Accountability of Peace Operations - Essay Example

Accountability of Peace Operations Are peace support operations under the auspices of the United Nations sufficiently accountable? Introduction Peace Support Operations (PSOs) have been viewed in the past as a positive force since they have often managed to do quite a lot of good for the region they have been sent into (Wheeler, 2003). However, in recent times there have been calls for creating a level of accountability of peace operations for two primary reasons. First, the number of peace operations has risen quite dramatically and second, the nature of peace operations is often questioned by one party or another (Ehrenreich, 1998). Undoubtedly, there have also been cases where peace operatives have been guilty of violating the peace and even committed crimes against humanity (Zwanenburg, 2005). However, the United Nations certainly faces a lot of issues in bringing such violators to justice and making them accountable for their actions. To give a real answer to the problems of accountability of Peace Support Operations which is posed in the question, we must first examine the evidence which suggests that violations of international law and human rights have been made. After that we can take a look what has been done about those violations by the United Nations or other international bodies which will give us a measure of the level of accountability that has been adopted by the UN (Akbar, 2005). Finally we can discuss what ‘sufficient’ accountability is and discuss some of the recommendations made by experts on the idea of accountability for PSOs. Peace Support Operations The problem associated with the definition of peace support becomes multiplied when we consider the various terms that have been associated with different operations. For example while one operation may be undertaken on the basis of humanitarian intervention to bring peace to a country, another might be conducted to prevent a war from spilling into neighbouring regions (Akbar, 2005). Still others may be required for rebuilding and reconstruction of the civilian infrastructure after the ravages of war. In fact, the military forces can even be called in to keep the peace after a natural disaster has struck a region such as a Tsunami in coastal regions or an Earthquake in any part of the world. With the rising number of peace keeping operations, the diversity of a typical peace keeping unit has certainly increased. With that diversity we get different cultures that may bring different ideas of acceptable and unacceptable behaviour (Akhavi, 2003). In 1988, less than thirty countries had ever sent their forces to be a part of an alliance for peacekeeping, in 2000, there were more than 80 countries which had sent their troops on peacekeeping missions under the U.N. flag. Even though the soldiers, doctors, engineers and aid workers may be wearing similar uniforms and be given similar mandates from the U.N., it is not necessary that they follow the same acceptance of the ideas of right and wrong that are suggested by the United Nations (Duffey, 2000). Who’s Accountability? Even if a culture of authoritative dominance with military related accountability systems prevails in such operations, the individual accepted behaviour of groups which make up the humanitarian actors can not be denied (Ross, 2003). The language and wording of the laws is a primary barrier to creating a common understanding and even when that is overcome by using a lingua franca the cultural differences may still dominate on how the peacekeeping forces view themselves to be accountable. As discussed by Wheeler (2003) and Duffey (2000), nowhere was this situation more evident than in the humanitarian intervention which took place to prevent further bloodshed in East Timor. Differences in how accountability in the conflict was viewed caused problems for the several peacekeeping groups deployed in East Timor. The Australians, who are long time military allies of the Americans and have a background of training from the Americans, were seen ignore the idea of accountability and took the conflict as more or less all out war. They appeared to view even lightly armed locals as a threat and often used maximum force even when firm negotiations might have worked. On the other hand, the approach of the British soldiers was more humane as they continually tried to build local connections and cultivate friends amongst the East Timorese (Duffey, 2000). Clearly, the approaches used here are very different and one is relatively easy to justify to those who seek accountability than the other. Understandably, there are quite a few problems with ensuring accountability even though the peacekeeping missions undertaken today are often well planned in terms of giving general operational guidelines to peacekeepers. This is primarily due to the reason that the members which make up a peacekeeping force may themselves come from different cultures and backgrounds which has an effect on their outlook on what is right and wrong. The planners may have one sort of accountability in mind, the executors a different one while the local population may have a third viewpoint on what is a human rights violation and what is not. All these (often conflicting) ideas have a bearing on how humanitarian actors can operate with a view towards accountability (Skelton & Cooper, 2005). Certainly the accountability situation could be improved tremendously if everyone in the peacekeeping force saw the operation as an opportunity to resolve problems without firing shots but considering the number of times peacekeepers have to resort to violence and even abuse human rights; it seems as if conflicts in understanding the accountability of their actions