Climate Change: A Global Struggle - Essay Example

Climate Change: A Global Struggle Introduction Recently the international community was deliberating the regulatory paradigm to substitute the Kyoto Protocol after 2012. This paradigm was likely to create implementable limits on greenhouse gas emissions originating from highly industrialized countries and to create standards, probably short of prerequisites, for discharges from underdeveloped and developing countries (Dessler & Parson 2010). The inauguration of the new regulatory paradigm was planned to transpire at the 2009 Community on Progress (COP) in Copenhagen. The risks are great since any agreement will influence the development potentials of per capital underdeveloped countries and will establish climate change-linked damages endured by impoverished people for hundreds of years to come (Motavalli 2009). Failure to reach a compromise would have serious impacts on the development potentials of underdeveloped countries, numerous of which will suffer from the most grave effects of change in climate. The initial United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreement acknowledges these types of issues and demands that further accord negotiation listen to them (Frass-Ehrfeld 2009). Any agreement will be obliged to adhere to the UNFCCC standards associated to sustainable progress and the impartial distribution of obligations. There are important UNFCCC standards that function to direct the requirements of a valid climate agreement (Fress-Ehrfeld 2009). These are standards founded by the earlier treaty of the initial UNFCCC. As a result, they have position in international law, and legality obliges their fulfillment; but by safeguarding guidelines that enable development in poor countries (Posner & Weisbach 2010), they also satisfy the moral purpose of eliminating poverty. Therefore, the objective of this essay is to argue that the Kyoto Protocol, which succeeded the UNFCCC, was successful in meeting some of its global emission reduction targets by providing some figures and brief description of its principles and guidelines. Subsequently, the successful outcome of the Kyoto Protocol will be contrasted with the unfavorable outcome of the Copenhagen climate conference. Factors such as the creation of legally-binding commitments to emission reduction, financial assistance, and market-based mechanisms will be taken into account. The Kyoto Protocol Much of the global community, by the end of 1992, had espoused the UNFCCC to “stabiliz[e]… greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Ravindranath & Sathaye 2002, 5). The paradigm did not institute any obligatory emissions reductions for the parties; it merely obliges them to a set of common rules. The creation of specific emission objectives was left to a later accord: the Kyoto Protocol (Ravindranath & Sathaye 2002). Although the UNFCCC’s somewhat ambitious goal of preventing hazardous climate change was also the decisive goal the Kyoto Protocol, its definite objective was far humbler (Vasser 2008): to diminish the combined carbon emissions from contributing developed countries by roughly 5 percent comparative to 1990. There are two relevant things to emphasize (Vasser 2008): (1) the objective of reducing emissions was confined to developed countries, not the whole world; and (2) while definite percentage drops or goals were set for particular countries, these were not obligatory in an exact way since countries may employ different trading methods to obtain recognition for emission diminutions from other countries. The decisive aim was that cooperatively, emissions among the developed countries would drop to roughly 5 percent. Presently, 38 developed countries along with the 15 from the European Union (EU), which collectively comprise 64 percent of the global emissions in 1990, have endorsed the Protocol, the same as 150 developing countries, which have no requisite emission obligations under Kyoto (The Worldwatch Institute 2009). However, while the United States was on the original list of Kyoto, it is not on the existing record, because the U.S. Senate never endorsed the agreement (Shaffner 2007). In truth, five months before approving Kyoto, the Senate voted for a nonbinding ruling of the Senate to decline any international climate agreement that did not involve obligatory goals for developing countries (Shaffner 2007). Hence, it is premature to claim that Kyoto is a failure. As it appears, Kyoto’s industrialized countries are not just sustaining but are actually surpassing their Kyoto obligations. The combined emissions, in 2007, were roughly 17 percent lower than the base year emissions in 1990 (The Worldwatch Institute 2009). At this point, it should be emphasized that the largest portion of this decrease was not the outcome of any emission regulation or innovative low-carbon technology, but Soviet Union’s collapse. