What Do We Know about Metaphysics - Term Paper Example

of Lecturer 28 February Metaphysics No matter how different certain things are, they would likely have some features in common. These features which they would have in common will serve as elements that unify these things together. In metaphysics, universals are what certain things have in common (Rescher 69). These features could occur in different ways. For example, the universal feature of a set of white tiles would definitely be whiteness, which is the fact that they all are white in color. Another feature would definitely be their “tileness”, that is the fact that they are all tiles. According to metaphysicians, those features they share are called Universals. Widely, universals are often abstract while particulars are often concrete. However, this is not always the case as metaphysicians like D.M. Armstrong choose to also view universals not just as concrete, but in many lights that some other philosophers might not agree with. As far as universals and particulars are concerned, there are two main points of view that are competing for attention (Crane & Farkas 131). The first point of view is the theory which holds that the things in existence cannot be considered to be what they really are without the sum total of all their characteristic features. The implication of this position is that whatsoever an element is, it is as a result of the features that can be attributed to it. These features also pertain to space and time. This point of view is called the Bundle Theory (Inwagen & Zimmerman 62). The second point of view that is worthy of mention is the Substance-Attributes Theory. The Substance-Attributes Theory does not hold the opinion that the totality of a thing is the summation of all its properties, rather it opines that objects are ultimate, not their properties. Thus, there is the need to contrast between these things and the attributes they possess (Inwagen & Zimmerman 17). The position of D.M. Armstrong is not in tandem with the Bundle Theory. What Armstrong does is that he uses the basic arguments that support bundle theory as the premises on which he build his argument against. Armstrong’s first premise against the Bundle Theory is that a thing should be regarded as nothing without its bundle of properties, which of course includes the spatial and the temporary. He then goes on to posit that “if a thing occupies the same place at different times, then it has different properties and has to be a different thing.” (56). This implies that it does not change its properties as time changes. With this premise, he concludes that the Bundle Theory is wrong (Armstrong 56).The second argument by Armstrong is built on four premises. The first premise is that even when properties are universal, two different things cannot possess the same property. In the second and third premises, he posits that the possibility of things in the universe have cyclical features such that the features repeats themselves in the exact form that they are, even to the minutes detail. The properties of a certain thing will be the same as that of its other counterparts. Yet, in the fourth premise, Armstrong insists that each of these things, no matter how many features it has in common with others, is very much distinct from others. With this, he arrives at the conclusion which is that the bundle theory is false (Armstrong 72). Even if one is to consider a number of examples in real life, one would be sure that there are really things that have many or even all features in common. But the fact that they have many features in common does not mean that they are the same. It does not necessarily mean that the opinion of Locke about the “substratum” which is very much in line with the bundle theory is the correct one (qtd in King 98). What Locke postulate might be rightly considered to be rather rash. This is because he seemed to have jumped too quickly into the assumption that things are nothing without their properties. For example, even though attributes can tell a lot on the object in terms of time and space, he turned the blind eye to the possibility of a thing changing with time. Even the fact that the same thing exists at different times is enough proof to show that that thing might not remain the same. Time would most likely have a hand in changing what it is. Also, the fact that objects have certain features in common does not mean that they are the same thing. Each of them still remains what they are as single entities. The fact that they possess the same attributes does not necessarily mean that they are the same. So, this means that what objects are is not determined by the bundle of attributes they possess. Rather the case is the reverse; what objects are is what determines what their attributes are. The substance-attribute theory affords one room for more flexibility. Unlike the bundle theory, it is believed that the object remains in existence even when the properties change. This is due to the fact that it is the object that determines the property, or better still, the properties possessed by an object are merely additives to the object itself; they have no say in the existence of the thing. So, if the attributes of any object changes at any point in time, the object remains. In this case, the object is supreme to its features. On the other hand, as a result of the belief by bundle theorists that the attributes of an object is ultimate as against the object itself, it may be implied that if the properties of an object changes, it would mean that the end of that thing has come. Russell uses the term “compresence” to describe any two properties common to things (Hochberg 208). For example, if a chair and a table have two properties in common, Russell would likely say “the table is compresent with the chair.” (Hochberg 208). It is like saying that A is compresent with B, and that B is compresent with A. In this sense, it would definitely mean that the chair is also compresent with the table. One may then assume that all the things in the universe have certain things in common based on Russell’s ‘compresence theory.’ If that is the case, it would either be that, by chance or by design, all things in the universe are the same and one. If A is compresent with B; B, in turn, might also be compresent with C, then C would also be compresent with D, and so on. Then, one would discover that each feature which all things in existence have in common is compresence. However, it lends credence to cast some element of doubt on the possibility of living in a world where all things are the same. It would mostly likely be a very dull world. If the kind of world created by Russell’s “compresence” is one that is dull (due to its links with the bundle theory which has to do with sameness), the kind of world that would be created as a result of substance-attribute theory would be one with different entities. It will be a world of varieties, as opposed to having just one, one in which there would be liveliness in abundance. The view expressed by D.M. Armstrong is very similar to that which was expressed by Aristotle when he said “universalia in rebus” which means “Universals in things” (qtd in Booth 182). Quoting Aristotle , and taking in full measure the identity of universalia in rebus with particulars, he says that anyone that distinguishes the one from the other and considers universals to be more substances than particulars, is in fact, giving only a logical argument. (Booth 182 – 183) However, there is a sharp contrast between Armstrong’s position and that of Plato and Socrates which assumes that there are also unsubstantiated universals in the arguments from meaning and from perfections. (Armstrong 78-79). Armstrong counters their argument with his principle of Instantiation in which he opines that if at all there is any universal, it must be instantiated. Every universal property must be the property of a universal. Obviously, one of the best positions that may be assumed as it touches on the long-existing argument about universals and particulars is that of Armstrong. The trope theory successfully captures the position of Armstrong. In trope theory, if A has Z, and if B also has Z does not mean that A is B. Using a more specific example; if a table is white in color and a chair is also white, it only means that the table and the chair both have whiteness in common, but it does not mean that the table is a chair, or that the chair is a table. Rather, it means that both just have similar features. The trope theory is one theory which reinforces the position of Armstrong. Consecutively, the stance assumed by many other substance-attribute theorists will for a long time be found laudable. Works Cited Armstrong, David Malet. Selection from Universals: an Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press. 1989. Print Booth, Edward. Cambridge Studies in Medieval life & Thought. “Aristolelian Aporetics in Islamic and Christian Thinkers.” Third Series, Vol. 20. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1983. Print Crane, Tim; Farkas, Katalin (Ed). Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2004. Print Hochberg, Herbert. Russell, Moore, and Wittgenstein: The Revival of Realism. Egelsbach: Hänsel-Hohenhausen. 2001. Print Inwagen, Peter Van; Zimmerman, Dean W. (Ed.). Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 1998. Print King, Princeton (Ed.). John Locke: Critical Assessment. London: Routledge. 1991. Print Rescher, Nicholas. An Introduction to Process Philosophy. New York: State University of New York Press. 1996. Print. Read More