The BSE Saga in the United Kingdom - Essay Example

Task: The BSE Saga in United Kingdom Overview In the recent past, food alerts have been on the rise with regard to Salmonella, Listeria, dioxin and BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopathy). Confidence crisis surfaced among consumers in the market as a result, with the critical issues revolving around food governance and safety. However, of the food alerts that prevailed, the BSE saga in the United Kingdom (UK) that occurred from 1986 emerged as the most dramatic, thereby bringing the implication of the need for a real emergency. BSE is generally “a transmissible, neurodegenerative, fatal brain disease of cattle” (Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, para.1). This disease is characterized by a 4 – 5 years incubation period and its effects are adverse; after a few weeks of its onset, it often leads to the death of cattle. Researchers have indicated that as BSE gets into the brain of cattle; the spinal cord and the brain itself get affected, resulting to lesions that have alterations that are sponge-like. These lesions can be seen under the normal microscope. Some researchers have also indicated that the BSE agent is very stable, with the capability of resisting heat, drying and freezing, and more critically, resisting heat applicable in the processes of sterilization and pasteurization. This property has raised a controversy over BSE agent’s nature, as several theories have sought to explain such nature. It has been generally assumed that the BSE was derived from the disease scrapie, which occurs in sheep (Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 32), though there is no any evidence from experiments to show that this assumption is true. Further, there lacks a proof to show that BSE agent would behave like scrapie agent, which does not find its way into the human beings, when they consume the meat products that are from infected animals. The Background of BSE Generally, the roots of the BSE crisis dates back to the traditional food policy-making and UK Agriculture. The scientists in the UK first unravelled the disease in 1986 and by the year 2002, cases preceding 181, 376 had been confirmed. After the initial discovery, the disease had also been confirmed out of the UK from 1989. This led to an alarming call that initiated the introduction of programmes for monitoring the spread of the BSE in cattle that were slaughtered or found dead. 12 countries unveiled the presence of the disease in their territories including Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, Poland, Japan, Italy, Israel, Greece, Germany, Finland, Czech Republic and Austria (Bovine spongiform encephalopathy, 4). Measures for preventing further spread of the disease were put in place, whereby in the process of preparing animal feed, proteins from ruminants were banned in UK in 1988. The situation was termed as a crisis, for there were fears that the disease would affect human beings. Similarly, the European Union (EU) also banned mammalian MBM in the case of ruminants. At the centre stage, UK was the main actor in that drama as food products from UK that contained beef were officially banned from being exported to other countries from the year 1996. Luckily, from the year 1999, such bans specifications and directions with regard to the bans started being issued by the EU. There has been some relief in the UK since 1992 as the reports concerning the cases of BSE have been on the decline, though the programmes of monitoring and testing BSE in cattle still prevails in the EU. Generally, the issues surrounding the BSE saga are very confusing. There are many views on the matter from different points of perspective. For instance, the matter has been analysed both scientifically and politically, with the examiners drawing out evidences with regard to their perspectives. Furthermore, a clear conclusion on whether the matter was a crisis has not yet been made, for the saga has very many possible issues intertwined to it. Controversies have emerged with regard to the credibility of the matter and up to date, researchers and scholars have engaged themselves in never ending debates, in a bid to figure out the nature of BSE outbreak in the UK. However, there remains a question that is unanswered up to date; was the BSE saga really a crisis? Theoretical Perspectives on the BSE Saga in the UK Many theoretical perspectives have explained the BSE saga differently with different support information behind the assertions. For instance, most views have perceived the BSE saga simply as a crisis, whereby the factors that led to the disaster are identified and then blamed on specific persons or authorities. Others have related the incidence to the analysis of a crisis, thereby drawing conclusions from such analyses. In such a case, the failures of the BSE saga have been linked to governance – the government institutions such as the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food. However, disregarding the bases of theoretical approaches to the BSE saga, the big problematic issue at the centre of the matter has often been framed in ways that convincingly lead to the internalisation of the complexity of the issue, as well as a fixed set of possible solutions. According to Millstone and van Zwanenberg (27), people have not yet learned all lessons brought about by the BSRE saga, despite a significant progress being realised. Their argument is based on the instances at which the saga came out as extremely exceptional. For