China and the South China Sea Disputes - Essay Example

China and the South China Sea Disputes Introduction The South China Sea is currently the of various territorial and maritime claims from different countries, primarily including China, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. The claims of China are very extensive based on the nine-dash-line which has subsequently caused it to clash with its neighbors, most especially major US ally, the Philippines (Schwartz, 2014). The South China Sea is one of the major waterways of the world serving significant economic activity in Asia. Trade in the area has exceeded over $5 trillion each year and the US economic trade represents about 20% of such economy (Glaser, 2012). Interruptions in the flow of trade in the area would have a grave impact on international economic activity, endangering the norms which have secured relatively peaceful relations in the region. In November of 2013, the National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR) and the Henry M. Jackson Foundation gathered policy experts to discuss the overlapping claims in the South China Sea and consider the impact of US policy in the area (Schwartz, 2014). The participants pointed out the relevance of gathering more data to establish the features of the South China Sea, and therefore settle the issues of these overlapping claims. The NBR also assessed the implications of the US decision not to support the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea in relation to options in supporting the favorable results for the disputes (Schwartz, 2014). In relation to US impact in Asia, it must seek to reduce the possibility of conflict in the region by securing support for the rule of law and ensuring peaceful resolution of conflicting claims. Analysis There are about 100 territorial features which have been recognized in the South China Sea and since problems of sovereignty impact all the countries which have the right to exploit the possible beneficial resources for each feature, the stakes are high (Beckman and Schofield, 2014). The UNCLOS where all parties are members indicate the international standard in establishing ownership of the territorial waters as well as the exclusive economic zones using coastline qualities and related features. There are different features to be considered in this case: islands, low-tide elevations, rocks, submerged features, and artificial islands (Beckman and Schofield, 2014). Such features are identified based on their status during high and low tides, including their ability to support human or economic exploitation. Other features indicate various territorial benefits, including territorial seas, contiguous zones, EEZs, as well as continental shelves (Blanchard, 2014). While the UNCLOS indicates rules in establishing sovereignty, it does not include standards in settling claims of sovereignty. A major issue in going through these claims is the inadequate information available. Current information of whether features based on tide levels is not available or is not sufficient (Storey, 2013). China and the other claimants have often provided maps indicating their claims, which they also use in order to support their claims. Some participants to the discussion indicate that understanding the features of the South China Sea would help them define the region and possibly decide on the overlapping claims (Storey, 2013). Since the available information is too old or is sometimes not clear to provide any actual help to the parties, the participants focused on the issue as one where the US can actually help resolve the issue. In recent months, claiming countries China and the Philippines have resulted to flare-ups in the South China Sea. In April of 2012, a Philippines surveillance ship spotted Chinese fishermen in disputed waters in the South China Sea (McHale, 2013). A Chinese coast guard vessel also moved into the area of conflict and challenged the Philippine vessel. The standoff escalated with the Chinese vessel using nonmilitary vessels to physically bar the opening of the reef. In the weeks which followed, China caused conflicts among the members of the ASEAN, using its economic clout over Cambodia and the other Southeast Asian countries (Storey, 2013). The Philippines, in 2013 then forwarded an arbitration case to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, challenging China’s claims in the region. However, doubt has been expressed on whether the decision of the International Tribunal would actually binding on the parties (Hong, 2013). While international laws applied in this case indicates rules for determining what country would own a specific area, these are based on well-developed, public, and very much available information. Further compromising the possibility of the ITLOS settling this issue is the fact that the UNCLOS members have the choice to refuse compulsory resolution of disputes on issues of sovereignty which China has already opted for (Hong, 2013). As a result, the case is proceeding without China, which would now make the decision of the tribunal difficult to implement. Still, the Philippines’ decision to forward the issue to arbitration indicates a desire to have the issue peacefully resolved (Beckman, 2013). Participants recognize that the decision of the tribunal would at least call attention to China’s actions and prompt discussion on how to resolve the dispute. A political science and a macro-sociology/cultural anthropology perspective can also be made on the issue (Beckman, 2013). The South China Sea in the first place is considered a Mediterranean sea as it is surrounded by land which is claimed by different countries, including mostly the ASEAN countries, Taiwan, and China. Traditionally, the sea has been accessible to all nations and ships except for the three mile zone which were considered part of the national territory (Dieter-Evers, 2014). The UNCLOS extended the national