Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule - Essay Example

Contemporary political-economic dis tends to assume that the Internet is a democratizing and liberalizing force. The Internet has not only facilitated globalization but it has ensured that the world be transformed into a global village, characterized by interconnectivity and ease of communication, irrespective of physical distance. Precisely because of this, many have assumed that authoritarianism and dictatorships cannot survive the Internet. This assumption is based on the fact that authoritarian and dictatorship rule are, in part, dependant upon the control of the flow of information and, as far as the Internet is concerned, censorship is difficult, maybe impossible. Added to that, the information which people may retrieve from the Internet can very well incite rebellion against dictatorship and authoritarian regimes by motivating the citizenry to demand their rights. Due to these and several other considerations, the overriding assumption is that the Internet is a direct and immediate threat to authoritarianism and is a democratizing and liberalizing force. Shanthi Kalahil and Taylor Boas, however, forward an alternative thesis in their book, Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule, as this book report shall illustrate. Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule is a concise study of one of the more important of the contemporary global political issues: the effect of the Internet on authoritarian rule and whether or not it has the potential to undermine such governments. Despite the relative shortness of the study, especially when contrasted against the complexity and the vastness of its topic of exploration, the precise and concise way with which the authors deal with it, effectively contributes to their successful exploration of the potential of the Internet to undermine authoritarianism. In other words, rather than engage in abstract discussions and embark upon theoretical discourse, the authors immediately outline their intent and do not stray from it. That intent, as explicated by Taylor and Boas, is to explore the actual, rather than assumed or potential, usage of the Internet in eight semi-authoritarian regimes and the political impact that the Internet has had on each one of these regimes. The countries selected for inclusion in this study are the People’s Republic of China, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the /united Arab Emirates, Singapore, Cuba, Vietnam and Burma. Each of these countries, as Boas and Taylor, point out have authoritarian governments, although the degree of authoritarianism varies from one country to the other. By pointing this out, the authors acknowledge the distinctiveness of each of the countries they are going to discuss and signal their awareness of the fact that they cannot be treated as a collectivity. The conciseness with which the authors present their study is matched by the clarity with which they present their argument. Their thesis is articulated from the outset. That thesis, contrary to popular assumption, maintains that the Internet is not, necessarily, a force for democratization and, indeed, can even function to solidify semi-authoritarian/authoritarian rule. The assumption that the Internet is a democratizer is not, according to the authors, evidenced by any empirical support and, indeed, facts indicate that the Internet may be exploited for the service of authoritarianism. While this thesis may come as a shock to many readers insofar as it contradicts popular discourse, the fact is that Boas and Taylor support their thesis. Support for the above-mentioned thesis is partly predicated on disputing the popular assumption that free market economics and democracy are inextricably related, and that the first immediately gives rise to the second. It is necessary to dispute this relationship because, as they deal with the case of China, the authors have to concede to the fact that globalization, partly spearheaded by the Internet, has given rise to economic liberalization and incited the rise of market economies in various parts of the world, including Communist China. The Internet, quite simply stated, is used for a myriad of commercial and economic purposes, from connecting with international buyers and sellers to serving as a global storefront. That does not mean, however, that simply by motivating the development of market economics, the Internet is inciting the evolution of democracy. As the authors point out, the Chinese government has quite effectively exerted its control over the Internet. It monitors chat rooms and the activities of its citizens on the Internet through government employees referred to as cleaning ladies or big mammas, whose function it is to remove “deleterious information,” (p. 36) or any material which the political authorities may disapprove of. With specific reference to China, the implication here is that even though the Internet has facilitated the rise of market economics, it has not similarly functioned as regards democracy. The primary reason for the stated difference is that the government, which controls the Internet infrastructure and backbone throughout the country, has allowed the one but not the other. With the exception of Egypt, the other countries in this study exhibit a similar pattern. Again, the respective governments maintain a semi-ironclad control over the Internet and the activities of its citizens therein through their ownership of the technology’s infrastructure and control over its backbone. Apart from the fact that internet activity in these countries is largely limited to the educated classes in society and can hardly be defined as widespread, this means that censorship prevails. Indeed, as Boas and Taylor maintain through reference to their case studies, the Internet has functioned to enhance governmental capacities for the surveillance of its citizenry, because the governments in question actively encourage Internet users to report websites to which access needs to be restricted or users who are abusing their Internet privileges. Accordingly, users practice self-censorship. In other words, the measures which the governments in question have adopted have quite effectively ensured that the Internet does not function as a forum for free expression and political dissidence. Within the context of the stated control, the potential of the Internet to incite a grassroots political, possibly revolutionary, movement against authoritarianism is practically non-existent. Taylor and Boas’ argument is not limited to disputing the potential of the Internet to incite political movements against authoritarianism and to invoke the proliferation of democracy but to establish that the Internet has been used to legitimize authoritarian governance. Besides some of these countries embracing e-government, thereby communicating an appearance of transparency, they have used they Internet as a tool for propaganda, have tended to sanction Internet use for pro-government factions and organizations, as opposed to detractors and opponents. Added to that, the governments in question have further exploited the Internet to give their citizens the impression that they have a political voice and are engaged in a cooperative relationship with the government. In order to illustrate this last, it is necessary to refer to an example briefly mentioned in the above. For example, in Saudi Arabia, the government has tapped into widespread socio-religious conservatism in order to encourage citizens to identify sites which have the potential to corrupt society. These generally tend to be websites which spread democratic and liberalizing ideals. In other words, not only has the Internet not functioned as a democratizer but it has been exploited to legitimize authoritarianism by obscuring the fact that it is authoritarianism. It obscures it by giving an impression of transparency, by asking for the cooperation of the citizenry over the control of the Internet and, indeed, by allowing Internet use and, supposedly, free expression. Hence, the Internet legitimizes authoritarianism and does not undermine it. As earlier stated, the authors present a persuasive argument within the limits of their purpose. That purpose, as they clarify from the outset, is the provision to “policy discourse” and “scholarly debate” on the political effect of the Internet on authoritarian regimes (p. 5). Within this context, they describe their work as “a framework that allows for methodological thinking about limited evidence … in the short to medium term” (p. 3). That is, their work may be defined as a guideline for the study of the Internet’s political impact despite the limitation of evidence pertaining to that impact because of the relatively short history of the technology. According to Boas and Taylor, the referred to methodology may be described as “a clear-eyed realism that separates facts about the technology’s potential from the froth of wishful thinking” (p. 153). Even when we, as readers, evaluate the study from within the limits of the methodology and purpose outlined by the authors, we find the work partly lacking. As earlier noted, the authors do provide a persuasive and strong alternative argument about the Internet as a force for democratization and liberalization. Nevertheless, the fact that they fail to concede to the possibility of an alternative reality or that the Internet may be functioning as a slow but gradual liberalizer and democratizer, weakens their argument. At the very least, Boas and Taylor should have referred to examples which have been alternatively interpreted, such as the rise of the opposition movement in Egypt within the context of the internet age, and then established why their argument, nevertheless, remains valid. Despite this shortcoming, however, the book provides an insightful look into the way in which authoritarian regimes are dealing with this new technology. Read More