Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages - Essay Example

Arguments posed for the government allowance and recognition of same-sex marriages often rely on premises that are dependent upon philosophical systems that are wholly incompatible with one another. When this occurs, revealing the theoretical errors involved with the reasoning is not difficult. Many times, such arguments have nothing to do with a real metaphysical groundwork, but instead rely on the unstable foundations of such abstractions as “equality” or “fairness”, which have support only from intuition. When faced with such a case, the only possible response is not to present favorable arguments, but a negative case—namely, to present arguments against the case that has been brought forth. The following is a reply to several objections to a previously stated position: that it is the moral responsibility of a government to effectively ban same-sex marriage. This responsibility was defended by a conception of the natural law, which is fundamentally incompatible with the practice of homosexual marriage rites. It shall be shown that these objections are baseless and cannot be shown to have any philosophical merit, especially since their philosophical histories are contradictory—meaning that these criticisms are mutually exclusive and are mutually incorrect. The first point taken to support the thesis that the government has no moral responsibility to ban same-sex marriage is that there is a history of normality when it comes to the practice of gay marriage. The objector cites the time of Plato as proof that homosexuality has been, for ages, been a widespread practice, and in a variety of different cultural contexts. However, even a cursory knowledge of Plato’s thoughts on love, contained in the dialogue Symposium, would reveal that Plato, like Aristotle, thought that homosexuality was an affront to nature, and hence, natural law. In the eighth book of the Symposium, a speaker considers “how to have legislation banning homosexual acts, masturbation, and illegitimate procreative sex widely accepted. He then states that this law is according to nature” (Pickett). Plato and Aristotle, arguably the two wisest men in the history of Ancient Greece, both expressed a sharp distaste for the unnatural practice of homosexuality—the former of whom expressed his belief in a ban on the practice in the Ideal State. In addition to the incidental philosophical objection to the practice, there is also a logical objection to be made to this argument as well. The writer here seems to suggest that because something is socially acceptable, that it is then somehow morally acceptable. This suggestion is perhaps even more absurd when one considers that the objection relies on support from a culture nearly two and a half millennia ago. Extending this argument to its logical conclusion, we might even say that it is moral for us today to cast off deformed children when they are born, a practice held by the ancient inhabitants of Sparta to be of the highest moral importance (Bluestone 66). This argument, thus, commits the fallacy of cultural relativism with respect to moral truths. Cultural relativism holds that, in general, each individual person’s actions (whether personal or public) are to be judged within the context of his or her entire culture. As shall be shown later, cultural relativism is philosophically incompatible with the other claims posited by the objector with respect to same-sex marriage bans—claims that rely on the universality of morality in all cases. In a second criticism, the objector claims that same-sex marriage does not contradict the principle of utility, a principle which states “an action is right if and only if it maximizes the happiness for the greatest number” (LaFollette 25). An argument based on an ethic of utilitarianism, however, unlike the previous example that relies on cultural relativism, relies on the existence of a universal principle of right action—thus making the two criticisms, by their natures, incompatible. If one chooses, nevertheless, to discard the previous argument, and proceed solely on the basis of a normative theory like utilitarianism, there still remains a problem. Such an ethical principle requires omnipotence on the part of the moral agent (in this case, society as a whole). If this principle of happiness is to guide all actions, then the agent must be able to predict all the consequences of that action in order to be held accountable for a mistake or deliberate wrongdoing. To use the philosopher Daniel Dennett’s example, the near meltdown of the nuclear reactor at Three Mile Island has brought perhaps long-term happiness because of the more stringent nuclear policies it prompted. Nevertheless, at the time, this consequence was not considered, because it was not particularly relevant (Dennett 498). Even if agents do have control over their actions (and determinism is false), the consequences of an agent’s actions are, perhaps mostly, unpredictable. Lastly, the objector appeals to an unsupported ethical abstraction like principles of equality. Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, notes a distinction between two kinds of equality: those that are proportional and those that are numerical (Aristotle). With respect to the objector, it is unclear which sense of equality is being used. Is banning same-sex marriage a violation of equality insofar as it does not treat individuals as indistinguishable and gives everyone differing amounts of goods, or does it not give individuals what is due to them? Clearly, if justice is simply a matter of giving a party what is due to them, proportional equality is just. However, it seems that the objector is relying on a conception of equality as what is numerically equal. This is the case for two reasons: (1) the objector relies on the testimony of a homosexual person who testifies to a lack of difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals, and (2) the objector cites same-sex marriage as a means to stopping discriminatory practices against homosexuals. With these observations about the objector’s case, it is clear that the account of equality being used here is supremely unjust and illogical insofar as it is an avoidance of what is factually correct. The factually correct thing to say is that there is a difference between homosexuals—not only in how they live, but also in how they perceive and interpret reality. If the objector is to uphold the identification of homosexuality as a minority, the argument must also be committed to the view that its minority status makes homosexual individuals in an inherently similar situation with members of other minority groups, such as African-Americans (in fact, the objector notes the similarity of interracial marriage and same-sex marriage). But numerous studies demonstrate empirically that minorities of any ethnic, national, or cultural group have their perceptions in some way affected by their social place because of their minority status (Porter and Washington). To deny the fact that minority groups, such as homosexuals and African-Americans, do not perceive and act in a different manner in response to the same stimuli is a purposive evasion of natural facts. And to try to enforce equality in accordance with this evasion is not only unjust and vicious, but also supremely immoral. What a ban on same-sex marriage consists of is a proportional equality—giving people what they deserve, based on the dictates of nature and natural law. And what homosexuals do not deserve, on the basis of this natural law, is equal rights to a moral commitment entailed by the institution of marriage. What the objector has offered to this discussion is nothing more than a series of mutually exclusive claims that resort either to (a) cultural relativism, (b) an untenable ethical system, or (c) appeals to an ill-defined, unjust political principle. The objector, in the conclusion, attempts to refute natural law’s application to homosexuality; however, such an attempt fails insofar as it equates nature with the commands of God. And instead of attacking nature as a proper basis for ethical theory, the objector attacks God as a source of morality—thus supporting the claim that natural law, qua a system containing the dictates of nature and not God, properly supports the moral imperative on the part of a government to effectively ban all forms of same-sex marriage. The objector states: “society must understand… that [homosexuality] exists”. But such a conclusion does not follow from the premises presented here. Works Cited Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Martin Ostwald. Chicago: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962. Bluestone, Natalie Harris. Women and the Ideal Society. Boston: University of Massachusetts Press, 1987. Dennett, Daniel C. Darwins Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996. LaFollette, Hugh. Ethics in Practice: An Anthology. New York: Blackwell Publishing, 2002. Pickett, Brent. Homosexuality. 6 August 2002. 26 November 2008 . Porter, J. R. and R. E. Washington. "Minority Identity and Self-Esteem." Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 19 (1993): 139-161. Read More