Development of the Concept of Security - Essay Example

Running Head: CLASSIC SECURITY DILEMMA Classic Security Dilemma [Name Of Student] [Name Of Institution] CLASSIC SECURITY DILEMMA INTRODUCTION Security has traditionally been seen in military terms. However, the rise to prominence of new global issues has meant that traditional geo-strategic considerations no longer dominate the foreign policy agenda. Today the notion of security is assuming a more comprehensive, multidimensional character. The military dimension is decreasing in significance relative to economic and environmental concerns. Economic strength rather than military capability; a country's Gross National Product (GNP) and per capita income rather than the number of nuclear-armed missiles and men under arms will be the dominant themes of international relations of the nineties and beyond (Asch, 2003). In other words, as economic strength becomes the single most important index of national power, the 'high politics' of diplomacy and security give way to 'low politics' of economy and trade. After all, it was economic bankruptcy which led the former Soviet Union to withdraw from the superpower competition and which brought about the end of the Cold War. This broadening of the concept of security has come about as a result of the recognition that non-military threats to security-such as problems of maritime passage and seabed boundaries, refugee and population flows, terrorism and rising sea-levels-are as important as military threats (Leffler, 2002). The nature of these threats and the need to take countermeasures at regional and national levels will also necessitate a change in the concept of nation state and sovereignty. in this paper I will present a detailed discussion on the “classic security dilemma”. DISCUSSION The emerging world order compels national leaders to redefine security assumptions and defense strategies. opportunities for new strategies emerge even as old conflicts are revived. The challenge of the current period is to expand the domain of alternative security strategies, because no single approach will be adequate for all cases. Arguably, one of the key problems for security policy derives from the recognition that "traditional" strategies, which rely primarily on military force, are counterproductive in many situations. (Leurdijk, 2002) The concept of security must be reclaimed from its 1950s focus on military threats. Freedom from threat in the international system is a wider and deeper social goal than freedom from military attack. A wider concept embraces a more open appraisal of threats and allows a discussion of economic and ecological security. A deeper concept focuses attention below and beyond the state, to individuals who experience security/insecurity in various ways. All this points to a reconsideration of government priorities, suggests new directions for government policy, and wider public participation in the creation of security. The very concept of security itself needs to be moved away from purely military definitions to a much more inclusive and relevant definition including economic, ecological and social concerns (Asch, 2003). These combined approaches allow the development of a set of connected political and cultural elements which create a 'landscape of stability' in the international order, without seeking rigid balances of power, and avoiding major interventions against perceived areas of threat. A central dilemma of military deterrence strategy is accommodating the possibility that communicating resolve by demonstrating one's capabilities to fulfill defensive threats may well be construed as offensive threats, even though no offensive posture is intended--the classic "security dilemma." Domestic political insecurities and vulnerabilities on the part of potential aggressors can aggravate the problems of misperception. (Russet, 2001)Lebow and Stein have argued that the internal political and psychological characteristics of the potential challenger are at least as important as the external security balance. In the neorealist understanding of international relations, the East-West conflict which emerged in the aftermath of World War II was a natural consequence to deterrence, and in their view, as a result of internal compulsions that have little to do with an opportunistic cost-benefit calculation (which is the presumed motivation in traditional deterrence theory). Leaders have launched attacks when their own political and strategic vulnerabilities were aggravated, even though they knew the probability for military success was low. Lebow argues, therefore, that a successful deterrence strategy is one that does not aggravate the potential challenger's insecurity so that he is motivated to take risks or to act preemptively. By challenging the presumption of rational deterrence theories that aggression is largely opportunistic, Lebow and Stein acknowledge the difficulties of accurate communications but focus on a different set of dynamics and derive different strategic implications. (Leffler, 2002) Security is the opposite of insecurity. Insecurity, in turn, has a lot to do with uncertainty. However, the near certainty that an evening stroll in the streets of the Bronx will lead to a mugging is not what is normally meant by security. Rather, security is the certainty that a desired good or condition will be maintained. Security thus comprises both components: "certainty" and a "desired good" (Asch, 2003). Accordingly, insecurity can be measured by multiplying the "value of the desired condition" by the "probability