Planning and Operations in Crisis in Emergency Management: The Planning Process and Preparedness - Case Study Example

But the quick rate of spread of the virus, with hospitals themselves proving to be mediums for contagion, had made the Toronto emergency response team all the more arduous. Further, the medical team dealing with suspect patients were found wanting in diagnostic skills. There were speculations that the infection could possibly be a typical Pneumonia or even Tuberculosis. The delay in developing diagnostic algorithms for identifying SARS proved too late for the 43 citizens who lost their lives and the 3 hundred odd who survived a bout of infection.

One could also identify complacency as a major factor in the unraveling of the SARS outbreak. The Toronto Public Health’s (TPH) Communicable Disease Control division had virtually become obsolete as major infectious diseases were brought under control towards the end of the last century. With the conquering of small-pox and measles, the division had been turned into a nominal institution. Its personnel did not anticipate any emergency work of the sort the SARS epidemic would make exigent. This proved to be a big handicap as SARS unfolded in Toronto during that fateful month.

Another factor that proved counterproductive in checking SARS is the decentralized organizational structure of the Canadian healthcare industry. With the general public resorting to both public and private healthcare facilities as it suited them, there was no centralized command structure applicable to all hospitals. Given how even one infected patient can spread the virus to other patients, nurses and doctors in the hospital premises, this lack of control over disparate institutions proved a big handicap.

For example, no standard precautionary orders or measures could be ordained upon all hospitals across the city, thus thwarting a concerted effort. There are some crucial differences between the SARS crisis and the 911