territory zone to 12 miles with a 200 mile exclusive economic zone. The EEZ allowed for exclusive fishing and exploitation rights for the claiming nation state. The UNCLOS provisions can easily be applied to countries without any overlapping claims, especially in the case of islands which may belong to separate states. The UNCLOS provides for suggestions on how some of these territorial issues can be resolved (Quang, 2010). Some of these suggestions include the use of historical evidence to support claims and the UNCLOS also allows for the use of equidistant measures in order to support claims. The Philippines uses the section X of the UNCLOS to claim portions of the South China Sea and China argues based on historical claims. Since the 1970s, various disputes based on UNCLOS provisions have already been settled by the tribunal in Hamburg, Germany. However, the South China claims have yet to be settled (Yee, 2011). One of the possible reasons for failures in settlement may be credited to the increasing importance of the energy resources which have been seen in the South China Sea. The ASEAN members have also become dependent on these resources and China is certainly in need of such energy resources to support its expansive population (Malek, 2013). It is important to understand the underlying causes of these conflicts and overlapping claims. Interpretative sociology by Max Weber as well as the historical analysis of Fernand Braudel would be used for this article (Dieter-Evers, 2014). The analysis would focus on studying the history surrounding the clashes, rather than short outbursts or clashes between contending parties. Weber’s perspective relates to the fact that it is important to understand the intention of the parties, their motives as well as the context upon which actions are taken (Dieter-Evans, 2014). Braudel’s perspective is based on the fact that history can be quantified by using graphs and charts and series data can indicate historical trends. In considering historical trends relating to the South China Sea dispute, there are parallels which can be drawn from the past. For instance, the archipelagic Greeks also battled Persia state at some point and Greece could have effectively claimed the entire Mediterranean Sea, but Alexander the Great defeated the Persian Empire and cut off the Mediterranean Sea (Dieter-Evers, 2014). However, his empire also failed following his death. Conflicts between Rome and Carthage was also based on maritime dominance with Carthage failing and Rome becoming a dominant power in the Mediterranean for many years following. In 1713, when Gibraltar was ceded to Britain, the latter also overrun Malta and controlled sea lanes in the Mediterranean Sea for a while, allowing for the building of the Suez Canal to Asia but also causing instability in the Mediterranean region (Dieter-Evers, 2014). In aligning these events with the current South China Sea issue, China can be perceived here as Rome with the US Empire possibly also seeking governance of the Mediterranean South China Sea. It is important to look deeper into the history of the conflicts. The Mediterranean seas have displayed a history of their countries going through a time of extensive trading as well as religious and scientific exchanges. Common cultures emerged through these trade activities, in the case of Athens, Alexandria, Rome, and Venice. Cultural integration was also seen in the Java Sea and the Straits of Malacca, extending into the South China Sea (Dieter-Evers, 2014). However, such integration did not cover the South China Sea area as the region was never able to develop a common cultural setup as in the Mediterranean region. Despite naval expeditions, extensive trade, migration, religious exchanges, the South China Sea was only one in name, but never in terms of culture (Wu, 2013). Each country looked inward and was very much fragmented. Still, the South China Sea has become one of the major shipping lanes of the world and its rich marine resources and yield have secured lucrative livelihoods for the countries in the region (Chen, 2014). Post-World War II discovery of oil and gas reserves in the South China Sea triggered new geographical conflicts in the region where resource flows, not the political differences presented divisions between countries (Yee, 2011). The positions of the states in the area were reiterated further with negotiations and discussions failing with no apparent effective solutions in place. Analysts point to the weakness of the ASEAN unity which largely contrasts with China’s single-minded and unrelenting power and pursuit of power as an emerging economic and political player (Carpenter, 2013; Yee, 2011). However, beyond such weakness assessment of the ASEAN and China’s determination, Weber and Braudel’s perspectives may provide a better and more effective assessment of the issue (Dieter-Evers, 2014). In general, the accepted perspective of the sea is that it is an open space without specific or lineal points or bounds. Boundaries are based on land coordinates with three mile zones, 12 mile international boundaries based on coast lines being the UNCLOS-recommended settlements (Ratner, 2013). The EEZ or exclusive economic zone extending 200 miles also allows for exploration of marine resources. The seas are considered open space and can be accessed by vessels traversing the area. The states in the Mediterranean seas have specific qualities based on their maritime options in the region. Those with extensive coast lines, deep rivers, and long natural harbours enjoy better and more lucrative economic potentials (Evers, 2011). As such, these would likely cause tensions for states in the region. States with bigger landmass may not consider the seas as lucrative areas. The Mediterranean region would likely manifest similar geographical structures in land and maritime conditions. Some of these countries in the region may be Border States with smaller coastlines