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The September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United s and the London underground bombings of 7 July, 2005, have affected fundamental changes in the laws governing surveillance. Prior to either of these attacks and, more specifically 9/11, stringent regulatory and legislative frameworks restricted law enforcement’s prerogative to place citizens under surveillance. Following 9/11, however, the United States passed the Patriot Act and the United Kingdom the Civil Contingencies Act. Both of the mentioned critically undermine civil rights in either country and while arguing the extent to which they do so is beyond the scope of the present research, the research shall, nevertheless establish this to be the case with reference to surveillance.
Through a comparative analysis of the post 9/11 right to surveillance granted to either of the two states, this paper shall demonstrate that even though the USA constitutes a more critical case than the UK, the right and expectation to privacy in both countries has been critically undermined.Laws governing privacy in the United Kingdom have traditionally, and customarily, restricted the right of the state to engage in the surveillance of citizens without establishing, and arguing, a cause to do so and obtaining the necessary warrants.
The Interception of Communications Act (1985) effectively disallows law enforcement, or any representative of the state, from intercepting the telephone and electronic communication of citizens unless it is first established that doing so is integral, either to national security, or for the negation of the real and immediate threat which that person, or those whom he/she communicates with, pose towards society (Lloyd, 1986). Added to that, and as Carter (2001) explains, the European Convention on Human Rights, to which the United Kingdom is subject, holds that, other than when authorized by a court following the submission of evidence which clearly shows that surveillance is necessary for the prevention of a crime or the negation of an immediate threat, any form of state surveillance of private citizens, constitutes both a violation of their most basic civil and human rights.
In other words, the pre 9/11 and pre 7/7 situation in the United Kingdom was such that strict regulatory frameworks effectively restricted the right of the state to engage in the surveillance of its citizens.As regards the pe-9/11 situation in the United States, despite the fact that the US Constitution makes no explicit provisions for privacy, the expectation and right to privacy is provided under the Bill of Rights, in individual state constitutions and civil rights legislature. As Seline (1991) explains, federal law, and more specifically, the Privacy Act of 1974, maintains that any/all citizen record held by any government agency cannot be submitted to another without the proper authorizations and, importantly, the presentation of such evidence as which establishes that there is just cause for the violation of a citizen’s right to privacy.
That same act further disallows state and law enforcement authorities and agents from engaging in the covert surveillance of citizens without a court order, issued only following the presentation of evidence which establishes the imperatives of doing so, either for national security reasons or for the prevention of crime (Seline, 1991). Indeed, privacy laws in the United States are such that online privacy is further protected by the Federal Trade Commission. The United States Supreme Court has, pursuant to privacy laws and the Bill of Rights, fortified and solidified citizens’ expectations of privacy in numerous rulings and findings (`The enemy,’ 2004).
The implication here is that the legal and the regulatory framework governing privacy rights in the United States are extremely stringent and aims towards the protection of citizens’ inherent rights to privacy. Accordingly, it is from within the framework of the aforementioned that the surveillance of citizens without the required authorities and warrants is regarded as both unconstitutional and illegal.Proceeding from the above stated, it is evident that the pre-9/11 situations as regards surveillance and the expectation of, and right to, privacy in both countries is comparable.
Within the context of the legal and the regulatory frameworks which defined and protected the right to privacy, Seamus et al. (2005) explains that the covert surveillance of private citizens was permissible but only following the presentation of evidence regarding its imperatives and the subsequent issuance of warrants to that effect. Law enforcement agencies did not possess the authority to engage in surveillance themselves, even if they possessed such evidence as which established just cause.
Instead, they were required to present that evidence to the required judicial/court authorities which, subsequent to the examination of the evidence presented either sanctioned or rejected the request for the covert surveillance of citizens (Seamus, et al., 2005). As earlier noted, the September 11th attacks on the United States instigated the passage of the Patriot Act and, in so doing, effectively redefined the legal and regulatory frameworks governing privacy and covert surveillance. The Patriot Act effectively authorizes the state and law enforcement agencies to engage in the covert, and warrant-less surveillance of citizens whom, whether rightly or wrongly, have been identified as persons of interest (`Enemy,’ 2004; Heil and Kirk, 2006).
As Seamus et al. (2005) explains, surveillance includes all of the wire-tapping, the monitoring of a person’s online activities, inclusive of which is accessing email correspondences, and unauthorized searches. The implication here is that, within the context of the Patriot Act, the constitutional and legal guarantees and provisions regarding privacy and surveillance have been, quite effectively, nullified. They have been nullified insofar as citizens, if for any reason are identified as persons of interest, can be placed under covert surveillance without the requisite warrants.
Needless to say, not only does this imply that the Patriot Act has annihilated the expectation of, and right to, privacy but insofar as it has removed the checks and balances which prevented the abuse of state surveillance authorities, has opened the way for abuse. Indeed, accusations and evidence of abuse abound.In the United Kingdom, both the Civil Contingencies Act and the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act have combined to undermine rights to privacy in the United Kingdom. As Chesney (2003) explains, law enforcement agencies possess the right to place foreign nationals and suspect organizations under covert surveillance without recourse to a court/judge for issuance of the relevant warrants.
Importantly, however, the authority to survey organizations is limited only to that list of organizations which have already been classified as suspect, whether due to involvement in crime or, possibly, terrorism. Added to that, the surveillance of both foreign nationals and private citizens is limited to those whose activities, whether because of their interpersonal relations or affiliations with suspect organizations, are recognized as potentially threatening to national security (Chesney, 2003).
In other words, warrant-less surveillance is limited to the aforementioned.In the final analysis, a comparison between the two countries indicates that both determined that the pre-September 11th legislative restrictions on covert surveillance were an obstacle to the confrontation of the threat posed by terrorism. Accordingly, insofar as both Great Britain and the United States were concerned, the fight on terror was partially contingent upon the ability of either state to monitor the activities of persons who were identified as possible terror suspects or who, without their knowledge, may have terror connections and leads.
Given that the process of obtaining surveillance warrants was time-consuming and, hence, a possible hindrance to the capacity of national law enforcement and security agencies to execute their fight on terror, the mentioned acts were passed in order to facilitate the stated. There is, however, despite clear similarities, fundamental differences between the two countries as regards post-9/11 surveillance authorities. Quite simply stated, in the United States, the authority is much more expansive and more open to abuse than it is in the United Kingdom.
BibliographyCarter, A.B. (2001) `The architecture of government in the face of terrorism.’ International Security, 26(3).Chesney, R.M. (2003) `Civil liberties and the terrorism prevention paradigm: The guilt by association critique.’ Michigan Law Review, 101(6).`The enemy within’ (2004) Economist, 372(8396). Heil, E. and Kirk, V. (2006, Jan. 1) `… As Panel To Turn To Patriot Act, Warrantless Surveillance.’ CongressDaily, 1/24/2006,Lloyd, I.J. (1986) `The interception of communications act 1985.
’ The Modern Law Review, 49(1).Seamon, R. H. et al. (2005) `The patriot Act and the wall between foreign intelligence and law enforcement.’ Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 28(2).Seline, C.J. (1991) `Eavesdropping on the compromising emanations of electronic equipment.’ Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 23(2).
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