The Station Nightclub Fire Research - Example

The Station Nightclub Fire Research Name: Course: Tutor: Date: Table of contents Introduction The fire occurred on 20 February 2003 at the Station Nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island. It started when a band that was performing used pyrotechnics that lit foam insulation lining the walls of sections of the ceiling of the platform that was being used as a stage. The main entrance was crowded as people tried to escape, and as a result 100 people were killed while hundreds of others were injured. After the disaster, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) made several recommendations meant to increase occupant safety in nightclubs. This paper evaluates the disaster by analyzing the factors that caused the fire, the aftermath of the disaster, how the fire impacted codes and processes related to building safety, and the impact of the disaster on building codes and processes today. Event history On 20 February 2003, a tragic fire erupted at the Station Nightclub in West Warwick, Rhode Island in the United States, leading to the deaths of 100 people and leaving approximately 200 others injured. At about 11.07 pm on that day, Great White, the band that was playing at the scene, used pyrotechnics for special effects as part of its opening performance. The pyrotechnics ignited the highly-flammable polyurethane foam insulation used to line the wall and ceiling of the platform area where the band was performing, resulting in the fatal fire (International Association of Arson Investigators 130). The Station Nightclub fire was a rare event as much of the incident was captured on video by a camera that was present to cover the performance on that day. The initial burning of the polyurethane foam wall coverings by pyrotechnic devices used by the band, as well as much of the evacuation process, is thus well documented. From the video, investigators had a rare opportunity to witness a serious emergency event as well as the resulting human behavior as the fire progressed. The video highlights the swiftness with which the fire spread along the flammable interior finishes of the building and the corresponding limited amount of time available for the patrons to evacuate from the building (Tubbs and Meacham 83). According to Clark and Billon (92), the Station Nightclub was completely consumed by the fire within three minutes. As a result, 96 people were killed instantly and hundreds were triaged to local hospitals. Four people died in hospital, and only 132 escaped the injury unharmed (International Association of Arson Investigators 130). Clark and Billon also note that the Station Nightclub was rated as the ninth deadliest public fire assembly experienced in the history of the United States. From the video footage, it is evident that spectators and even band members failed to see the wall covering ignite or perceive its danger. The first recognition of the fire by the patrons happened 24 seconds after the ignition, with most patrons starting to evacuate the building after 30 seconds, only after the band had stopped playing. Some patrons had taken alcoholic beverages and most of them attempted to leave the building through the main entrance – the point they were familiar with – even though there were three more exists at the site (International Association of Arson Investigators 130). Aftermath Estimates of the number of people within the Station Nightclub on the night of the fire range from 440 to 458 based on witness accounts as well as identification of the casualties and survivors after the fire. Based on the 2003 International Building Code (IBC) the allowable occupant limit for the building was 420 people (it is however important to note that this building code was not in force in Rhode Island at the time of the incident). It is nevertheless evident that the building was overcrowded, and in case of any emergency, evacuation would not be an easy task. The magnitude of the disaster was more pronounced because the patrons were not aware of the fire on time. The band continued to play for about 30 seconds after the burning had started. In fact, many patrons initially thought that the flames were part of the show (Tubbs and Meacham 85). Survivors said that the patrons had asked each other if the flames were part of the show, and so many did not begin to move immediately. After about 100 seconds since the flames started, occupants became clogged in the main entrance, and this is where many of them died. Many survivors reported that during the fire they were pushed to the floor as people rushed to the main exit, and some were trampled. Some occupants used the two other exits but one was blocked early by the fire. As such, many occupants used windows to escape, which resulted in even more casualties (Tubbs and Meacham 85). In the end, a total of 16 hospitals in Massachusetts and Rhode Island offered care for 196 burns victims. Some 35 victims required intensive care and ventilatory support. Kent County Hospital received the highest number of victims – 82, and for the second time in its history, the Shriners Hospital for Children opened its services for adults, ultimately receiving 17 patients from Rhode Island medical facilities. The first time this hospital offered such services was during the 11 September 2001 terror attacks on the World Trade Center (Clark and Billon 92). According to Clark and Billon (92), the Station Nightclub fire is an exemplar of an indoor fire disaster. Indoor fire disasters usually result in a higher cumulative death rate and more deaths at the scene, as a result of the inhalation injury and rapid oxygen deficits – which was the case during the Station Nightclub fire. Impact on Codes/Processes After the incident, an investigation was launched by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to determine the cause of the fire. The findings give an insight into the violations of the building and fire codes following the events at the Station Nightclub prior to and after the disaster. The investigation was based on all the relevant building codes, fire detection and suppression systems in the building, the materials used in the construction as well as interior finish of the building, exit points, and the fire department response to the incident. From the information that was gathered, federal investigators were able to develop new information and confirm published reports pertaining to what initiated the fire, the reason for the fast spread of toxic fumes and flames, the difficulties encountered by patrons, and the mass casualty situation confronted by the fire department (Ockerhshausen 17). From the incident, the following points are of note regarding building and fire safety codes: The building