within the peacekeepers is a significant problem. It can also create dichotomies for the local population who would see one group of peacekeepers behaving in a different way from others and may even be confused about how to react with the peacekeepers and such instability of reaction can be deadly in a conflict zone (Li, 2002). The problem is significantly more complex if the civilian arm is also included with peacekeepers since in a given conflict zone humanitarian actors could include diplomatic agencies, land, sea and air arms of the forces, armed and unarmed combatants, civilians, local government officials, NGOs, human rights watch dog organizations and other bodies with their own cultural influences. On both the micro and the macro levels, problems can occur with accountability issues and the interpretation of the conflict depending on individual or organizational viewpoints and acceptance of ground realities (Zwanenburg, 2005). Evidence and Actions In terms of guarding the guardians, there are several watchdog groups and NGOs who have monitored the progress of peace keeping operations but the evidence is often suspect. While an NGO can accuse a military group of violating international law, a military group can accuse the NGO of not understanding the combat situation and the problems faced by the peacekeepers. With a primary focus on seeking evidence against each other, there is certainly a conflict between the peacekeepers and NGO officers (e.g. workers for the Red Cross, Oxfam, Save the Children as well as other similar charitable organizations). Their rather dim view of each other as well as other actions in peace keeping missions was outlined by Duffey when he said that: “Aid workers are often suspicious of the military and the military is similarly incredulous of aid workers. Such unfamiliarity inevitably encourages the promulgation of ill-informed stereotypes; for example, the military is often characterized as an insensitive, ill-informed, controlling and inflexible war machine, while NGO personnel are seen as sandal-wearing, two-faced, undisciplined and uncoordinated liberals (Duffey, 2000, Pg. 149).” Of course larger organisations such as NATO and the UN will give their own guidelines as what is acceptable behaviour for both the military commanders and civilian bodies but those guidelines may often be ignored by individuals if not the entire group (Wheeler, 2003). Zwanenburg (2005) laments the fact that the guidelines are often restricted to the conduct of the organisation but not the individuals who make up the organisation. In and of itself, an organisation is not a real entity since it can not take any action on its own. Individuals make up the members and representatives of that organisations and it is the same individuals who should be given proper guidelines before they go to work for the organisation and held accountable for their actions which they discharge their given duties and be responsible for any of their doings which stand in violation of the guidelines given to them. Hard Evidence The evidence against the peacekeepers is quite significant in terms of ethical and legal violations and the sources for the evidence are based within and outside the United Nations (Coady, 2002). For example, the Head of the UN commission on human rights in Sarajevo, Bosnia & Herzegovina stated quite clearly that, “Although there is evidence of a small number of women being brought into Bosnia and Herzegovina for the purpose of sexual exploitation before 1995, it has now been accepted that the real problem started with the arrival of peacekeepers at the end of 1995 (Spees, 2004, Pg. 20)”. Even more serious is the case of the ‘food for sex’ scandal which was uncovered by a UNHCR/Save the Children Team working in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. The team was working on the subject of human rights abuses and sexual violence against refugee as well as other children and as reported by Spees, “The team confidentially noted allegations concerning 67 perpetrators, 42 agencies, 40 child victims, and 80 separate sources, plus additional cases involving unnamed peacekeepers. Young girls reported exchanging sex for desperately-needed humanitarian assistance – biscuits, soap, medicines – or meagre sums of money (Spees, 2004, Pg. 20)”. Madeleine Rees, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights in Bosnia, has given an estimate that roughly a third of those individuals who visited Bosnia’s established brothels were UN personnel, NATO officers, or humanitarian aid workers (Khaleeli, 2004). The exploitation of women as sex slaves in war torn regions seems to be fully supported by the very individuals who are supposed to stop it from happening. Clearly, international organisations are not following their own laws and not enforcing the laws for their representatives. Hardly any Action Concerning disciplinary action against UN officers who have been found guilty of violating human rights, Spees (2004) reports that, “When any action has been taken upon receipt of allegations of sexual abuse or assault, often the most severe measure is dismissal. Dismissal appears to be rare considering the frequency and scope of sexual abuse, exploitation and trafficking documented in relation to PSOs (Spees, 2004, Pg. 23)”. Despite the volume of evidence against peacekeepers and their actions, their have hardly been any reports of criminal punishment or reprimands against them. The reason for this is not that the UN is choosing to ignore the facts since the body has actually taken grave notice of it. In fact, the problems of bringing violators of international law go much deeper than the UN trying to brush things under the carpet (Cunningham, 2003). The problems in bringing the