New Green Liberalism by Simon Hailwood - Essay Example

In his article “New Green Liberalism”, Simon Hailwood argues that the concepts of liberal environmental justice and ecological justice are continuations of the same thought. The author defines ecological justice as something based on a non-instrumental view of nature. In using this term, he indicates that nature should be considered as something other than how it can be useful or necessary for human existence. In other words, it exists regardless of its relationship to humans. Hailwood summarizes his argument by stating, “‘Respecting nature’s otherness’ requires not identifying oneself (or one’s own interests, or indeed humanity or humanity’s interests) with wider nature, and recognizing that wider nature is not merely an extension of human culture (i.e., its material resource). Similarly, liberal ‘political reasonableness’ requires accepting neutrality the level of the justification of principles of justice; one should not expect them to enshrine one’s own conception of the good” (1). With nature considered to be something existent unto itself, it must be considered within the framework of political liberalism. Having presented his argument and attempted to make it clear, the author then moves on to explore what he means more fully regarding ecological justice. This process starts with a more thorough exploration of what it might mean to take a non-instrumental view of nature and how to consider what it would mean to respect nature’s otherness. Essentially, he describes ‘nature as other’ as something “independent of, or not determined by, the significances attributed to it, and the modifications made to it, within local landscapes” (2). While he acknowledges that this is an imprecise definition, he also makes the case that it is precise enough for the purposes of his argument. To determine what it means to respect nature’s otherness, he then presents what he terms three fundamental truths that must be kept in mind. The first of these is that ideas of ‘awe and humility’ must be given priority over concepts of arrogance and superiority over nature as it simply exists. This suggests that humans should “maintain a respectful distance” from the idea of nature by avoiding making any express demands on it. This includes making any attempt to put its resources to meeting human consumption demands or to involve it as an object of human adoration. The two additional truths include the No Teleology Thesis and the Autonomy Thesis, each of which assert the concept that there is no reason to believe that nature should have any direct connection to humans or have any human purpose as a motivation for being. Because of this, theories such as Goodin’s ‘green theory’ indicates that nature, as something that has as origin independent from humans or human purposes, is something that should be given the highest value. At the same time, however, it is necessary for humans to situate themselves within a landscape in order to shape their perspective. Culture is developed and shaped by the landscape around them which has been adapted and changed as humans have used the resources that landscape makes available to them. Nature with this kind of human influence is landscape and it is this that most people have in mind when they conceive of the concept ‘nature’ in their minds. For this reason, it takes additional thought to consider nature as something that has evolved independent of human influence that should be respected as such and yet remains so susceptible to human behavior. This ability to separate nature from landscape is the objectivity Hailwood indicates is the first necessary step to respecting nature’s otherness. Taking this kind of viewpoint means nature must exist for its own ends which can be considered in terms of positive or negative ends. Positive ends suggest it is moving toward something while negative ends suggest humans should do their best to simply stay out of the way. A positive end is something that can be identified and thus actions can be taken that will help that end be reached more efficiently. The end goal of nature, though, cannot be identified, so Hailwood makes his case that nature, once respected as something other than its instrumental to human existence, must be treated as having a negative end and thus humans must do what they can to just stay out of the way. “Even if we think that (any part of) independent nature has ends of its own, to seek to identify with them and make them our own, or see them as external endorsements of our own goals, is to ignore nature’s otherness” (7). While nature influences and constrains the cultures that develop within a given environment, this cannot be said to be the end goal as nature does not determine the culture, only sets the basic parameters within which the culture must exist. In terms of relating nature to human development in the form of political or social structures, then, nature has no direct role. However, language development has consistently referred to ‘natural’ societies as being those that are conscious of reducing their impact on the natural world while ‘unnatural’ societies are those that exploit the land to the greatest degree. To demonstrate how this ecological justice meshes with concepts of environmental justice, the author next moves into a closer examination of the liberal perspective mentioned in his introduction. Much of his argument is based on the theories of Rawls in which reasonableness refers to “first a willingness to propose fair terms of social cooperation that others as free and equal also might endorse, and to act on these terms, provided others do, even contrary to one’s own interest; and second, a recognition of the burdens of judgment and acceptance of their consequences for one’s attitude (including toleration) toward other comprehensive doctrines” (9). In other words, first to