that his own ontological argument is both congruent with ancient teachings and also sets the stage so beautifully for modern physics. This leads to my strong inclination to give more than a passing glance to his writings, and I look forward to continuing to search through and further reflect upon Kant’s ideas. Descartes avoided Anselm’s existence-as-predicate assumption, in his argument. He also drew a distinction between the existence argument for God and the existence argument for objects, and distinguished between ontological necessity and logical necessity. These are strong contributions. I have too much trouble, however, accepting his assumption of innate ideas and clear and distinct thought, which is at the basis of the certainty of Descartes’ argument. In the end, the existence of God is neither proven nor disproven, and we are left with only the certainty of conditioned faith. . Works Cited Anselm, St., Anselm’s Basic Writings, translated by S.W. Deane, 2nd Ed. (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing Co., 1962) Aquinas, Thomas, St., Summa Theologica (1a Q2), “Whether the Existence of God is Self-Evident (Thomas More Publishing, 1981) Banach, David. "Descartes' Ontological Argument." 1982. anselm.edu. 6 March 2012 David-Neel, Alexandra. "With Mystics and Magicians in Tibet." 1931. Rev. ed. as Magic and Mystery in Tibet. New Hyde Park, N.Y.: University Books, 1956. Reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1971. Descartes, Rene. Meditations, Trans., Laurence J. Lafleur (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1960). ……….., Philosophical Works of Descartes.II, Trans., Elizabeth S. Haldane. and G. R. T. Ross (Dover, 1955). Hoover, Thomas. The Zen Experience. (Booktrope Publishing, 2010). Kant, Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. trans., J.M.D. Meiklejohn (New York: Colonial Press, 1900) ……….. The Conflict of the Faculties. Trans. Mary J. Gregor (Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1992) ………. “The Only Possible Argument in Support of a Demonstration of the Existence of God.” Trans, David Walford and Ralf Meerbote in Immanuel Kant, Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, pp. 111-201. Khyentse, Dilgo. "Dzogchen Practice in Everyday Life." 2005. Nyingma. 7 March 2012 . Piaget, Jean. "The equilibrium of cognitive structures: The central problem of intellectual development."  1985. Trans, T. Brown & K. J. Thampy, Trans., Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Williams, Debra. "Scientific Research of Prayer: Can the Power of Prayer Be Proven." PLIM Report, Vol. 8(4) (1999) . Read More