perpetrators to justice come from the various levels of jurisdiction which apply to them. Spees (2004) reports that, “The multi-national character of UN and regional PSOs and criss-crossing of jurisdictional responsibilities has produced situations where allegations of misconduct and even criminal behaviour often fall through the cracks (Speed, 2004, Pg. 21).” This occurs because when the member states send their officers to fight or maintain peace for the UN they sign mutual agreements which confirm that any war crimes committed by the officers will be tried in their home courts. No country wants the negative publicity of conducting war crime trials on its own military officers therefore the problem is more or less ignored by the member country and things go on as they have. In some situations, local authorities might have jurisdiction over foreign aid workers but if the country itself is torn by war and regions are being ruled by war lords it is hardly likely that the judicial system is working efficiently (Schneider, 2004). Even if the legal system is working it is possible that the courts might be unwilling to bring cases against those donor agencies that have just started making investments in the country and are in the process of rebuilding the infrastructure. Civilian authorities may not feel that they have the power to remove those workers or military officers who are responsible for keeping the peace despite their human rights and law violations. Of course the only real solution to the problem comes with education and training both for the humanitarian actors and the local authorities. Accountability training for those who are going into conflict zones should be emphasized for both civilian workers and military officers (Zwanenburg, 2005). Before peacekeepers or humanitarian actors are inserted into a hot zone, they should be given both general and specific information about how they are to conduct themselves and what the local authorities can do to them if they are suspected of illegal activities (Schneider, 2004). The same information should also be provided to local authorities who should be given protection if they bring up accusations of misdoings by the peace keepers. Most importantly, the peace keepers should realise the cultural understanding of what they can and can not do may be very different from their legally permissible actions (Skelton & Cooper, 2005). Additionally, changes in the way peace keepers are recruited and handled by the UN are necessary to provide the UN the means by which they it can discipline the violators of international law. Moreover, the states or donor agencies as well as NGOs who do not prosecute violators of law on their own should not be asked in the future to support any peace operations. Whistleblower protection for those who bring such violations to the notice of the public as well as the administrators for the peace keeping mission should also be improved. Clearly, there is a lot which is wrong with the situation and therefore a lot will have to be done before there is sufficient accountability of PSOs (Zwanenburg, 2005). Conclusion In an ideal world, peace keepers would be automatically accountable for their own actions to their own conscience. However, we do not live in an ideal world and that is one of the reasons why we have conflicts in the first place. While the international community as well as the United Nations may see a peace keeping operation as a good thing which brings hope to those who have seen the ravages of war, it is likely that some of the peace keepers may turn into exploiters themselves. Accountability for such violators is certainly lacking and even though the UN has tried to address these problems it does not appear to be enough. Word Count; 2,719 Works Cited Akbar, N. 2005, ‘Scoring the Millennium Goals’, Journal of International Affairs, vol. 58, no. 2, p233-244. Akhavi, S. 2003, ‘Islam and the West in world history’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 545-562. Coady, C. 2002. The Ethics of Armed Humanitarian Intervention. United States Institute of Peace. Cunningham, J. 2003, ‘A "Cool Pose": Cultural perspectives on Conflict Management’, Reclaiming Children & Youth, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 88-93. Duffey, T. 2000, ‘Cultural Issues in Contemporary Peacekeeping’, International Peacekeeping, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 142-169. Ehrenreich, B. 1998, Blood Rites: Origins and History of the Passions of War, Owl Books. Khaleeli, J. 2004, ‘Conflict, Sexual Trafficking, and Peacekeeping’, WILPF [Online] Available at: http://www.peacewomen.org/un/pkwatch/News/04/RIsextraffickingpk.html Li, X. 2002, ‘Dichotomies and Paradoxes: The West and Islam’, Global Society: Journal of Interdisciplinary International Relations, vol. 16, no. 4, pp. 401-418. Ross, L. 2003, ‘Culture and Morality: Conflicting Perspectives at a Time of Cultural Confrontation’, Human Development, vol. 46, no. 2, pp. 151-154. Schneider, K. 2004, ‘Accountability for sexual exploitation & abuse in UN peacekeeping operations: the promise of the new model MOU’, WILPF [Online] Available at: http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/Peacekeeping/modelMOU.html Skelton, I. and Cooper, J. 2005, ‘Youre Not From Around Here, Are You?’, Joint Force Quarterly, no. 36, pp 12-16. Spees, P. 2004, Gender Justice and Accountability in Peace Support Operations, International Alert. Wheeler, N. 2003, Saving Strangers : Humanitarian Intervention in International Society, Oxford University Press. Wilhelm, I. 2005. ‘Caught In the Crossfire of Disaster and War’, Chronicle of Philanthropy, vol. 18, no. 5, pp 8-14. Zwanenburg, M. 2005, Accountability of Peace Support Operations, Springer. Read More