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union came an abrupt economic depression, from which the countries of the ex-Communist coalition have yet to completely recover (Hathaway-Zepeda 2004). The discharges of countries with transitioning economies (EIT), in 2007, remained roughly 37 percent lower than the levels in 1990. However, the rest of the industrialized countries are doing well, with their combined emissions just roughly 2 percent higher than the levels in 1990- a much smaller proportion increase than that of China or the United States (Hathaway-Zepeda 2004, 31). The 15 member nations of the EU also seem to be on a track to fulfill their Kyoto goal (Vasser 2008): one year prior to the five-year Kyoto deadline, in 2007, the emissions of the EU-15 countries were approximated to be four percent lower than the baseline in 1990. As can be discerned in the facts suggested, it is quite early and quite misleading confusing to proclaim Kyoto a failure. According to some scholars, in all possibility when 2012 turns around, the industrialized countries will have reduced emissions higher than the aimed 5.2 percent (Lo 2007). Even though this will be attributable largely to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the treaty did not incorporate a provision for amendments for economic prospects. And all the same, there is the possibility of finding EU more autonomous of the Soviet Union and successful in reducing emissions by five percent (Vasser 2008). At this point the present economic recession will facilitate. So far from being unsuccessful, Kyoto looks like it will fulfill its quite narrow targets. Nevertheless, Kyoto cannot be considered a tremendous success either. Since 1990 and in spite of the agreement, worldwide emissions from the use of fossil fuel have escalated by nearly 37 percent (The Worldwatch Institute 2009). Two issues certainly have contributed to this: (1) the tremendous escalation in emissions from China; and (2) the United States’ failure to endorse Kyoto (Baumert 2006). First, China’s emissions have escalated by a huge 153 percent since the last two decades, and China is currently the major emitter (Baumert 2006). The failure to come up with obligatory emission goals on developing countries such as China was a basic error in Kyoto and one that should be corrected in subsequent negotiations. Second, contrary to the EU, the United States, the biggest emitter since Kyoto was approved, witnessed a 17 percent boost in its emissions (Dessler & Parson 2010). The treaty was paralyzed by the decision of the U.S. not to endorse. Nevertheless, China is on the point of surpassing the United States in level of emissions and between them will make up the largest portion of hazardous carbon production and emission across the globe. Some would claim that it is useless for other countries to try to reduce their emissions if the biggest perpetrators are not taking part and may certainly even be worsening the problem (Pike, Lee & Hagenbach 2008). Even though the Kyoto Protocol cannot be the last stride in attaining greenhouse gas emissions reduction, it can be regarded as the greatest historic campaign in dealing with problems in carbon reduction. Within the United Kingdom as well as the United States other programs are taking place to vigorously trim down carbon emissions (Shaffner 2007). Kyoto should be perceived as a springboard to more radical initiative. Contrast between the Outcome of Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord In spite of the excitement, the Copenhagen climate change conference is doomed to fail. The question is why would it fail when Kyoto succeeded? Over the succeeding decades, world leaders will adopt more ambitious emission goals than those suggested, and largely overlooked, in the Kyoto Protocol. However, actual support for more ambitious parameters will collapse. By midcentury, the binding emissions regulations established will be quite below those established at Kyoto, incomparable from the goals for greenhouse gases deliberated by world leaders in Copenhagen. The political resolve for grander regulations, by the advent of 2100, will have shrunk almost entirely. The causes are numerous, but lead to this. Current emerging superpowers such as China, India, and Brazil basically, would not accept serious reductions on their emissions, and the United States and Europe’s pro-regulation masses would not be powerful enough to push their influence (Dessler & Parson 2010). But these explanations are not sufficient to claim that Copenhagen will fail where Kyoto succeeded. A brief background review will facilitate a more valid argument. 