Irredentism on a Few Specific Locations - Essay Example

Irredentism Table of Contents Introduction Discussion References Introduction This paper explores irredentism in the context of three locations where irredentism may rear its head within the next half century, by way of identifying possible courses of action that may be taken after the so-called problematic locations have been identified. The exploration identifies those places and locations where irredentism is a flashpoint, and undertakes a discussion too of several facets of irredentism as they apply to the locations. Among the aspects discussed are the aggressor countries and the targets of their aggression; population and/or historical claims used to justify the territorial claims; how likely foreign populations within target countries or territories to aid claiming countries who use aggression to push for the claims making use of violence and/or political action; targeted areas for the claims; present and/or future alliances that may figure in concerted military actions related to irredentism; treaties tied to the disputed territories, prior wars and/or disputes tied to the disputed territories; success capacities of the aggressor countries/parties to claim the territories successfully; resistive capacities of the target countries or territories; avenues open to target countries for resistance and to prevent being taken over by claiming countries; Political parties and groups/factions that may reshape policy of the state towards irredentist actions; and other aspects of the subject matter that are relevant (Vardy, 1983; Plaut, 1999). Irredentism of course, as can be gleaned from the above aspects, relates to the popular political drive for the reclamation of territories based on either historical claims or the ethnic affinity of the claiming nations/parties with a part of the population in those targeted countries/territories. Irredentism has a long precedent throughout human history, and continues to play a large part in the dynamics of many present conflicts involving nations and ethnic groups around the world. This paper focuses on a few specific locations and discusses those aspects of irredentism that have been outlined in this Introduction (Stack Exchange, 2015; Waterbury, 2009; Carment and James, 1995). Discussion Europe has ever been a flashpoint for various irredentist claims and territorial disputes throughout its long history, and there are some that have spilled over to the modern era, even as the bounds of the claims and the issues tied to them have evolved through time too. There are Spain’s claims to Gibraltar just to name one; Bulgaria’s claims on Macedonia; and Russia’s general irredentist claims towards its former empire, the Soviet Union territories. In Asia, there are the claims of China over South Tibet as well as the Indian territory of Arunachal Pradesh, which according to the Chinese government is a territory that is included in Tibet; irredentist claims by Pakistan over Kashmir as weal as Jammu, in dispute with India. Cambodia over parts of Vietnam’s Mekong Delta; and Japan’s dispute with Russia over the Kuril Islands. In South America, there are the claims of Bolivia over Chile’s coasts; and Argentina and Britain over the Falklands. Some of these disputes have already been resolved and are not active, but some are not active in the main but continue to simmer in the background, with the claimants just biding their time and waiting for more opportune times to resume actions towards getting physical claim to the disputed territories (Answers Corporation, 2015). China is an interesting focus of an irredentism discussion and analysis because of its recent belligerent actions towards its neighbors in the South China Sea, and because it has the ambition, the future capabilities, and the historical claims and precedent to push its irredentist claims on many territories, in dispute with many countries. Some analysts point to China waging future wars to reclaim at least six territories over the next half century or so, making China the perfect focus of discussions for the purposes of this paper. To be specific, China is touted as making true on its irredentist claims against key territories by going to war, with the target territories being Taiwan, The Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, Southern Tibet, the Ryukyu and Senkaku Islands in a dispute with Japan, and Outer Mongolia. Each of these disputes constitute a different set of dynamics and a different set of considerations as outlined in this paper’s Introduction. The constant, arguably, is China’s growing military and economic might, and how that translates to future capabilities to make good on its irredentism agenda. Then too, one can expect given its present acts of belligerence and aggression, that it may go and launch the irredentist claims whenever the time is ripe and the target territories and nations are not able to either protect themselves and fend off attacks or are left out in the cold by other nations, such as the United States, who may opt to stay out of the disputes and may just opt to allow China to go ahead with the territorial annexations with no resistance. It remains to be seen what the final outcomes are, but in most cases China has the upper hand in sheer economic and military power in comparison to its counter parties to the disputes, with the exception of Japan and Taiwan to a lesser extent, who may have the economic if not the military capabilities to be able to slug it out with China in a prolonged and protracted fight to gain access to the territories on the part of China and to fend off attacks from China in the case of the target territories and their governments (Consortium of Defense Analysts, 2013; Chellanney, 2000; Chellaney, 2013). It is interesting to note that for many of its territorial