in relation to their landmass; however, there may at least be three Mediterranean areas where at least one state covers various islands of an archipelago (Dieter-Evers, 2014). Based on the UNCLOS, the archipelagic state refers to the state which is made up wholly of one or more archipelagos and would likely cover other islands. Archipelago covers various islands, including islands, connected waters, other natural qualities which are very much interconnected that these islands and waters support an inherent geographical, economic, as well as political system. Braudel suggests that geographical conditions of the Mediterranean seas would affect the flow of history (Braudel, 1972). The cultural elements in the flow of history are also important within the context of the discussion. Anthropologists would support the notion that cultural values are harder to shift when compared to political or economic systems. It is therefore important to consider the concept of space in relation to the cultural traits of significant permanence (Yee, 2011). Due to the significant ethnic diversity in the South China Sea area, this would likely be a difficult task. It is therefore important to consider some concepts which may likely impact on propositions which would support research in terms of issues in the South China Sea. Countries in the South China Sea include three cultural groupings. China, Taiwan, Singapore, and Vietnam have common cultural qualities, same with Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. Thailand also has a specific and unique culture (Hong, 2013). The disparities are not specifically known, especially as these countries have different ethnicities, however there seems to be dominant ethnicities which have supported long-term politics in the area. Focusing on two major blocks, first the Nusantara (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines), and the Sinic block (China, Taiwan, Singapore and Thailand) cultural perceptions of space can be differentiated (Dieter-Evers, 2014). The cultural translation of maritime space with therefore be based on the Longue Duree of history according to Braudel. Such method would improve understanding of current issues in the South China Sea. Malays and Chinese perceptions of space seem to be different with Chinese space indicated specific boundaries. In Southern China, village houses are neatly lined in a row with their ancient cities closed in by walls in order to ensure ideal patterns in the region (McHale, 2013). The Malay kampongs on the other hand include scattered houses which are set on lands without specific boundaries. In the Malay setting, there is no specific understanding of urban space and no word to actually translate to ‘city.’ Power comes from the Sultan and may be supported by walls; however, the houses are scattered around the inclusively designated areas. Power is concentrated on one person, mostly designated by the sultan with servants and warriors given duties as citizens (Karim, 2013). Each sultanate may have a specific area which he rules over and the disparate ruling areas would likely result to haphazard and unclear borders which often overlap with each other. The focus on a centre, a leader where power emanates from is an Austronesian idea often observed in Southeast Asian countries. Power comes from the centre which thins out with distance (Dieter-Evers, 2014). Such concepts were changed with the entry of colonial rule; however the traditional concepts of space are still present as cultural qualities as well as perceptions. Authority is strong at the centre but then is diminished farther away from the centre. Another concept of space for the Malays is their focus on water. Nusantara specified maritime space between islands while Chinese conceptualizations are land-based. Ancient Chinese have always believed on transcendental relations with the vastness of the ocean (Sun, 2010). The concept of defence for China has been changed by Deng Hsiao Ping in order to relate more to offshore defence which is different from China’s idea of protecting lands (Sun, 2010). However for the Malays and other peoples, the focus of their life and protection is the water, not the land (Andaya, 2000). The Malay states derived their wealth from trading in river products, trading across the sea to other kingdoms and sultanates (Hall, 1985). Power was focused on home or what is called the istana, pushing upriver and veering further away into the waters. The Nusantara centred and circling concept of space is different from the Chinese concepts of bound space. Unclear boundaries against specific and defined boundaries specifically define the issues in the South China Sea (Dieter-Evers, 2014). The Nusantara understanding refers to a maritime perception of free and unrestricted space, and the Chinese view the South China Sea as a bound territory and their exclusive territory. The two precepts of space do not match each other and being cultural concepts are hard to change. The position of China on the South China Sea issue also seems to be founded on its concept of space. A change from the inward-looking policy to an outward looking and strong naval power does not necessarily mean that the concept of space has changed significantly (Dieter-Evers, 2014). Thousands of years of history cannot be set aside in a few decades; economies can be transformed to better levels within the span of a century, culture can cover a longer time period and values can be very difficult to change. Max Weber’s discussion on the relevance of religiously-founded protestant ethics in the establishment of European capitalism indicates how prolonged and stable values match diverse economic as well as political transitions (Weber, 2010). The Chinese understanding of bounded space is very much a stable cultural system, one which supports the country’s southward growth into the Nan Yang, or the Southern maritime region. The entire South China Sea is