of the loss of the desired condition". It follows that, owing to the enormous variety of desired conditions, different forms of security and insecurity arise. Job security, for example, means that evidence suggests that a valued job can be maintained in the future (Sutherland, 2002). In the following, however, we restrict our definition of the term "security" to the desired condition of freedom from impairment and harm to the physical integrity of a social actor. Thus, the security of social actors can be seen as guaranteed if their physical integrity can be regarded as certain. In other words, we examine exclusively the security of social actors within the field of security. There are different ways in which security understood in the above sense can be adversely affected. On the one hand there are threats. We characterise threats as uncertainties intentionally brought on by identifiable social actors. Threats are greatest if an actor contemplates inflicting physical harm and has the means to do so. During the Cold War, a large number of decision-makers in the West perceived the Soviet Union as a threat because they suspected Soviet leaders of intending to inflict physical harm and believed that the Red Army had the effective means to do so (Leffler, 2002). Dangers, on the other hand, exist independently of the decisions of social actors. An earthquake serves as an example here. It is dangerous for the people living in an earthquake area if they can do nothing about it. It is, however, a risk if they could do something about it but do nothing because it is too expensive, for instance. Risks depend on the decisions of social actors, i.e. they are not naturally given but socially generated, although these decisions are not made with the object of causing harm. Risks are brought about by conscious social decisions that may have negative side-effects. (Leurdijk, 2002) What are the tasks of the state in connection with these forms of insecurity? First of all, it is clear that the state has only a limited influence on natural dangers. Neither in the past nor the present has the state been able to prevent earthquakes. Although modern states have contributed towards the containment of dangers, this has never been a core task. (Asch, 2003) The security task of the nation-state was, and is, related primarily to the reduction of socially generated forms of insecurity. Accordingly, it is a duty of the state to reduce threats and risks. This means on the one hand, in the Liberalist sense, the right of society, individuals and groups of individuals, to freedom from harm and, on the other, in the Realist sense, the right of the nation-state, i.e. that of the state, its population and its territory, to freedom from harm. (Sutherland, 2002) However, the state and individuals (or groups of individuals) are not just objects of insecurity, but both can also be sources of insecurity. Both state and non-state actors can pose a threat or risk, as well as being affected by threats and risks. There are thus four specific aspects of the state's task to provide security: (1) providing external defence: safeguarding the state against threats by other states and from the risk of war in general (defence function); (2) securing the rule of law: safeguarding the individual against threats by the state (constitutional function); (3) securing the legitimate monopoly of force: safeguarding the state against threats of terrorism or revolt (authority function); and (4) providing internal protection: safeguarding individuals against the risk of harm by the actions of other social actors (protective function). (Black, 1999) In the past 20 or 30 years the ability of the nation-state in the OECD world to fulfil its security functions has changed significantly. On the one hand, state defence against other states is so successful today that "defence policy" is regarded by many people as redundant and the rule of law is widely held to be guaranteed. (Russet, 2001) On the other hand, difficulties have arisen with the provision of internal protection and the maintenance of the legitimate monopoly of force. In relative terms, OECD states are threatened far less by the belligerent intentions of other states than by terrorist organisations and by autonomous and separatist movements. Then again, relatively speaking, individuals in the OECD world feel much more affected by both threats generated by criminal organisations and especially by risks stemming from global environmental damage than they do by threats to their human rights. These findings can be summarised as follows: state-induced threats are declining, while society-induced risks are on the increase. To be sure, we are not arguing that denationalisation is the only factor explaining this shift in the provision of security in the OECD world. We have argued here that this shift in the provision of security in the OECD world might partly be seen as a consequence of denationalisation or at least as being sustained by denationalisation (Rummel, 2001). This shift in the provision of security is itself having consequences for the building of international institutions. States have always established international institutions to provide security, but our above analysis suggests that the focus of international security institutions will change. While international institutions concerned with providing external defence and securing the rule of law still remain necessary, those dealing with the provision of internal protection and the maintenance of the legitimate monopoly of force are becoming more important. Although