disputes with different countries take off from the perspective of China laying claim to historical ownership and rights to the target territories. This is the case for the Spratlys and a large chunk of the South China Sea; Taiwan; and the disputed islands with Japan, namely the Senkaku and Ryukyu Islands, as well as South Tibet. It is interesting too that as some experts have pointed out, the historical claims being made have been pushing outward since the end of the Second World War, as evidenced by the way China had been redrawing the bounds of its claimed territories as it was able to gain control of larger and larger parts of Tibet. Redrawings have come to claim parts of Indian territories close to Tibet as being part of Tibet and therefore part of China. Historically therefore China has had a history of using any and all power in order to continue to carve out a larger and larger territory as part of its own. This, and its recent belligerence, suggests that the historical push continues, only slowed down by China’s own tempo and timing. The dynamics of China’s irredentism is therefore based on a very fluid definition of history. In the most loose sense, it owns or is able to lay claim to lands that it says it owns, whether or not the historical basis is accurate. It then uses a strategy that it used with Tibet of de facto legitimizing its claims by creeping closer and closer to the territory and then backing up its bold claims with military power, eventually superseding old realities with new rules backed up by military power and permanent settlement. The Tibet dynamic as it can be called, is observed to be in operation now with its claims to territories that are now part of India but very close to Tibet. Moreover, this same dynamic is said to be in place in the South China Sea, where China has laid claim to a large part of it, and is quietly creeping into the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea as preparation for that long and drawn out process that it was able to use successfully with Tibet (Chellaney, 2000; Chellaney, 2013). The fact is that by themselves the counter parties to the dispute may be unable to resist China in the long term, but given the broad alliances among them, and the mandatory support of the United States for instance for Japan and other countries in the South China Sea in the event of attack by China, means that there are ways by which the parties to the dispute with China may be able to fend off China’s irredentist claims. India meanwhile definitely has the resources and the manpower to resist China, and to engage China in war if necessary in order to defend its territory. In the South China Sea, on the other hand, American treaties with key countries in the dispute, and inter-country alliances, can provide some muscle. Taiwan is vulnerable but can also rely on the military protection of the West, for now. On the other hand, unlike the countries in South East Asia, which have some political cohesion, Taiwan is relatively isolated. The waning of American power may translate to Taiwan being vulnerable to a successful attack by China in the next fifty years. The thinking is that China’s irredentism is something that is innate in its way of being as a country and that the future success of its government and its economy will only give China more ammunition to push forward with its irredentist claims on the territories discussed above. What is finally fantastic about China’s brand of irredentism is that it has had great success with Tibet for instance, in the recent past, with no claim to its own ethnic groups being in the territories, but rather that it has made very bold claims about the disputed territories being China’s based on dubious historical foundations (Consortium of Defense Analysts, 2013; Chellanney, 2000; Chellaney, 2013). 1 References Answers Corporation (2015). List of irredentist claims or disputes. Answers.com. Retrieved from http://www.answers.com/topic/list-of-irredentist-claims-or-disputes Carment, D. and James, P. (1995). Internal Constraints and Interstate Ethnic Conflict: Toward a Crisis-Based Assessment of Irredentism. Journal of Conflict Resolution 39 (82). Retrieved from http://cc.sjtu.edu.cn/G2S/eWebEditor/uploadfile/20121029212204712.pdf Chellaney, B. (2000). Chinese irredentism threatens Asia- and may come back to haunt Beijing. The Japan Times. Retrieved from http://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2000/11/09/commentary/chinese-irredentism-threatens-asia-and-may-come-back-to-haunt-beijing/#.VPiNlCie38M Chellaney, B. (2013). Irredentist China Ups the Ante. Forbes. Retrieved from http://www.forbes.com/sites/brahmachellaney/2013/12/02/6/ Consortium of Defense Analysts (2013). China’s irredentist nationalism and the six wars sure to come. cofda. Retrieved from https://cofda.wordpress.com/2013/09/23/chinas-irredentist-nationalism-and-the-six-wars-to-come/ Plaut, S. (1999). Palestinian Irredentism: A Warning from History. Middle East Quarterly 6 (2). Retrieved from http://www.meforum.org/459/palestinian-irredentism-a-warning-from-history Stack Exchange (2015). Why is the OED’s first reference to irredentism as late as 1886? English Language and Usage. Retrieved from http://english.stackexchange.com/questions/186263/why-is-the-oeds-first-reference-to-irredentism-as-late-as-1886 Vardy, S. (1983). The Impact of Trianon upon Hungary and the Hungarian Mind: The Nature of Interwar Hungarian Irredentism. Hungarian Studies Review X (1). Retrieved from http://efolyoirat.oszk.hu/00000/00010/00008/pdf/HSR_1983_1_021-042.pdf Waterbury, M. (2009). From Irredentism to Diaspora Politics: States and Transborder Ethnic Groups in Eastern Europe. Center for Global Studies, George Mason University. Retrieved from http://www.gmu.edu/centers/globalstudies/publications/gmtpwp/gmtp_wp_6.pdf Read More