Structural Peculiarities of Terrorist Organizations - Essay Example

Structures of terrorist organizations Structures of terrorist organizations Introduction Terrorist organizations are organizations that directly or indirectly engage themselves in preparing, planning, assisting and fostering a terrorist act without consideration of its occurrence. A terrorist act is an action or a threat of action where done out of political, religious and ideological reasons or with the intentions of humiliating or coercing or intimidating the government of a particular country, state, territory or even the public. An action by a terrorist organization can constitute a terrorist act if it: Causes physical harm to a person Damages property Causes death of a person Puts a person’s life in danger other than the person committing the action Risks the life or safety of the public Seriously disrupts or destroys systems of information, telecommunication, financial, transport system among others. Decentralization is a type of organizational structure whereby daily operations, responsibilities of decision making and other military logistics are delegated by the top management to other middle level and lower level managers either within the same or different geographical areas. On the other hand, centralization refers to the organizational structure whereby most of the major logistics such as decision-making, resource allocation are conducted at the same office, which is the central head office. Decentralization by terrorist groups offers relatively more advantages than centralization (Rapoport 2004, p. 47). There has been efforts by the United States together with its allies aimed at destabilizing the Al-Qaeda organization but this organization continues to operate as normally and even more stronger and has been big security threat to the US and other western nations. Research has shown that part of Al-Qaeda’s prolific success lies mostly on its ability to function as a decentralized organization. Although the U.S invaded Afghanistan and Iraq, Al-Qaeda still poses serious threats to the national security of the U.S and this has been contributed by the decentralized manner in which they operate. The U.S has targeted this organization both militarily and politically but despite this, Al-Qaeda continues to thrive. Al-Qaeda has conducted several terrors acts even despite the efforts of Global War on Terror (GWOT) by the U.S. (Cronin 2008, p.102). Most modern terrorist organizations are thriving on very well because they function as distributed networks in what is called as decentralized system. The manner in which they operate makes such organizations able to survive better than if they were organized in hierarchical systems. Initially, GWOT actions had significant significances on Al-Qaeda but with the manner in which it operates, it has remained a resilient organization. For example, autonomous individuals and cells and advanced technologies combined with globalization tools and the motivation to undertake terrorist acts just represents “microactors” who are difficult to detect and counter. Ori Brafman and Roy Beckstrom present this phenomenon in the book ‘The Starfish and the Spider: The Unstoppable Power of Leader-less Organizations’. They present a theory, which explains this scenario in detail. In their book, these two authors make comparisons between centralized and decentralized organizations. They state that decentralized institutions base much on completely different principles than the traditional centralized organizations and they are based much on shared ideologies (Brafman & Beckstrom 2006, p129). Decentralized structures such as the Al-Qaeda are very powerful to deal with. On the other hand, centralized governments such as the U.S government are based much on a clear organizational structure thus; it becomes easy and feasible to come up with tactics and strategies that can defeat such force. Al-Qaeda is a well-structured organization with operations well distributed in different regions. It is run around a central ideology and this is one reason it is considered a threat to Western societies. It advocates for unity among the Muslim society whereby it promotes Muslims to take action against the Non-Muslim community. Al-Qaeda uses recruiting and training operations, which creates empathy and confidence among the team for the justice, which they pursue as an organization and to collaborate with allies in coming up with a formidable operating environment. They use adaptive procedures and processes as well as exploiting the current technology when executing their plans and this has enabled them to remain agile in their operations (Brafman & Beckstrom 2006, p126). Decentralization Most terrorist organizations have embraced decentralization of operations and have become more adaptive and flexible to their environment and this has been brought about by the increasing involvement of the United States in counter-terror activities all over the world. Centralized and top-down terrorist organizations tend to lack feasibility especially if they have ambitions of targeting the U.S who use the latest military technology and multiple intelligence techniques and can target ant locality within the universe. Thus most successful terrorist organizations are those which embrace decentralization such as the al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The al-Qaeda and the ISIS terrorist organizations The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) represent a good example of a trend of a decentralized terror network. This group started just as a branch from the al-Qaeda but due to its structural advancements, it has grown to a formidable terrorist group with a radical Islamic ideology and research shows that further decentralization will make it more dangerous and adaptable. The use of decentralized, adaptive and flexible terrorist networks limits the capability of the United States to successfully conduct counter-strikes against terrorist groups. It also maximizes the efficiency and unpredictability of terror organizations. ISIS is exceptionally efficient and effective in decentralizing its operations rather than planning and directing operational activities from a centrally located control and command. Through decentralization, ISIS has resulted into a new organizational model that is not easy to target and has created a new counter-terror challenges for the U.S and its allies. Decentralization is crucial for the survival of the leaders of many terrorist organizations. For instance, Osama Bin Laden died, Ayman al Zawahiri is hiding