Should Third Term Abortions Be Allowed in All Cases - Essay Example

Should Third Term Abortions Be Allowed in All Cases? Essay of Introduction Abortion has been the focus of major legal, medical, and ethical debate in the United States for the latter part of the twentieth century. The milestone resolution by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1973 on Roe v. Wade was a defining moment (Wikipedia, 2013d). The case confirmed that a woman has a fundamental right to independence, free will, and privacy that allows first-trimester abortion. Supreme Court handed over the resolutions about second-trimester abortion to states’ judgment and firmly denounced third-trimester or late term abortions (Farrell, 2010, 27). This essay focuses on the ethical implication of third trimester abortion with reference to its medical effect on the fetus and the mother. In particular, this essay argues against third trimester abortion. Numerous claims against abortion argue that both the mother and the fetus have particular rights. It was emphasized by Annas (1998 as cited in Orshan, 2008, 310) that the fetus is not an individual within the context of the Constitution and declares that states cannot criminalize abortion prior to the determination of the viability of the fetus. States can prohibit abortion after determination of the viability of the fetus only if there is an anomaly that allows abortion to defend the health or life of the mother. States can enforce limits on abortion prior to the determination of viability only if such limits do not generate major barriers to a woman’s acquiring an abortion (Wikipedia, 2013b). Roe v. Wade made sure that women have the legal privacy right, and that such right is basic and general to cover her choice to obtain an abortion. Third Trimester Abortion: The Debate Third term abortion is the most disputed topic of reproductive rights. There is no involuntary right to obtain abortion after the first trimester. In later trimester, the fetus is already viable. A six-month fetus can possibly stay alive with a delivery even though it would have higher susceptibility to complications. The Supreme Court has always considered exceptions for the likelihood of third trimester abortion if the woman’s life is in danger (Hall, Bobinski, & Orentlicher, 2007). It is not possible to ethically abort a possibly viable fetus except if there is a major justifying condition like danger to the life of the fetus or the mother. With regard to court directive, the court cannot oblige a doctor to carry out an operation that is professionally or ethically unjustifiable (Wikipedia, 2013a). For instance, if legislation ratified today making it legally permissible to carry out ‘mercy killing’, or euthanasia, on a fatally ill individual, it would still be immoral or disreputable to do so even with the permission of the court. Third term abortions have been discussed more intensely by the members of Congress due to the almost full term growth of the fetus and the more complex medical procedure required. In theory, third term abortions can be carried out only when there is a real threat to the life of the fetus or the mother (Wikipedia 2013a). Nevertheless, a number of states outlaw third term abortions completely. Third trimester abortions are unusual in the United States, primarily because the fetus after the second trimester can already survive outside the womb. Hysterotomy is the common procedure applied to terminate pregnancy in the third trimester. After the fetus can normally stay alive outside the womb, induced abortion in any way is uncommon (Jones, 1991, 352). A hysterotomy is usually referred to as a ‘mini-Caesarean’ because the method resembles that of a Caesarean birth. Severe or mild complications of this operation affect roughly 23 to 51 per cent of patients (Jones, 1991, 352). One depressing feature of such late term abortion is that the fetus comes out alive but will eventually die due to respiratory problems, a disquieting procedure for all the individuals involved. Most people think that late term abortions are ethically more complex than early abortions. In a survey conducted in 1998 in the United States, 61% of the respondents preferred legalizing early abortion; but very few, roughly 15%, agreed to legalize late term abortions (McMahan, 2001, 288). This judgment is expressed in legislation in the U.S. and elsewhere, that allows early abortions but limits late term ones, which in a number of countries are somewhat inflexible. Knowledge that people are inclined to think that third trimester abortions are worse is what has encouraged adversaries of abortion to concentrate their efforts recently on abortions late in pregnancy, like the controversial ‘partial-birth abortion’, defined as a termination of pregnancy where in the individual carrying out the procedure partially delivers an alive fetus before exterminating the fetus and completely terminating the pregnancy (Butts & Rich, 2005, 71-72). Late term abortion is ethically intolerable because the moral value of the fetus is increasingly intensified as it develops psychologically. Whatever factor signals the end of full moral standing would seem to be relevant as a marker of when full moral standing begins… The moral problems with manipulation of sperm and egg cells are often believed to be less troublesome than those arising from manipulating a late-term fetus or postnatal infant. It is important to know why this is so. It must be that, no matter how we attribute moral status to sperm and egg cells, we view them as having a moral standing that is different from the late-term fetus or postnatal infant. If we can identify what it is that is responsible for this perceived shift in moral status, perhaps we can understand better when full moral standing accrues (Butts & Rich, 2005, 72). In the argument of Veatch he has proposed that no matter what it is that causes moral position to end is what causes it to