Durkheim and Social Solidarity - Essay Example

Durkheim and Social Solidarity Durkheim’s theory of the functioning of society is a complex one, rich in detail and intertwined mazes of sociological bases to explain how individuals function both separately and as part of a society. The focus of this paper will be based on his concept of organic solidarity, and how it was seen by Durkheim as a normal development of the division of labour within society. Yet what was ‘society’ for Durkheim, and how did he see the role of its members in relation to it? He saw society as a separate entity from that of its individuals; as independent from the actions of the individuals within it. According to Durkheim, certain social facts such as family norms, formal laws and regulations exercise a form of coercive power on the members of a society, and these exist independently from its members (Martin & McIntyre 1994, p.433). Presented as thus, these social facts are a part of society which are functional but objectively self-existent within a society. In The Division of Labour, Durkheim explored the way in which a society shifts from its more primitive state to a modern society; through the content of its moral rules and stances, and also through the solidarity of its nature. In relation to the former shift, he expressed law as an assurance of a society’s fundamental values, as the moral values attached to individuals by individuals borne of human dignity. He assigned law the unifying value of society, calling it a ‘glorification…of the individual in general…sympathy for all that is human’ (Individualism and the Intellectuals 1889, p.273). As a form of coercive power in society, law depicts society as a moral unit, and we feel the force of this coercive power when we deviate from it. This is not to say that we are constantly aware of the coercive power within society; through the sharing of similar beliefs and goals, we as individuals are able to create the impression that such collective beliefs are our own. Yet how can the members of a society co-exist with a set of moral values which are not a sum of its members individual values? It is as though Durkheim describes us a blank slates, upon which our entering into society is drawn a set of moral values by this separate entity – does this not undermine any autonomy that we could possess as individuals? Just because moral rules are obligatory does not mean that they are not a creation of the collective values and beliefs of its individuals. How can it be a ‘collective common conscience’, (Division of Labour in Society 1893, ch.2) and how can it explain the shift in society which he speaks of? Durkheim’s view of the role of law within a society paves the way for a deeper understanding of how he placed the shift from mechanical to organic solidarity in society. Durkheim saw the law as a unifying function of a society; a collective expression of its moral bases and outlooks. Yet how does this function alongside the concepts of solidarity of which he speaks? What is mechanical solidarity and how does it shift to organic solidarity? Durkheim states that individuals of a society experience social attraction to one another by not only the similarities they share, but also by the differences between them. He sees it as a way by which we complete those elements we feel we lack in our own personality. So a person who feels that he may lack a certain characteristic or element, and in realising this insufficiency, he will seek friends who possess this characteristic or quality that he lacks. But how does this make up for the fact that he lacks this quality? To socialise with those friends who have this quality does not necessarily mean that he will acquire it. Durkheim states that ‘in joining with them, we participate in some measure in their nature, and thus feel less incomplete.’ (Division of Labour). In other words, Durkheim explains that to socialise with certain people allows us to feel part of their world, part of their person and thus through experiencing the quality they lack, we feel as though we do not lack it. It seems to matter not whether we experience this quality we ourselves lack on an internal or external basis, the mere fact of being with another who possesses it allows us to create the illusion that it is a part of our nature as separate from our personality. So we are presented with a solidarity in society created by the differences between some of its members, and where these differences serve to complement each other, we thus create an interdependence with one another based purely on these differences. It is interesting to see how Durkheim expresses a difference between individuals within a society as something that A possesses and B does not. He does not express a more likely and possibly more destructive difference; that in which A possesses and B does not like. It would be interesting to see how he could reconcile those qualities which we do not possess not because we simply lack them, but because we do not like them with his concept of solidarity. Although Durkheim focuses on qualities which we feel we lack and which makes us feel incomplete as a method of solidarity between individuals, he does not seem to touch upon why we would lack them in the first place. Yet by focusing on the differences which create solidarity as those which we lack and desire, he is able to form a more steadfast argument. Durkheim’s definition of mechanical solidarity is not unlike that collective conscience which has already been briefly explored. This mechanical solidarity is a natural element which brings us together within a society separate to what we are as individuals. These mechanical elements precede, and exist independently of us as individuals and connect us by way of a more primitive form of similarity; that we belong to the same group, sector, religion, and so on. This form does not concern who we are as individuals, it simply stops at the fact that we are a member of this certain group. Under this theory, one would imagine each individual in a society as a cluster of black dots dispersed about the page. The mechanical solidarity would be circles drawn around certain clusters which unite them by way of their religion, or tribal belonging, or familial ties. It is the circles which create the solidarity, as separate