175 countries, excluding the United States, ratified the Kyoto Protocol in December 1997. Kyoto built a large market where in non-polluters and polluters may trade ‘pollution rights’ (Lo 2007, 225). This particular market has facilitated the justification of decisions at the individual firm level, but it has to this point failed to lead to the level of reductions projected by the Kyoto Protocol (Lo 2007). Implementing the 1997 treaty has been practically unattainable. One result of the problems experienced since 1997 was a 2007 conference in Bali, Indonesia. The Bali conference had more humble objectives than Kyoto (Vasser 2008). It was a provisional stride on the path to Copenhagen, where it is anticipated there will be a new worldwide treaty. After massive struggle, the U.S. delegate at Bali accepted major compromises at the last-minute. This enabled the setting out of the ‘Bali road map’ for succeeding climate regulation (Vasser 2008). Now the issue is whether these attempts will work or not. Primarily, as aforementioned, Kyoto develops three market-based processes for developed countries to fulfill their emission goals. These are joint implementation, the Clean Development Mechanism, and emissions trading (Lo 2007). All dealings concerning these processes should be documented in the international transaction record kept by the UNFCCC Secretariat and the countries’ national registry (Lo 2007). Accounting is carried out by the parties through presentations of annual emission registers and countrywide reports on a regular basis. Kyoto upholds an inclusive and meticulous system of conformity to guarantee parties are fulfilling their obligations with each form of nonconformity demanding a particular course of action (Hathaway-Zepeda 2004). In contrast, the Copenhagen Accord lacks effective enforcement and compliance systems. The duties of developed countries are measured, accounted for and validated according to globally agreed-to directives, whereas actions by non-Annex 1 (industrialized countries and EIT) countries are mandated to go through local measurement (Posner & Weisbach 2010), accounting and validation with the outcomes presented through national announcements every two years. With regard to technology and finance transfer, Kyoto is intended to aid developing countries to adjust to the detrimental effects of climate change through enabling the finance, transfer, access, and development of environmentally sophisticated technologies (Vasser 2008). Nevertheless, the particular annual financial assistance to developing countries is not specified within Kyoto (Baumert 2006). On the other hand, the Accord requires industrialized countries to give financial assistance, capacity building, and technology for developing nations to enforce adjustment mechanisms (Dessler & Parson 2010). Priority will be granted to Africa, small island States, and poor countries. To encourage parties to ratify an international agreement and not defraud, the agreement should not require them to modify the patterns of their action much from whatever they are already doing. More ambitious agreements, such as the Copenhagen, get rid of potential members or encourage deceptions. The requirements of Kyoto discarded the United States, guaranteeing that it could not succeed (Shaffner 2007). Perhaps that is what the parties who ratified, or at least some of them, were expecting to happen. They can sustain their good reputation and then not comply, since after all it would not be reasonable for them to reduce their emissions when the United States, the world’s largest emitter, does not (Vasser 2008). Giving up self-interest for the wellbeing of the majority does not occur quite often. Another reason for the failure of the Copenhagen’s ambitious goals is the fact that there is an inherent division between the affluent nations whose wealth does not rely greatly on burning our planet and the impoverished countries that actually have no inexpensive alternative yet to carbon and fossil fuel emissions. They have a motivation to do whatever it is necessary to advance the quality of life of the population they rule. The affluent have a motivation to promote the rapidly increasing poor to be environmentally friendly, but the rapidly increasing poor have little motivation to pay heed as long as they remain impoverished (Vasser 2008). As the government of India likes to note, India is fast progressing in income and in greenhouse gas emissions (Lo 2007), but it remains a dull shade of what prosperous nations such as the United States have released over the decades when shifting from poor to rich. However, when the rapidly increasing poor exceed the prosperous, the tables will turn. Brazil, India, Mexico, and China will afterwards call for environmental reform because that will secure their prospective privileged position, while the comparatively poor of hundreds of years from now will oppose regulations that hamper their attempts to ascend to the top (Dessler & Parson 2010). The prosperous will even wage wars to hinder the growing poor from becoming rich that they endanger the established political order. Conclusion The most widespread and frequent remark against the Kyoto Protocol was that it did not oblige largest developing nations such as India and China to curb their carbon