begin. Veatch argued that people do not have particular ways of identifying which condition is the one that decides when total moral position ends and begins (Butts & Rich, 2005, 72). He believes that the issue of when total moral position ends and begins involves an individual’s philosophical opinion and religious belief. Without a doubt, the issue of the legality and morality of third trimester abortion should be discussed separately. Even though numerous evident moral violations are left ignored by the state, numerous others are tackled by the state in ways that most people believe are widely suitable. If it is right that third trimester abortion creates major harms, and if it is also right that loss has ethical implication, then rigid control of third trimester abortion would be legally established (Wikipedia, 2013c). Simultaneously, it appears evident that absolute outlawing of the third trimester abortion would make the current state of affairs even worse. Laws outlawing third trimester abortions, in short, must specify exceptions for the uncommon instances of the truly unjust life, as well as for the instance where the condition of the pregnant woman is quite seriously threatened that the negative consequences she will bear if she does not have the third trimester abortion will be more severe than the harm her child will experience if she does. The developmental view explains that third trimester abortion is more unethical than early abortion, and this appears to be substantiated by connecting the fetus’s physiological growth with the moral value. The more physiologically viable the fetus, the more valuable or worthwhile the fetus is, and the more unethical the process of abortion turns out to be. Andrew Peach, in his work Late vs. Early Term Abortion, argues that there is no need to refer to the developmental perspective in order to explain the major moral disparities between early abortion and late abortion (Kaczor, 2011, 61). Third trimester abortion involving harm or pain to the fetus is worse than taking the life of the fetus that does not inflict harm or pain. Obviously, it is likely to eliminate this disparity by just anesthetizing the fetus before the third-trimester abortion operation, but in late term abortion this disparity lingers. Others may protest that even the fetus in early trimester feels pain, but the usual supporter of abortion refutes this (Kaczor, 2011, 61). Regardless, it is absolutely true that taking the life of a fetus prior viability would entail no fetal pain and harm and thus would be discernible from other types of abortion that as usually carried out involve harm or pain on a fetus. Peach stresses that the more simply a responsibility can be fulfilled the worse it is not to fulfill it. To complete a pregnancy already in the late term is simpler, all other things being equal, than to continue a pregnancy the whole nine months, hence third-trimester abortion is more ethically unjustifiable than early abortion (Farrell, 2010). Peach also claims that in early abortion the fetus’s individuality is more simply taken for granted whereas in late trimester the individuality of the fetus is more apparent. There is a certain extent of possibility that the embryo is only a “bunch of cells” (Kaczor, 2011, 61-62). Nevertheless, the movement of the fetus inside the womb, and ultrasound of third trimester pregnancy make the individuality of the fetus more difficult to disregard. Hence, it is more complicated and challenging to claim for ignorance when terminating pregnancy in the third trimester. Early in pregnancy, the fright and distress provoked by the early discovery reduces the guilt of women who prefer to obtain abortion in this condition. Nevertheless, as time passes by, emotions calm down and hence third trimester abortion becomes, all other things being equal, more intentional and thus more immoral. Ultimately, as the pregnancy progresses, most probably the connection or attachment between the fetus and the mother strengthens making any ‘disconnection’ even more depressing and ethically complicated (McMahan, 2001). One should not refute the equal rights of every human being irrespective of their developmental status so as to explain that third trimester abortion is generally more unethical in several regards than early abortion. Third trimester abortion is absolutely unethical or morally wrong, thus it should not be allowed in all cases. In certain instances of third trimester abortion, the pregnant woman may want to abort the pregnancy due to a finding of fetal defect only discovered later in pregnancy. The emotional shock and distress caused by the discovery of a handicapped fetus in the later part of pregnancy may be no less serious than the trauma caused by an unplanned pregnancy found out early. Furthermore, it is possible that a woman with irregular menstrual cycle or illness only finds out that she is carrying a child in the third trimester (Orshan, 2008). Yet, these exemptions do not weaken the common assumption that third trimester abortion is more ethically complex or challenging than early abortion all other things being equal. Ultimately, Peach emphasizes that, generally, third trimester abortions are encountered as more depressing than early abortions (Kaczor, 2011, 64-65): Even if they feel or have judged that abortion is a necessary evil, all things considered, their sense of remorse and loss would have to be more palpable or intense given the level of development of the child; what has been taken away cannot plausibly be denied. This must be particularly true for the woman, whose attachment to the person in her womb presumably develops as the child develops. Just as, in general, late term miscarriages are likely to impact a woman (or couple) more severely than early term ones, late-term abortions must surely impact a woman (or couple) more severely than early term ones. Even though the arguments of Peach do not prove that third