instance, the entanglement of science and politics in the UK’s policy-making institutions has borne the concern of such regimes of making decisions and appraisal of risks, across a platform of diverse risks, and jurisdictions at national and multinational levels. Again, the misrepresentation of the political and scientific issues and the shortcomings that resulted thereof, have suggested the same. From the above point of view, it is logical to say that the BSE saga was a crisis of governance and science. This is a clear demonstration of how the traditional methods of presenting the processes of making policies that are science based, are unsustainable (Millstone, 627). Many analysts have suggested that alternative approaches should be formulated to explain the saga, but still, such suggestions have been challenged by the fact that the deployment of science in the processes of making decisions, in an environment that opposes science and is fully democratic, has not been achieved. Similarly, the vice versa, and deploying science in an environment that is opposed to democracy and is fully science oriented, has not been achieved. People such as Lord Phillips conducted inquiries into how the matter of BSE was addressed the government of UK. The report by Phillips highlighting over 100 lessons that would be learnt from the BSE saga have since been made public, with the report arguing that the UK government’s policies of addressing the BSE saga were generally appropriate and sensible. But then, it is inevitable that uncertainties attached to the issues of enforcing government policies, delays in introducing the government policies and the measures of designing the government policies of addressing the BSE saga was to be subjected to criticism. The failure of the UK government’s strategy of communicating the risk attached to BSE was miserable, since the public had the perception of having been misled by the experts in the field of science, as well as the institutions of the government. That failure has been linked to the UK government’s efforts towards sensitisation of people in a number of theoretical perspectives, among them, the subordination of public health and consumer protection, to an agenda that is politically and economically oriented. As well, it is suggested that the UK government had misinterpreted the initial objectives of formulating such policies, and the grounds in which such policies worked Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 28). Adding to that, some people have suggested that the UK government was seeking to withhold its misrepresentation through the acquisition, interpretation and representation of scientific facts in manners that were opposed to scientific ways. However, there is some logic in the Philips report when it indicates that; given the nature of the BSE – longer period of incubation and diagnosis of the disease based on clinical symptoms – it was clear that no risks attached to BSE could have been possibly eliminated. Beck et al (397) assert, “The BSE crisis in the United Kingdom represents a dramatic incident of a risk-management failure.” Incomplete internalization of all risks of diverse nature and inadequate skills of risk management is linked to such failure, by these authors. From this point of view, it is certain that the initial interest in carrying out a proper assessment of risks and management issues is linked to the great number of threats, which the social and natural environments are associated with. Similarly, the advances from the technological and scientific field may bear problems that can be associated with such environments. This suggestion is in line with Millstone and van Zwanenberg’s perception of the BSE saga as being a disaster. From another point of view, Forbes (342) suggests that the BSE saga “does not amount to a crisis, a failure or a disaster, and cannot serve as a critique of the UK political system.” Forbes believes that a shortcoming of intractable policy is the backbone of the complexity of the saga, as he criticizes the systems of politics and administration in the UK government. According to him, the saga portrays “a fluctuation between one extreme, an administration characterized by high quality and vigour, and another, where incapacity and incompetence abound (343). Forbes’s point of view is factual to some considerable point. The key players in the BSE saga have hidden identities which are not always questioned whatsoever, and their failures or actions were in relation to consequences that were foreseen and yet avoidable, according to evidence drawn from the UK government’s website (Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 37). It is also logical to say that such practices happened on specifically planned days, and each specific action was under the responsibility of each player. Furthermore, Forbes states that in the UK government’s history, there is no clear indication of a policy that had failed in such a spectacular scenario, which raises an eyebrow when the BSE saga is termed as a failure. Critical Analysis of the BSE Saga in the UK Whether pictured as a crisis or not, the BSE saga was well known to the UK government from the time it was diagnosed in 1986. From this tome to 1988, the concerned institutions within the ministry of Agriculture had the concern of the public gaining knowledge on the issue of BSE. At that point, it is clear that the government was concerned with how the public would react to the issue and how the export of cattle and beef products would be affected by the