emissions, and the brunt of curbing emissions fell mostly on more prosperous countries, such as the EU and the United States. It was one of the primary causes why the United States did not endorse Kyoto. However, the Kyoto Protocol had a number of successes in reducing collective carbon emissions. On the other hand, the climate conference in Copenhagen has led to an unpleasant outcome. The great expectation of the world for a binding and momentous agreement was frustrated by a non-binding agreement referred to as Copenhagen Accord, an agreement mainly arbitrated by the world’s most developed and major polluter, the United States. Having seen the excitement and actions of the climate conference in Copenhagen, one reality became apparent: the climate intercession is not arbitration among equals; it is not a global negotiation for the greater good, the wellbeing of the common people and the environment. It is a self-motivated act where the powerhouses oblige their interest to the detriment of the majority. Rather than promoting the legally obliging commitment for reduction of emissions under the Kyoto Protocol to volumes recommended by science and proposed by social justice, it suggests jointly or independently measured economy comprehensive emissions goals for 2020 (Posner & Weisbach 2010), a commercially oriented method refuting historical climate liabilities of industrialized nations as well as their major obligation to alleviate climate change. The Accord recognizes the necessity to regulate global temperature increase to a bare minimum of two degrees Celsius (The Worldwatch Institute 2009). However, it has no definite goal and legally-binding pledge from affluent nations to curb their emissions by the next decade or earlier. The primary cause of the failure to establish a legally-binding commitment for greenhouse gas emission reduction is the persistent refusal of prosperous countries led by the United States to reduce their carbon discharge in accordance to what is required worldwide. In a profit-oriented and fossil-dependent global production, major capitalist nations fear that reducing their emission will ruin their economy hence losing their control over the global economy. Therefore, the Copenhagen Accord is a statement to the prejudice and unfairness of the global capitalist system, the regimes of the industrialized countries and their duped regimes in the South. Essentially the Accord has failed to establish a legally binding pledge to curb worldwide carbon emissions that peoples who are most affected by global climate change have demanded. Furthermore, it was carried out undemocratically, in the ‘divide and rule’ strategies of colonial and capitalist superpowers, to the detriment of the interest and wellbeing of the majority of the world’s population. And lastly, it bears new market oriented climate mechanisms that view the climate problem as a chance to gain more profit for wealthy nations and their private businesses. Copenhagen Accord will not reap the same successes that the Kyoto Protocol had. It aims to reduce greenhouse gas emission and deal with global warming but in fact, it will result in fugitive global carbon emissions that endanger the world to further environmental catastrophe and human miseries. References Baumert, Kevin A. "Participation of Developing Countries in the International Climate Change Regime." The George Washington International Law Review (2006): 365+. Dessler, A. & E.A. Parson. The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: A Guide to the Debate. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010. Frass-Ehrfeld, Clarisse. Renewable Energy Sources: A Change to Combat Climate Change. Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2009. Hathaway-Zepeda, Taylor. "Qualifying Kyoto: A Warming Climate and Heated Debate." Harvard International Review (2004): 30+. Lo, Shih-Fang. "The Efficiency Gap behind the Annex 1 Parties under the Kyoto Protocol." International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology (2007): 225+. Motavalli, Jim. "Countdown to Copenhagen: The World Faces an Urgent Climate Crisis. Is the International Community Up to the Task?" E. (2009): 28+. Pike, L., A. Lee & M. Hagenbach. Climate Action: Getting Greener: Getting Slimmer, and Going Digital. United Nations, 2008. Posner, E.A. & D. Weisbach. Climate Change Justice. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. Ravindranath, N.H. & J.A. Sathaye . Climate Change and Developing Countries. Norwell, MA: Springer, 2002. Shaffner, Eric. "Repudiation and Regret: Is the United States Sitting Out the Kyoto Protocol to its Economic Detriment?" Environmental Law (2007): 441+. The Worldwatch Institute. State of the World 2009: Into a Warming World. Washington, DC: W.W. Norton & Company, 2009. Vasser, C.P. (ed). The Kyoto Protocol: Economic Assessments, Implementation Mechanisms, and Policy Implications. New York: Nova Science Publishing, 2008. Read More