trimester abortion is consistently more wicked than early abortion as regards conditions and moral responsibility—although they are similarly unfair in relattion to being the deliberate taking of a life of an unborn human being—it would appear that the arguments of Peach are solid and logical provided that they are interpreted as ‘all other things being equal’ premises. If the assumptions are strong, it would be easier to justify why third trimester abortion is widely believed to be more wicked than early abortion without refuting the identical fundamental worth of human beings in whatever developmental phase they are in. Concerns about the moral standing of a fetus in late pregnancy, quite rigid in the context of early abortion, is mostly an issue of agreement among legislators, medical professionals, and bioethicists. Even in countries that do not lay down restrictions on abortion, there is an increasing inclination among professionals to oppose third term abortions that are not aimed at rescuing the life of the pregnant woman or serve the interest of the unborn child—specifically described as avoidance of extreme pain and misery or sure death (Hall et al., 2007). However, fetal standing is not the same as newborn standing. This results in an intriguing ethical irony evidently affecting practice and policy. The fetus’s lower standing, on the one hand, permits feticide, or a process of deliberate killing that cannot be disregarded when the pregnant woman has a developed moral and legal individuality. The process of tolerable killing, on the other hand, generates a necessity for the state to be cautious. Therefore, the interest of the state to safeguard the unborn child may be more powerful than its interest to safeguard the newly born (Farrell, 2010). This is not due to the fact that the standing of the fetus is in any case better, but due to the fact that the process of killing should be intently controlled and supervised. Official U.S. legislation is exposed to street-level demands that must initiate reform. In the case of third trimester abortion, the policies of almost all states give a vast importance on the interest of the unborn child, making it hard to acquire an abortion for serious abnormalities or defects in these states (Wikipedia, 2013b). However, third trimester abortions are still carried for such reasons. No reliable figures are accessible but it should be assumed that pregnant women either go to the states permitting third trimester abortions for fetal abnormality or that doctors manipulate the system, terminating abnormal pregnancies under the guise of fetal risks to the health of the pregnant woman. Furthermore, published statements demonstrate eagerness, if not liability, on the physicians’ part to terminate seriously abnormal fetuses (Wikipedia, 2013b). The shortsightedness of state legislation on this subject matter is obvious. Nevertheless, the number of physicians who perform abortion keeps on decreasing, suggesting unwillingness on the doctor’s part to perform abortion. Since numerous policies are weak to a certain extent, how might reform best be embarked on? In numerous instances, it is unnecessary to demand legislative efforts. The intensity and fury of the debate over abortion simply prevents any rigorous attempt to initiate reform in several countries. For instance, in the United States it simply will not take place. There is no demand in the U.S. to loosen late term abortion policies, making one wonder whether discretion requires that the prevailing situation stay uninterrupted. Conclusions Third trimester abortions should not be permitted in all cases, or for any reason. It is morally reprehensible to terminate a pregnancy in the late term just because there is a possibility of some form of fetal defect or maternal threat. Third trimester abortion is no better than parents who slaughter or abandon their children when they discovered a risk of genetic defects. Late term abortion is simply blatantly immoral and cannot be driven by anything but self-centeredness the parents’ part. Veatch is correct in arguing that the ethical consideration of third trimester abortion should be grounded on philosophical and religious judgments, not on legal and/or medical considerations. Abortion is totally wrong, and no reason can make it morally right. Abortion does not only causes medical problems for the patient, but it also brings about emotional and psychological trauma, not only to the patient but also to the people performing abortion, especially when merciless procedures (e.g. partial-birth abortion) is being carried out. References Butts, J. & Rich, K. (2005). Nursing Ethics: Across the Curriculum and into Practice. Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett Learning. Farrell, C. (2010). The Abortion Debate. Minnesota: ABDO. Hall, M., Bobinski, M., & Orentlicher, D. (2007). Health Care Law and Ethics. New York: Aspen Publications. Jones, M. (1991). Human Reproductive Biology. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Kaczor, C. (2011). The Ethics of Abortion: Women’s Rights, Human Life, and the Questions of Justice. New York: Routledge. McMahan, J. (2001). The Ethics of Killing: Problems at the Margins of Life. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Orshan, S. (2008). Maternity, Newborn, and Women’s Health Nursing: Comprehensive Care Across the Life Span. Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott Williams & Wilkins. Wikipedia (2013a). Abortion Law. Wikipedia. Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abortion_law Wikipedia (2013b). Abortion in the United States. Wikipedia. Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Abortion_in_the_United_States Wikipedia (2013c). In Vitro Fertilization. Wikipedia. Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/In_vitro_fertilisation Wikipedia (2013d). Roe v. Wade. Wikipedia. Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Roe_v._Wade Read More