from the characteristics of each dot – or individual. This form of solidarity exists primarily within primitive groups, for which its individuals’ specific functioning within society plays little part, because there is a low degree of specialisation between members as individuals. Such societies also tend to be more close-knit, for they are bound by this similarity which causes them to share the same values and conceptions. It is the shared form of values which creates the collective conscience in such societies, and it is thus much stronger for it has not been dispersed by specialisation. Durkheim’s concept of the functioning of law within a primitive society is also helpful in gaining an understanding of this mechanical solidarity. He describes law as reproducing ‘the principle forms of social solidarity’ (The Division of Labour in Society 1893, Ch.1), in that closer members within a society will create more particular and distinctive relationships, which thus require a more complex level and number of legal rules to regulate them. This concept of mechanical solidarity does seem convincing, even when applied today. It is highly plausible that in more primitive societies the collective conscience is much stronger, and the individual personality is thus rather repressed. The stronger the degree of mechanical solidarity within a society, the more its individuals share the same values and beliefs, and the less they diverge from this shared set of principles. This can also be applied in connection to the size of a society, which also can depend on its level of development; smaller societies tend to be more primitive, and perhaps this is indeed because its individuals do not diversify, and thus old customs and practices tend to remain. Furthermore, the lack of specialisation in such societies does not require the differentiation between its members, thus they are more able and more likely to share the same values and beliefs, for there is nothing else to question or develop them. It is very easy to see the stark contrast between Durkheim’s organic and mechanical solidarity concepts, especial when placed in the background of the types of society one would expect to see each form of solidarity. It is not surprising that Durkheim’s organic solidarity could only be used to explain this social phenomenon in a more advanced society. Durkheim defines organic solidarity as that which is borne from the members of a society recognising their mutual dependence based on individual ability to carry out specialised activities. The degree of solidarity in terms of collectiveness as seen under the mechanical solidarity model is much weaker here, and individualism is of a much higher degree. In such societies, the division of labour is much more advanced, and so sub-sectors – or groups – are created, along with the need for a separate and distinct form of values which apply to this specialised sector. Society in terms of the collective conscience becomes disjointed, or more depleted, and the shared values and norms are less within society as a whole, and more within industrial sectors and areas of specialisation. This not to say that the functioning of society is completely divided into these sectors, for their working as a whole alongside, although distinctly different in nature and values from one another, is vital for the overall functioning of society. Yet, although Durkheim primarily associates mechanical solidarity with primitive societies and organic solidarity with more advanced societies, it is not to say that the advanced society can not possess forms of mechanical solidarity and vice versa. Durkheim explains that even the most complex and diverse of societies can possess some forms of mechanical solidarity; this rings true if one is to think of the connection between individuals created by shared religious, political or cultural values. Thus, even an advanced society can and will experience some form of mechanical solidarity, and in turn a primitive society will possess some form of specialised areas and individual or group specialisation. Thus, the two forms of solidarity are not exclusive from the two forms of society, it is more that the advanced societies will naturally progress to utilise the organic solidarity as a natural necessity of its advanced state. However, Durkheim states that these two forms of solidarity, beyond being found in a society, do little more and can not be defined in terms of degree by right of its own existence. Instead, Durkheim turns to a different value by which we can measure the level and degree of solidarity within a society. Durkheim’s use of the law within a society arguably gathers great ground in establishing the degree of solidarity within it. Primarily, he distinguishes between restitutive and retributive law and sanctions to determine how developed a society actually is. The sanctioning of acts which fall under restitutive law requires a great deal more of understanding and at the very least economic awareness. Thus, societies which are even able to comprehend the sanction for non performance of contract are from the outset likely to be more advanced, at least in the division of labour sense which Durkheim speaks of. Durkheim also contends that restitutive law develops in societies which experience a high degree of individual variation. In such circumstances, he admits that the collective conscience will weaken, and societies will become content to leave the administration of restitutive sanctions to other bodies. This is because the morality of such a society becomes stretched and thus thins out, conglomerating into specialised sectors of moral codes. If one is to think of the customs and certain regulations involved in the sector of shipping, its moral codes are a far cry from those of everyday life in which we expect our personal selves and property to remain unscathed by others. It is because of the creation of these ‘side-sectors’ in societies with advanced economic conditions, which some of us never even come to experience let alone understand, that such restitutive sanctions connected to them are too distant for the collective conscience as a whole to comprehend or become offended by. Thus those specialised elements which do not govern, or indeed affect our lives sit well with us to be governed and regulated by