public’s reaction. The government’s policy of ensuring that the information on the presence of BSE in cattle was held back as much it could be done, draws a clear conclusion that the government was not determined to stop further spread of the disease, as well as to address the risk of human beings contracting the disease. Hand in hand, the UK’s BSE saga brings the picture of a country having a system of governance that is slowly falling, due to its high levels of being vulnerable to a considerable amount of policy mistakes that can be avoided. Eventually, the people’s perception that the government may be falling considerably, is an association of failure in the process of making policies. It is critical that peoples’ perceptions are very significant when compared to the real economic performance. Crises from policymaking processes are often difficult to note, and are often failures that are extreme costly. When attention is not given to the conditions and the ways in which the definition and labelling of events are conducted, then the probability of failure increases close to 1. For this reason, we may consider rating the UK’s BSE saga as being a crisis, given that the performance of the UK government in addressing the BSE saga is worth being termed as a failure, when it is related to all the areas of risk that surrounded it. This instance – UK’s BSE saga – brings to question the implications of policy-making process in the UK. Does the process really have legitimacy in scientific and democratic platforms? The BSE saga ultimately brings to test, the process of policy making in the UK. The UK government’s move brings a clear picture of a scenario whereby, the policy-makers have the facts from the sensible science but they manipulate these facts to come up with information that is of total pretence. Concealing of the shortcomings within the field of science as well as distinguished opinions is a characteristic of the BSE saga, and all the responsibility of such practices is taken by the expertise in the field of science and the policy-makers themselves. It is imperative that the scientists who were supportive to the government were engaged in policy-making, which is not right. There is an indication that the scientists were influenced politically and this is echoed to the rest of the community of science; how do other scientists picture and learn from the BSE saga in the UK? However, it is also true to assert that understanding of science and the advices that are given by scientists cannot be independently developed with regard to economic, political and social contexts. More so, even if it is well known to us that the UK’s BSE saga had many key players involved, there lacks a clear indication of negligence, which demonstrates the factors that caused the whole saga. Thus, to assert that the BSE saga was a crisis is a remark that has to be thoroughly examined before conclusion. On the other hand, asserting that it was not a saga is also an uncertainty that can have a few pieces of supporting evidence. However, to be rest assured, we have to accept that something went wrong somewhere, but the exact location of the mistakes is hard to unveil, for the key players are not in question. The Whole BSE saga in the UK therefore leaves all of us in a dilemma, given that the whole issue is politicised. Conclusion It is inevitable that the UK’s BSE saga is a situation intertwined with issues that calls for the close examination from politics and science, and such framework has the shortcomings of science predominating it. Concluding the BSE saga as being a crisis may not be an accurate assertion, for the intertwining of science and politics creates a hard to understand discipline. Politics has the power of manipulating the direction to which science works, and therefore, the truth behind the BSE saga remains within the government and the concerned institutions. Moreover, the public policy of the UK government brings a clear case example of a policy-making approach that is too risky, and not considerate of any legitimacy with regard to science and democracy. This case has prompted the creation and reformation of authoritative institutions, which manoeuvre to practice implementation of strategies with the right channels. It is notable that some kind of progress exists within such institutions, but how soon can we tell what the outcomes of such institutions can be? The close relationship between political and scientific aspects makes implementation of some strategies extremely difficult. Thus, such institutions may also be vulnerable to influences from the political background, and who knows whether all perceived disasters in other sectors have been really crises? Works Cited Beck, Matthias et al. “Public Administration, Science, and Risk Assessment: A Case Study of the U.K. Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Crisis.” Public Administration Review. 2005. Vol. 65 (4): 396 – 408. “Bovine spongiform encephalopathy.” World Health Organization. 2002. Web. 13 January 2012. Available at: . Forbes, Ian. “Making a Crisis out of a Drama: The Political Analysis of BSE Policy-Making in the UK.” Political Studies. 2004. Vol. 52: 342-357 doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2004.00483.x Millstone, Erik. “Science, Risk and Governance: Radical Rhetorics and the Realities of Reform in Food Safety Governance.” Research Policy. 2009. Vol. 38 (4): 624-636. Millstone, Erik and van Zwanenberg. “BSE: A Paradigm of Policy Failure.” The Political Quarterly, 2003. Vol. 74 (1): 27-37. Read More