Accidents and Catastrophes: The Cocoanut Grove Nightclub Fire - Case Study Example

Accidents and Catastrophes Case Study – Report Part A The Cocoanut Grove Nightclub fire, Boston, which took place in Massachusetts, in 1942, happened in a small space with a relatively cramped, dark environment. The fire which killed 492 people has formed a case study in understanding the issues of fire and fire safety (Thomas, 1992). The lessons learnt from the fire were again painfully applicable in the more recent Station nightclub fire which killed 100 people. The Cocoanut Grove was the most deadly nightclub fire accident in the history of USA. The building was a single-storey building with a finished basement, which housed the Melody Lounge and a kitchen (Bryner, et. al, 2007). The club consisted of adjoining structures with well defined sections connected by passageways and staircases. Although investigation results were inconclusive, eyewitnesses evidence suggests that the fire started shortly after 10 PM, when a busboy in tightening a loosened lit bulb using a match to illuminate the area, accidently lit decorations in Melody Lounge on fire. Smoke quickly spread through the area and customers fled, climbing a flight of narrow stairs to the main foyer. At least one emergency exit had been locked shut; the revolving doors at the main entrance jammed as scores of people attempted to push their way through. The problems: The code-based capacity of the club was pegged at 600 people. However, on the night when the tragedy took place; over 1000 patrons occupied the club (Cote, 2000). The fire broke out in some combustible decorations in the basement lounge; there was only one obvious exit where the fire originated. The exit required the patrons to climb a set of stairs leading through an exit door to a hallway and eventually to the main exit which included a revolving door. The door in this hallway, which was opening in the street was locked when the fire was raging. There were other exits which were not locked but the unfortunate part was that decorations that had been put up at the venue had inadvertently concealed these exits preventing their access, identification and use (Tubbs and Meachan, 2007). The fire spread rapidly across the underside of the buildings first floor which again did not have sufficient exit capacities. Its main exit was equipped with a door that swung against the direction of the exit travel. The push of the crow trying to escape the smoke that had infiltrated the room prevented the door from opening and many of the room’s occupants ended up dead (Gabriel and Beningo, 2005). The important thing of note is that the fire lasted less than an hour from the point of ignition to the point of extinguish, but ended up killing almost 500 people. A majority portion of these deaths, incidentally, were attributable to the problems and the bottlenecks associated with exit, and the inability of the main revolving door to support the large flow of occupants (Tubbs and Meachan, 2007). The points to note therefore are as follows: 1. The Club itself was occupied well over its capacity at the time of the fire. 2. The interiors of the club were decorated with items, which were combustible. These included the combustible interior finishes, and the artificial plants in the room of origin 3. The other significant problem was that a multitude of exit points although present were hidden behind a slew of decorations and false walls rendering them almost useless. These were therefore used only by those that were employees of the club. These people were well aware of the fact that these exits were present 4. The worst part of the tragedy was that many people died because of the direction in which the revolving doors opened. The incident had its set of impacts on the regulations associated with fire safety. After the incident, the NFPA Building Exits Code increased in strictness considerably. At the 1945 NFPA Annual Meeting, the committee on Safety to Life recommended that changes be made to the prescribed method of exit capacity measurements, clarifications of the stairway enclosure requirements, changes to requirements regarding movable chairs in nightclubs and changes in exit lighting and signage requirements. Station Nightclub Fire While numerous lessons regarding fire safety in nightclubs were learned from the Cocoanut Grove nightclub fire of 1942, it became evident on the night of February 20, 2003, that these lessons did not necessarily result in lasting, effective change across the US. On that night, 100 patrons and employees of the Station Nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island, lost their lives or suffered injuries that injuries that would eventually prove fatal, and many others were seriously injured. Many parallels exist between the tragedies at the Cocoanut Grove and the Station Fire. This particular fire was the subject of the second fire investigation carried out by the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s National Construction Safety Team (NCST) Act, which was enacted in response to 2001 collapse of the World Trade Center Towers. The Problems The fire itself was a rare event-much of the incident was captured on video camera crew that happened to be present. The initial ignition of polyurethane foam wall coverings by pyrotechnic devices used by a performing band as well as much o the evacuation process, is therefore clearly documented. Thus investigators have had an unusual opportunity to witness a serious emergency event and the resulting human behavior while