specialised bodies. This is not to state that such highly advanced societies do not have in common some form of moral code underlying the law as whole, for we still manage to respect the existence of such specialised areas. So to some extent, we retain at least a minimal form of mechanical solidarity in even the most advanced of societies. Durkheim places this on the singular moral element that we all share – respect for the individual. Thus, no matter how complex a society becomes, it still is able to share at least one collective moral basis as part of its conscience. And it is this specific moral connection which allows us to surrender certain restitutive elements to specialised bodies – that we respect the more advanced circumstances of the individual who chooses to indulge in such aspects of life. So Durkheim present his theory of solidarity, in which primitive societies possess the less complex mechanical solidarity, which is more close knit, yet causes its individuals to lose some degree of individuality. Values and interests run more or less along the same lines, and the level of solidarity is high because of this. In contrast, organic solidarity is more apparent in societies which have a more advanced division of labour, in which the segregation of interests is a natural and necessary consequence of such advanced conditions. In such societies, the level of solidarity is of a lesser degree than that of more primitive societies, but this is far from stating that they do not possess at least some form of mechanical solidarity. However, this mechanical solidarity within the more advanced societies is based on other shared factors, such as religion and political beliefs. Furthermore, those primitive societies will also possess some form of organic solidarity, insofar as the division of labour is enacted upon, albeit to a lesser degree. Yet, it is suggestible that Durkheim has been rather simplistic in his ‘black or white’ depiction of social solidarity. Could it only be that there is an advanced society and a primitive society? What of the societies which could be located in between the two stark contrasts? Durkheim seems to ease this problem when he states that both forms of solidarity can be found in both types of society, and this does appear to be a satisfactory reply. The fact that he goes on to admit himself that his solidarity theory is not able to distinguish between different measures of solidarity and division of labour within societies also eases this criticism. He thus admits that the solidarity theory can only go so far in determining – or categorising – the type of society which exists, in terms of degrees of advancement. There does seem to be some confusion, however, surrounding the possibility that a single society may possess stark forms of both solidarity types. Is it not possible, and indeed evident, that a society in today’s era could possess both forms of solidarity? It seems that Durkheim’s theory does not go as far as stating whether high degrees of both forms of solidarity can be possessed in a single society, or whether it is the form of solidarity which creates the dividing line and cuts the society in two. Certainly, some areas, which one would call a single society can contain separate areas of highly advanced division of labour whilst also containing areas of very low economic activity. These societies are not necessarily split into two, and one can only guess that Durkheim would interpret this as so, stating that a single society can contain high degrees of both forms of solidarity within one ‘area’. So this is not to say then, that mechanical and organic solidarity are extreme opposites, rather they are two different forms of society, although they can be contained in a single society, at different levels. One cannot, however, ignore the confusion surrounding whether a society can contain both forms of solidarity to a high degree, or to the same level, which is arguable existent in this era. Durkheim’s theory is a very convincing account of how societies exist and its individuals interact with one another. Despite some confusing elements, which may have developed in light of recent advancements in society, his theory gather much ground in helping one to understand how the degree of division of labour with a society can explain and contribute to its level of solidarity. Yet, it is not only that he established solidarity, he also ties it in with his analysis of the role of law within society – so that a method of measuring the degree of solidarity could be formulated and provide more information. All in all, Durkheim’s feat is immense here; his insight and intellect into the functioning of society as a whole and individually is enlightening and goes a long way in helping one to view society as more than a set of statistics and psychological data. Bibliography Bellah, Robert N. 1973. Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society, Selected Writings. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. Cladis, Mark. Beyond Solidarity? Durkheim and Twnty First Century Democracy in a Global Age. In Alexander, Jeffrey C. & Smith, Phillip Daniel. The Cambridge Companion to Durkheim. 2005. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cotterrell, Roger. 2006. Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in The Mirror of Social Theory. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishers. Durkheim, Emile. 1889. Individualism and The Intellectuals. Reprinted in Pickering W.S.F. & Miller, W.W. 1993. Individualism and Human Rights in The Durkheimian Tradition. Giddens, Anthony. 1972. Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings. London: Cambridge University Press. Hassard, John. 1995. Sociology and Organization Theory: Positivism, Paradigms and Postmodernity. UK: Cambridge University Press. Jones, Susan Stedman. 2001. Durkheim Reconsidered. Cambridge: Polity Press. Lukes, Steven. 1985. Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work. California: Stanford University Press. Martin, Michael & McIntyre, Lee. 1994. Readings in The Philosophy of Social Science. Boston: MIT Press. Mestrovic, Stjepan 1988. Emile Durkheim and the Reformation of Sociology. New York: Rowan & Littlefield. Poggi, Gianfranco. 2000. Durkheim. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Read More