The Marine Base Attack in Beirut, 1983 - Case Study Example

The Marine Base Attack in Beirut, October 1983. Introduction: Terrorist attacks are aimed at the general population with the viewof causing panic, fear and death so that the perpetrators may influence governments in their favor. These attacks like others in the domestic sphere may be avoided where the intelligence apparatus is able to identify the targets and culprits before they attack. This paper is aimed at identifying the intelligence failures that led to the terror attack of marines in Beirut and what actions would have been taken to avoid it. The American public just like the media are constantly demanding answers based on the unsatisfactory intelligence received before any terror attack. The foreign policy governing matters of security in the country needs a complete overhaul in order to curb instances of terror attacks within American territory and on American troops on peace keeping missions. Review of the intelligence gathered will also prevent the constant criticism the government gets of intelligence failure every time there is a terror attack. There has to be a strong and distinct relationship between intelligence gathered and foreign policy to prevent future attacks. There have been many instances in the US when the presidents sought to take control of the intelligence guiding security matters. The continuous doubt by the public on the state of foreign policy when it comes to intelligence has allowed policy makers to play an active role in having control over surprise. This lessens the chances of surprise in intelligence failure and at the same time allows policy makers an opportunity to seek ways of sealing the gaps in law to avoid future occurrences. Lowenthal defines intelligence as any information that meets the needs of policy makers, and that has been collected, refined and narrowed to meet those specific needs.1 It is therefore important to identify that information related to intelligence is closely related to policy. The role of intelligence is not meant to be foretelling and predicting, but as Nye puts it, the role of intelligence is aimed at assisting policy makers to think about the future when making decisions.2 In essence therefore intelligence is solely aimed at assisting policy makers to make better decisions about the future and in the process avoid the dangers that are projected by intelligence projections. The terrorist attack on the marine barracks in Beirut occurred mainly due to a failure in the intelligence systems in place and a weak foreign policy. On the 23rd of October 1983, about 241 US military personnel were killed when a truck with 12,000 pounds of TNT crashed into their contingent compound. The contingent was stationed at the Beirut International Airport at the time. In yet another simultaneous attack another truck bomb hit the French MNF headquarters where about 56 soldiers were killed. Before this twin attacks, there had been other attacks in Beirut targeted at US citizens including the car bomb attack on the Beirut US embassy in April where 17 US citizens were killed.3 Investigations on the incident by the Department of Defense Commission concluded that the attack could be equated to an act of war through terrorism. There was a clear lack of human intelligence leading to the complete failure in intelligence leading to the attack. Based on the Commission’s findings, information collected by trained intelligence agents would have been sufficient to prevent the attack. In the past, there was a huge public outcry on invasion of privacy in the collection of intelligence and hence, there was a reduction on the actual use of human intelligence which was a major fail. Out of the Beirut attack however, the Commission in their findings recommended that it was necessary for the Secretary of Defense to embark and rely on an all source intelligence system that included human intelligence. The Commission was also able to uncover incidents of uncoordinated threat assessment when it came to intelligence. It was found that between May and October of the year 1983, there were many warnings of car bombings although none of them materialized into something substantial to be investigated. Out of this loophole in intelligence, the bombing on October 23rd caught everyone unawares as there was no specific intelligence on where the attack would occur, how it would be carried out and when it would happen. Had the intelligence officials concentrated on the warnings issued beforehand then they may have had a hunch of the perpetrators or even a clue of where the attack would be carried out next. It is important to note that the Beirut bombing on the Marine barracks was much larger and more sophisticated than what the intelligence agencies had imagined. According to the reports issued by the FBI Special Agents based in the explosives unit, the explosion was the biggest of its kind that was non-nuclear; he also added that it was equivalent to an explosion caused by 12,000 pounds of TNT.4 The Committee issued a report that clearly identified problems in intelligence that would have prevented the attack were they dealt with appropriately. Although the Marines were able to collect data through intelligence, they were not able to analyze it effectively due to its huge number. They also had problems in analysis as the information they received was generally non-specific and would have little impact when they needed to effectively plan for defensive measures. There was not enough support given to the Marines by the intelligence agencies is assessing and diffusing important information from the data gathered. The fact that the information did not have specific material that would allow intelligence officers an opportunity to act on it was also a problem. The Marines were always aware that they faced the threat of a terrorist attack and expected that the intelligence officials would supply them the relevant information to do so. The element of surprise in attacks paints a negative picture on intelligence agencies and their ability to collect reliable and effective information. This is however not as bad as the problems identified by Handel that intelligence personnel have a hard time convincing policy makers in their governments that the information collected is viable.5 It is difficult to in some cases avoid intelligence failure hence it’s important for intelligence agencies to try and prevent the element of surprise. Kam agrees with Handel, that surprise attacks are difficult to prevent as there were nonspecific indicators showing the attack was imminent anywhere. He however states that, surprise attacks show that it is easy to make mistakes when discerning capabilities.6 Intelligence agencies made efforts to try and prevent this terror attack but the fact that the Marines were not able to synthesize the information easily; there was a laxity in intelligence. The policy makers in the U.S need to ensure that proper legislation is put forward to furnish the Marines with sufficient intelligence that will prevent future attacks on their military bases. The intelligence agencies should also give them sufficient information early enough to make proper arrangements for security operations. Bibliography: Gates, Robert M. An Opportunity Unfulfilled: The Use and Perceptions of Intelligence at the White House. The Washington Quarterly, winter 1989, 35-44. Handel, Michael I. “Surprise and Change in International Politics”. International Security 4, no.4. (Spring 1980): 57-85. Kam, Ephraim. Surprise Attack the Victim’s Perspective. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. Lowenthal, Mark M. The Burdensome Concept of Failure. In Intelligence: Policy and Process. Ed. Alfred C. Mauer, Marion D. Tunstall and James M. Keagle, 43-56. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985. Nye, Joseph S Jr. “Peering into the Future”. Foreign Affairs (July/ August 1994): 82-93. U.S Congress, House. Review of Adequacy of Security Arrangements for Marines in Lebanon And Plans for Improving That Security. Committee on Armed Services, Investigations Subcommittee, November – December 1983. Washington: GPO, 1985. Read More