himself somewhere and many other numerous al-Qaeda leaders have been captured and killed since September 11 2001. The reason behind decentralization must be more practical. Apart from protecting the leaders of terrorist organizations, decentralization helps in increasing security for the groups. The ISIS has combined this concept with the increase in communication technology in its operations and this has made it more effective in its operations. Decentralization leads to the establishment of new terrorist organizations whose goals and objectives differ with those of the original. ISIS is no longer termed as a branch of al-Qaeda but a complete terrorist group, which though developed from al-Qaeda, has grown to be a perfect example of decentralization. A BBC news report on 3rd February 2014 asserted that al-Qaeda has no links with the ISIS which has been involved in lethal clashes in Syria. However, it does not insinuate that these groups do not share similar structures, goals, ideologies and targets (Rohan 2002, p234). Decentralization of terrorist organizations leads to innovation and creativity in military decision-making and execution and this prompts further success for such organizations. For instance, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed orchestrated and planned the September 11 attacks and not Osama Bin Laden or any other senior leader of al-Qaeda. Through this, the United States could not easily execute their counter attacks and the al-Qaeda group has considered this as creativity. This type of organizational management approach is what Brafman and Beckstrom precisely advocate for in their book, ‘The Starfish and the Spider’. This book provides managers with tools aimed at fostering creativity and innovation as well as equipping them with leadership attributes. This book also serves as a decentralization draft that describes how al-Qaeda and ISIS operates. In decentralization, there is no central leadership. Ayman al Zawahiri can be claimed as in charge of the al-Qaeda group but the reality is that he is not the commander and just controls a small continent of al-Qaeda bodyguards around him and has restricted communication with the rest of the entire organization. Brafman and Beckstrom call this a catalyst. They argue that a catalyst is different from a centralized leader. For instance, a Chief Executive Officer, CEO who is the overall boss not like a catalyst who interacts with other people as a peer. Catalysts inspire people within organizations (Brafman & Beckstrom 2006, p129) The capability of al Qaeda to instigate attacks is what makes it not easy to combat. Anyone who wishes can become part of al Qaeda, and it is not necessary for them to relocate to Pakistan and secure a training camp to join. Al-Qaeda units are everywhere around the globe. Terrorist attacks are mostly generated from the bottom upwards and are self-organizing and flexible local initiatives and this is what is referred to as decentralization at work. Members are provided with a certain level of autonomy and anonymity and at the same time, they are given the flexibility to carry out attacks in ways that best accomplish their objectives (Brafman & Beckstrom 2006, p127) Decentralization in al Qaeda and ISIS has been one of the success features of the organization. As counter attacks by the United States and its allies against the terrorist groups increase, the trend of decentralization among the groups and their command and control makes them more difficult to find and detect. This is precisely hoe Brafman and Beckstrom describe how decentralized organizations work. They assert that in decentralized organizations, anyone can be involved in any action. Decentralization is what allows ISIS and al-Qaeda to continue growing and adapting to change despite the measures by powerful governments such as the United States to combat them (Brafman & Beckstrom 2006, p132). Al-Qaeda has many cells, which are geographically distributed, and with local level leadership and this enhances autonomy in decision-making and execution. Al-Qaeda’s members are readily identifiable and it displays a self-organizing system during recruitment of new members, which is bound by ideology. In addition, training for the members is always conducted in ad hoc and decentralized means using virtual resources. This reduces financial requirements and the susceptibility of members as targeted by GWOT as well as the capability to reach a larger audience. The use of ad hoc and decentralized ways of training came after the U. S launched the QWOT campaigns targeting the Al-Qaeda who were initially using organized training camps, which were easily noticed by the U.S soldiers. The endurance of terrorist organizations varies considerably depending on the structure whether centralized or decentralized. Most terrorist groups tend to last longer than others do. This much depends on the structure and leadership of the group. For instance, centralized organizations tend to fail more easily than decentralized because they are concentrated in one place and can easily be attacked and their structures destroyed by organizations and agencies fighting against them. On e the leadership has been killed, the group ends up terminating operations. When negotiating with centralized terrorist organizations that have a clear leader, it can be worthy noted that decapitation of the leadership would have a significant impact on the entire group. However, decentralized and well-networked terrorist organizations are designed to fight and execute terrorist activities without specific leadership thus attacking a single leader would mean nothing since they have several other leaders in several geographical areas (Rohan 2002, p. 67). With the emergence of War on terror, most terrorist organizations such as the al-Shabaab and the al-Qaeda have adopted the decentralized form of terrorism. Out of this, it has been proved difficult to fight against such terrorist groups due to minimal direct contact as well as the mitigation of the state-terrorist relationship. On the other hand, hierarchical and centralized terrorist groupings such as Hezbollah and Hamas have far much different style of leadership than those of al-Qaeda and al-Shabaab. They are more easily targeted making war on terror campaigns to perform better (Rohan 2002, p. 69). Centralization A terrorist organization’s structure determines its capability and reach. Hamas and the Hezbollah terrorist groups tend operate in a centralized control and hierarchical structure (Asal & Rethemeyer 2006, p.73). Another dangerous network model has also emerged