it was in progress. The video also shows the rapidity with which the fire spread along the combustible interior finishes and the corresponding limited amount of time available for egress. Estimates of the number of occupants within the club on the night of the fire range from 440 to 458, based on witness interviews and identification of causalities and survivors subsequent to the fire. Based on the 2003 International Building Code (IBC) which was not in effect in Rhode Island at the time of the fire, the allowable occupant load for the building was 420 (Grosshandler, et. al., 2005). This limitation was based on the three exit doors. Memos exist that indicate that the town of West Warwick had allowed up to 404 occupants for such an event, provided a uniformed firefighter was on the premises at the time. While two off duty police officers were at the club when the fire started, no fire department personnel were present. Estimates of the number of occupants within the club on the night of the fire range from 440 to 458, based on witness interviews and identification of casualties and survivors subsequent to the fire. The band continued to play for approximately 30 second after ignition, evidence of the general impression that many patrons initially thought the flames were part of the show. Many ended up asking each other if the fire was part of the event and its corresponding celebrations. This also then meant that despite being aware of the fire, many did not begin the process of evacuation immediately. Comparisons and Similarities This is where the similarity between the two incidents becomes obvious. First, there was a problem with the available exits. Not many were created and those that were there had been locked or hidden underneath decorations. The spaces were small dark and cramped in both cases, with no room for movement. The numbers present were well in excess of the capabilities of the venue. Also the exit points were not highlighted and there was a marked presence of combustible items in both cases in the vicinity of the party area. Besides this, the staff was not trained in helping the patrons out in case of an emergency, the architecture also did not allow for quick exits. The doors were not conducive of quick egress. Case Study – Report Part B Human Behaviour In recent years safe performance’s core component has been linked to behavior management and the concept seems to have gained considerable credibility with its use being discussed and implemented frequently. Human element, thus, forms the centerpiece of every incident that takes place. It is more applicable more when a person’s involvement in doing something at an event leads to the catastrophe (Siebert, 2003). For people to work effectively two things have to happen-first, equipment controls and their job itself must be designed to fit the limitations of the human being second the people in charge need to understand the position. Individual differences, motivations, emotions, attitudes and learning processes are all components of what forces a person to be safe. Therefore program acceptance is dependent on an understanding o these psychological factors that influence program success. Therefore program acceptance is depending on an understanding of these five psychological factors that influence program success. Factors to be Understood in Case of Fires There are a number of factors that need to be analyzed in the context of the susceptibility to a risk from potential fires. Both clubs had a convoluted entry and exit points that could lead to trouble at the time of evacuation. There are two main entry and exit points the with the front door being the only easily accessible exit. There is an additional exit but that is known only to the staff. The third door was locked so that break-ins could be prevented. Not only this, there are bars that have been installed across the fire exit at the top floor which would have to be removed by a member of the staff in case of an emergency. This is not viable in most cases. There are also numerous inflammable materials that characterize much of the things that the building houses. It being a nightclub, glass, alcohol and smoking are a regular feature, all being highly combustible. It is the flammability of materials in most cases that leads to deteriorating fires and intensifying them leading to intense structural damage. Burning plastics, easily ignitable materials and highly flammable furnishings and decorations have been a feature of nightclub fires in the past (Foley and Stirling, 2008). The other factors that could be counted as being catalysts to the problem of fire acceleration are issues of low lighting. Nightclubs are also characterized by high levels, and by the fact that most clients are not familiar with the structural design and layout of the area. Live entertainment is often a delaying factor where evacuation is concerned often slowing down movement toward exits. The band that regularly performs at the clubs makes use of a pyrotechnics display, and sparklers distributed to patrons. There is also the use of fire works that light up celebrations. Management to prevent the use of pyrotechnics in small or densely occupied spaces cannot always be relied upon, so venues must always be designed to mitigate the consequences of any resultant fire.    