the latter are still less important than the former, they have gained weight since the late 1970s and early 1980s. From the late 1940s to the early 1970s, the major international institutions were commissioned to assist states in the fulfilment of their security functions in order to reduce state-induced threats and risks (i.e. in the provision of external defence and securing the rule of law). In this period, international institutions such as the United Nations (1945), NATO (1949), the CSCE (1975), and the IAEA (1957) were established mainly to reinforce the defence function. International treaties such as the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (1968), the Test-ban Treaty (1963), and the first Arms Control Treaties (1970s) were signed. (Aron, 2000) In addition, the United Nations was commissioned to promote the implementation of human rights, i.e. to secure the rule of law. The Declaration of Humans Rights (1948), the Convention on Civil and Political Rights (1966) and the Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) were drawn up and signed as a result of this. Furthermore, the Council of Europe was established in 1949 and the European Human Rights Convention was signed by its member states in 1950. Later, in 1975, the codification of human rights was put on the CSCE agenda (1975). Hence, it can hardly come as a surprise that 18 out of 27 major human rights agreements signed after World War II were signed between 1945 and 1970. (Black, 1999) However, since the 1970s international institutions have served increasingly to tackle their member states' problems in providing internal protection and securing the legitimate monopoly of force, that is, to eliminate society-induced threats and risks. The fight against terrorism, i.e. securing the legitimate monopoly of force, has become a central issue of many international organisations. While in the 1950s and 1960s one could hardly find any significant international collaborative effort to fight terrorism, a new dynamic phase set in from the 1970s onwards. Interpol's activities were extended to encompass terrorism. Even institutions such as the United Nations and the G7 are now dealing with terrorism. Eight out of nine major international conventions concerned with fighting terrorism were signed in the 1970s and 1980s, and not in the 1950s and 1960s. While these efforts to fight terrorism on a global scale still remained limited, the efforts made in Europe went further. (Aron, 2000) Some EC member states formed TREVI (Terrorisme, Radicalisme, Extremisme, Violence Internationale) in 1975 to co-operate not only in the arrest of terrorists, but also in the related investigations. The exchange of relevant information was made possible, and subsequently improved, by the set-up of a computer-based system. This new kind of collaboration between the European states was then consolidated and formalised by the Schengen Accord (1985/90) as well as the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) and the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997). (Broers, 2000) In addition, since the 1970s a growing number of international institutions have helped states to fulfil their function of providing internal protection. International environmental institutions became particularly important from the 1970s onwards. Since then, international organisations such as the UNEP and the European Union as well as the OECD, the Council of Europe, the G7, the ITO, the WMO and the WTO (former GATT) have drawn up regulations for the protection of the natural environment. Risks arising from the depletion of the ozone layer, from climate change and long-range transboundary air-pollution are tackled by co-operative efforts in these institutions. One document reveals that the majority of international environmental agreements and instruments established after World War II (95 out of 122) were signed in the 1970s and 1980s and not in the 1950s and 1960s. Another source counts 86 international environmental agreements signed after 1970 out of a total of 120 since 1945.[58] This trend is even more pronounced within the European Union. While in the 1960s, the EEC passed on average one environmental legal act per year, the number grew to more than five per year in the 1970s and more than 20 per year in the 1980s. In addition, from the 1970s onwards, some of the most important UN conferences, such as the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, dealt with environmental issues. (Russet, 2001) Furthermore, within the UN system a number of organisations co-ordinate efforts to fight organised crime, especially drug trafficking. Interpol, for instance, has been reorganised extensively and consolidated. In the 1950s and 1960s it was merely regarded as a private 'policemen's club' whose main function was to provide policemen and women with the opportunity to exchange experiences. In its early years, Interpol was an international non-governmental organisation (INGO) and as such enjoyed a consultative status within the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC). (Russet, 2001) In the 1970s, however, Interpol was expanded systematically into an international governmental organisation (IGO) whose public assignment became to provide states with assistance in arresting criminals. Since 1985 it has been running a computer-based network that can be used by police all over the world. A quite similar development can be observed in Europe. After World War II it was the Council of Europe that was assigned the task of dealing with crime. But it did not play a significant role and merely served as the arena for negotiations leading up to the European Agreement on Extradition (1957) and the European Agreement on Mutual Legal Aid (1959). These, in fact, only multilateralised the forms of co-operation already established in bilateral agreements signed before the war (Broers, 2000). In the 1970s the European states began to work together more intensively in their fight against organised crime within the framework of the European Union. As already mentioned, the formation of TREVI in the 1970s, as well as the Schengen Accord and the Treaty of Maastricht in the 1990s, were landmarks in the trend towards an intensification of European efforts to fight crime, especially organised crime.