Biomedical Ethics of Birth - Essay Example

Writing a Thesis ment This paper will explore whether, as argued by American philosopher and Mary Ann Warren, moral or legal rights should be accorded at birth and not at conception. Where Warren suggests that fetuses cannot have moral rights because they do not possess the characteristics one must have to be deemed a person, I think that fetuses should be protected as persons and granted rights which can afford them such protection, irregardless of how physically & mentally immature they are. I will argue that advances in technology have given us more insight to fetal development, and these may shed light on the moral respect due to fetuses. Where Mary Anne Warren maintains that legal rights should not be extended to fetuses as doing so would violate women’s rights such as the right to self-determination for one, I concur that it would prove difficult to protect individual persons who share one body. This was evident in the Supreme Court’s decision in the Case of Ms. G (Thomas & Waluchow, 2002). The ruling further supports Warren’s position on the issue. I will conclude the paper stating that a fetus is also a person and thus deserves our moral respect but any right it may have comes only second to a higher right, that of the woman who bears it. This may sound harsh but it will be best to remember, as history has shown us with slavery, apartheid & abortion, that what is legal isn’t always going to be moral. For the subject of this paper, I will be treating a fetus’ moral right separately from its legal right. In discussing why birth, not conception, is morally significant, Mary Ann Warren presented several opposing assumptions. Believers of the intrinsic-properties assumption find that birth does not change any intrinsic properties of a fetus. Both fetuses & newborn infants almost have the same intrinsic properties. According to one believer, only the capacity of sentience, or being responsive, and the degree of such is a valid basis for moral standing. Warren argues other species would have a higher moral standing than infants if proven that these species are highly sentient. She further says that if the sentient criterion is true then all sentient beings should be treated as moral equals. Therefore, killing other sentient beings such as a mouse or a fly should be considered as immoral as killing an infant. Another philosopher claims that unless a being is capable of wanting to exist, it can’t have a right to life. Since neither an infant nor a fetus is self-aware then killing them wouldn’t be inherently morally wrong. “Other things being equal, it is surely worse to kill a self-aware being that wants to go on living than one that has been self-aware and that has no such preference.” (Boetzkes, E. and Waluchow, W. 2002) When an infant becomes self-aware, around the age of 3, this should be when their right to life is strong. If this is so, Warren argues, then why is it in some cultures ceremonies or decisions marking the infant as a member of the community are made after only a few days of birth? It may be that the longer the infant lives & becomes part of those around it, the harder it would be to kill it. Warren finds this last idea morally relevant. In On the Moral and Legal Status of Abortion Mary Anne Warren writes that beings should have two or three of the characteristics listed below to be considered a person. She suggests “that the traits which are most central to the concept of personhood, or humanity in the moral sense are, very roughly, the following: 1) Consciousness (of objects and events external and/or internal to the being), and in particular the capacity to feel pain; 2) Reasoning (the developed capacity to solve new and relatively complex problems); 3) Self-motivated activity (activity which is relatively independent of either genetic or direct external control); 4) The capacity to communicate, by whatever means, messages of an indefinite variety of types, that is, not just with an indefinite number of possible contents, but on indefinitely many possible topics; 5) The presence of self-concepts, and self-awareness, either individual or racial, or both. (1996)” A fetus, according to Warren, lacks these characteristic & as such is a non-person that can’t enjoy rights. I find myself disagreeing. Because of advanced technology, we can say that the fetus meets two characteristics, specifically 1 & 3, on Warren’s list. A fetus has been seen to feel pain. “At 11 weeks after conception the fetus starts to swallow the surrounding amniotic fluid and to pass it back in his urine. He can also produce complex facial expressions and even smile.” (Human Development, n.d.) If we go by Warren’s list, then a fetus is a person, deserving of, for this part of the paper, moral rights. Some may disagree saying consciousness and self-motivated activity are not enough bases for personhood & the moral respect. I say if people who are not conscious like those in comatose, or not able to think rationally like those in mental institutions, or not able to move due to paralysis and such are still considered by society as persons and not treated immorally, then why not a fetus that is more sentient & capable of self-activity than them? Warren also says an infant is a social being and as such can be considered as a potential person because we can interact with it. The infant at birth enters the human social world, where, if it lives, it becomes involved in social relationships with others, of kinds that can only be dimly foreshadowed before birth. (Boetzkes, E. and Waluchow, W. 2002) The infant is said to be cared for and known as an individual even if it is not yet self-aware. Thus, Warren says, even if an infant doesn’t have inherent properties which give it a moral right stronger than a fetus’, the fact that it actually emerges into the social world makes us consider giving it a stronger right. I believe a fetus is also a social being. A pregnancy almost always evokes emotions from society, may these emotions be good or bad. We also see how soon-to-be parents start preparing for the child by purchasing baby stuff, reading aloud stories or making it listen to music, etc. Some may say these practices are also done by pet-lovers and plant owners. Are we to say then that pets & plants can have moral rights? For this argument, I think it best to remember the classification of species. People are humans. When they conceive, they naturally think of the being within them as humans as well. When they sing, read or talk to this being, it is not just a myth believing doing so would make the being grow healthier or faster as it is with plant & pet owners. These actions are borne out of their instinct as mothers &/or fathers. On a negative note, we also see how unwanted pregnancies are taken care of the soonest possible time. I think these practices prove even more how fetuses can be social beings like infants. In discussing a fetus’ legal rights, I will refer to the case study of Ms. G. The Supreme Court upheld the appeals court’s decision stating that the court cannot force the woman to get treatment. It also said that valuing the fetal rights more than the woman’s would encroach on the woman’s freedom of movement. I think Warren may claim that the Supreme Court’s ruling was just and reasonable especially since the issue involved a choice between upholding fetal rights or women’s rights. This is exactly why Warren is against granting rights to fetuses. The court discussions may also please Warren as they talk about a non-existent child. This is consistent with Warren’s belief that personhood is marked by birth and not at conception. On the other hand, the dissenting opinion also refers to having a degree of protection for the unborn child or the possibility of endangering it if the pregnancy is taken to term. To these Warren may say that protection isn’t necessary for a being that has yet to exist. On this point I would have to agree with the Supreme Court’s ruling. Granted that there are existing laws providing legal protection for unborn children, these rights should only come in second to the woman’s rights. I do not negate Ms. G’s moral responsibility. She had been through the same situation thrice before and yet she had continued to expose herself to the same predicament. Seeing the disabilities brought about by her addiction to her two older kids, Ms. G. should have ensure the life inside of her would not be affected by her addiction. However, it would be a violation of her rights if we took matters into our own hands. As the Court ruled, how sure is society that the remedy won’t turn out worse? I conclude this paper stating that a fetus, based on Mary Anne Warren’s checklist, is a person. As members of the same society, we must therefore accord the same degree of moral respect to fetuses like we give to fellow persons. Nevertheless, this doesn’t mean legal rights necessarily follow for the fetus. Although there are statutes now in place for the legal protection of fetuses even at conception, these should be implemented only second to the woman’s rights and yet not be taken lightly in situations of life and death. References Human development from conception to birth. (n.d.) Society for the Protection of Unborn Children. Retrieved on March 23, 2009 from http://www.spuc.org.uk/ethics/abortion/human-development T.A. Mappes and D. DeGrazia, eds. Biomedical Ethics. 4th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc. 1996, pp. 434-440. Thomas, J. and Waluchow, W. (2002). Well and Good: A Case Study Approach to Biomedical Ethics. 3rd Ed. Peterborough: Broadview Press. Read More