Evaluate the Risks and Decide on Precautions Risk determination is inclusive of the concepts of the factors of both risk acceptance and risk aversion-the former relates to the acceptable levels of societal risks and the latter to the methods that could be used for avoiding risks, as an alternative to the involuntary opposition of risks. Risk identification and elimination it is to be understood are purely parts of risk assessment-both would in the long run involve uncertainty and the interpretation of impact of uncertainties relying on scientific consideration more than technical and value judgments. With respect to risk identification again, changes in the levels of risk are identifiable in three circumstances: when a new risk is created, when the magnitude of an existing risk changes and when perception of an existing risk changes (Pickard, 2008). All three may occur simultaneously. It has to be understood that the correct management of fire safety is necessitated by the need of ensuring that fires are do not happen at all, or at least the risk of them occurring is reduced to the minimum. It is also necessary that there are steps taken that would ensure the timely control or containment of fires. Finally, it is also necessary that a fire when it occurs grows; everyone in the premises is able to escape to a place of total safety easily and quickly (Pickard, 2008). There are a number of factors that need to be analyzed in the context of the susceptibility to a risk from potential fires. First the club has a convoluted entry and exit points that could lead to trouble at the time of evacuation (Pickard, 2008). There are two main entry and exit points; the one with the front door being the only easily accessible exit. There is an additional exit but that is known only to the staff. The third door is always locked so that break-ins could be prevented. Not only this, there are bars that have been installed across the fire exit at the top floor which would have to be removed by a member of the staff in case of an emergency. This is not viable in most cases (Pickard, 2008). There are also numerous inflammable materials that characterize many of the things that the building houses. It being a nightclub, glass, alcohol and smoking are a regular feature, all being highly combustible. It is the flammability of materials in most cases that leads to deteriorating fires and intensifying them leading to intense structural damage. Burning plastics, easily ignitable materials and highly flammable furnishings and decorations have been a feature of nightclub fires in the past (Foley and Stirling, 2008). The other factors that could be counted as being catalysts to the problem of fire acceleration are issues of low lighting. Nightclubs are also characterized by high levels, and by the fact that most clients are not familiar with the structural design and layout of the area. Live entertainment is often a delaying factor where evacuation is concerned often slowing down movement toward exits (Kumaran, 2011). Management to prevent the use of pyrotechnics in small or densely occupied spaces cannot always be relied upon, so venues must always be designed to mitigate the consequences of any resultant fire (Ridley, 2008).     Precautionary Steps The nature of the design and the fact that the premises use both combustible material and pyrotechnics mean that real precaution could be achieved with the sprinkler protection to achieve an acceptable level of safety (Ridley, 2008). It also has to be achieved that at least during service hours, the exits are not locked. If by any chance this results in problems with security, then alarming systems could be used and the club could also make use of electronic locks. There could also be additional security provided at the gates. Display maps showing the location of exits and firefighting equipment around the venue (toilets and bars provide good locations where people will see them and absorb the information). There is also the need for installation of fire extinguishers to be installed on easily visible and accessible points within the facility. The idea should also be the use of non-combustible or fire-retardant materials for furnishings and for decorations.  References: Bryner, N., Madrzykowski, D., Grosshandler, W.L., (2007). Reconstructing The Station Nightclub Fire –Materials Testing and Small Scale Experiments. Interscience Communications Ltd., London Grosshandler, W, Bryner, N, Madrzykowski, D, and Kuntz, K., (2005). “Report of the Technical Investigation of The Station Nightclub Fire” Report NCSTAR 2: Vol. 1. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology Kumaran, A., (2011). Evacuating the building in the event of a fire alarm. Available http://www.realisingopportunities.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Student-Union-Fire-Strategy-Document-University-of-Leicester.pdf. Accessed January 18, 2011 Pickard, H., (2008). Facilities Management Legal Update 2008: Special Report. Workplace Law Group. pp28-31  Ridley, J., (2008). Health and Safety in Brief. Butterworth Heinenamann. p276   Society for Testing and Materials, (1982). Fire Risk Assessment. ASTM International. pp3-6  Siebert, I., (2003). Leisure. Elsevier books. p24 Santos, Gabriel and Aguirre, Benigno E., (2005). “Critical Review of Emergency Evacuation Simulation Models.” Pp. 27-52 in Workshop on Building Occupant Movement During Fire Emergencies, edited by R. D. Peacock and E. D. Kuligowski. Gaithersburg, MD: National Institute of Standards and Technology. Thomas, J., (1992). The Cocoanut Grove inferno. Available http://www.boston.com/news/daily/21/archives_cocoanut_112292.htm. Accessed January 18, 2012 Tubbs, J, Meachan, B., (2007). “A guide to evacuation and Crowd Management Planning”. John Wiley and Sons. pp88-91 Read More