[59] Although international institutions dealing with organised crime are far less developed than international environmental institutions, they have become a significant component of international co-operation and are receiving increased attention, not least because they have at the same time strengthened the position of state organisations with respect to transnational societal groups. (Sutherland, 2002) To sum up, then, we can observe a changing focus in the role of international institutions in the field of security. This change can at least partly be seen as a result of the impact that denationalisation has had on the security function of the state. While in the 1950s and 1960s international institutions dealt mainly with state-induced insecurities, from the 1970s onwards they increasingly had to tackle society-induced threats and risks. Nowadays, international institutions. assist states in the OECD world not only in providing external defence and securing the rule of law, but also in securing the legitimate monopoly of force and providing internal protection. International institutions have thus changed their character, firstly, in that they aim increasingly to regulate not only the actions of state actors but also those of societal actors[60] and, secondly, in that they rely increasingly not only on negative regulations (i.e. regulations that prescribe states to refrain from taking certain measures), but also on positive regulations (i.e. regulations that require states to take certain measures) (Siverson, 2002). Traditional international security institutions obligated states not to build or use certain weapons, not to employ weapons beyond a certain number, not to violate human rights, etc. They were to civilise the nation-state. New international security institutions, however, contain many more obligations for states to do something, i.e. to intervene into societal relations and to bring people and the economy to change their behaviour. (Broers, 2000) Since this has strengthened rather than weakened the position of states with respect to society, this new character of international institutions has far-reaching consequences for the democratic legitimisation of security policies (Sutherland, 2002). International institutions dealing with state-induced threats and risks do not create severe problems for democratic politics. If states commit themselves in international institutions to refrain from intervening in society, no special legitimisation is needed. In contrast, international institutions dealing with society-induced threats and risks could create severe problems for democratic politics. If states commit themselves in international institutions to intervene in society they essentially restrict individual freedom for the purpose of providing a public good. (Sutherland, 2002) Those kinds of international institutions seem to need a much stronger form of legitimisation by democratic procedures. At present, though, these democratic procedures do not exist and will be difficult to achieve in the future.[62] This leaves international security institutions on the horns of a dilemma: how to reconcile legitimacy and efficacy. While societal denationalisation has rendered denationalised security policies imperative if they are to be effective, the denationalisation of these policies is, in turn, making them increasingly difficult to legitimise. Denationalisation, then, renders it necessary to start thinking about ways of reconciling this dilemma within international security institutions that are both legitimate and effective. (Broers, 2000) CONCLUSION In the contemporary process of transformation in world politics, at least a few nations can point to significant experiences with nonviolent action that toppled long-standing dictatorships. Mass mobilizations and popular refusal to abide the charade of legitimacy were major factors in the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union (Siverson, 2002). In Poland, the deep social structures related to workers' movements and Solidarity provided the organizational bases for transforming political society. Sharp even suggests that the level of mobilization apparent in Poland in 1980-81 may have deterred a Soviet invasion at that time to restore "order."Similarly, demonstrations and the creation of alternative political organizations continued in Czechoslovakia in 1989, even after protectors were shot in Wenceslas Square. And the government of Lithuania determined to pursue a defense strategy based explicitly on nonmilitary civil resistance, even after economic coercion (in 1990) and violent repression (in January 1991). In certain situations, therefore, velvet revolutions may provide evidence of resolve based on experience. These are isolated incidents, however, and the best that can be said is that the evidence is mixed. Read More