Station Nightclub Fire - Research Paper Example

Station Nightclub Fire Station Nightclub Fire Introduction: On the night of February 20, 2003 a fire struck the Station Nightclub located in Rhode Island, West Warwick. This fire occurred after an ignition on the pyrotechnics installed for a band performance that night. After a thorough investigation, it was concluded that the fire spread across the club via the polyurethane foam mounted on the wall to limit the sound from emanating outside the room. This paper aims at highlighting the events and causes of the fire, which will lead towards the analysis of the extent to which the codes were adhered at the time of the event, and the changes in the laws that were made subsequent to the fire. History of the Station Nightclub The building that constitutes the Station Nightclub was conceived in 1949 when it comprised a restaurant, a tavern and a nightclub. Back in 1972, a fire hit the building due to which it was kept closed until 1974. In 1974, it was re-opened as a restaurant however it saw an ownership change in 1985 when it was again re-opened as a pub. The interiors and the roofs were made out of wood and the pub was divided into a bar and a club. The wall at the western side of the club constituted a raised platform which was used by the bands to perform. The walls as well as the platform were insulated with polyurethane foam to control the volume of the music. There were four exits in the room, out of which only one of them was used by the crowd to regress. This was the main front door of the club. Fire alarms and heat detectors were also present but there was no mechanism to sync them with any nearby fire station. (Duval 2006). Background and Significance There were many other incidents similar to the station nightclub fire that took place prior to this one. Rhythm Club fire 1940, Coconut Groove Boston 1942 and Beverley Hills Supper Club South Gate 1977 are the three major nightclub fires that had occurred during the century (Duval 2006). These accidents paved way for different codes that were designed for the safety of people. The paper will aim at analyzing the affectivity of these codes at the same time discussing the extent to which these codes were followed in the construction of this night club. Furthermore, the new codes were conceived as a result of this incident that took away the lives of many people. Moreover, different suggestions and recommendations will be proposed by the end of the paper. Event: Instigation of the Fire A timeline of the events has been specified by the NIST investigation department, according to which the band took its place and lights were dimmed 11:07 PM that night. Soon after that, four pyrotechnics present at the stage were ignited which started reaching the alcove near the drums. In a couple of seconds, the insulation foams started catching fire. Exactly after 11 seconds the band and the crowd realized that the fire is not an intentional part of the show. After 30 seconds, the band ceased to play and crowd started to egress. The fire alarm began to ring after 41 seconds. It was not before 60 seconds after the ignition began that the emergency 911 number was reached. The scene after 90 seconds indicated that a black smoke had trounced the club, and right after 100 second the main exit was blocked with the stampede trying to egress the club. 5 minutes subsequent to the ignition, the club was raging with fire. (Grosshandler 2005). Cause of the Accident Soon after the accident, the site was visited by NIST representative, other investigating agency representatives and forensic archeologists to give their insights on the causes of the accident. There reports indicated that there were two main factors that led to massive destruction after the event. Firstly, the interiors of the club were quite prone to the fire as they were highly combustible. The wood used was highly inflammable, thus this even led to the impediment in effective egression as smoke was soaring in the club room acting as deterrence in the way of the crowd trying to exit the building (Duval 2006). Secondly, the insulation foam that was also easily prone to be burnt. The foam was made out of polyurethane which is generally used as a packing material. This foam cost merely $575 while good quality fire deterrent foam would have cost $1550 (McGrevy). Thus, this foam caught fire readily which was the main cause for the extension of the fire throughout the room. Overcrowding was also however one of the factors that acted as a catalyst for the aforementioned causes (Duval 2006). Results and Losses The instant loss of the incident was a death toll of 96 which increased to 100 in the next 70 days of the incident. Out of the 400 people attending the event, 100 people loss their lives and 100 of them were severely injured. A case was filed against two of the owners of the club along with the person who was managing the event, who had the charges of manslaughter. The trial however began in 2006. (Duval 2006). Analysis of the Fire Codes Old Codes Subject before the Accident and its Shortcoming During the Accident At the time of the construction of the night club the BOCA (buildings officials and Codes Administration) code was applicable which treated clubs as separate entities with separate codes being applied to these building being utilized for nightclubs. According to the IBC 602.5, the building should have undergone Type VB construction; however the building was constructed out of unsafe wood. According to the IBC table 600, the building should be fire resistant only when there is a distance higher than 10 ft between exterior walls and the property line. Station nightclub had a distance lower than this so there was no need of fire resistance. (Grosshandler 2005). The height allowed under the IBC table 500 to club buildings was up to 6000ft high, this wall of station club was however only 4484m tall. However the IBC code requires a sprinkler protection with the building, which was not complied during the construction of the company. The IBC chapter 8 requires a thorough testing of the interiors for being fire resistant, however the interiors of the station club didn`t follow these codes and was highly combustible. The smoke and fire scales determined by the IBC codes were also not met. NPFA 5000 codes requires a rigorous testing for plastic codes, which the plastic codes used under this building did not follow. NPFA 5000n also requires an automatic sprinkler installation for an accommodation higher than 300, this building didn`t have any kind of sprinkler system at all. The same code also requires a fire alarm to be connected with a local fire extinguishing company. Though the club had a manual fire alarm located in main hall and pool tables, but wasn`t connected with local stations. The exits however complied by almost all the exit codes specifies by the NPFA. (Grosshandler 2005). Thus if the model codes for 2003 had been followed by the building owners and the managers, the fire could have been avoided very easily. Change in the Codes Major investigations being held in Massachusetts by the board of Rhode Island and other members paved way for a change in the scope of the codes to prevent further incidents. The NPFA 101 and the NPFA 5000 approved in 2006 specifies that a maximum exit load of two thirds of the capacity of the exit passage would be allowed for nightclubs. Under the “life security code” and “the building construction and safety code”, now for a festival seating arrangement with occupancy higher than 100 people to take place, the crowd managers would have to place automatic sprinklers in the building and ensure that proper egression is available. The minimum egression capacity would now have to be 117%. (Duval 2006). Conclusion The new litigations incorporated were the need of the time to prevent any more accidents from taking place. A lot of further recommendations have been made by different committees to ensure that the codes are being implemented. The local authorities should make sure that the codes are being implemented. Also, proper crowd managers and egression managers who should be approved by local authorities should be appointed at such sites. The people who wish to attend these night parties should also be given special training regarding these areas. According to a recommendation made by the NIST, any night clubs not having a proper sprinkler system should be banned for using pyrotechnics under that area. Portable fire extinguishers should also be present at the disposal of a specialized task force to carry the job in case of an accident. Thus conclusively, designing an effective code system is very crucial to prevent any such accidents but until and unless these codes are being applied effectively they are of no use. Consequently, studying human behavior is very important to add valve to the codes and it should be ensured that people are aware of the rules and regulations, and proper action is being taken against those who don`t. References Duval, R. F., National Fire Protection Association., & NFPA Fire Investigations Dept. (2006). NFPA case study: Nightclub fires. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association, Fire Investigations Department. McGrevy, C. D. (2008). The Station Night Club Fire that occurred 20 Feb 03 in West Warwick, Rhode Island. Cincinnati, Ohio: University of Cincinnati Grosshandler, W. L., Bryner, N. P., Madrzykowski, D., Kuntz, K., United States., Building and Fire Research Laboratory (U.S.)., & National Construction Safety Team Act (U.S.). (2005). Report of the technical investigation of The Station nightclub fire. Gaithersburg, Md: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Technology Administration, National Institute of Standards and Technology. Read More