being claimed by China and they have drawn clear boundaries which go deep into the south, often disregarding the different claims of other ASEAN members. Based on an ASEAN perspective on the South China Sea, the region is likened to a territory of the Malay or Javanese Sultanates (Dieter-Evers, 2014). The Brunei, Malaysia, Filipino, and Indonesian claims are piled and levelled next to each other. This is not a cause for much concern among the Malay and Indonesian politicians, for as long as the different claims are acknowledged. However, this is not the case for Vietnam and China especially as China’s claim has been made very much clear. The South China Sea is apparently theirs. The desire for energy resources, including oil may be considered the primary reason for China’s claim, however, this may also be settled via negotiations, allowing for different boundaries, one which is likely to horrify China and its idea of bounded space. Cultural values however cannot be wholly used to explain the issue, and these traits cannot be considered as fixed concepts. These concepts are however difficult to change. It is therefore easier to allow for the expansion of the economy to support the GDP rather than to shift cultural values. This must be considered when suggesting possible solutions to the complicated and culturally-established issues. Conclusion The South China Sea maritime dispute has been in existence for a long while now, however, in the past year and especially in the last few months, China has manifested actions which indicate how it is aggressively moving towards protecting its claim over the region. Its actions have mostly been directed towards the areas and contested islands near the Philippines. The Philippines has subsequently submitted the issue for international settlement. However, the settlement of the issue under international tribunal would not guarantee China’s assent to said decisions. In understanding the issue, history and culture can be used to explain the claims of the different South East Asian countries and of China. Some of these countries claim the South East Asia based on historical claims and these area claims cannot be considered serious because, at best they are frivolous and are difficult to prove without specific provisions and documentable evidence. The two concepts of maritime space are incompatible, hence, the conflict in the region. The Nusantara model supports the sharing of resources, and although it would make a patchwork division for the region, it would provide the fairest solution for the conflict. In the end, appeasing and securing peace in the region would best be served by providing an acceptable compromise for the claimants, not one which is based on an unbending and all-encompassing claim, such as the claims made by China. References Beckman, R., 2013. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the Maritime Disputes in the South China Sea. American Journal of International Law, 107(1), pp. 142-163. Beckman, R. & Schofield, C., 2014. The South China Sea Disputes: Formula for a Paradigm Shift [online]. Available at: http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/Perspective/RSIS0352014.pdf [Accessed 14 March 2014]. Blanchard, B., 2014. China to start regular patrols from island in South China Sea [online]. Available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/21/us-china-seas-idUSBREA0K0G220140121 [Accessed 14 March 2014]. Braudel, F., 1972. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. London: Collins. Carpenter, T. G., 2013. Dangerous Congressional Meddling in the South China Sea [online]. Available at: http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/dangerous-congressional-meddling-in-the-south-china-sea/ [Accessed 14 March 2014]. Chen, D., Pu, X., & Johnston, A. I., 2014. Debating Chinas Assertiveness. International Security, 38(3), pp. 176-183 Dieter-Evers, H. (2014). Understanding the South China Sea: an explorative cultural analysis. IJAPS, 10(1). Evers, H. & Karim, A., 2011. The Maritime Potential of ASEAN Economies. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs 30 (1): pp. 117−124. Hall, K., 1985. Maritime Trade and State Development in Early Southeast Asia. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.Storey, I., 2013. Manila Ups the Ante in the South China Sea. China Brief, 13(3). Glaser, B., 2014. Armed Clash in the South China Sea. Council on Foreign Relations, Contingency Planning Memorandum, no. 14 [online]. Available at: http://www.cfr.org/world/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883 [Accessed 13 March 2014]. McHale, S., 2013. Conflict over the South China Sea: Identity Politics Meets History. Policy. Hong, Z. H., 2013. China-Philippines Relations Stunted by the South China Sea Dispute. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Karim, M. A., 2013. The South China Sea Disputes: Is High Politics Overtaking?. Pacific Focus, 28(1), pp. 99-119. Lee, G. B. & Evers, H.-D., 1978. Urban-Development and Landownership in Butterworth, Malaysia. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9 (1), pp. 28−49. Malek, M., 2013. A legal assessment of Chinas historic claims in the South China Sea. Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs, 5(1), p. 28. Quang, M., 2010. The South China Sea Security Problem: Towards Regional Cooperation. Asia Europe Journal 8, pp. 427−434. Ratner, E., 2013. Rebalancing to Asia with an Insecure China. The Washington Quarterly, 36(2), pp. 21-38. Schwartz, L., 2014. Competing Claims in the South China Sea: Potential Paths Forward and Implications for the United States [online]. Available at: http://www.nbr.org/research/activity.aspx?id=401#.UyRtTs7Gb0U [Accessed 13 March 2014]. Sun, L. 2010. Chinese Maritime Concepts. Asia Europe Journal 8 (2), pp. 327−338. Wu, S., 2013. Solving disputes for regional cooperation and development in the South China Sea: a Chinese perspective. London: Elsevier. Read More