among terrorist groups and that is the centralized hierarchy that directly controls a group of social, political, and military cells of an institution. This to combines and strengthen support, military capability as well as consolidating political capital while emerging as a regional and global actor. Good examples of such terrorist organizations are the Hezbollah and the Hamas who have become more recognized with international legitimacy and a broad national support. The centralized control has been a prerequisite factor for the Hezbollah when initiating plans of political discourse, armed resistance campaigns and other social services engagement. The Hezbollah terrorist organization Hezbollah has been a diverse organization, which simultaneously provides huge social services. This organization is recognized in the Lebanese National Assembly and has been an illegal armed militia that has executed several criminal terrorist attacks around the world. However, a review of the organizational structure and development shows that its control has been centralized in terms of operations and resources. Hezbollah relies on global network of cells and institutions throughout Europe, South America, the Middle East as well as the South East Asia to raise funds, disseminate propaganda, prepare logistically for attacks and ensuring that this organization remains robust and strong. However, these cells cannot allocate resources, make decisions or plan to conduct terrorist operations autonomously; instead, they carry out operations under the control of a single main cell, which is the central office for other smaller cells. The pro-Iranian Hezbollah of southern Lebanon is very good example of an umbrella organization comprising of radical Shiite groups and mostly it is a mixture of both hierarchical and network organization. However, in most cases, this group tends to operate in a hierarchical arrangement, which is the centralized nature (Ranstorp, 1994, p. 304). Although the Hezbollah group has remained tight-lipped as far as its organizational structure is concerned, various research activities have confirmed that its structure is a hierarchical pyramid, which is headed by Majlis Shura al-Qarar which the decision is making advisory Council. Sheikh Hassan Sayyid Nasrallah has been presiding as the secretary general of the group (Nasrallah, 2007p.398). The Advisory council comprises of nine members among them two Iranian representatives whose presence indicates that the Iranian government is an influential figure in the management of the organization. Below the Advisory council are various subordinate councils, which are the judicial council, the Executive council, the Political advisor, the Political council and the Jihad/military council. Each functional council is responsible for various operational ‘desks’ each of which is in charge of specific topics. Nasrallah says that Hezbollah is composed of four levels of organization in which the top levels are more visible to the public whereas the last levels are just represented by guerrilla fighters (Nasrallah, 2007p.399). Hezbollah terrorist group embraces a centralized, hierarchical structure because of its non-violent natural state of existence and their reputation as well. Initially, their main objective as a group was to remain successful in politics. Their non-violent nature has helped them to this far since they pose very little risk especially from the United States because of their non-violent nature. As long as the existing political environment is the same, Hezbollah will not change its calculus: it won’t be of any benefit to if they attack Israel. Even if they are given nuclear weapons by the Iranian government, their nature will not change. They would not consider attacking Israel because the likelihood of destroying them is minimal. The group’s reason for existence is not destruction rather it’s winning the minds and hearts of the Lebanese people so as to solidify their implications in the political system. This calls for non-violence within the group. Nonetheless, it may involve some minor domestic political violence at times and that is why it has been termed as a terrorist organization. They engage in terrorist attacks, violence only when their political stance is threatened thus a proper, and ideal way of avoiding engagement in attacks is to allow them to grow and evolve their political wing (Alagha 2006, p. 214). The Hamas terrorist organization The Hamas Terrorist group, which was, formed in 1987 concentrates its operations in the Gaza strip and some areas of the West Bank. Decisions and other logistics are conducted in one central office rather than being distributed in several regions. Its origin is in the Muslim brotherhood, Palestinian branch, and it is supported by a very strong social and political structure within the Palestinian territories. This group is independent though it receives support from other foreign countries and movements. After the two co-founders of Hams were assassinated in 2004 (Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aaziz Rantisi), the organization made a strategy of refraining from exposing its leadership structure to the public. As for now, it is unclear of who controls the Hamas policies and strategies and other financial decisions. Research has showed that Hamas follows a centralized, hierarchical structure in which a 15-member political bureau ultimately controls the rest of the group (Walter 2004, p. 65). When orders come from an outside leadership, local committees and other branches deal with them in Gaza. Hamas leadership structures, which were based in Damascus between 2001 and 2012, are now increasingly becoming widespread into various countries across Middle East due to the Arab Uprising in Syria. Due to this, the hierarchical structure of Hamas may be changing and reports indicate that its structure is becoming more networked and decentralized ( Michael, 2011). Conclusion Many successful terrorist organizations such as the al-Qaeda tend to be highly decentralized and are highly networked rather than working through an organizational hierarchy. Such organizations have downsized their core competencies by outsourcing their core functions that were initially done in a central place. One major advantage of networked structures is that such organizations are much flexible and can become more competitive and successful in the global world. In addition, such organizations do not require many resources such as fighters, office space, and even financing (Rapoport 2004, p. 50). 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