agree on standard terms of interaction and then abide by them and second recognizing the responsibility this implies upon one’s actions and beliefs. The reasonable is modified by the rational, which is how the agent goes about pursuing its own ends. Taking a reasonable approach tends to ensure a political situation in which a more neutral perspective is adopted because less private interest is involved. As in defining the concept of nature as opposed to landscape, the author acknowledges that there are no sharp boundaries where total neutrality exists and few instances where total nihilism succeeds, but he claims this provides a satisfactory framework from which to base his arguments. Within the political realm, “the reasonable person does not seek to identify the state or political with her own conception of the good life” (11). Having achieved the necessary objectivism to apply this neutrality of perspective to the human societies, the author moves forward to draw connections between ecological justice and environmental justice as continuations of the same thought. If these ideas can be applied on the human level, he suggests, it should not be such a stretch to expand these ideas to also respect the concept of nature as other. As with the relationships among humans, there is no means of achieving absolute neutrality toward nature and landscape, but injecting the idea of reasonable neutrality as in human societies introduces a possibility of a more harmonious balance. In applying these ideas to nature, though, Hailwood emphasizes the need to establish a point of neutrality. Among people, “liberal neutrality is about reasons for acting” while nature’s actions are in response to causes rather than reasons (12). In other words, nature does not set out to react in a given way, to create a given landscape or to dictate a specific event. Rather, it responds to forces we may or may not understand that we may or may not have put in place and that we must interpret as having no particular end goal in mind – nature’s neutrality. Just as political systems cannot dictate that a single specific definition must be followed by all of the citizens within its territory, neither can anyone impose one specific interpretation for the ultimate ideal form of nature in a given area at a given time. The single most important concept in this discussion is the idea of toleration, finding a means of allowing both to exist to as great a degree as possible without threatening the ability of the other to exist also to their greatest degree without infringing on the rights of others. While it is necessary for us to adopt a more liberal, non-instrumentally neutral attitude regarding our respect for nature as other, Hailwood emphasizes that this is not the position of the ‘green activist’ attempting to discover a more ‘natural’ life nor is it the instrumentalist approach in which the natural ‘good life’ is one that strives to preserve those resources required for human comfort. This meshing of conceptions of nature provides a means by which the emotional green activists meet with the dispassionate concepts of the political machine. With this understanding of how ecological law and environmental law are continuations of the same line of thought, discussion of nature independent of human perception can be engaged in between green activists and pragmatic politicals, achieving the aims of the former by encouraging the latter to respect nature as other and thus allow it to fall within the jurisdiction of protecting neutrality. Acknowledging some of the objections that might be raised against his ideas, Hailwood assures his audience that he is not suggesting nature as other or nature as wilderness should be respected “to the point of a misanthropic disregard of human concerns” (19). He points out that nature as other refers to something greater than simple wilderness to include things such as weather, tectonics, animals and insects and therefore can occur in every element from the deepest cave to the highest point in the stratosphere. In addition, it is impossible to fully extract the subjective from the equation just as it is impossible to extract the human from nature entirely. The question is not whether we need nature to survive, which represents the instrumental view of nature, but on whether we will accord nature as other the same protections of neutrality that we accord to other societies and cultures within our midst. Hailwood acknowledges weaknesses in his argument throughout his essay and takes the time to explore some possible objections to it following his presentation. The biggest weakness with his argument is his highly subjective foundations. His definition of terms he is to use is vague while the language he uses to convey his ideas seems deliberately complicated. By their nature, the concepts under discussion are abstract and therefore the definitions must be vague, but any comparison of two abstract terms is going to remain abstract as well. The author’s use of complicated sentence structure and advanced terms makes the study all the more complicated. To improve communication of his meanings, the author should have attempted to go back through his text to simplify language. His argument seems to be well structured as he first presents his argument and then spends time attempting to define the two major parts of his thesis. With these ideas in place, he moves on to draw a parallel between them and launches into discussion of how these ideas can be used to further more sustainable interaction between human societies and nature as other. He finishes his argument by attempting to address objections and concluding with an appeal to objective reasonableness in attempting to acknowledge nature’s place in our political and social discussions. References Hailwood, Simon. (2003). A New Green Liberalism. Available November 30, 2009 from Read More