was overcrowded based on the existing code requirements as well as the mandates of the town of West Warwick (Tubbs and Meacham 85). The fire spread extremely quickly due to combustible interior finishes around the stage. Fire reached the ceiling within 25 seconds of ignition, and fumes reached the floor in the club in about 90 seconds (Tubbs and Meacham 85). The sound proofing form used in the building was not of the desired standard as it was not fire retardant (McGrevy 3). The arrangement of the main egress vestibule restricted exit there to about one person per second, and ultimately resulted into a crowd-rush that in effect prevented occupants from escaping through the same exit (Tubbs and Meacham 85). One of the four exits was quickly blocked by the club employees, and survivors reported difficulty in operating another (Tubbs and Meacham 85) Some victims were found in the back area of the club near offices and a storeroom. An egress had previously been present in this area but had been removed (Tubbs and Meacham 85). According to NIST, the Station Nightclub violated most of the 2003 model codes of building safety. The direct contributors to the large loss of life were identified as (i) the close proximity of the highly flammable polyurethane foam to the pyrotechnics that ignited the deadly fire, (ii) the Station Nightclub was not equipped with a sprinkler system, which resulted in the incapability to suppress the fire at its initial stages, and (iii) the inability of the egresses to handle all of the occupants in the short time available for the rapidly growing fire (Ockerhshausen 17). NIST further pointed out that strict adherence to the 2003 model codes that were available at the time of the Station Nightclub fire would help in forestalling similar catastrophes in future. It thus made 10 recommendations to reinforce existing model codes and proposed changes that would make them even more effective. The first recommendation required local and state jurisdictions to adopt building and fire codes covering night clubs based on the national model codes, implement aggressive and effective fire inspection programs, and ensure that there are adequate fire inspectors as well as building plan examiners who are professionally competent to a national standard to carry out this work (Newman). Recommendation 2 and 3 address the application of automatic fire sprinkler systems to extinguish fires in nightclubs and restricting the flammability of materials used as finish products to avert such fires in the first place (Newman). Recommendation 4 calls for the NFPA 1126 standard on the utilization of pyrotechnics before an audience to be strengthened by highlighting the need to use automatic sprinkler systems, addressing minimum occupancy and building size levels, posting of pyrotechnic use plans as well as emergency procedures, and setting minimum clearances between pyrotechnics and the substances they potentially could light (Newman). Recommendation 5 requires changes in the national model codes that raise the factor of safety for determining occupancy limits in all new and existing nightclubs. Along the same line, Recommendation 6 addresses portable fire extinguishers while Recommendation 7 requires the development and implementation of effective interoperable communications for mass casualty incidents within and between first responder organizations. Recommendations 8 through 10 deal with critically needed research to serve as a foundation for further improvements in codes, standards and practices (Newman). Impact on Today’s Codes/Processes After the Station Nightclub fire, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) made available a wide array of safety information pertaining to places of gathering. This included statistical and historical information about other major nightclub fires, safety tips for club goers, and NFPA journals. This information impacts codes and processes to this day. There were also Tentative Interim Amendments (TIAs) or emergency code amendments which were adopted by the NFPA on August 14, 2003. These changes stipulate that There should be fire sprinklers in new nightclubs and related assembly occupancies as well as in existing facilities that accommodate more than 100 people. Building owners should inspect exists to ensure that they are free from obstructions and keep records of each inspection There should be at least one trained crowd manager for all assemblies. Festival seating for more than 250 people is prohibited unless life-safety assessment approved by the relevant authorities has been performed. There are also safety codes like NFPA 101 and NFPA 5000, which are expected to improve levels of safety in all places and make the world a better place to live. Conclusion The Station Nightclub fire was one of the deadliest nightclub fires experienced in the United States. The fire led to the deaths of 100 people and caused injuries to hundreds of others. The devastation caused by the fire was enormous because the fire was not detected early enough, the building’s interior was not fireproofed, and it also lacked basic safety features such as sprinklers. After the disaster, the NIST identified that the Station Nightclub had violated most of the 2003 model codes, and that strict adherence to these codes could have the minimized loss. It thus made recommendations to boost safety in places of gathering. NFPA also emphasized the same point by stipulating measures to increase building and occupant safety especially in assembly areas. Most of these changes pertain to installation of fire safety equipment and enhancement of handling of crowds during a fire incident. Works Cited Clark, Alan and Billon, Laura. Burns: The Medical and Forensic Model. New York: Lawyers & Judges Publishing Company, 2006. International Association of Arson Investigators. Fire Investigator: Principles and Practice to NFPA 921 and 1033. 3rd Ed. New York: Jones & Bartlett Publishers, 2010. McGrevy, Charles D. “The Station Night Club Fire that Occurred 20 Feb 03 in West Warwick, Rhode Island.” University of Cincinnati. 30 Sep 2011. Newman, Michael E. “Final NIST Rhode Island Nightclub Fire Report Urges Strict Adherence to and Strengthening of Current Model Safety Codes.” 29 Jun. 2005. 30 Sep 2011. . Ockerhshausen, Joseph. “Special Report: The After-Action Critique: Training through Lessons Learned.” U.S. Fire Administration/Technical Report Series. April 2008. Tubbs, Jeffrey S. and Meacham, Brian J. Egress Design Solutions: A Guide to Evacuation and Crowd Management Planning. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 2007. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). “Summary of NFPA code changes since Rhode Island and E2 Nightclub tragedies.” 2011. 30 Sep 2011. Read More